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International air transport is currently undergoing a process of deep and 
fundamental structural change, in turn requiring changes to the legal order. 
This thesis offers an evaluation of the practices and prospects of legal change 
in one world region as part of this global transformation. 
 The postwar order of the air was one of specifically national 
organization: international markets were defined bilaterally, with states 
directly or indirectly controlling the conditions of service, which were 
provided by nationally owned and controlled airlines. This structure was held 
together by a network of bilateral air transport agreements controlling the 
conditions of entry, the availability of routes, and the capacity and frequency 
to be offered in each market, and then “multilateralized” through the 
acceptance of multilateral tariff coordination through the International Air 
Transport Association. This system was to ensure an international air transport 
system that was both efficient and provided each state the opportunity to 
participate in it. 
 However, this vision no longer describes what is thought to be an 
efficient air transport system. Beginning in the late 1970s, states have engaged 
in an ongoing process of renegotiating the order away from bilateral, regulated 
markets towards a multilateral space where efficiency is obtained through 
competition between global transport networks. The result thus far is an 
ongoing, incomplete, uneven, and multiform process of rebalancing the 
regulatory order to equalize the conditions of competition, particularly in 
relation to market access and ownership and control laws, while on the other 
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hand ensuring that each state’s concerns over its participation in the 
international system are satisfied. 
 This thesis analyzes developments in East Asian – defined here as the 
ten ASEAN countries plus China, South Korea, and Japan – as these states 
liberalize and potentially integrate their air transport markets, both from the 
perspective of global change and from considerations of efficiency and 
participation, before offering a set of prescriptive suggestions based on the 
analyses. Organizationally, it is divided into four Parts. Part I – entitled 
“Prolegomena” – presents the central challenge of reforming the market 
access and ownership and control laws as one of balancing demands for 
efficiency and participation that are placed on the system and outlines reasons 
why regional approaches might prove particularly fertile ground for reform. 
Part II – “Transitions” – then provides a detailed analysis of the legal 
structures governing the international system from its development at the close 
of the Second World War to the present day. In particular, Chapter 2 analyzes 
the creation of the postwar system, while Chapters 3 and 4 look to current 
processes of reform, with Chapter 4 in particular looking at ongoing legal 
reforms in South- and Northeast Asia. Part III – “Strategy” – then returns to 
the issues of efficiency and participation, analyzing the development of legal 
instruments designed to achieve each end, respectively. Finally, Part IV – 
“Structure” – returns to the question of legal reform and the restructuring of 
the East Asian market, synthesizing a set of recommendations from the 
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CHAPTER 1: A PROLEGOMENA TO THE STUDY OF REGIONALISM IN EAST 









Law is a production of space. Its basic features are shaped by social 
understandings of the roles and boundaries of public and private life, by the 
interrelationships between political, economic, and social systems, by 
individual and collective self-identification and otherness. It is at the same 
time an essential element in producing those spaces, shaping the boundaries 
and paths of individual and collective social conduct, modifying the position 
of individuals, groups and societies as a whole in relation to each other. Law 
suppresses, enables and defines the capacities and limits of institutions as 
diverse as the state, the firm and the market.  
 This statement rings as true in the air as it does on the ground. Air law, 
a body of public and private rules and norms governing the use and 
exploitation of the airspace, governs an interwoven series of relations between 
state and non-state actors in the controlled use of the air through a complex set 
of legal arrangements at the international, national, and individual levels. This 
body of rules includes aviation law, relating to man’s navigation through the 
 4 
airspace, as well as air transport law, which addresses the use of airspace for 
the transportation of goods and persons.1 This last area, and particularly the 
law governing regularized transportation between states through common 
carriers, is the object of the present analysis. 
 Throughout its regulatory history, international air transport has 
remained singularly attached to the nation-state. This might at first appear 
paradoxical: of all the modes of transportation, none has been more readily 
associated with a world beyond the state than air transport. This was as true in 
1944, when the delegates to the International Civil Aviation Conference met 
in Chicago to establish a new international order of the air, as it is today. Kai-
ngau Chang, Vice President of the Conference and Delegate of the Republic of 
China, forcefully portrayed the aircraft as a catalyst towards a global (or at 
least globally-minded) civil society in his address to the Conference’s 
Opening Plenary Session: 
 
Whereas in the horse and buggy days a village or a county was a big 
place, not to say a state or province, the introduction of railroads and 
automobiles has changed conceptions of distances, making it as easy to 
reach the frontiers of a country as it was to reach the borders of a 
province in days of yore. These developments greatly stimulated the 
                                                
1 See Isabella H.Ph. Diederiks-Verschoor, An Introduction to Air Law, 7th ed. (The Hague, 
Boston and New York: Kluwer Law International, 2001) at 1 [Diederiks-Verschoor, An 
Introduction]. See also Peter P.C. Haanappel, The Law and Policy of Air Space and Outer 
Space: A Comparative Approach (The Hague, London and New York: Kluwer Law 
International, 2003) at 1-7 [Haanappel, Law and Policy]; Nicolas Mateesco Matte, A Treatise 
on Air-Aeronautical Law (Toronto: The Carswell Co. Ltd, 1981) at cs. III-IV. While it has 
arguably evolved into an area of law sui generis, its content is intertwined with aspects of 
other bodies of law, including administrative law, civil law, and criminal law. Cf. Diederiks-
Verschoor, An Introduction, ibid. at 3; Haanappel, Law and Policy, ibid., xiii-xvi. 
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national consciousness of the people but at the same time created many 
new problems that could be solved only on a national scale. 
 Added to this was the expansion of ocean transportation, which 
further revised our conception of distance, a conception which is now 
being radically altered by the remarkable development of aviation. 
Technological progress during the past fifteen years … [has] totally 
changed the art of air transportation. Hereafter, national boundaries will 
be no more significant than the dividing lines between provinces. It is 
inevitable, therefore, that the peoples of the earth will grow more and 
more world-conscious. The world has finally become a real geographical 
unit.2 
 
Yet this global outlook juxtaposed against an international world constructed 
from national polities, economies, and societies, and one in which the state 
reified the blood, sweat, tears, and toil of the nation.3 Indeed, the entire 
postwar international economic order reflects this international logic, 
mediating between international and domestic markets to ensure the relative 
stability of each.4 Air transport proved no exception to this rule: situated in a 
middle politics between power and prosperity, and greatly influenced by non-
                                                
2 Kai-Ngau Chang, Address to the Opening Plenary Session, 1 November 1944 in US 
Department of State, Proceedings of the International Conference on Civil Aviation, Chicago, 
1 November – 7 December 1944 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing 
Office, 1948) vol. I at 45 [US Dept of State, Proceedings]. 
3 See e.g. John Gerard Ruggie, “Taking Embedded Liberalism Global: The Corporate 
Connection” (2003) IILJ Working Paper 2003/2, History and Theory of International Law 
Series at 2, online: <http://www.iilj.org/publications/documents/2003.2%20Ruggie.pdf> 
[Ruggie, “Taking Embedded Liberalism Global”]. 
4 On the postwar institutions governing money, finance, and trade, see generally John Gerard 
Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the 
Postwar Economic Order” (1982) 36 Int’l Org. 379 [Ruggie, “Embedded Liberalism”]. 
Chapter 2 discusses the mediating function of the postwar institutions of the air in significant 
detail. 
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economic interests, including national security, nation-building, and national 
prestige,5 national airlines found themselves comfortably situated within a 
legal framework balancing international connectivity with stringent forms of 
industrial protection. 
 But the international organization of the world so thoroughly 
recognized at the close of the War no longer adequately describes transactions 
in the 21st century economy. Indeed, in recent decades markets have 
substantially outgrown the national territories that used to encompass them, 
“threatening to leave behind merely national social bargains.”6 Today’s 
                                                
5 A particularly apt quote comes from Andreas Lowenfeld, who noted that: 
 
[t]he difference between aviation and, say, textiles, shipping, or nonferrous metals is 
that aviation directly engages the prestige, the fascination, and the "national interest" of 
almost all the countries of the world. International aviation is thus not just another 
problem in a changing international economic system, though it is that; international 
civil aviation is a serious problem in international relations, affecting the way 
governments view one another, the way individual citizens view their own and foreign 
countries, and in a variety of direct and indirect connections the security arrangements 
by which we live. 
 
Andreas Lowenfeld, “A New Takeoff for International Aviation” (1975) 54 Foreign Affairs 
36 at 36 [Lowenfeld, “A New Takeoff”]. 
6 Ruggie, “Taking Embedded Liberalism Global”, supra note 3 at 2. Ruggie identifies the 
problem in full in the following manner: 
 
So what is the problem today? The embedded liberalism presupposed an international 
world. It presupposed the existence of national economies, engaged in external 
transactions, conducted at arms length, which governments could mediate at the border 
by tariffs and exchange rates, among other tools. In recent decades, however, markets 
increasingly have gone global, threatening to leave behind merely national social 
bargains. “Our challenge,” United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan alerted the 
World Economic Forum in January 1999, ten months before the so-called Battle of 
Seattle, “is to devise a similar compact on the global scale, to underpin the new global 
economy. ...Until we do,” he predicted, “the global economy will be fragile and 
vulnerable – vulnerable to backlash from all the “isms” of our post-cold-war world: 
protectionism, populism, nationalism, ethnic chauvinism, fanaticism and terrorism.” 
 
Ibid. (citing Kofi Annan, “A Compact for the New Century,” 31 January 1999 (UN, 
SG/SM/6881)). 
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economic realities require new bargains beyond the state, and new institutions 
to enforce them. 
 Again, air transport proves to be no exception to the rule. Beginning 
with US “deregulation” in the late 1970s,7 states have begun a slow and 
gradual process of introducing market dynamics into both their domestic and 
international air transport systems, characterized by varying degrees of 
liberalization (i.e., the removal of the ex ante regulations that have substituted 
market-based decision-making),8 as well as a general trend towards separating 
the state’s regulatory functions from the operations of its airline(s).9 These 
reforms have proven major catalysts for change in the industry, expanding 
networks, increasing the variety of available services, and lowering the 
average cost to the user. 
 But while states increasingly call for a transition from bilateral 
international markets to global aviation market, rhetoric has not been matched 
by reality. Given its history, its fragmented institutional structure and the 
variable capabilities of nationally organized competitors, it should be little 
surprise that reforms have been slow, fitful, uneven, incomplete, and pluriform 
                                                
7 On US deregulation and its export into the international sphere, see generally below at 131-
48. 
8 See generally ICAO Secretariat, “Overview of Trends and Developments in International Air 
Transport” (24 March 2009), online: 
<http://www.icao.int/sustainability/Documents/OverviewTrends.pdf> [ICAO, “Overview”]; 
ICC Committee on Air Transport, “Policy Statement: The Need for Greater Liberalization of 
International Air Transport” (1 December 2005) at 6-7, online: 
<http://www.iccwbo.org/uploadedFiles/ICC/policy/transport/Statements/304-2-23-Rev3-EN-
1-12-05.pdf>. 
9 See generally ICAO, “List of Government-Owned and Privatized Airlines (Unofficial 
Preliminary Compilation)”, online: 
<http://www.icao.int/sustainability/Documents/PrivatizedAirlines.pdf> (last updated 4 July 
2008) (listing airlines, including, inter alia, the dates for complete and partial privatization 
and government repurchase of shares). 
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in character.10 Importantly, with all but few exceptions air transport remains 
“nation-bound”.11 This is particularly true with respect to international 
markets not tied to the home state, cabotage (i.e., the right for State A’s 
airline(s) to operate domestic routes in State B) and to national ownership and 
control requirements; however, in many cases even basic market access to 
international routes remains restricted in some form. Even in the few instances 
where states have agreed to integrate national markets into larger functional 
units, such as in the European Union (EU), reform remains targeted at 
rationalizing intra-community services in order to leverage improvements in 
their relationships with third parties. 
 At the same time, the emergence of East Asia and the Middle East as 
economic growth poles has de-centered the North Atlantic from its traditional 
role as the center of global regulatory reform.12 These states are likely to 
                                                




=true>; Brian Havel, Beyond Open Skies: A New Regime for International Aviation (Alphen 
aan den Rijn, 2009) at 23, fn 1 [Havel, Beyond Open Skies] (citing Andreas F. Lowenfeld, 
“Competition in International Aviation: The Next Round” (Address before the International 
Conference on Air Transport and Space Application in the New World, June 1993) (noting 
that the industry was in a long period of change “more suitable to weekly newsletters than to 
an effort at description and analysis with some perspective”)). These differences are supported 
by a general policy of allowing each state to choose its own path to liberalization. See e.g. 
ICAO, “Declaration of Global Principles for Liberalization of International Air Transport” in 
ICAO, Consolidated Conclusions, Model Clauses, Recommendations and Declaration. ICAO 
Doc. ATConf/5 (31 March 2003, REVISED 10 July 2003) [ICAO, Consolidated Conclusions 
AT/Conf 5]. 
11 Paul Mifsud, “Metal Neutrality and the Nation-Bound Airline Industry” (2011) 36 Air & 
Sp. L. 117. Brian Havel has called the nationality-based regulatory framework the “Chicago 
system” of regulation. See e.g. Havel, Beyond Open Skies, ibid. at 5-17. Ultimately, this study 
does not adopt this definition; however, the identification of the central substantive problem as 
one of nationality could not be more correct. See also the discussion of “full market access” 
below at 280-91 (discussing the concept of “open skies”). 
12 See Havel, Beyond Open Skies, supra note 10 at 523 (noting that “[t]oday, with an 
embattled U.S. industry cut off from foreign investment capital and potential merger and 
acquisition partnerships, continued fealty to a Chicago-style open skies model appears 
anachronistic when U.S. airlines have lost their almost structural dominance of the 
international marketplace and face intensified competition from well-positioned carriers from 
other economic regions, especially Asia and the Middle East.”); Commission on Trade in 
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complicate the reform process as they, like others, try to manipulate the rules 
of the game to suit their own national (or regional) industries. 
 Regionalism plays a critical part in this contentious transition from 
international to global aviation markets. This study addresses regional reform 
in East Asia, defined here as the ten member states of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, 
Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam –, 
plus China, South Korea, and Japan, together comprising the ASEAN+3 
economic grouping.13 Indeed, there are at least three distinct processes for 
discussion, from ASEAN’s formalized but embattled commitment to open 
skies and, eventually, an ASEAN Single Aviation Market (ASAM), to more 
formative discussions of trilateral liberalization among the Northeast Asian 
states and broader liberalization within the region. Building on these 
developments, this study asserts as its basic thesis that East Asian regionalism 
best achieves its objectives (if not uniquely so) through a process of managed, 
incremental reform in a way that specifically accounts for competitive 
positions and political outcomes, and that integrates its approach into broader 
                                                
Goods and Services, and Commodities, Air Transport Services: The Positive Agenda for 
Developing Countries – Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat, UNCTAD TDBOR, UNCTAD 
Doc. TD/B/COM.1/EM.9/2 (16 April 1999) at 3, para. 5 (noting that “[t]here has been a high 
concentration of trade in all segments of international air services in North America and 
Europe during the last three decades. However, the growing importance of the market shares 
and growth rates of the Asia and Pacific region in all segments of ATS has to be underlined.”) 
[UNCTAD, The Positive Agenda]; IATA, Press Release, “Asia Pacific: Challenges and 
Opportunities – Intra-Asia market Eclipses North America as World’s Largest” (1 February 
2010), online: <http://www.iata.org/pressroom/pr/pages/2010-02-01-01.aspx> (also noting 40 
percent of traffic originates from or is destined for China) [IATA, “World’s Largest”]. 
13 Founded on 8 August 1967, ASEAN originally consisted of five member states, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Brunei joined on 7 January 1984, 
followed by the CLMV states (Cambodia, Laos PDR, Myanmar, and Vietnam) on 30 April 
1999, 23 July 1997 (Laos and Myanmar), and 28 July 1995, respectively. See generally 
ASEAN, “History”, online: <http://www.asean.org/asean/about-asean/history>. See also 
Christopher M. Dent, East Asian Regionalism (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2008) at c. 4. 
While not the only form of cooperation between ASEAN and Northeast Asia, ASEAN+3 
represents the first time that the region met without the participation of players from outside 
the region. See e.g. Dent, ibid. at 149-65. 
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global reforms. In doing so, it focuses on market access and ownership and 
control reform, the two primary regulatory barriers to transnational aviation 
markets, suggesting a multi-level structure designed to tap into global 
financial markets but restricting changes to market access and control criterion 
to specifically regional scales to account for political concerns. At the same 
time, these reforms should build the region’s capacity as an equal partner in 
larger global reforms. 
 Ultimately, the body of this thesis serves as a justification for this 
decision – as an argument for the path proposed at the end of this thesis. It also 
does a number of other things, establishing a clear history of the development 
of the global regulatory structures, analyzing the objectives of reform, and 
evaluating a range of practical impediments to achieving those objectives as 
well strategies to surmount them. As part of this work, Chapter 1 begins by 
contextualizing regulatory reform generally and regionalism in particular 
within a normative framework of efficiency and participation. Accordingly, 
section two outlines this normative framework before discussing how 
liberalization within a system of nation-bound airlines affects – and how 
nation-boundedness limits – the pursuit of these two primary norms. Section 
three then discusses regionalism’s function within the multiform pursuit of 
regulatory reform, highlighting economic, political, and contextual arguments 
for this particular path to reform. Whether through the text or the footnotes, 
both sections also tie points made into more specific discussions in later 
Chapters. Section four then briefly draws analytical boundaries around the 
work before section five summarizes the contents of the thesis. 
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2. LIBERALIZATION AND THE POLITICS OF PARTICIPATION AND EFFICIENCY 
 
At the heart of this thesis is an understanding of institutions as instruments 
mediating between the various claims of competing organizations, both public 
and private. According to this understanding, states and other suppliers of 
institutions such as the EU design institutions to tailor transaction costs to 
support specific types of transactions and to prohibit or discourage others.14 
Institutions thus channel and bound the range of opportunities and risks that 
actors must address within a particular sphere. 
 Importantly, opportunities can be bounded both normatively and 
functionally. For international air transport, two norms – efficiency and 
participation – continue to guide the transition from bilateral international 
markets to multilateral global aviation market. Indeed, the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO), the United Nation’s (UN) specialized body on 
international civil aviation,15 has consistently confirmed these norms by 
articulating two primary objectives for global systems: adaptation and 
participation.16 These are in fact not new considerations; rather, they 
                                                
14 See generally e.g. Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic 
Performance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990) (providing an economic theory 
of institutional change as the result of demands put on it by organizations) [North, 
Institutional Change]; Ruggie, “Embedded Liberalism”, supra note 4 at 398-404 (noting that 
regimes/institutions are neither determinative nor completely irrelevant, but “play a mediating 
role, by providing a permissive environment for the emergence of certain kinds of 
transactions, specifically transactions that are perceived to be complementary to the normative 
frameworks of the regimes having a bearing on them.” Ibid. at 404). 
15 On ICAO’s origins and roles see generally below at 66 & 75.  
16 ICAO, Report of the World Wide Air Transport Conference on International Air Transport 
Regulation: Present and Future, Montreal, 23 November – 6 December 1994, ICAO Doc. 
9644 AT Conf/4 (1994) at 11 [ICAO, Report AT/Conf 4].  ICAO, “Declaration of Global 
Principles for Liberalization of International Air Transport” in ICAO, Consolidated 
Conclusions AT/Conf 5, supra note 10 at paras. 1, 3-5. 
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reinterpret existing norms contained in the Chicago Convention17 in order to 
meet new understandings of regulation and economic organization. Thus, 
“adaptation” refers to changes meant to enhance, simplify, and increase the 
flexibility of the regulatory environment18 by moving institutions away from 
an old model thought to produce efficiency towards a new model of efficient 
regulation. Similarly, “participation”, defined as “a reliable and sustained 
involvement in”19 international aviation, reflects a (rather open-ended) 
revision to norms articulated at Chicago.20 
 Postwar institutions reached a normative balance by dividing the 
national from the international and mediating between the two objectives of 
supporting international services and protecting domestic industries. Its basic 
composition is of a great diffusion of bilateral agreements21 (modeled on 
                                                
17 See Convention on International Civil Aviation, done at Chicago, 7 December 1944, 
Preamble, art. 44(d)-(f) (tasking ICAO with the objectives of “meet[ing] the needs of the 
peoples of the world for safe, regular, efficient and economical air transport”, “prevent[ing] 
economic waste caused by unreasonable competition”, and “insur[ing] that the rights of 
contracting States are fully respected and that every contracting State has a fair opportunity to 
operate international airlines”, respectively) [Chicago Convention]. See also below at 75-80. 
18 ICAO’s report on the Fourth World Wide Air Transport Conference defines adaptation as 
“the adjustment of air transport regulation to the broader dynamic environment in which 
international air transport operates.” ICAO, Report AT/Conf 4, supra note 16. The same 
Conference identifies enhancement (“the growth and improvement in the quantity and quality 
of the international air services”), simplification (“the elimination of complex and detailed 
management that characterizes most existing regulatory arrangements”), and flexibility (“the 
design of new regulatory arrangements for international air transport in ways that permit air 
carrier to maximize opportunities for innovation and commercial creativity”) as secondary 
goals of reform. Ibid. 
19 Ibid. at 10 (defining participation as “a reliable and sustained involvement by a State in the 
international air transport system”).  
20 Cf. Chicago Convention, supra note 17, art. 44(f). 
21 See e.g. Bin Cheng, The Law of International Air Transport (London: Stevens & Sons, 
1962) at 491 (calling the bilateral system a “labyrinthine legal grotto”) (cited in Brian Havel 
& Gabriel Sanchez, “Restoring Aviation’s ‘Cosmopolitan Mentalité’” (2011) 29 B.U. Int’l 
L.J. 1 at 12, fn 48 [Havel & Sanchez, “Restoring Aviation”]; Brian Havel & Gabriel Sanchez, 
“The Emerging Lex Aviatica” (2011) 42 Geo. Int’l L.J. 639 at 642 [Havel & Sanchez, “Lex 
Aviatica”]) [Cheng, International Air Transport]. Estimates currently place the number of 
bilateral agreements at around 4,000, although the exact number can only be guessed at. 
David Knibb, “Liberalisation: Breaking the Bilateral Web” Airline Business (22 April 2010), 
online: Flight Global <http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/liberalisation-breaking-the-
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variants of the 1946 “Bermuda I Agreement” between the US and the UK)22 
directly regulating conditions on entry, capacity/frequency, pricing, and route 
determination, and indirectly controlling access by allowing the state granting 
access to its airspace the right to revoke or suspend the operating rights of any 
airline not “substantially owned and effectively controlled” by nationals of the 
state choosing (or “designating”) that airline, together with “multilateralized” 
price and service quality controls carried out within the International Air 
Transport Association (IATA), the trade organization of the world’s 
international scheduled airlines.23 This system – its origins, the issues 
underlying its form, and ultimately its failings – constitutes the subject of 
Chapter 2.  
 The problem with such a system is that it neither reflects current 
understandings of efficient air transport markets nor the scale of economic 
organization more broadly. Indeed, liberalization has proven that direct 
regulation generally results in inflated fares and limits network connectivity,24 
while integration projects designed to consolidate national markets into a 
single transnational operating market like the Single European Aviation 
Market (see further Chapter 3)25 clearly demonstrate the benefits not only of 
open markets but also of rescaling those markets to levels beyond the state.26 
                                                
bilateral-web-340857/>. The reasons for the bilateral – as opposed to multilateral – system 
form a significant portion of the discussion in Chapter 2. 
22 See generally below at 103-15. 
23 See generally ibid. 
24 See e.g. below at 126-31 (discussing the benefits of deregulation in the US), 161-62 (noting 
the benefits of EU liberalization thus far) & 284-85 (discussing the benefits of open skies in 
other regions more generally). 
25 See generally below at 148-74. 
26 See infra notes 493-94 and accompanying text (describing the benefits of regional 
integration thus far). Cf. infra note 498 (noting the possibility of considerable further gains 
within the EU as a result of third party recognition of a European market). 
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To achieve at least some of these gains, states have accepted limited forms of 
liberalization, including a large number of “deregulated” domestic markets as 
well as varying degrees of international market liberalization.27 
 Yet “global”28 markets have not equated with global airlines. Indeed, 
with the exception of the EU (which has largely – though not completely – 
replaced its member states) and now, potentially, ASEAN (which could do the 
same for Southeast Asia), states continue to insist on national forms of 
organization.29 This persistence of structural nationalism remains a serious 
problem, not only for the efficiency of the system, but also for its health. By 
removing the regulatory cushions provided by Bermuda I–IATA, 
liberalization exposes the industry to the cyclicality of markets; however, 
national restrictions also limit the industry’s ability to respond to this 
cyclicality, whether by concentrating exposure in terms of market access or 
limiting access to increasingly global pools of finance capital and a wider pool 
of expertise that might otherwise buoy competitiveness.30 These two issues – 
the relative openness and appropriate scale of air transport markets – comprise 
the core issues of this study. 
 Of course, for the utopian these issues have already been answered, as 
a global aviation market necessarily entails a market (with activities regulated 
                                                
27 See e.g. Intervistas-ga2, supra note 10 (noting that “[a]s of 2006, many nations have 
allowed market forces to govern their domestic routes, while a slow, erratic process of 
“creeping liberalization” has prevailed on many international air corridors”). 
28 A term adopted both by the US DOT and the European Commission. See generally US 
DOT, 1995 Policy Statement, infra note 61; Commission, Com(92), infra note 503 at 14-15. 
29 See ICAO, “Overview”, supra note 8 at 1-2, para. 2.3 (noting that, as of March 2009, 12 
reported agreements exchanged seventh freedom rights, while eight exchanged eighth and 
ninth freedom rights). 
30 See generally e.g. Paul Stephen Dempsey, “The Cyclical Crisis in Commercial Aviation: 
Causes and Potential Cures” (2003) 28 Ann. Air & Sp. L. 1 [Dempsey, “The Cyclical Crisis”]; 
Jeffrey Shane, “Foreword” in Havel, Beyond Open Skies, supra note 10 at ix-xi (these 
concerns likewise carry throughout Havel’s work). 
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ex post by competition law)31 of singularly global scale. In reality, however, 
there is a great degree of dissonance between these ideals and the concerns 
and practices of states. This section describes the relationship between 
organizational practices and the normative framework of efficiency and 
participation. 
 
2.1. The Benefits and Limits of Efficiency in International Aviation 
Markets 
 
All this is not to say that liberalization within the nation-bound industry has 
not enhanced efficiency. Indeed, liberalized markets have seen quite dramatic 
reductions in overall prices, expanded route networks, and the emergence of 
important economies of scale (see further Chapters 3 and 5).32 
 One of the most important effects of liberalization has been on market 
structure, where unrestricted market entry and operational freedom has 
allowed airlines to move away from the traditional distinction between 
scheduled and non-scheduled air transport (although legal arrangements 
continue this distinction)33 towards a market segmented by network, feeder, 
                                                
31 Indeed, competition law figures into the US system, the EU system, and the proposals for 
ASAM. The Single Aviation Market of Australia and New Zealand also requires SAM airlines 
(on SAM airlines see infra note 967 and accompanying text) to abide by each state’s 
competition rules. See generally Jeffrey Goh, The Single Aviation Market of Australia and 
New Zealand (London and Sydney: Cavendish Publishing Limited, 2001) at cs. 5-7. 
32 See below at 126-28 & 161-62. See also generally Chapter 5 below. 
33 Interestingly, while the Chicago Convention draws a basic distinction between scheduled 
and non-scheduled services (Chicago Convention, supra note 17, arts. 5-6), with those 
distinctions informing the scope of rights exchanged under the Convention (see infra notes 
251-52 and accompanying text), the Convention does not offer a definition of either. In 1952, 
ICAO adopted the following definition at its 2nd Assembly, emphasizing the role of the 
timetable or recognizable regularity: 
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and low-cost carriers (LCC).34 Athough  the distinctions can blur, the network 
carrier (offering full-service on complex multiple-fare systems through one or 
more hub airports, often dominated by the airline)35 and the LCC (using cost-
reducing strategies – single-class service; limited use of aircraft types; point-
to-point service on high-demand routes; serving secondary airports – to serve 
price-sensitive travelers)36 remain the most visibly distinct.37 These 
                                                
A scheduled international air service is a series of flights that possesses all of the 
following characteristics: 
(a) it passes through the air space over the territory of more than one State; 
(b) it is performed by aircraft for the transport of passengers, mail or cargo for 
remuneration, in a manner that each flight is open to use by members of the 
public; 
(c) it is operated, so as to serve traffic between the same two or more points, 
either 
(i) according to a published timetable, or 
(ii) with flights so regular or frequent that they constitute a recognizable 
systematic series. 
 
ICAO, Definition of Scheduled International Air Service, ICAO Doc. 7278-C/841 (10 May, 
1952) (cited in e.g. Milde, ICAO, infra note 188 at 101) [emphasis added]. Others have 
adopted similar definitions (see e.g. EC, Reg 2408/92, infra note 464, art. 2(d)). While open 
skies treats both types equally, many agreements continue to draw the distinction between the 
two. See e.g. ASEAN-China Agreement, infra note 811, art. 2(2)(c) & Annexes I-II. 
34 See generally Peter P.C. Haanappel, “Competition Between Network, Feeder And Low-
Cost Airlines” (2004) 53 Z.L.W. 532 at 535-39 (classifying services in deregulated/liberalized 
markets as feeder airlines, global airlines, low-cost/low-fare airlines, mega-airlines, network 
airlines, and niche airlines before regrouping them into network, feeder and low-cost 
categories) [Haanappel, “Network, Feeder and Low-Cost”]. 
35 Ibid. at 537. On the economics of hub-and-spoke network systems see generally infra note 
381 and accompanying text. 
36 Haanappel, ibid. at 538-39 (noting that “[l]ow-cost airlines show different patterns” and that 
one should distinguish between “pure” low-cost and others offering a mix of services, but also 
noting a common patterns of point-to-point operations); Bijan Vasigh, Ken Fleming & 
Thomas Tacker, An Introduction to Airline Economics (Aldershot and Burlington, VT: 
Ashgate, 2008) at 307-29.  
37 This line continues to blur in practice, with pundits now discussing “hybrid” models, 
crossing the fuzzy lines drawn between the two business models to offer what might be called 
enhanced low cost service. Haanappel, ibid. at 539. See also e.g. CAPA Centre for Aviation, 
“New Cebu Pacific Long-Haul Operation Could Push Out Philippine Airlines But May 
Require Hybrid Model” (2 February 2012), online: 
<http://www.centreforaviation.com/analysis/new-cebu-pacific-long-haul-operation-could-
push-out-philippine-airlines-but-may-require-hybrid-model-67281> [CAPA, “Cebu”]. In 
contrast, whether contractually or through ownership, feeder airlines’ interests remain tied to 
the network carrier. Feeder airlines operate thinner, regional routes, and are integrated into a 
larger network carrier’s network. These can be franchise arrangements, such as American 
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developments both diversify interests and present challenges to labor groups 
as airlines look to reduce costs by renegotiating input costs.38 Both feature 
prominently – implicitly where not explicitly – in much of the analysis in the 
body of this work. 
 Airlines have also responded to international market liberalization by 
rescaling their operations to meet the strategic requirements of competition. 
One method of rescaling, particularly in mature markets, is through 
consolidation. In the US and the EU, there is a clear, ongoing process of 
concentration around three airlines or airline groups. In the US, the 2008 
Delta/Northwest and 2010 United/Continental mergers reduced the number of 
US “mega”-carriers39 to four (Delta, United, US Airways, and American 
Airlines), while talks between American Airlines and US Airways suggest a 
possible move to three in the near future;40 in Europe, concentration centers 
around three airline groups: Air France-KLM, International Airlines Group 
                                                
Eagle, branded as part of a larger “family” of airlines, or they can be independent brands: 
prior to Lufthansa’s sale of bmi to British Airways, bmi had served to feed Lufthansa’s 
operations through London Heathrow. See Haanappel, ibid. at 538. On Lufthansa’s sale of its 
interest in bmi to British Airways, see e.g. Ian Walker, “IAG Completes BMI Purchase from 
Lufthansa, To Be Integrated Into BA” Dow Jones Newswires (20 April 2012), online: Wall 
Street Journal <http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20120420-701265.html>. SilkAir, an 
independently branded regional carrier affiliated with owner Singapore Airlines, similarly 
connects thinner routes to Singapore Airline’s larger network, this time at its Singapore hub. 
38 On deregulation and interest group cohesion, see Michael E. Levine, “Why Weren’t the 
Airlines Reregulated?” (2006) 23 Yale J. on Reg. 269 [Levine, “Reregulated?”] (the title of an 
earlier version of the article helps emphasize the point. Michael E. Levine, “Regulation, the 
Market, and Interest Group Cohesion: Why Airlines Were Not Reregulated” (2006) NYU L. 
& Econ. Working Paper 80, online: <http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_lewp/80/>). On labor relations 
in particular, see also infra notes 391 (noting Kahn and Levine’s reaction to US labor 
volatility) & 554-57 (discussing two EU-US Labour Forums) and accompanying text. For a 
more general discussion of liberalization’s impact on labor, see ILO, The Impact of the 
Restructuring of Civil Aviation on Employment and Social Practices, ICAO Doc ATConf/5-
WP/31, (2 December 2002 (rev. 6 February 2003)); ILO, The Impact of the Restructuring of 
Civil Aviation on Employment and Social Practices, ICAO Doc ATConf/5-WP/66 (18 
February 2003). 
39 Ibid. 
40 See e.g. Charisse Jones, “Why American Airlines Appears Ripe for Acquisition”, USA 




(IAG) (including British Airways and Iberia), and Lufthansa.41 In East Asia, 
China has also played an active role in consolidating its network airlines into 
its own “Big Three” (China Airlines, China Eastern, and China Southern) (see 
further Chapter 4);42 however, with the exception of Vietnam Airlines’ 49 
percent interest in newly launched Cambodia Angkor Air, this type of cross-
border consolidation has yet to occur in the wider region. 
 For newly liberalized markets, rescaling may result from either 
consolidation or new entry.43 Newly liberalizing East Asia is currently 
witnessing an aggressive expansion in its LCC market. To penetrate both 
domestic and international markets, this has occurred largely through brand 
expansion by joint ventures. For example, AirAsia’s total network coverage is 
composed of an aggregate of many nationally established companies: 
Malaysia-based AirAsia and AirAsia X, AirAsia Indonesia, AirAsia Thailand, 
and AirAsia Japan.44 Other groups, including Qantas subsidiary Jetstar and, 
                                                
41 See Havel, Beyond Open Skies, supra note 10 at 327-35 (discussing the “tiered” market 
structure in the US) & 383-86 (discussing a similarly “tiered” structure in Europe). On the role 
of network size in the US deregulated market, see e.g. Michael E. Levine, “Competition in 
Deregulated Markets: Theory, Firm Strategy, and Public Policy” (1987) 4 Yale J. on Reg. 383 
at 409-11 (describing horizontal and vertical consolidation in the US industry) & 425-32 
(discussing the reasons for consolidation) [Levine, “Competition in Deregulated Markets”]. 
On concentration in Europe, see e.g. Haanappel, “Network, Feeder and Low-Cost”, supra note 
34 at 537 (noting that “[t]here is a tendency, at the present time very strong in Europe, for 
larger network carriers to get larger, and for smaller to get smaller”, giving the example of the 
Air France-KLM merger as one of growth and SN Brussels and Swiss as examples of 
networks reducing in size). 
42 See below at 218-19. 
43 As will be seen, states have often sought to control this process, whether through 
incremental relaxations, preferential measures, or flexible application of the regulations. 
These functions are discussed, inter alia, in Chapters 3 & 4 (see below at 124-26 (US 
deregulation), 149-36 (EU internal market integration), & 222-52 (ASEAN liberalization and 
integration), and analyzed again in Chapter 6. 
44 See e.g. Alan Khee-Jin Tan, “Prospects for a Single Aviation Market in Southeast Asia” 
(2009) 34 Ann. Air & Sp. L. 253 at 263-67 (discussing AirAsia Indonesia and Thailand, as 
well as Jetstar and Tiger’s (initial) failures at entering South Korea and the Philippines) [Tan, 
“Prospects for ASAM”]. On Northeast Asia, see e.g. “Bullet v Budget – Can Low-Cost 
Airlines Beat Bullet Trains” The Economist (28 April 2012), online: 
<http://www.economist.com/node/21553488>.  
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more recently, Singaporean Tiger Airways and (tentatively) Indonesian Lion 
Air,45 follow similar patterns of expansion. Table 1.1 summarizes these 
patterns by group and affiliate nationality. 
 
Table 1.1: LCC Groups (By Country of Origin and Affiliates’ 
Nationality) 
 
Airline (Nationality) Affiliated JV (Nationality) 
AirAsia (Malaysia) AirAsia X (Malaysia); AirAsia Thailand (Thai); 
AirAsia Indonesia (Indonesia); AirAsia Japan 
(Japan); 
 
Jetstar (Australia) Jetstar Asia (Singapore); Jetstar Pacific 
(Vietnam); Jetstar Japan (Japan); Jetstar Hong 




Mandala Airlines (Indonesia); SEAir 
(Philippines); 
 
Lion Air (Indonesia) Malindo (Malaysia – proposed 2013). 
 
 These developments also reveal the important role legal institutions 
play in shaping industrial structure. For example, a number of different 
partnership patterns exist: Jetstar Pacific, AirAsia and Jetstar Japan, and 
Jetstar Hong Kong are all co-owned by flag carriers in the home country 
                                                
45 See ibid. See also “Qantas Launches Jetstar Hong Kong as Low-Cost Carrier” The Guardian 
(26 March 2012), online: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/mar/26/qantas-launches-
jetstar-hong-kong>; CAPA Centre for Aviation, “Tiger-Backed Mandala Resumes Operations 
with Focus on Indonesia’s Largest Routes” (5 April 2012), online: 
<http://www.centreforaviation.com/analysis/tiger-backed-mandala-resumes-operations-with-
focus-on-indonesias-largest-routes-71212> [CAPA, “Tiger-Backed”]; “Tiger Airways buys 
40% of Philippines’ SEAir” The Straits Times (7 June 2012), online: 
<http://www.straitstimes.com/BreakingNews/Singapore/Story/STIStory_808200.html> 
(cooperation had been put off for several years due to lobbying by local airlines. See e.g. Tan, 
ibid.; Alan Khee-Jin Tan, “Aviation Policy in the Philippines and the Impact of the Proposed 
Southeast Asian Single Aviation Market” (2009) 34 Air & Sp. L. 285 at 286, 288, 305-07 
[Tan, “Policy in the Philippines”]) [“Tiger buys”]. Eileen Ng, “Lion Air to Set Up Budget 




(Vietnam Airlines, Japan Airlines, ANA, and China Eastern, respectively);46 
Tiger has invested in small, pre-existing secondary airlines;47 Malindo and 
AirAsia Indonesia offer examples of ventures with other interests.48 However, 
investment patterns follow a common pattern, with majority ownership 
remaining in local hands and with the parent airline taking a significant 
minority shareholding. Thus, e.g., AirAsia holds 49 percent and Indonesian 
nationals 51 percent of AirAsia Indonesia, Jetstar hold 30 percent and 
Vietnam Airlines 70 percent of Jetstar Pacific, and Tiger Airways holds 33 
percent of Mandala Airlines and 40 percent of Southeast Asia Airlines 
(SEAir).49 In all of these (sometimes quite dramatic)50 cases, these 
developments are a direct result of liberalization, emphasizing not only 
liberalization’s role in growth but also its limits. 
 Legally, three distinct but interrelated barriers prevent these (and 
other) airlines from operating as a single company, representing the core 
constraints on an ostensibly globalizing aviation industry. First, market access 
restrictions prevent a designated airline from performing any number of 
services, and almost universally on cabotage routes and routes between 
international points unconnected to the state designating the airline (a 
                                                
46 See ibid. On Vietnam, see e.g. CAPA Centre for Aviation, “Jetstar Pacific to become 
Vietnam Airlines’ Low-Cost Carrier in Salutory Move to Both” (23 February 2012), online: 
<http://www.centreforaviation.com/analysis/jetstar-pacific-to-become-vietnam-airlines-low-
cost-carrier-in-salutary-move-to-both-68641>.  
47 See supra note 45. 
48 See ibid. 
49 See supra notes 44-46. 
50 Indeed, many LCCs now dominate their respective domestic markets. See e.g. CAPA, 
“Cebu”, supra note 36; “Lion Rules Market Despite Pilot Cases” The Jakarta Post (5 March 
2012), online: <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/03/05/lion-rules-market-share-
despite-pilot-cases.html>; Eric Bellman & Gaurav Raguvanshi, “Lion Air Orders Put 
Spotlight on Indonesia” Wall Street Journal (15 February 2012), online: 
<http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204880404577224912644361538.html>. 
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“seventh” freedom service) (on the “freedoms of the air”, see further Chapter 
2).51 Thus, under current operating conditions Malaysian-owned AirAsia 
cannot operate directly between Jakarta and Yogyakarta (a ninth freedom 
service) or between Jakarta and Bangkok (a seventh freedom service): to 
perform both services, the airline must be an Indonesian entity. 
 Second, domestic restrictions on foreign ownership and control limit 
the different ventures from formally integrating. In many states, in order to 
operate any services an airline in State A will have to demonstrate that 
substantial ownership and effective control of the airline – two distinct criteria 
determined by the percentage of (voting and/or absolute) shares held and the 
foreign entity’s ability to influence decision-making procedures, respectively – 
remain with State A’s nationals.52 While there are a number of reasons for 
maintaining this “internal lock”53 on the ownership and control of airlines 
(see, e.g. the following section), such “citizenship purity rules”54 also result in 
inefficient structures in terms of administrative redundancies and limits on any 
individual airline’s ability to access international capital markets and global 
                                                
51 See generally below at 81-85. See also generally the discussion on market access to open 
skies and beyond below at 278-307. 
52 See e.g. Isabelle Lelieur, Law and Policy of Substantial Ownership and Effective Control of 
Airlines: Prospects for Change (Aldershot & Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate, 2003) at 3-6; 
Havel, Beyond Open Skies, supra note 10 at 133-35 (describing the ownership and control 
tests as a “dyad”, that are respectfully quantitative and qualitative in nature). See also Yu-
Chun Chang & George Williams, “Prospects for Changing Airline Ownership Rules” (2002) 
67 J. Air L. & Com. 233 (discussing US, EU, and APEC initiatives); Yu-Chun Chang, George 
Williams & Chia-Jui Hsu, “The Evolution of Airline Ownership and Control Provisions” 
(2004) 10 J. Air Transp. Man. 161. See also OECD, Directorate for Science, Technology and 
Industry, Division of Transport, Liberalisation of Air Cargo Transport, Doc. No. 
DSTI/DOT(2002)1/REV1 (2 May 2002)  at 34-36 (suggesting separating ownership 
relaxations from control relaxations, using MALIAT (infra note 584, art. 3(2)) as an example) 
[OECD, 2002 Revision]. See also the discussion on ownership and control in Chapter 5 below 
at 312-39. 
53 Havel, Beyond Open Skies, supra note 10 at 165 & 492. For a discussion of the domestic 
restrictions generally, see ibid. at 133-71. For a discussion of the problem of the internal lock 
with respect to global multilateral proposals, see below at 198-99. 
54 Ibid. at 133. 
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pools of expertise as well as the group’s ability to shift capital freely between 
companies. 
 Generally speaking, both market access restrictions and domestic 
restrictions on foreign ownership and control persist in South- and Northeast 
Asia.55 In contrast, from 1992 the EU has both eliminated market access 
restrictions on intra-EU flights for member states’ airlines and replaced 
nationality-based ownership and control rules with European ones. Chapter 3 
discusses these changes from state to European organized and regulated (i.e. 
“Europeanized”) market in significant detail.56 However, most international 
air transport agreements also permit State B to suspend or revoke an airline 
designated by State A under a bilateral agreement where State A’s chosen 
airline is not substantially owned and effectively controlled by nationals of 
State A. This third element, an “external bolt”57 distinct from its national 
counterpart, can impede reform even where states are willing to remove their 
domestic restrictions. For the EU and its member states, this has meant 
renegotiating national ownership and control clauses with third parties to 
introduce a “Community” ownership and control clause.58 Until the relevant 
authorities renegotiate a sufficient number of agreements (see below at 
Chapter 3),59 European airlines have arranged complex holding structures 
maintaining each operating company’s separate nationality. Thus, the first 
                                                
55 See generally below at 221-62. One exception is Singapore, which has removed all 
domestic restrictions on foreign investment. See e.g. Chang, Williams & Hsu, supra note 52 at 
162 (also noting that Chile requires only that the airline’s principal place of business be in 
Chile). However, as Singapore has no domestic market, these provisions have no economic 
value until such time as the “external lock” on foreign ownership and control is also removed. 
56 See below at 148-74. 
57 Havel, Beyond Open Skies, supra note 10 at 135 (while calling national ownership and 
control generally a “double-bolted lock”). 
58 See generally below at 167-70 & 336-37. 
59 See below at 167-74 (discussing both horizontal mandates and common aviation areas). 
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cross-border European merger, Air France-KLM, has used a French holding 
company with 100 percent economic interest in KLM, but which retains only a 
49 percent voting interest in KLM managerial decisions.60 In East Asia, 
AirAsia and Jetstar use similar if not identical structures (see above), as does 
the Virgin group of airlines, which includes Virgin Atlantic, Virgin America 
and Virgin Australia. 
 Commercially minded network carriers, including the Virgin group, 
have also responded to the opportunities and constraints of nation-bound 
liberalization by forming global network systems. But whereas Virgin 
represents a single supra-organization (the US Department of Transportation 
(DOT) has called this a “sole carrier system”), the major global networks 
remain global airline alliances among a number of distinct individual/national 
carriers (i.e., “joint carrier systems”).61 
                                                
60 See e.g. EC, Commission Decision of 11/02/2004 declaring a concentration to be 
compatible with the common market (Case No COMP/M.3280 – AIR FRANCE / KLM) 
according to Council Regulation (EEC) No 4066/89 [2004] O.J. L 60/5 at para. 6 (transferring 
a 100 percent economic interest and 49 percent voting interest in KLM to Air France. See also 
Mendes de Leon, “A New Phase”, infra note 349 at 374-78 (providing a detailed analysis of 
this structure)). Other decisions offer other variants. EC, Commission Decision of 04/07/2005 
declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market (Case No IV/M.3770 – 
LUFTHANSA / SWISS) according to Council Regulation (EEC) no 4064/89 at paras. 6-7 
(creating a Swiss-law trust – AirTrust – to hold Swiss shares, with Lufthansa agreeing to 
acquire shares in AirTrust at different times: 11 percent immediately, 49 percent upon the 
concentration’s approval and 100 percent after securing sufficient third country rights); EU, 
Commission Decision of 14/07/2010 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the 
common market (Case No COMP/M.5747 - IBERIA / BRITISH AIRWAYS) according to 
Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 (establishing Spanish holding company TopCo for 
both airlines, each airline retaining separate operations and with shareholdings remaining the 
same) [Commission, Iberia/British Airways]. See also EC, Commission Decision of 
14/05/2009 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market (Case No 
COMP/M.5403 - LUFTHANSA / BMI) according to Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004; 
EC, Commission Decision of 22.6.2009 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the 
common market and EEA Agreement (Case No COMP/M.5335 – Lufthansa / SN Airholding); 
EC, Commission Decision of 28.8.2009 declaring a concentration to be compatible with the 
common market and the EEA Agreement (Case No COMP/M.5440 – Lufthansa / Austrian 
Airlines). 
61 US DOT, Statement of United States International Air Transportation Policy (3 May 1995), 
reprinted in Havel, Beyond Open Skies, supra note 10, 589 at 594 [US DOT, 1995 Policy 
Statement]. 
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 Alliances are the attempts of a commercialized, privatized industry to 
reduce costs, extend networks, circumvent market access and ownership and 
control restrictions, and ultimately curb competition between members while 
increasing competitive advantage vis-à-vis non-members.62 The earliest 
alliances, such as Northwest/KLM and US Airways/Lufthansa, provided 
equity to second-tier US airlines while extending access to each other’s largely 
complementary route networks, including to the US domestic market, through 
the practice of “code-sharing” (i.e. placing one operator’s code on the other’s 
operations).63 In each alliance, the US airline received a substantial capital 
injection, while both partners significantly expanded services on the other 
continent with relatively little capital expenditure.64 Regulators have 
recognized similar advantages across the transpacific.65 
                                                
62 See below at 200-04 & 266-68. The US has integrated this knowledge into its strategic 
liberalization policy. See generally below at 131-48. 
63 See US GAO, Impact of Changing Foreign Investment and Control Limits on U.S. Airlines 
(GAO/RCED-93-7, December 1992) (discussing alliances involving equity purchases 
between NWA/KLM and Continental/SAS) [GAO, FDI in Airlines]. See also Havel, Beyond 
Open Skies, supra note 10 at 201. Early on, it was thought that equity investment would 
solidify an otherwise superficial arrangement. See e.g. Paul Stephen Dempsey, “Carving the 
World into Fiefdoms: The Anticompetitive Future of Commercial Aviation” (2002) 27 Ann. 
Air & Sp. L. 247 at 271-80. These have turned out less solid than first thought. 
64 Ibid. Tiger’s investments in Mandala and SEAir provide similarly symbiotic exchange 
between these airlines. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
65 For example, both American/JAL and United/Continental/ANA alliances were reported to 
create roughly 15,000 new origin-destination pairs each, while American/JAL reported only 
three overlapping routes (New York-Tokyo, Los Angeles-Tokyo, and Chicago-Tokyo), 
Continental/ANA one (New York/Newark-Tokyo) and United/ANA five (Los Angeles-
Tokyo, Honolulu-Tokyo, San Fransisco-Tokyo, Chicago-Tokyo and Washington-Tokyo); 
only Washington-Tokyo was reduced from two to one competitor, while Washington serves 
as a transit hub for passengers from other locations. US DOT, Joint Application of American 
Airlines, Inc. and Japan Airlines International Co., Ltd. under 49 U.S.C. ss. 41308 and 41309 
for approval of and antitrust immunity for alliance agreements, Dkt No DOT-OST-2010-
0034-0001 (16 February 2010) at 17, 28-30; US DOT, Joint Application of All Nippon 
Airways Co., Ltd., Continental Airlines, Inc. and United Air Lines, Inc. under 49 U.S.C. ss. 
41308 and 41309 for approval and antitrust immunity for alliance agreements, Dkt No DOT-
OST-2009-0350-0001 (23 December 2009) at 15, 49-52. The two applications were 
consolidated and approved in late 2010. US DOT, U.S.-Japan Alliance Case, Dkt No DOT-
OST-2010-0059-0180, Order 2010-10-4, Show Cause Order (6 October 2010) (consolidating 
applications for antitrust immunity between American-JAL and United-Continental-ANA) 
[US DOT, US-Japan SCO]; US DOT, U.S.-Japan Alliance Case, Dkt No DOT-OST-2010-
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 Since these initial transatlantic pairings, alliances have intensified in 
depth and expanded in coverage. Three global alliances – Star Alliance 
(founded in 1997), oneworld (founded in 1999), and SkyTeam (founded in 
2000) –66 currently offer seemingly integrated global coverage through the 
networks of their member airlines. Table 1.2 provides a summary of alliance 
membership as of November 2012. 
 
Table 1.2: Current Airline Alliance Membership (as of November 
2012) 
 
Alliance Member Airlines 
Star Alliance Adria Airways; Aegean Airlines; Air Canada; Air China; 
Air New Zealand; ANA; Asiana Airlines; Austrian; 
Avianca/TACA Airlines; Brussels Airlines; Copa Airlines; 
Croatia Airlines; EGYPTAIR; Ethiopian Airlines; LOT 
Polish Airlines; Lufthansa; Scandinavian Airlines; 
Shenzhen Airlines; Singapore Airlines; South African 
Airways; Spanair; SWISS; TAM Airlines; TAP Portugal; 
THAI; Turkish Airlines; United; US Airways 
 
oneworld airberlin; American Airlines; British Airways; Cathay 
Pacific; Finnair; Iberia; Japan Airlines; LAN; Qantas; Royal 
Jordanian; S7 Airlines 
 
SkyTeam Aeroflot; Aerolineas Argentinas; Aeromexico; Air Europa; 
Air France; Alitalia; China Airlines; China Eastern; China 
Southern; CSA Czech Airlines; Delta; Kenya Airways; 
KLM; Korean Air; Middle Eat Airlines; Saudia; TAROM; 
Vietnam Airlines; Xiamen Air 
 
 
                                                
0059-0185, Order 2010-10-11, Final Order (10 November 2010) [US DOT, US-Japan Final 
Order]. 
66 See e.g. Star Alliance, “Travel the World with the Star Alliance Network”, online: 
<http://www.staralliance.com/en/about/member_airlines/>; Oneworld, “Member Airlines”, 
online: <http://www.oneworld.com/member-airlines/>; SkyTeam, “Our Members”, online: 
<http://www.skyteam.com/en/About-us/Our-members/>. See also Dan Reed, “More Travelers 
Loyal to Alliances, not Airlines” USA Today (4 March 2010), online: 
<http://www.usatoday.com/travel/flights/2010-03-03-airalliances25_CV_N.htm>. 
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 A key feature in nation-bound liberalization, alliances feature 
prominently in discussions in Chapters 3 and 4.67 However, a number of their 
features also play to the efficiency and participation norms and therefore merit 
a succinct discussion at this point. One basic criticism of alliances is that while 
they capture a significant portion of the benefits of merger (one report 
antedating “metal neutrality” (i.e., revenue sharing agreements that eliminate 
all forms of intra-alliance competition on those routes)68 describes benefits of 
                                                
67 See supra note 62. 
68 For immunized “metal neutral” agreements with the US, see US DOT, Joint Application of 
Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane-S.p.A., Czech Airlines, Delta Airlines, Inc., KLM Royal Dutch 
Airlines, Northwest Arilines, Inc, and Société Air France for Approval of and Antitrust 
Immunity for Alliance Agreements under 49 U.S.C. ss. 41308 and 41309, Dkt No DOT-OST-
2007-28644-0174, Order 2008-4-17, Show Cause Order (9 April 2008) [US DOT, SkyTeam II 
SCO]; US DOT, Joint Application of Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane-S.p.A., Czech Airlines, 
Delta Airlines, Inc., KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, Northwest Airlines, Inc, and Société Air 
France for Approval of and Antitrust Immunity for Alliance Agreements under 49 U.S.C. ss. 
41308 and 41309, Dkt No DOT-OST-2007-28644-0185, Order 2008-5-32, Final Order (22 
May 2008); US DOT, Joint Application of Air Canada, The Austrian Group, British Midland 
Airways Ltd, Continental Airlines, Inc., Deutsche Lufthansa AG, Polskie Linie Lotniecze LOT 
S.A., Scandinavian Airlines System, Swiss International Air Lines Ltd., TAP Air Portugal, and 
United Air Lines, Inc. to Amend Order 2007-2-16 under 49 U.S.C. ss. 41308 and 41309 so as 
to Approve and Confer Antitrust Immunity, Dkt No DOT-OST-2008-0234-0193, Order 2009-
4-5, Show Cause Order (7 April 2009); US DOT, Joint Application of Air Canada, The 
Austrian Group, British Midland Airways Ltd, Continental Airlines, Inc., Deutsche Lufthansa 
AG, Polskie Linie Lotniecze LOT S.A., Scandinavian Airlines System, Swiss international Air 
Lines Ltd., TAP Air Portugal, and United Air Lines, Inc. to Amend Order 2007-2-16 under 49 
U.S.C. ss. 41308 and 41309 so as to Approve and Confer Antitrust Immunity, Dkt No DOT-
OST-2008-0234-0253, Order 2009-7-10, Final Order (10 July 2009) [US DOT, Star 
Transatlantic Final] (see also US DOT, Joint Application of Air Canada, Austrian Group, 
British Midland Airways Limited, Continental Airlines, Inc., Deutsche Lufthansa AG, Polskie 
Linie Lotnicze LOT S.A., Scandinavian Airlines System, Swiss International Airlines Ltd., TAP 
Air Portugal, and United Air Lines, Inc. to amend Order 2007-2-16 under 49 U.S.C. ss. 41308 
and 41309 so as to approve and confer antitrust immunity, Dkt No DOT-OST-2008-0234-
0326, Order 2011-11-16 (14 November 2011) (adding Brussels Airlines)); US DOT, Joint 
Application of American Airlines, Inc., British Airways PLC, Finnair OYJ, Iberia Líneas 
Aéreas de España, S.A., and Royal Jordanian Airlines Under 49 U.S.C. ss. 41308-41309 for 
approval of and antitrust immunity for alliance agreements, Dkt No DOT-OST-2008-0252-
3390, Order 2010-2-8, Show Cause Order (13 February 2010) [US DOT, oneworld SCO]; US 
DOT, Joint Application of American Airlines, Inc., British Airways PLC, Finnair OYJ, Iberia 
Líneas Aéreas de España, S.A., and Royal Jordanian Airlines Under 49 U.S.C. ss. 41308-
41309 for approval of and antitrust immunity for alliance agreements, Dkt No DOT-OST-
2008-0252-3406, Order 2010-7-8 Final Order (20 July 2010); US DOT, US-Japan SCO, 
supra note 65; US DOT, US-Japan Final Order, supra note 65; US DOT, Joint Application of 
Delta Air Lines, Inc., Virgin Blue Airlines Pty Ltd, Virgin Blue International Airlines Pty Ltd 
d/b/a V Australia, Pacific Blue Airlines (NZ) Ltd, and Pacific Blue Airlines (Aust) Pty Ltd 
Under 49 U.S.C. ss. 41308-41309 for Approval of and Antitrust Immunity for Alliance 
Agreements, Dkt No DOT-OST-2009-0155-0026, Order 2010-9-4, Show Cause Order (8 
September 2010) (tentatively denying request); US DOT, Joint Application of Delta Air Lines, 
Inc., Virgin Blue Airlines Pty Ltd, Virgin Blue International Airlines Pty Ltd d/b/a V Australia, 
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between 70 to 80 percent of those expected from mergers),69 for the same 
reasons as joint ventures among LCCs in East Asia, they do not capture all of 
them and are thus a second best model for efficient global airline systems.70 
More difficult to address are the effects of uneven and incomplete integration 
within alliances and of uneven alliance membership within a region. This 
section briefly addresses the former, while the following section broaches the 
latter. 
 While outwardly singular, it is imperative to recognize that levels of 
integration vary between alliance members. For example, without metal 
neutrality, individual members retain the revenues earned on a particular route 
and thus an incentive to compete amongst each other across a route.71 
Moreover, some levels of cooperation remain tied to states accepting a 
specified degree of liberalization. This has been particularly felt in 
relationships with the US: because current restrictions prevent cross-border 
mergers, a number of alliance activities (such as price coordination) fall afoul 
of the US’ per se antitrust laws.72 While the US DOT may grant these 
practices antitrust immunity through powers conferred to it by the Federal 
                                                
Pacific Blue Airlines (NZ) Ltd, and Pacific Blue Airlines (Aust) Pty Ltd Under 49 U.S.C. ss. 
41308-41309 for Approval of and Antitrust Immunity for Alliance Agreements, Dkt No DOT-
OST-2009-0155-0055, Order 2011-5-8, Show Cause Order (10 May 2011) (tentatively 
granting immunity based on changes to application); US DOT, Joint Application of Delta Air 
Lines, Inc., Virgin Blue Airlines Pty Ltd, Virgin Blue International Airlines Pty Ltd d/b/a V 
Australia, Pacific Blue Airlines (NZ) Ltd, and Pacific Blue Airlines (Aust) Pty Ltd Under 49 
U.S.C. ss. 41308-41309 for Approval of and Antitrust Immunity for Alliance Agreements, Dkt 
No DOT-OST-2009-0155-0062, Order 2011-6-9, Final Order (10 June 2011). See also 
generally Mifsud, supra note 11. 
69 Charles A. Hunnicutt, “Competition Policy and International Airline Alliances” (2004) 29 
Ann. Air & Sp. L. 175 at 177 (citing Merrill Lynch, Global Airline Alliances (25 September 
1998) at 2). 
70 For a recent study that reaches this conclusion, see e.g. Havel, Beyond Open Skies, supra 
note 10 at 164. 
71 A point made, inter alia, by Mifsud in his discussion of intra-alliance fragmentation. See 
Mifsud, supra note 11 at 122-27. 
72 See e.g. ibid. 
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Aviation Act, it has required an open skies agreement as a precondition for 
immunity (see further Chapter 3).73 
 In a nation-bound system, this competition causes problems. China 
offers an excellent case in point: although the Chinese “Big Three” are all 
alliance members, intra-alliance competition (e.g. gateway competition from 
Korea or Japan,74 or beyond China competition from US airlines (e.g., 
Beijing-Singapore)) has resulted in China and the US failing to agree to open 
skies (see further Chapters 5 and 6).75 Thus, inter-carrier activities have not 
received immunity from US antitrust law. While certainly differences in 
competitiveness count for some of China’s hesitation, Chinese interests must 
certainly also be concerned with US airlines’ ability to leverage differences in 
market access commitments on intermediate/beyond markets with third 
countries (it is “intermediate” or “beyond” the reference states depending on 
which bilateral is referenced). For example, US airlines operating New York-
Beijing-Singapore may operate the final segment with no restrictions, while 
until recently Chinese airlines would be limited in their operational decisions. 
In the meantime, China has begun liberalizing many of these markets, such as 
ASEAN-China (see Chapter 4),76 presumably in part to ensure local capacity 
captures those markets prior to permitting US carrier entry. 
 
                                                
73 See generally below at 142-47 (discussing the standard for immunity, its political role in 
moving liberalization forward, and metal neutrality as the outer limit to nation-bound inter-
airline cooperation). 
74 There is a long history of competition between international gateways, one that the US has 
been quick to capitalize on (see below at 137-41). 
75 See below at 285-90 & 354-55. 
76 See below at 256-60. 
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2.2. The Challenge of Participation in the Transition to Global Aviation 
Markets 
 
These inefficiencies have long been recognized. Indeed, although global 
recognition of the need for new institutions is relatively new, demands for a 
certain level of flexibility are as old as Chicago.77 Yet efficiency is not the 
only primary norm of the system – it must still answer the demands for 
participation.78 However, with the exception of the EU, the concept of 
participation has been deeply embedded within a number of state interests, 
preventing thus far many of the reforms needed to adapt the instruments to the 
structural changes in the transnational economy. This section breaks down the 
issues surrounding participation into three heuristics: competitiveness, 
reciprocity, and a residual of non-economic concerns. 
 While sundry context-specific issues exist, the root of participation’s 
concerns with competitiveness is located in the persistence of nation-
boundedness. In this regard, while rhetorically discussions involve the 
                                                
77 See below at 100-02 (discussing Venezuela’s position on ownership and control) & 314-26 
(discussing the development of multinational registration systems and the “community of 
interest” principle). 
78 Speaking at the 5th Worldwide Air Transport Conference, then-President of the ICAO 
Council Assad Kotaite put the primacy of the participation norm in the following terms: 
 
Liberalization, as a process and a methodology rather than an objective, must be 
judged by its consequences and its benefits, and not by its theoretical underpinnings. 
The opportunities of liberalization must be placed in the context of its challenges. It is 
especially important that liberalization does not result in the omission of any State 
wishing to participate in international air transport. That participation is another well-
established Convention principle. It is, of course, for each State to determine the nature 
of its participation in the light of realities and opportunities. This Conference, 
therefore, must address the concerns that many States have for the sustainability and 
viability of their participation in the liberalization process. 
 
Dr. Assad Koraite (Address at the Opening Session of the Fifth Worldwide Air Transport 
Conference, Montreal, 24-29 March 2003) at 2-3. 
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development of global aviation markets, in practice most states continue to 
pursue more self-interested, strategic goals. Read in terms of state interests, 
liberalization becomes a means of exploiting the competitive advantages of its 
national industry against another national industry, whether by having more 
efficient airlines or by leveraging factors such as lower input (e.g. labor) costs, 
level of economic development, or the relative size of a protected domestic 
market, to gain market share in international markets.79 These issues are 
embedded in the US model of liberalization, the “open skies” (see further 
Chapters 3 and 5);80 indeed, the DOT’s most recent international air transport 
policy statement, which calls for a shift to global markets and then declares its 
national industry’s ability to exploit those markets, clearly exhibits these 
tendencies.81 Similar structures of national interest emerge from proposals for 
global reform such as IATA’s Agenda for Freedom and the US’ proposed 
Draft Multilateral on Foreign Investment, both of which feature in Chapter 3.82 
 Competitiveness is also complicated by the specific institutional 
characteristics of bilateralism as well as by its dynamic nature. Institutionally, 
the bilateral state-to-state negotiating process both increases the bargaining 
strength of the strong and creates an uneven distribution of benefits among 
                                                
79 See e.g. infra note 81. For a comparative study of many national industries, see also Tae 
Hoon Oum & Chunyan Yu, “Cost Competitiveness of Major Airlines: An International 
Comparison” (1998) 32 J. Transp. Res. A. 407. 
80 See below at 131-48. One particularly useful depiction of open skies is Brian Havel’s 
description of it as “stretching” the nation-bound system. See Havel, Beyond Open Skies, 
supra note 10 at 13 (noting that “[o]pen skies was designed to stretch the negotiating 
framework of the Chicago system to its point of maximum tolerance.”). For a description of 
the principal components of open skies, see infra note 854 and accompanying text. 
81 Indeed, the US Policy Statement not only emphasizes national competitiveness, but also the 
dynamic nature of competitive advantage. US DOT, 1995 Policy Statement, supra note 61 at 
594. See infra note 411 and accompanying text for a reproduction of the passage in full. 
82 See below at 194-98 & 204-07. Importantly, both structures leave open not only the option 
of maintaining the internal lock (a point made below at 199), but also the bilateral power 
structure (on bilateralism, see infra notes 156-57 and accompanying text). 
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even like-minded states. Indeed, for 30 years the entire postwar order of the air 
reflected a fairly stark division between agreements with the US, which were 
relatively liberal, and agreements with other states, which made deeper 
incursions into economic activity.83 In this way, bilateralism became a 
deliberate tactic to achieve the policy aims of a strong minority of interests – a 
point discussed further in Chapter 2.84 Similarly, the roots of plurilateralism 
(i.e. an agreement between a small number of states that remains open to 
others for signature) in air transport lie in the desire to ensure an even 
distribution of liberalization’s benefits among a group of states with dissimilar 
bargaining strengths (see further Chapter 6).85 
 Nation-boundedness and bilateralism also shape and are shaped by the 
types of expectations embedded in the system. In this regard, reciprocity has 
been particularly specific, and has led to the “regulatory micromanagement”86 
of much of the system by route, limits on capacity and/or frequencies, and 
even through the division of revenues earned in a bilaterally created 
international market: even in less strictly controlled operating environments, 
specific forms of reciprocity virtually dominate the industry. Again, Chapters 
2 and 6 develop the roles of reciprocity of exchange in shaping the 
institutionalized bargains reflected in the system in further detail.87 
 States have adopted a number of mechanisms to address issues of 
competitiveness and reciprocity. On the one hand, they employ a broad range 
                                                
83 See below at 106-12. 
84 See ibid. 
85 See below at 398-402. 
86 Havel, Beyond Open Skies, supra note 10 at 357. 
87 In particular, they look at the roles of specific and diffuse reciprocity in air transport 
relations, as well as the possibility of moving beyond them. See generally below at 112-15 & 
380-97. 
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of transitional arrangements to structure liberalization through difficult phases 
that threaten participation or otherwise raise political hurdles that cannot be 
surmounted through one-off liberalization. Whether applied equally to all 
airlines or only to a sub-set of (usually national) airlines, such measures 
supply reform incrementally so as to even out differences, mitigate harms, 
balance distributions more equitably, and structure airlines’ preparations and 
responses across a period of time – in other words, to play to the dynamic 
elements in liberalization. Their efficacy is attested to by their wide adoption, 
from several East Asian agreements with the US (see Chapter 5)88 to the EU’s 
own process of integration through a series of three “packages” (see Chapter 
3).89 A major part of Chapter 6 is dedicated to discussing such participation 
and preferential measures, both in themselves and their possible effects on 
perceptions of reciprocity.90  
 On the other hand, features of non-national organization – particularly 
revisions to the ownership and control rules – not only emphasize differences 
in competitive positions: by equalizing access to capital markets and 
technical/managerial know-how, they also level the playing field. Again, these 
are not new claims.91 At the same time, states have devised means of 
restricting non-reciprocal exchange, such as the “no-free rider clauses” found 
in agreements with the EU designed to prevent carriers whose home member 
state maintains restrictions or has no relationship with a third party from using 
the amended “Community” carrier clause in bilateral agreements to gain 
                                                
88 See infra notes 879-94 and accompanying text. 
89 See below at 149-63. 
90 See generally below at 347-97. 
91 See below at 101-02. For successful uses of foreign inputs (including equity investment) in 
East Asia, see below at 213-15. 
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access through a second member state (see further Chapter 3).92 Other 
proposals seeking to deal with reciprocity in different ways are discussed in 
Chapter 6.93 
 Finally, there are some differences between relaxing market access 
restrictions and relaxing ownership and control rules in terms of their effects 
on labor markets and regulatory oversight. These points are developed further 
in Chapter 5.94 
 States are not alone in influencing the participation norm, with private 
actors also playing important roles in affecting participation in positive and 
negative ways. The incomplete distribution of alliance networks in an area – 
that is, where some states’ airlines participate in global alliances and others 
remain outside of their global networks – is a primary example of this. As seen 
from the previous section, alliances can significantly increase network 
coverage and significantly lower costs to members.95 For alliance members, 
such agreements ensure the continued participation of its airline – a fact 
emphasized by the nearly universal link between open skies and demands for 
immunity across US-European and US-Northeast Asian markets.96 But in 
regional or global markets, situations where some national networks are in and 
some out of global networks alliances also provide significant competitive 
advantages to the insider. Indeed, the US has built this knowledge into its 
aviation policy through a strategy of “divide and conquer”, using the price and 
network effects of liberal agreements and immunized alliances to force more 
                                                
92 See below at 169-70. 
93 See below at 380-97. 
94 See below at 339-42. 
95 See supra notes 64-65. 
96 See below at 142-45. 
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conservative/protectionist states to reconsider their international aviation 
policy (see further Chapter 3).97 
 The problem of incomplete alliance membership is also felt in 
Southeast Asia, where Thai International and Singapore Airlines have 
longstanding histories of participation in alliances, and both are currently part 
of Star,98 while others have only recently joined (e.g. Vietnam Airlines 
(SkyTeam, 2010))99 and airlines in large, potentially lucrative markets (e.g. 
Garuda, Philippine Airlines and Malaysia Airlines) have yet to join, although 
some are expected to join in the coming year.100 Chapter 4 discusses this issue 
in the context of ASEAN efforts at liberalization and integration,101 while 
Chapter 7 offers some final thoughts on how applying for and obtaining 
alliance membership might affect demands for liberalization.102 
 Beyond the strategic concerns regarding the impact of uneven and 
unequal liberalization on a nation-bound industry, states also possess a 
                                                
97 See below at 136-41. 
98 Thai is a founding member of Star, while Singapore Airlines joined Star later that year. SIA 
had previously participated in a trilateral marketing alliance with Swissair and Delta called the 
“Global Excellence Program”, which ran from 1989 to November 1997. The dissolution of the 
Global Excellence Program paved the way for SIA’s induction into Star and Delta’s later 
participation in SkyTeam. See e.g. Havel, Beyond Open Skies, supra note 10 at 200-01, fn 
413. 
99 Leithen Francis, “Vietnam Airlines Formally Joins SkyTeam” Flight Global (10 June 2010), 
online: <http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/vietnam-airlines-formally-joins-skyteam-
343109/>. 
100 See generally Skyteam, “Garuda Indonesia”, online: <http://www.skyteam.com/en/About-
us/Our-members/Future-SkyTeam-Members/GARUDA-INDONESIA/>; oneworld, 
“Members Elect”, online: <http://www.oneworld.com/member-airlines/members-elect/>. 
Formerly, MAS had been approved for an immunized alliance agreement with Northwest. See 
generally US DOT, Joint Application of Northwest Airlines, Inc. and Malaysia Airline System 
Berhad for approval of and Antitrust Immunity for a Coordination Agreement under 49 U.S.C. 
41308 and 41309, Dkt No DOT-OST-2000-6791-0008, Order 2000-10-12, Order Granting 
Approval and Antitrust Immunity for a Coordination Agreement (13 October 2000). The 
agreement was never implemented, and closed out 24 May 2007. See generally US DOT, 
Order 2007-5-16, Order Terminating Proceedings (24 May 2007) (terminating the 
NWA/MAS alliance among others). 
101 See below at 266-72. 
102 See below at 445-46. 
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residual of non-economic concerns. One such concern is with the effects of 
foreign ownership and directorship on particular emergency programs, such as 
the US’ Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), which allows US airlines to 
voluntarily agree to allow the US Department of Defense to utilize its aircraft 
for wartime troop transport in exchange for access to lucrative peacetime 
contracts.103 Thailand holds similar concerns over its national system’s ability 
to provide emergency airlift capacity.104 Both programs have also provided 
arguments for refraining from liberalization that would open national markets 
beyond open skies (see further Chapters 3 and 4).105 In the US context, those 
advocating moving beyond nationality argue that foreign participation would 
not negatively impact the CRAF program and suggest that both the lucrative 
peacetime market and, possibly, an amendment requiring CRAF participation 
for airlines entering the US market would prove adequate in ensuring its 
continuance.106 Similar arguments might be made for Thai concerns. 
 Concern may also be expressed over the nature of foreign investment 
more generally. In particular, two dimensions stand out as concerns for states, 
especially developing countries: the relatively more footloose nature of 
foreign capital, in which downward trends might critically impact services in 
the country/region, and the possibility of state capture by foreign enterprises, 
resulting in foreign-controlled enterprises controlling part of the state’s 
                                                
103 See e.g. The Brattle Group, The Economic Impact of an EU-US Open Aviation Area (2002) 
at c. 7, online: <http://www.brattle.com/_documents/UploadLibrary/Upload335.pdf>. See also 
Brian Hindley, Trade Liberalization in Aviation Services: Can the Doha Round Free Flight? 
(Washington D.C.: AEI Press, 2004) at 11-14; Lelieur, supra note 52 at 86-89, 153. 
104 See Thomas et al., infra notes 116 at 63. See also Tan, “Prospects for ASAM”, supra note 
44 at 275. 
105 See e.g. below at 147-48, 174-80 (noting the US’ resistance to moving beyond the nation-
bound airline paradigm) & 242-43, Table 4.1 (noting the same in the Philippines and 
Thailand). 
106 See supra note 103. 
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transport infrastructure.107 These issues have generally been resolved through 
national ownership and control provisions. Exceptionally, the Philippines has 
a constitutional limitation on foreign ownership of public utilities, meaning 
that foreign interests cannot own more than 40 percent of any Philippines 
airline without a prior amendment to the constitution.108 With or without the 
constitutional protections, such issues would need to be addressed by the 
reformed regulatory structure. 
 
3. REGIONALISM AS AN INSTITUTION FOR REGULATORY REFORM 
 
Concerns over participation and efficiency can be addressed in a number of 
ways. While the thesis focuses on the regional “path” to liberalization in the 
East Asian region, the regional is by no means the only one to regulatory 
reform. Nor is one path pursued at the cost of another. Indeed, at least four 
paths – continued bilateral reform, lead-sector (usually all-cargo) reform, 
limited multilateralism (including regionalism and plurilateralism), and 
universal multilateralism109 – feature prominently in general discussions of 
                                                
107 See e.g. Commission on Trade in Goods and Services, and Commodities, Report of the 
Expert Meeting on Air Transport Services: Clarifying Issues to Define the Elements of the 
Positive Agenda of Developing Countries as Regards both the GATS and Specific Sector 
Negotiations of Interest to Them, UNCTAD TDBOR, UNCTAD Doc. T/B/COM.1/EM/9/3 
(23 August 1999) at 15, para. 57 (noting that “[o]ne expert warned that when alliances include 
airlines with considerable disparities in size, resources, market power and access to finance 
and technology, they might entail risks for the weaker partners. In the case of Africa, for 
example, airlines are going through the process of privatization and becoming involved in 
alliances, but they are also becoming too dependent on foreign capital and companies.”). 
UNCTAD has also provided an overview of trade interests, economic issues and public policy 
concerns in UNCTAD, The Positive Agenda, supra note 12 at 10-16, paras. 32-53. For this 
reason, developing countries have been particularly concerned with pursuing the participation 
and preferential instruments discussed in Chapter 6. 
108 See e.g. Tan, “Policy in the Philippines”, supra note 45 at 288 & 305. 
109 See e.g. ICC, supra note 8. For a discussion of three attempts at global multilateral change, 
see generally below at 181-84, 194-97 & 204-07 (discussing GATS, the Agenda for Freedom, 
and the US’ 2010 Draft Multilateral on Foreign Investment). The OECD has done a study on 
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liberalization. They are also to be found in the discussions in the chapters 
below. 
 Still, among the various paths regionalism has played a particularly 
important role in reforming regulatory instruments. Without exception, all 
geographical regions exhibit some form of cooperation in the air transport 
field, almost all to open skies and some beyond, while regional relations 
among developing nations form the earliest attempts at deconstructing strict 
nationality rules (see further Chapter 5).110 And more states have expressed 
significantly more comfort with regional “communities” than with universal 
openness.111 This section anchors these preferences within the normative 
framework presented above, addressing issues of efficiency and participation 
in turn. It then turns to analyze how regionalism fits within broader attempts at 
global regulatory reform. 
 
3.1. Regionalism and the Efficiency Norm 
 
One argument for a regional approach to liberalization stems from the fact that 
regional reform captures a particularly significant portion of the gains 
expected from liberalization, both in terms of transport networks and its 
effects on economic activity more broadly. This is the result of multiple scalar 
                                                
air-cargo liberalization, which is discussed infra notes 914-16 and accompanying text. On the 
theory of plurilateral agreements in theory, see e.g. Henri A. Wassenbergh, “A New 
Plurilateral Approach to International Air Transport Regulation” in Henri A. Wassenbergh & 
H. Peter van Fenema, eds., International Air Transport in the Eighties: The Changing Scene 
(Deventer: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1981), 205 [Wassenbergh, “Plurilateral 
Approach”]. For MALIAT and the EU-US Agreement as plurilateral initiative, see below at 
190-97. On the EU-US Agreement, see also generally Havel, Beyond Open Skies, supra note 
10 (arguing for the US-EU agreement as the basis for a wider plurilateral approach). For 
(constructive) criticism of the plurilateral approach, see below at 397-402. 
110 See below at 314-26. 
111 See e.g. ICAO, Report AT/Conf 4, supra note 16 at 23-24, paras. 2.3.5.2-2.3.5.3. 
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levels of economic transnationalism: despite the singular world-scale 
suggested by “globalization”, many of the processes encapsulated within the 
term are of a singularly regional dimension. Thus, while finance may be said 
to operate at a truly global scale, recent work on international trade patterns, 
fragmenting production chains, and the operations of multinational 
corporations all demonstrate clear patterns of economic regionalization.112 
 A principal source of demands for liberal market reform is from the 
mix of business interests using or otherwise relying on air services.113 And one 
way of understanding these interests is in terms of transport costs. Indeed, 
“[i]n a system of free trade, the prices of individual commodities can vary 
only by the amount of transportation costs.”114 Given liberalization’s role in 
lowering average costs and expanding networks,115 this phrase succinctly 
                                                
112 See e.g. Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Globalization: What’s New? What’s 
Not? (And So What?) (2000) 118 Foreign Policy 104 at 110-11; Masahisa Fujita, 
“Globalization, Regional Integration and Spatial Economics: An Introduction” in Masahisa 
Fujita, ed., Regional Integration in East Asia from the Viewpoint of Spatial Economics 
(Basingstoke & New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2007), 1 at 2-6 (noting: (1) that NAFTA, the 
EU, and East Asia, had each increased its concentration of world GDP over the period 1980-
2000, with the aggregate (83 percent in 2000) evenly distributed between the three by 2000; 
and (2) that in 2003 each region’s intra-regional trade shares (i.e. percentage of intra-regional 
trade relative to global trade) approximated fifty percent, up significantly for both NAFTA 
and East Asia from numbers in the 1980s.); Alan M. Rugman, “Regional Multinationals and 
the Myth of Globalization” in Andrew F. Cooper, Christopher W. Hughes & Philippe de 
Lombaerde, Regionalisation and Global Governance: The Taming of Globalisation? 
(Abingdon and New York: Routledge 2008), 99 at 100 (noting that only nine of the world’s 
largest 500 multinational enterprises had at least 20 percent of sales in North America, 
Europe, and East Asia, while 320 of the 380 multinational enterprises for which data was 
available had an average of 80 percent of total sales in their home region) (citing Alan M. 
Rugman, The Regional Multinationals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005)). 
113 Again, Michael Levine provides one interesting theory in this area, explaining the 
persistence of US deregulation (and the Canadian regulator’s reentry in their domestic market) 
in terms of the relative cohesion of airline interests and the demands of the general public (and 
the media’s influence on them). Levine, “Reregulated?”, supra note 38. For a less theoretical 
discussion of business and airline interests in the Philippines, see Tan, “Policy in the 
Philippines”, supra note 45. 
114 Bela Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration (Homewood, Illinois: R.D. Irwin, 1961) 
at 23. See also Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation, 2nd Beacon Paperback (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 2001) at 59-70 (identifying local and external trade as naturally occurring 
forms of trade (as opposed to internal trade created by national trade policy), and 
distinguishing the two by the transportability of the goods). 
115 See generally supra note 24. 
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captures a wide range of businesses’ interests in the liberalization process. 
Indeed, liberalization can have a number of important effects for a wide range 
of industries: lower costs and expanded network coverage play important roles 
in stimulating tourism growth,116 they extend the reach of time-sensitive, 
perishable goods, and they permit a range of other industries to take advantage 
of lower input costs abroad, causing production chains to fragment across 
national borders to exploit a lower aggregate of transformation plus transport 
costs.117 
 But the effects of lowering transport costs also have limits, resulting in 
more appreciable changes among more proximate states.118 Given this 
geographic limit on the effect of liberalization in terms of users’ production 
and consumption geographies, one might therefore expect that regional 
                                                
116 See e.g. the analysis of benefits in CAPA Consulting’s 2008 report, Ian Thomas, David 
Stone, Alan Khee-Jin Tan, Andrew Drysdale, & Phil McDermott, Developing ASEAN’s Single 
Aviation Market and Regional Air Services Arrangements with Dialogue Partners (Final 
Report, June 2008, REPSF II Project No. 07/003) at 128-45. For a critical approach to 
liberalization’s link to tourism, see WTO, “Liberalization with a Human Face: The Aviation 
Dimension” (ICAO Doc ATConf/5-WP32, January 2003). 
117 In other words, by lowering the transport costs sufficiently, goods become cheaper to 
produce abroad and ship to the consumer market than to produce in the higher cost local 
economy. There is a wealth of recent work on this phenomenon. For example, new economic 
geography attempts to theorize and empirically test the effects of transport costs on industrial 
location, often with interesting implications. See e.g. Paul Krugman, “Increasing Returns and 
Economic Geography” (1991) 99 J. Pol. Econ. 483; Paul Krugman & Anthony Venables, 
“Globalization and the Inequality of Nations” (1994) 110 Q.J. Econ. 857; Paul Krugman, 
Anthony Venables & Masahisa Fujita, The Spatial Economy: Cities, Regions, and 
International Trade (Cambridge, Massachussets: The MIT Press, 1999); Paul Krugman, “The 
‘New’ Economic Geography: Where Are We?” in Fujita, ed., supra note 112, 23 at 24 
[Krugman, “Where are We?”]; Nuno Limão & Anthony Venables, “Infrastructure, 
Geographical Disadvantage, Transport Costs, and Trade” (1999) 15 World Bank Econ. Rev. 
451 (finding that “If a country could improve its infrastructure from the median to the top 25th 
percentile, then its CIF/FOB factor would fall from 1.28 to 1.11, this being equivalent to 
becoming 2,358 km closer to all its trading partners. Conversely, deterioration in 
infrastructure from the median to the 75th percentile raises the predicted CIF/FOB factor from 
1.28 to 1.40, equivalent to becoming 2,016 km further away from all trading partners.” Ibid. at 
459-60). See also Mei Wen, “Relocation and Agglomeration of Chinese Industry” (2004) 74 J. 
of Dev. Econ. 329 (using spatial economic analysis to discuss China’s spatialized economy).  
118 See e.g. Balassa, supra note 114 at 41 (distinguishing between geographical distance and 
economic distance, which is made up of geographical distance, transport costs, and 
infrastructure quality); Alejandro Micco & Tomàs Serebrisky, “Competition Regimes and Air 
Transport Costs: The Effects of Open Skies Agreements” (2006) 70 J. Int’l Econ. 25 at 26 
(noting the correlation between geographic distance and trade). 
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patterns find priority of place in many states’ air transport policies. The fact 
that this accurately describes actual practices among states – including 
ASEAN’s “prioritizing” air transport liberalization as a means of supporting 
the competitive advantage of other industries and South Korea’s attempts at 
forming a Northeast Asian trilateral aviation area (see generally Chapter 4) – 
lends a great deal of support to such an assumption. 
 Data regarding the air transport industry itself also emphasizes the 
importance of the regional scale. For example, The World Trade 
Organization’s (WTO) QUASAR data set, which measures the relative 
openness of air transport relationships,119 attributes 3.5 million annual 
passenger movements to the Indonesia-Singapore market, making it the single 
most important for both countries.120 In contrast, the largest market between 
either state and a European country is only ½ to 1 million passengers, while 
combined the two countries only see between 250,000 to 700,000 passenger 
movements to/from the US.121 Of the ASEAN member states, only the 
Philippines ranks the United States first in passenger movements, while the 
maximum aggregate value for movements between all ten countries and the 
US – slightly over 4.1 million passengers – is only 600,000 more than the 
                                                
119 See WTO, “WTO – Air Services Agreements Projector (ASAP)”, online: 
<http://www.wto.org/asap/index.html> [WTO, “ASAP”]. ASAP utilizes the QUASAR (which 
stands for Quantitative Air Services Agreement Review) data set to visualize and compare 
agreements across a wide range of countries. See WTO, “The WTO Launches Analytical Tool 
on Air Services” (14 June 2010), online: 
<http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news10_e/serv_14jun10_e.htm>. 
120 WTO, “ASAP”, ibid. 
121 Ibid. (In contrast to a number of intra-regional pairings of over 1 million passengers, the 
ASAP estimates 500,000 to 1 million passengers move over the Singapore-United Kingdom 
market; the Indonesia-Germany pairing represents only 200,000 to 500,000 passengers. 
Traffic between Singapore and the United States is estimated at between 200,000 and 500,000 
passengers, while traffic volumes for the Indonesia-United States market is estimated at a 
mere 50,000 to 200,000). 
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Singapore-Indonesia market.122 Other data suggests similar conclusions. A 
2008 report by CAPA Consulting to the ASEAN Secretariat (see further 
Chapter 4)123 noted that intra-ASEAN routes comprised 52.3 percent of all 
international seats operated by ASEAN airlines.124 Of the remaining passenger 
seats, travel to China, South Korea, and Japan accounted for 29.6 percent of 
total demand.125 In contrast, ASEAN-Europe travel account for only 12.7 
percent, while ASEAN-US travel made up just 4.3 percent of total seats 
flown.126 
 The link between proximity and demand shows itself in other relations 
as well. As might be expected, intercontinental traffic remains much more 
important for Northeast Asian countries, particularly over the transpacific and 
particularly for Japan.127 Nor is this link between proximity and trade volume 
peculiar to East Asia: QUASAR notes that the US-Canada market supports up 
to 4 million and the US-Mexico market up to 1.5 million more passenger 
movements than the US-UK market, the third largest market for the US, by far 
                                                
122 Ibid. (the breakdown would include: Brunei (0 pax); Cambodia (1,000 pax); Indonesia 
(200,000 pax); Laos (0 pax); Malaysia (200,000 pax); Myanmar (1,000 pax); Philippines (1.5 
million pax); Singapore (1 million pax); Thailand (1 million pax); Vietnam (200,000 pax). 
123 See below at 241-44 & 267-68. 
124 Thomas et al., supra note 116 at 149 (their data is taken from OAG 2008). 
125 Ibid. at 150. The data is also broken down for China (12.0 percent) Korea (7.3 percent) 
Japan (10.3 percent). Travel to/from ASEAN member states and Hong Kong accounts for 
another 11.9 percent and Taiwan 7.2 percent of total international seats. Ibid. 
126 Ibid. Of the European seats, the EU accounts for 11.0 percent and other European 
destinations 1.7 percent of total output. In comparison, India and South Asia account for 9.7 
percent, Oceania 11.6 percent, and the Middle East 9.7 percent of international seats. Ibid. 
127 WTO, “ASAP”, supra note 119. The ASAP records 11-11.5 million passengers moving 
between Japan and the United States, as compared to 6.5-7 million between Japan and South 
Korea. On the other hand, South Korea demonstrates much higher traffic volumes between 
South Korea and Japan (6.5-7 million pax) or China (5.5-6 million pax) relative to volumes 
between it and the United States (3-3.5 million pax). China’s traffic to/from the United States 
is also relatively lower (2-2.5 million pax). The comparison, however, is incomplete, as the 
ASAP does not provide for data on the China-Japan market. 
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the largest European gateway, the seat of a rather vicious 30 year political 
contest, and the focus of much academic writing.128 
 There also appears to be a strong regional scalar limit to the low-cost 
business model. On the transatlantic, open skies has failed to stimulate either 
established LCCs or new entrants from either side of the Atlantic to enter the 
market. This may be the result of a number of factors, ranging from robust 
competition from network carriers on trunk routes, passenger preferences on 
intercontinental service, the use of different aircraft types, and particular 
aspects of the low-cost model concentrated on particular sets of routes.129 And 
while AirAsia X’s flights on between Kuala Lumpur-London and Kuala 
Lumpur-Paris broke the mold for intercontinental low-cost travel, those 
services were suspended earlier this year to concentrate on building long-haul 
capacity between South- and Northeast Asia and Australasia,130 suggesting a 
similar limit to interest, if not profitability. 
 
3.2. Regionalism and the Participation Norm 
                                                
128 Ibid. (indicating the US-Canada market is made up of 18.0-18.5 million passengers, the 
US-Mexico market 15.5-16.0 million, and the US-UK 14.5-15.0 million. The US-Japan 
market follows in fourth with 11.0-11.5 million passengers. Perhaps the most startling figure 
is the number of passengers carried on the US-Dominican Republic country pair: at 3.0-3.5 
million passengers, this equals the estimate for the US-South Korea country pair, and is 
significantly higher than the US-Netherlands country pair (2.5-3.0 million passengers)). This 
is also true of US trade relationships more broadly. Both Canada and Mexico do significantly 
more trade with the US than any EU member state, despite many EU member economies 
being significantly larger than either. Indeed, Canada, “a Spain-sized economy” only eight 
percent of the EU, does more trade with the US than the entire EU, an “outsized” relationship 
that antedates NAFTA or the other US-Canada trade relationships. Krugman, “Where Are 
We?”, supra note 117 at 26. 
129 See generally e.g. Vasigh et al., supra note 36 at 328 (noting that “international” air 
transport remains the domain of the legacy carriers). 
130 See “AirAsia Suspends Flights to London, Paris in Cost-Cutting Effort” Sydney Morning 
Herald (13 January 2012), online: <http://www.smh.com.au/travel/travel-news/airasia-
suspends-flights-to-london-paris-in-costcutting-effort-20120113-1pych.html> (noting 
comments from AirAsia X CEO Asran Osman-Rani as citing high costs and low demand from 
Europe as the reasons for removing service). 
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Regions are not only important for the de facto processes of economic 
regionalization that they represent. In many cases, thickening economic 
integration and interdependence has also increased states’ needs for new forms 
of governing these transnational markets. As institutionalized inter- or 
transgovernmental forms of governance, regionalism represents one method of 
asserting political authority over markets.131 It is arguably regionalism’s 
political importance that establishes its role for liberalization. 
 Of course, regionalism is not the only instrument states employ to 
control transnational activity. On the one hand, extraterritorial jurisdiction, 
usually tied to an attempt to control one or more anticompetitive “effects” that 
firm behavior outside a particular state has within it, provides an important 
tool to control anticompetitive activities of transnational dimensions.132 On the 
other hand, organizations such as ICAO, the WTO, or the UN offer more 
universal, consensus-based forms of political representation. 
 Yet while both forms of governance have benefits and advantages, 
when compared with regionalism each also possesses demonstrable 
limitations. The unilateral nature of extraterritorial jurisdiction can often 
undermine its legitimacy among others affected by the decision, while the 
efficacy of the extraterritorial mechanism itself relies on either the state’s 
                                                
131 See e.g. Bjoern Hettne & Fredrick Soederbaum, “The Future of Regionalism: Old Divides, 
New Frontiers” in Cooper et al., supra note 112, 61. Hettne’s use of Karl Polanyi’s “double 
movement”, in which authority subordinates itself to the market before the market’s 
destructive effects require authority to reassert itself over the market, to explain regionalism’s 
political role also links well into Ruggie’s essentially Polanyian framework. See Ruggie, 
“Embedded Liberalism”, supra note 4 at 385-92. 
132 See e.g. David J. Gerber, Global Competition: Law, Markets, and Globalization (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010) at c. 3; Bernhard Grossfeld & C. Paul Rogers, “A Shared 
Values Approach to Jurisdictional Conflicts in International Economic Law” (1983) 32 
I.C.L.Q. 947 at 947 (noting the source of the debate over extraterritoriality attaches to that 
over enforcement of US antitrust law). 
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ability to enforce the decision on assets at home or to get, through pressure if 
necessary, another state to enforce the decision on its behalf.133 The nearly 
universal opposition to the US Civil Aeronautics Board’s (CAB) unilateral 
attempt to dismantle the IATA ratemaking system, briefly discussed in 
Chapter 3, offers one example of the potential difficulties of unilateral 
approaches to issues of global governance.134 At the same time, organizations 
based on universal participation have with few exceptions failed to move 
beyond contests over relatively atomized visions of independent national 
interests.135 Here, while consensus strengthens legitimacy, accommodating 
almost 200 states also limits the pace and available range of actions. Questions 
of who is to supply the global multilateral forum may also come into play. 
 Regional institutions have proven much more diverse in their range of 
uses and potentialities. Their mix of low numbers, like interests, and 
particularly thick levels of economic integration and interdependence make for 
                                                
133 On the efficacy of exterritorial jurisdiction see e.g. William S. Dodge, “The Structural 
Rules of Transnational Law” (2003) 97 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 317 (noting that “[t]he ability 
of a country to regulate extraterritorially depends not simply on rules of prescriptive 
jurisdiction but also on rules of judicial jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments. The 
most extraterritorial law in the world will have little impact if a court cannot or will not 
exercise jurisdiction over defendants who violate it, or if the resulting judgment cannot be 
enforced against the defendants’ assets” and calling these rules the “structural rules of 
transnational law”. Ibid. at 317). 
134 See below at 132-33. 
135 The lack of political/social cohesion to successfully move interests up, so to speak, into an 
international political community is demonstrated, inter alia, in the retention of primitive 
voting structures in universal organizations. See e.g. Henry G. Schermers & Niels Blokker, 
International Institutional Law: Unity within Diversity, 4th rev’d ed. (Boston & Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2003) at 515, s. 786 (noting that “[t]o some extent, consensus 
resembles the unanimity rule, as it existed in primitive societies. This traditional rule of 
unanimity also disguised majorities and differences of interests and power. As in these 
societies, the transition to a general application of majority voting at the global level, in 
universal international organizations, seems only possible at a more advanced level of social 
integration. In the meantime, the application of majority voting will mostly be limited to 
decision-making in some regional organizations, and to decision-making on procedural and 
technical matters in universal organization.”). 
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particularly deep forms of institutional cooperation.136 At the same time, 
regionalism does not necessarily occur to the state’s detriment. Joseph Weiler 
has found that constitutionalizing the European Community (EC) came not at 
the expense of its member states’ political power, but rather enhanced it even 
while limiting the legal sphere of autonomous action,137 creating a non-zero-
sum outcome by combining supranational legal arrangements that prevented a 
member state from wholly or selectively shirking Community obligations and 
an individual state’s right to veto a measure, through which it could exercise 
political control over the Community architecture.138 The effect of this legal-
                                                
136 See e.g. ibid. 
137 Weiler makes his point in the following manner: 
 
[i]t may, at first sight, seem reasonable when thinking about the Community and its 
Member States to conceive of this relationship as a zero-sum game: the strengthening 
of the community must come “at the expense” of the Member States (and vice-versa). 
However, the evolution of the Community in its Foundational Period ruptures this 
premise of zero-sum. The strengthening of the Community was accompanied by the 
strengthening of its Member States. 
 
Joseph H.H. Weiler, “The Transformation of Europe” (1991) 100 Y.L.J. 2403 at 2430 
(referring to Hoffman, Reflections on the Nation-State in Europe Today” in L. Tsoukalis, ed. 
European Community – Past, Present & Future (1983), 21, 22 as indicative of the zero-sum 
approach). 
138 Ibid. Weiler continues by noting the particular legal-political relationship played a 
fundamental role in creating the win-win situation: 
 
The interplay between the Community normative and decisionmaking regimes, as 
explained above, gave each individual Member State a position of power brokerage it 
could never have attained in more traditional fora of international intercourse. The 
constitutional infrastructure “locked” the Member States into a communal (read: 
Community) decisionmaking forum with a fairly rigorous and binding legal discipline. 
The ability to “go it alone” was always somewhat curtailed, and in some crucial areas, 
foreclosed. The political super-structure, with its individual veto power and 
intergovernmental discourse, gave each Member State a decisive position of influence 
over the normative outcome. 
 
Ibid. at 2429. 
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political relationship was an enormous growth in Community competences,139 
a result of not only of political control, but also of small numbers and 
relatively similar expectations (at least within the range of compromise) and 
thus the ability to reach agreeable political bargains that strengthened state 
power. 
 The EC also demonstrates another potentially important role for 
regionalism. Through the Single European Act of 1986, member states ceded 
absolute political control of the Community architecture in the name of 
creating an effectively European polis, at least with respect to economic 
life.140 Weiler cogently describes this “transformation of Europe” as one of 
becoming equally a “single European market” and a “single European 
market”.141 The result has been the general transference of interests from the 
strictly national to the European level – a “Europeanization” of a wide range 
of economic interests and regulatory systems governing them. 
 The rescaling of air transport markets runs tangential to this larger 
transformation. Already under discussion as a possible area of mutation under 
the Treaty of Europe as early as 1979, the industry found itself carried 
partially into this European polity by internal market integration from 1986 to 
1992142 and externally through a level of mixed competence at state and 
                                                
139 See ibid. at 2437-50. Weiler describes this process as one of mutation brought about by 
four distinct processes: extension (“mutation in the area of autonomous Community 
jurisdiction” ibid. at 2437), absorption (occurring “when the Community legislative 
authorities, in exercising substantive legislative powers bestowed on the Community, impinge 
on areas of Member State jurisdiction outside the Community's explicit competences” ibid. at 
2438), incorporation (“the creation of judge-made higher law for the Community, and then its 
application to acts of the Member States” ibid. at 2441), and expansion (“the case in which the 
original legislation of the Community "breaks" jurisdictional limits” ibid. at 2442)). 
140 Ibid. at 2477. 
141 Ibid. at 2477. 
142 See generally below at 149-63 (discussing the three packages and the transition to single 
internal market). 
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regional levels.143 Thus, at the beginning of the 21st century the norms of 
efficiency and participation are increasingly becoming European ones, a point 
emphasized in discussions contained in Chapters 3 and 6.144 Still, it is clear 
from the same processes this transference has been structured so as to 
accommodate national-level political interests to the greatest extent possible, 
and to an extent that would not yet be possible at the global level. 
 So far, this type of multi-scalar or “multiperspectival”145 approach 
remains uniquely European. The closest analogue to the Single European 
Aviation Market is the Single Aviation Market of Australia and New Zealand 
(SAMANZ), a single internal market between two states in which both states 
permit airlines owned and controlled by nationals of either state to operate 
freely within its and between their territories (see further Chapter 5).146 But 
such arrangements, while expanding services and competition, have not 
translated into joint external representation or regionalized norms: the SAM 
airline remains a species unique to the trans-Tasman.147 
 East Asia remains even more nationally embedded. In ASEAN, despite 
the ASEAN Charter, which entered into force in December 2008148 and is seen 
as something of a half-hearted and less-than-realized “constitutional 
                                                
143 See generally below at 165-69 (discussing the Commission’s conflict with the Council over 
external competence, the European Court of Justice’s “open skies” decisions, and the 
horizontal and vertical mandates subsequently negotiated with the Council). 
144 See below at 148-63 & 386-97. 
145 John Gerard Ruggie, “Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in 
International Relations” (1993) 47 Int’l Org. 139 at 171-73 (noting that the EC “may 
constitute the first “multiperspectival polity” to emerge since the advent of the modern era.” 
(Ibid. at 172) and describing multiperspectival institutional forms as a means of governing, 
inter alia, transnational microeconomic links) [Ruggie, “Territoriality and Beyond”]. 
146 See below at 308-12 & 328-31. 
147 See ibid. 
148 See generally Charter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, done in Singapore, 20 
November 2007 [ASEAN Charter]. On the development of ASEAN’s role in the region’s 
economic affairs, see generally below at 222-24. 
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moment”149 for the region, member states may still exit certain programs 
through the “ASEAN Minus X” Formula (see further Chapters 4 and 6).150 In 
Northeast Asia, despite years of discussions China, Japan, and South Korea 
have failed to reach even so much as a free trade agreement, although the three 
governments continue to explore the idea.151 With tensions between China and 
Japan often flaring, the role of regionalized norms in mediating national 
political interests and transnational economic activity – internally or externally 
– looks unlikely (although not entirely impossible) in the short-term. 
 Yet Asian states have also begun to develop ideas of deeper ASEAN – 
and even Asian – political cooperation. In the area of air transport, ASEAN 
member states have already promulgated a series of treaties that when 
aggregated establish regional open skies, and, despite some issues with 
implementation of the open skies accords and disagreements on fundamental 
issues including market access and ownership and control, they continue to 
support the idea of an ASAM (see further Chapter 4).152 Private interests have 
also begun supporting regionalized markets. Indeed, in 2009 AirAsia invested 
its commercial identity with the ASEAN community, launching a campaign as 
the “truly ASEAN” airline, emblazoning the motto across its fuselages, 
offering a range of “truly ASEAN” products for sale during flights, and, more 
                                                
149 See generally e.g. Simon S.C. Tay, “The ASEAN Charter: Between National Sovereignty 
and the Region’s Constitutional Moment” (2008) 12 S.Y.B.I.L. 151; Eugene K.B. Tan, “The 
ASEAN Charter as “Legs to Go Places”: Ideational Norms and Pragmatic Legalism in 
Community Building in Southeast Asia” (2008) 12 S.Y.B.I.L. 171; Simon Chesterman, “Does 
ASEAN Exist? The Association of Southeast Asian Nations as an International Legal Person” 
(2008) 12 S.Y.B.I.L. 199. Cf. e.g. Weiler, supra note 137 at 2413-19 (discussing the features 
of the constitutionalization of the EC). 
150 See generally below at 248-52 (outlining the Formula and its application to the industry) & 
363-68 (discussing some of its possible ramifications on reciprocity). 
151 See generally below at 252-55. 
152 See below at 237-46. 
 49 
recently, moving their headquarters to Jakarta.153 ASEAN member states have 
also undertaken to negotiate air services agreements with key dialogue 
partners, including China and South Korea, under ASEAN’s auspices.154 
Meanwhile, South Korea and Japan have resolved an impasse on access to 
Tokyo, even as interest groups in both states begin to model deeper forms of 
cooperation.155 
 Whether these plans result in an ordered expansion of member states’ 
individual national capacities, whether their collective interests will arrive at a 
regionalized expression of the normative framework, or whether their efforts 
will fall short under the demands of political nationalism, has yet to be seen. 
For its part, Chapter 4 analyzes the present state of the industry, while Chapter 
6 analyzes a range of instruments designed to balance concerns over nation-
bound participation norms as well as how these mechanisms can lead to 
different understandings of reciprocity within the region. Ultimately, the 
proposal contained at the end of this thesis provides one potential mechanism 
to align – and, perhaps, to sublimate – the politics of state interests to bring 
about a regional program. 
 
3.3. Regionalism and Transition to a Global Aviation Market 
                                                
153 See e.g. AirAsia Berhad, Annual Report 2009, online: AirAsia.com 
<http://www.airasia.com/iwov-resources/th/common/pdf/AirAsia/IR/AirAsia_AR09.pdf>; 
“ASEAN at 42 – and Flying High” The PhilSouth Angle (8 August 2009), online: 
<http://thephilsouthangle.com/?p=4482>. Francezka Nangoy, “AirAsia Makes Jakarta Home” 
The Jakarta Globe (8 August 2012), online: 
<http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/corporatenews/airasia-makes-jakarta-home/536332>. CEO 
Tony Fernandes nevertheless insists the company remains Malaysian. See e.g. Presena 
Nambiar, “Malaysia to Remain Air Asia’s Home: CEO” The Jakarta Globe (13 August 2012), 
online: <http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/business/malaysia-to-remain-airasias-home-
ceo/537797>. 
154 See below at 255-62. 
155 See generally below at 252-55, 298-99 & 383-85. 
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Finally, regional initiatives also play important roles in terms of negotiating 
the larger shift to global aviation markets. In this regard, regionalism 
establishes various conduits for organizing, channeling, and projecting 
collective interests into the international sphere. This function both affects the 
number and range of interests in global discussions of regulatory reform and 
strategically enhances bargaining position vis-à-vis third parties. 
  To understand how regionalism brings about these effects, it is 
imperative to understand how multilateralism functions as a bargaining forum. 
As already noted above when discussing the Bermuda I-IATA system and 
“principled” bilateralism as a strategic decision,156 one of the features of 
bilateralism is that it projects individual state power more forcefully than 
multilateral institutions. In contrast, multilateral negotiations provide a forum, 
supplied by the host state or organization, for others to coordinate and 
collectively project their interests into the negotiation process, thereby 
enhancing their position.157 Bilateralism removes the coordinating forum, 
weakening less powerful states’ position vis-à-vis a more powerful negotiating 
partner. 
 In this regard, regionalism supplies an alternative forum among 
geographically proximate states to exchange information, or to coordinate or 
even consolidate positions vis-à-vis third parties.158 A single external policy 
                                                
156 See below at 103-15. 
157 See e.g. Mark W. Zacher, “Multilateral Organizations and the Institution of 
Multilateralism: The Development of Regimes for Nonterrestrial Spaces” in John Gerard 
Ruggie, ed., Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 399 at 401. 
158 See generally the discussions of the EU and ASEAN below at 148-74 & 222-52, 
respectively. 
 51 
can strengthen member states’ industries’ competitive position in global 
markets (see below) as well as increase gains made in bargains with third 
parties though collective bargaining designed to both increase the value of the 
rights exchanged – and thus the total value of what is reciprocally exchanged – 
and prevent third parties from gaining a more advantageous position through 
state-to-state bilateral talks.159 By doing so, it complements the coordinating 
function of a global multilateral platform, partially supporting a phenomenon 
(i.e., interest group coordination without a global coordinating forum) that 
already occurs in many global multilateral forums,160 while at the same time 
securing a more favorable negotiating position vis-à-vis third parties. 
 Practice, however, does not always hold to the ideal. As the discussion 
of the participation norm has made clear, state interests can drive individual 
member states to seek their own gain by arbitraging between a common/single 
internal policy and fragmented external policy in order to influence broader 
patterns of traffic flows between member and non-member states.161 As a 
practical matter, the interrelationship between internal and external policy will 
impose a cost on member states choosing to retain a protective policy with 
regard to non-member states.162 
 Members may also curtail or otherwise control the regional 
organization’s ability to act autonomously with respect to the issue-area. 
Unlike a state, which holds the full range of rights and obligations under 
                                                
159 These were all points made by the European Commission with respect to the Single 
European Aviation Market. See below at 164-66. 
160 See e.g. Miles Kahler, “Multilateralism with Small and Large Numbers” (1992) 46 Int’l 
Org. 681 at 693-94 (noting UNCLOS III had been preceded by similar regional and 
minilateral diffusions of the norms and rules that might go into the global multilateral regime). 
161 See e.g. below at 140-41 (discussing the Netherlands-US relationship). 
162 See e.g. infra note 424. 
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international law, an international organization’s scope of action remains 
bounded by the competences specifically attributed to it.163 Specific 
competences can be express, implied, or inherent, and are often left to the 
organization to interpret how far they stretch;164 however, where those 
competences do not exist, the organization cannot go. As Chapter 3 notes, the 
European Commission’s efforts to achieve a common external policy have 
been only partially successful, and even that has taken more than a decade to 
achieve.165 In the European context, the dispute remains over the scope of the 
Commission’s competence – where it exists, the Commission can act to bind 
its member states. In organizations such as ASEAN, which emphasizes the 
nation-state’s autonomy, neither internal nor external market can take effect 
with respect to a particular member state without that state ratifying the 
ASEAN-level agreement. The effects of “the ASEAN way” on institution 
building will be discussed further in Chapters 4 and 6166 
 Open or integrated regional arrangements also affect carrier interests. 
With the disparate scales between domestic markets, open regional 
arrangements expand market scales towards those of larger member states. 
Chapter 3 highlights this point in its discussion of the Single European 
Aviation Market as a response to the need to compete in a more open 
transatlantic market with US carriers with much larger network coverage.167 A 
                                                
163 See e.g Schermers & Blokker, supra note 135 at 155-57, ss. 209-10 (discussing the power 
of attributed competence). 
164 See e.g. Nigel D. White, The Law of International Organisation (Manchester & New York: 
Manchester University Press, 1996) at 128-33 (discussing implied and inherent competences). 
165 See generally below at 163-74. 
166 “The ASEAN way” is usually translated as a mode of non-confrontational collaboration, 
leading to an extreme deference to state sovereignty in areas of collective action – including, 
notably, the ASEAN Minus X Formula. See supra note 150. 
167 See below at 165-66. 
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similar argument can be made vis-à-vis ASEAN and Europe or China.168 For 
example, while Lufthansa can channel a Europe-spanning network to 
Singapore through the Frankfurt-Singapore route, Singapore Airlines remains 
restricted in terms of the points it can draw on in Indonesia and in the 
Philippines (until recently the list had also included Thailand, Malaysia and 
Vietnam).169 An open intra-regional market would allow SIA to channel more 
passengers through this dense intercontinental route, potentially bringing 
additional revenue and permitting further discounted fares and/or additional 
frequencies. An integrated ASAM could potentially permit SIA to fly to 
Frankfurt beginning at, e.g., Ho Chi Minh City, whether as a unique, point-to-
point operation or as part of a second hub network developed either by SIA or 
as a subsidiary incorporated in Vietnam or even a third Southeast Asian state. 
In this regard, ASEAN’s efforts are similar to the EU’s work on balancing its 
competitive abilities against the US.  
 Although laudable, the achievability of this outcome remains 
essentially tied to the resolution of the tensions between member states. 
Indeed, given that intra-ASEAN travel accounts for approximately half of all 
international travel originating or destined for a member state, it is very likely 
that less competitive groups are more concerned with the effects of intra-
regional liberalization than the possibility of another weekly frequency to 
Europe, especially given the high concentrations of ASEAN-Northeast Asia 
                                                
168 On the ASEAN-Europe comparison, see e.g. Alan Khee-Jin Tan, “Liberalizing Aviation in 
the Asia-Pacific Region: The Impact of the EU Horizontal Mandate” (2006) 31 Air & Sp. L. 
432 at 447-53 [Tan, “Horizontal Mandate”]. With an estimated population of 1.34 billion in 
2011 (Shan Juan, “Population Now Stands at 1.341 Billion” China Daily (1 March 2011), 
online: <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2011-03/01/content_12091922.htm>), China 
more than doubles the total population, and covers a similar area as, all of ASEAN. Alan 
Khee-Jin Tan, “The 2010 ASEAN-China Air Transport Agreement: Placing the Cart before 
the Horse?” (2012) 37 Air & Sp. L. 35 [Tan, “ASEAN-China”]. 
169 See below at 231-37. 
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and ASEAN-Europe traffic carried through Bangkok and Singapore (see 
further Chapter 4).170 Again, the regional level figures prominently in global 
reform. 
  
4. COMPETITION, THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERALIZED MARKETS, AND THE 
QUESTION OF REREGULATION 
 
As noted at the beginning, this thesis concentrates on two critical components 
of the liberalization process – on the two hinges that prevent the reshaping of 
international markets into effectively transnational ones. In doing so, it places 
itself within a wider debate on the relative benefits of regulation and 
deregulation in the industry. Before moving deeper into the substantive 
analysis, this section briefly positions itself within these broader debates. 
  Despite the epithet of US “deregulation”, liberalization has not 
actually involved the removal of the state from the market. Rather, it has 
replaced a series of ex ante interventions with ex post interventions where 
actual market interactions yield anticompetitive results (i.e. competition 
law).171 In such cases, what occurs is not the total retreat of the state but a 
                                                
170 See below at 268. 
171 Justice Stephen Breyer, at the time professor at Harvard Law School and influential 
proponent of the deregulation movement, summarized the aims, means, and effectiveness of 
regulation and antitrust in the following terms: 
 
To understand the risks that deregulation poses, one must understand the classical 
theoretical relationship between antitrust and economic regulation. In classical theory, 
both institutions aim to achieve similar economic objectives. […] Economic regulation 
bypasses the competitive process and seeks to obtain these benefits directly. […] 
Antitrust, on the other hand, tries to achieve these benefits indirectly. […] From a 
classical perspective, these economic benefits, perhaps like happiness or reputation, are 
best secured when one does not aim at them directly. Decentralized individual 
decisions made in a workably competitive marketplace are more likely to prove 
economically efficient, to bring about efficient production processes, and to encourage 
 55 
replacing of one form of governance with another, more efficient system.172 
Where historically one or a few have enjoyed privileges not granted to others, 
this may include competitive handicapping, at least initially, an intervention 
which Alfred Kahn, the man held largely responsible for US deregulation,173 
has argued yields “schizophrenic” but necessary policy.174 At the same time, 
liberalization has not meant a total removal of the state. In both the US 
“essential air services”175 and EC’s “public service obligation”176 programs, 
the government retains a residual of authority to directly intervene and 
subsidize routes that are politically or socially desirable but economically 
unviable, often permitting the government to establish a monopoly over the 
                                                
desirable innovation than are the centralized, bureaucratic decisions of the economic 
regulator. Classical theory emphasizes the many systematic institutional features of 
regulatory systems that prevent them from ever coming close to replicating the effects 
of well-functioning competitive markets. The classicist nonetheless finds reasons for 
regulating. He points to “defects” in certain markets that prevent competition from 
working properly. […] Competition is more desirable, and antitrust may help maintain 
competition. Yet for one reason or another, in these special markets, competition 
cannot work or by itself is inadequate. Thus, one must turn to regulation as a 
supplement or substitute. On this view, antitrust is not another form of regulation. 
Antitrust is an alternative to regulation and, where feasible, a better alternative. […] 
Regulation is viewed as a substitute for competition, to be sued only as a weapon of 
last resort – as a heroic cure reserved for a serious disease. 
 
Stephen G. Breyer, “Antitrust, Deregulation, and the Newly Liberated Marketplace” (1987) 
75 Cal. L. Rev. 1005 at 1006-07. 
172 See ibid. 
173 See infra note 379. 
174 See e.g. Alfred E. Kahn, “Deregulatory Schizophrenia” (1987) 75 Cal. L. Rev. 1059 (in 
particular noting that “[m]y conception of antitrust is one that necessarily involves 
competitive handicapping: There are some practices in which some businesses may safely be 
permitted to engage but others may not, because in the latter case, but not the former, they 
would probably have anticompetitive consequences.”) [Kahn, “Schizophrenia”].  
175 See generally 49 U.S.C. ss. 41731-44 (detailing essential and enhanced essential air 
services programs) & ss. 41761-67 (providing favorable credit lines for aircraft servicing 
small communities). For a critique of deregulation’s impact on small community service (and 
therefore a contextualization of the EAS), see e.g. Paul Stephen Dempsey, “The Dark Side of 
Deregulation: Its Impact on Small Communities” (1987) 39 Admin. L. Rev. 445. 
176 EC, Regulation (EC) No 1008/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
September 2008 on common rules for the operation of air services in the Community (Recast), 
[2008] O.J. L 293/3 arts. 15-18 (providing for public service obligations in the Community) 
[EC, Reg 1008/2008].  
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route where competition might render the service unviable.177 According to its 
proponents, this system represents the best available possibility, and drives 
many of the claims underlying the demands for further market integration.  
 Not everyone is in agreement. Another position is that given the 
instabilities caused by market cyclicality, the volatility of input prices such as 
oil, and exposure to threats such as terrorist attack require states to re-
intervene in the market to keep services sustainable.178 This opinion – a 
minority based in North America – argues instead for the reregulation of the 
industry. 
 This thesis generally subscribes to the former understanding of the 
ultimate aim of liberalization. In doing so, it adopts Michael Levine’s own 
observation that although the ex post regulatory system represents imperfect 
regulation over an imperfect market, it remains the best system we have.179 
Nevertheless, it will become apparent from the body of the work that the 
qualities, the economic theories, and the political intentions of the regulator 
play an important role in how the system develops, particularly in the 
transition from regulated to competition-based systems.180 In this regard, the 
                                                
177 See e.g. ibid., art. 16(9). 
178 For example, in North America, camps are situated along a line dividing those calling for a 
limited measure of regulatory reentry and those who see further liberalization, including 
foreign entry through both the front door of operations and the back door of investment, as the 
solution to the cyclicality problem. See Havel, Beyond Open Skies, supra note 10 at 368-78 
(placing Paul Stephen Dempsey and former president and chairman of American Airlines 
Robert Crandall in the former category and himself and Michael Levine in the latter). For an 
approach considering regulation, see Dempsey, “The Cyclical Crisis”, supra note 30. For a 
more overtly dismissive position, see Levine, “Reregulated?”, ibid. at 18 (dismissing what he 
regards as unfounded claims for “enlightened” regulation and deregulation “wasteful”). 
179 See Levine, supra note 41 at 494. 
180 For example, political economist David Levi-Faur has linked regulatory governance to 
both efficient markets and neo-mercantile policy. David Levi-Faur, “The Competition State as 
Neomercantilist State: Restructuring Global Telecommunications” (1998) 27 J. Socio-Econ. 
665 (distinguishing three types of regulatory structures: deregulation (removal of state from 
the market), regulation-of-competition (preventing anti-competitive outcomes) and regulation-
for-competition (entering the market to maintain competitiveness). Importantly, he associates 
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rather tumultuous effects of the DOT’s non-application of antitrust laws 
during the 1980s (see further Chapter 3)181 starkly contrasts with policies such 
as the European Commission’s lenient attitude towards violations of 
Community state aid rules – which noted in 1984 that “[t]he immediate 
application of the aid rules to airlines might cause some of them to cease 
operations” and that they would “therefore become systematic only with 
time”182 – as well as China’s policy of active reentry and the encouragement 
of particular market structures. These qualities, and their relative effects on the 





This Chapter serves three broad functions in relation to the thesis as a whole. 
It interprets the processes and problems of legal reform from the perspective 
of the normative framework of efficiency and participation. It explains 
regionalism’s potential for achieving these goals by demonstrating the 
                                                
the last with neo-mercantilist policies). Asia has also been associated with the 
“developmental” state, characterized by strong state-led, plan-rational industrial policy. See 
e.g. Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy 
1925-1975 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982) (originating the term “the 
developmental state”, the idea of a plan-rational, state-led industrial economic policy); 
Chalmers Johnson, “The Developmental State: The Odyssey of a Concept” in Meredith Woo-
Cumings, ed., The Developmental State (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1999), 32 
(providing a review and reflection on the concept and responding to alternative 
theories/arguments against the concept that developed in response to the original work). Many 
of these features, particularly China’s active involvement in structuring the “Big Three” and 
“encouraging” other market developments (see generally  infra note 672), suggest an active 
hand in shaping the market. 
181 See below at 128-31. 
182 Commission of the European Communities, Civil Aviation Memorandum No. 2: Progress 
Towards the Development of a Community Air Transport Policy (Com(84) 72 final, 15 March 
1984) at Annex IV.9, para. 17 [Commission, Memo No. 2]. 
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importance of regional efficiency, the particularly thick forms of political 
interaction that result from low numbers and high levels of integration and 
interdependence, and regionalism’s role as a forum to coordinate and 
maximize collective self-interest in global markets. At the same time, it noted 
East Asia’s low level of institutionalization and incomplete integration as 
compared to the US and European counterparts. 
 The body of this thesis builds out from this basic framework to analyze 
the development and current state of the regulatory reform as well as the 
particular instruments designed to preserve the system’s two primary norms. 
This is done in two parts, with Part II (“Transitions”) describing the historical 
development of the legal order and the broad contemporary processes of 
change and Part III (“Structure”) analyzing the methods and constraints on 
instrumental reform. Finally, Part IV (“Strategy”) combines the paths of 
transition with the structures of reform to propose a means of capturing the 
greatest amount of efficiency while retaining institutions designed to reinforce 
or transform ideas of participation. 
 The three Chapters making up “Transitions” focus on analyzing the 
matrix of norms and instruments designed to govern the air transport system 
from the close of the Second World War to the multiplicity of transitional 
paths currently in place. Cumulatively, they focus on three continent-spanning 
projects: the United States; Europe; and East Asia. In particular, Chapter 2 
analyzes the development of the postwar order of the air – i.e., the Bermuda I-
IATA system – in both form and content, and in particular in response to 
concerns that US airlines’ dominant position might negatively impact other 
states’ ability to carry traffic to and from the home state. From there, Chapter 
 59 
3 analyzes and evaluates the transition from Bermuda I–IATA to the 
liberalized regulatory framework that has resulted in the current state of 
uneven, creeping liberalization, focusing first on events across the transatlantic 
– from the United States to Europe to the relationship between them – before 
discussing global developments more generally. It also addresses a number of 
failures to reach truly transformative global change, both in terms of the US’ 
unwillingness to move beyond the nation-bound paradigm and more general 
concerns between an emergent global core/periphery. 
 While broadly covering global systems, both Chapters 2 and 3 focus 
on the historical core of the transatlantic. In contrast, Chapter 4 shifts its focus 
to the East Asian region, concentrating on the current period of reform. In 
particular, it analyzes the ASEAN member states’ efforts to liberalize and 
integrate their air transport systems – together with the tensions and setbacks 
that the group faces with respect to implementing existing agreements and 
determining the scope of the final outcome. It also outlines the state of 
liberalization in Northeast Asia and the potential for greater cooperation, as 
well as the prospect for further liberalization in the region as a whole. Unlike 
the European context, such efforts are much more tentative in nature, both in 
terms of the degree of liberalization and in the state of the overarching 
institutions enveloping efforts to liberalize or integrate their aviation markets. 
 From there, the two Chapters comprising “Structure” turn from 
historico-political analysis to focus on the individual instruments of 
institutional reform. In particular, Chapter 5 evaluates the different alternative 
legal instruments governing the two basic features of liberalization: market 
access (and in particular the exchange of traffic rights) and the substantial 
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ownership and effective control clauses. In focusing on these instruments, it 
both analyzes their historical development on their own terms and compares 
the two features as alternative means of achieving much the ends of enhancing 
efficiency by increasing the mobility of capital and expertise and by 
introducing competition. From there, Chapter 6 addresses the role of 
institutional design on the three heuristics of participation. In particular, it 
analyses the role of incremental liberalization as a means of preserving 
participation and thereby reducing recalcitrance to adaptation. It also analyzes 
the roles of different visions of reciprocity in moving the liberalization or 
integration process forward before offering a brief critique of plurilateralism 
based on the same general framework used to analyze incremental 
arrangements. 
 In moving from “Strategy” to “Structure”, Chapter 7 concludes the 
study by employing the concepts and categories developed in the body of the 
thesis to develop a concrete structure for liberalization and integration in the 
region. Specifically, it develops a structure designed to resolve issues related 
to implementing ASEAN open skies, as well as one to move the ten member 
states into an ASEAN Single Aviation Market. It also makes several 
suggestions for bringing Northeast Asia and the East Asian region as a whole 
beyond an open skies regime. These strategies are finally contextualized and 


























































CHAPTER 2: EMBEDDED LIBERALISM, COMPROMISED: THE DEVELOPMENT 









In order to understand the nature of the changes to the order of the air, it is 
first necessary to establish an understanding of the foundations on which the 
current system rests. In the case of air transport, these origins – the 
intellectual, political, economic, and, ultimately, legal roots of the regulatory 
structure – lie in the first half of the twentieth century. It is during this period 
that many of the fundamental concepts – the sovereignty of the air, the 
nationality requirements of airlines, the exemption of cabotage from 
international exchange – crystallized and the elementary features of air 
transport regulation defined and redefined into the rigid structure of bilateral 
agreements that continues, with rare exception, into the present. 
 In order to understand these processes, Chapter 2 sets itself two tasks, 
one formal the other contextual. Its formal task is simply to explain and 
analyze the development of the international regulatory system governing 
international air transport. In doing so, it presents the historical development 
of regulatory content from the beginning of the twentieth century through the 
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postwar period – roughly identified as the period of time bookended by the 
Second World War and the beginning of its dismantling in the 1970s. But the 
Chapter is also assigned a contextual role, one that places international air 
transport regulation within the broader intellectual and regulatory paradigms 
of the time. These paradigms are represented by an extension of the embedded 
liberalism thesis, one that sees the international order as one mediating 
between international and local stabilities, between form and content made 
possible by a conjunction of power and social purpose. Specifically, the 
institutional compromise of the Bermuda I–IATA system, a conjunction of a 
system of bilaterally determined rights to routes with multilaterally determined 
tariffs,183 represents a failure to conjoin multilateralism with acceptable 
assurances for “local” lines. Nevertheless, the system retained the core 
principle of balancing domestic and international stabilities, explaining its 
near universal acceptance as a system of governance. 
 
2. THE PARIS CONVENTION AND THE EMERGENCE OF AN INTERNATIONAL 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
 
“It is impossible to give sound consideration to the economic and political 
questions of international air transport without a clear understanding of what is 
included in the legal concept of “sovereignty over the airspace.””184 As the 
keystone of the international legal order, it is from this foundation that the 
                                                
183 See generally below at 103-12. 
184 John C. Cooper, “Air Transport and World Organization” (1946) 55 Y.L.J. 1191 at 1191 
[Cooper, “Transport and World Organization”]. See also Haanappel, Law and Policy, supra 
note 1 at 1-3 (“Public international air law … find[s] its real origins in the debate around 
sovereignty in national airspace which broke out once man made, heaver than aircraft had 
become a reality in the first decade of the 20th century.”). 
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problems of legal and political concern originate, and a fact that any model of 
regulation must ultimately accommodate.185 A proper investigation into a 
regime based on sovereignty begins with its recognition as a central 
organizing principle. 
 A state’s sovereignty over the superjacent airspace is by now a 
universally recognized principle of international law. This, however, has not 
always been the case. The first decade of flight witnessed a great debate over 
the legal status of the air. The earliest attempt to codify the status of the air, 
made in 1902 by the French jurist Paul Fauchille, declared quite simply that 
“air navigation is free.”186 His opinion represented but one of many in a rich 
debate in the international legal academy.187 This debate brought an early 
attempt to codify the law of the air, organized in Paris in 1910, to an 
irresolvable impasse.188 Outside the academy, however, opinion was both 
                                                
185 See Cooper, “Transport and World Organization”, ibid. (noting that “[f]rom this concept 
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109 at 110-16. 
188 See Polkowska, supra note 186 at 60-63; Michael Milde, International Air Law and ICAO 
(Utrecht: Eleven International Publishing, 2008) at 8-10 (also noting a Conference held by the 
International Law Association in 1912 reaching the same result as to the status of the air) 
[Milde, ICAO]. While the parties had agreed on a number of principles, disagreement over the 
principle of sovereignty resulted in an adjournment, with plans to reconvene at a future point 
in time. The reconvening of the conference never took place. 
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much less divided and much less in favor of the freedom of the air. In 1913, 
Germany and France concluded what would become the first bilateral air 
transport agreement, an agreement that would require operations to obtain the 
consent of the state flown over.189 Ultimately, it would be the outbreak of the 
First World War, as neutral and belligerent states began the closure of the air, 
which determined the fate of the question.190 By the time the Allied Powers 
promulgated the Convention for the Regulation of Aerial Navigation of 1919, 
signed at Paris as part of the peace of Versailles, it was already clear that 
every state would have “complete and exclusive sovereignty over the air space 
above its territory”.191 
 
2.1. The Paris Convention and the Emergence of a Multilateral Legal 
Structure 
 
The Paris Convention is a watershed in international air transport regulation. It 
has served a number of functions in the history of international air transport 
regulation, and not only in relation to sovereignty. It provided a model for the 
other interwar aviation agreements, and many of their features. Most 
importantly, it created the International Commission for Air Navigation 
(ICAN), an international body responsible for maintaining, amending, and 
supervising the technical and safety standards attached as annexes to the 
                                                
189 See e.g. Polkowska, ibid. at 62; Gertler, “Two (or More) Faces”, supra note 186; Peter P.C. 
Haanappel, “Bilateral Air Transport Agreements – 1913-1980” (1980) Int’l Trade L.J. 241 
[Haanappel, “Bilateral Agreements”]. 
190 See e.g. Polkowska, supra note 186 at 63 (citing the closure of, inter alia, French, British, 
Swiss, Swedish, Norwegian, and Greek airspace at the beginning of the war); Johnson, supra 
note 187 at 26-33. 
191 Convention on the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, done at Paris, 13 October, 1919, art. 1 
(reprinted in (1923) 17:4 Supp. A.J.I.L. 195) [Paris Convention]. 
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Convention. These functions continue in its successor, the Chicago 
Convention of 1944, not least with respect to the safety and technical matters 
governed by the permanent organization established under its auspices, 
ICAO.192 It also provided a model for national legislation. 
 Undoubtedly the greatest legacy of the Paris Convention is its 
declaration that all states held sovereignty over the airspace above their 
respective territories.193 The definition of sovereignty was inclusive: it would 
include the territorial waters, as well as all territory under a state’s mandate.194 
The three characteristics – that sovereignty is inherent, complete, and 
exclusive – fundamentally resolves the debate over whether the state possesses 
sovereignty over its airspace. It also firmly rooted the order of the air in the 
political and legal traditions of the state. 
 Yet, in itself, this declaration of sovereignty does very little to resolve 
the “difficult and baffling problems of aerial navigation”.195 While states and 
experts debated over sovereignty or freedom of the airspace, none advocated 
absolute freedom or absolute closure. What sovereignty represented was a 
default rule, a starting point from which states could agree to a permissible 
                                                
192 These include: the principle of sovereignty over airspace; prohibited areas; the nationality 
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note 1 at 15-16. 
193 See supra note 191 and accompanying text. 
194 Ibid.; Chicago Convention, supra note 17, art. 2. 
195 Blewett Lee, “The International Flying Convention and the Freedom of the Air” (1919) 33 
Harv. L. Rev. 23 at 30. 
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scope of operations.196 What the parties to the Paris Convention agreed to 
grant each other was a multilateral right of innocent passage.197 This right 
would be limited by provisions permitting signatory states to restrict cabotage, 
that is, foreign access to domestic markets, subject to other states’ right to 
reciprocate, to establish specified air corridors through which aircraft could 
operate, and the right to require a landing at a designated airport.198 Finally, in 
its original form, the Convention required that “[t]he establishment of 
international airways shall be subject to the consent of the states flown 
over.”199 As time went by, this clause would gradually become the basis for an 
outright ban of scheduled services.200 
 The right of innocent passage was not intended for all. Whereas the 
principle of sovereignty applied to all states, independent of their adherence to 
the Convention, the right of innocent passage was conferred only to parties to 
the Convention.201 This distinction was particularly influenced by the Allied 
Powers’ desire to curtail the development of the former enemies’ – and 
particularly Germany’s – “air power”, a functional understanding of the 
                                                
196 See e.g. ibid. at 30-31 (noting that one reason for the “hopeless disagreement” among 
prewar jurists was “the practical solutions derived from what were then the two principal 
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197 Paris Convention, supra note 191, art. 2. 
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201 See e.g. Matte, supra note 1 at 106 (“It is only in the second article of the convention that 
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economic and military dimensions of the nation’s newfound ability to “act 
through the airspace”.202 Three mechanisms barred the ex-enemy’s way from 
participating in the Paris Convention’s system of air transport regulation. Two 
provisions controlled Germany’s direct access to international civil aviation. 
First, the Convention established particularly onerous requirements for the 
former enemy’s participation in the Paris system, requiring either adherence to 
the League of Nations or unanimous acceptance by the Allied powers, or in 
the case of adherence after 1 January 1923, acceptance of at least three-
quarters of all parties to the Convention.203 This requirement stands in sharp 
contrast to the requirements placed on neutrals, which were simply permitted 
to adhere to the Convention.204 Second, the Convention expressly required 
contracting states to exclude non-signatories’ aircraft from the airspace above 
their territory.205 The intentions of the drafters were that, together, these 
provisions would create a “ring-fence” around Germany, keeping it from 
operating international services.206 Yet despite the effort, these rules proved 
utterly ineffective: Germany’s geographically central location on the continent 
                                                
202 John C. Cooper, “Air Power and the Coming Peace Treaties” (1946) 24 Foreign Affairs 
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Study of Air Power (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1947). 
203 Paris Convention, supra note 191, art. 42. 
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wholly undermined the purpose of the exclusion.207 Neutrals remained out, 
and Allied Powers soon found themselves bargaining with Germany for the 
right of innocent passage as well.208 The whole arrangement collapsed in a 
span of a few years. 
 A more robust set of requirements related to various aspects of 
nationality. The Convention provided a twofold link. First, it required an 
aircraft to possess a singular nationality.209 By establishing a “genuine” link 
between the aircraft and a particular state, the Convention created a means of 
mediating between the state and the actions of the aircraft in international 
law.210 Second, this formal link between state and aircraft nationality was 
buttressed by a further link to the nationality of the aircraft’s (natural or legal) 
owners,211 and, in the case of corporate personality, an even further link 
between an aircraft and management structure by requiring the chairman and 
two thirds of the directors to be nationals of the state of registry.212 Although 
these latter provisions certainly buttressed the “link” and thus the level of 
accountability between state and aircraft operations, another important 
                                                
207 See Cooper, “Air Power”, ibid. at 448-50. 
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function within the Paris system had been exclusionary in nature, controlling 
the ex-enemy’s capability to enter air transport through the backdoor of 
ownership. As international air transport regulation developed in scope and 
complexity, these rules would come to take on further significance. These 
points are highlighted below. 
 
2.2. Economic Nationalism and the Partitioning of the Skies 
 
Beyond these basic grants and restrictions, the regional multilateral 
conventions that emerged during the interwar period did not treat commercial 
aviation in any specific detail. This is due in part to the novelty of aviation – 
the first scheduled international service in Europe took place in August 
1919.213 Other operational constraints of the time involved the range and 
capacity of aircraft, the near universal use of mail subsidies to support 
development, and the non-economic roles air transport played in maintaining 
colonial empires.214 While the world remained cautious, it had not foreclosed 
the option of a system of relatively free navigation. 
 But the interwar period was one of increasing economic nationalism, a 
trend that had important effects on both multilateral and bilateral agreements 
governing the air.215 In addition to the amendments granting states the right to 
                                                
213 See e.g. Haanappel, “Bilateral Agreements”, supra note 189 at 241; de Murias, supra note 
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exchange traffic rights with non-contracting states, by 1933 amendments to 
the Paris Convention had effectively closed the skies to commercial services 
without prior authorization from the state flown over.216 At the same time, 
bilateralism began to take on an increasingly important, and increasingly 
specific, role in exchange between the industrialized countries. First used as a 
means to contract with non-signatories to the multilateral agreements, the 
increasing precision of exchange and additional restrictions placed in the 
multilateral frameworks saw bilateralism develop as a universal practice.217 In 
Europe, state practice would increasingly move in the direction of protection, 
pooling traffic, to be split among national operators, and using the 
International Air Traffic Association, a group composed of national airlines 
                                                
 
Once the First World War was over, the world waited for attempts to be made to 
transform the aer clausum into a medium without frontiers. States put their hopes in a 
global confederation and the League of Nations became the first permanent 
international organization aimed at the preservation of peace. Unfortunately, the supra-
state pyramid still remained in the future. The lack of confidence between the victors 
and the defeated, the principle of sovereignty which had been exalted during the four 
years of the War, and the fact that the first air convention had been drawn up by certain 
of the large victorious States only, all translated into a final text in which freedom of 
the air became more a hope than a reality. All the signatory States rushed to subscribe 
to the principles of the partitioned sky. Thus, instead of making aerodromes of the 
simple air terminals, States which adhered to the Paris Convention proclaimed the 
absolutism of sovereignty, under cover of which geographical boundaries were 
artificially extended upwards, usque ad coelum. It is true that air “corridors” – of 
variable width – were accepted in order to allow inter-State traffic between aerodrome 
terminals, but the spirit of the Convention was to safeguard the absolute and sovereign 
rights of the Contracting Parties. The outlook acquired during the four years of armed 
conflict was bearing fruit. 
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economic nationalism of the period with the “bias towards protectionism and nationalism”, 
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216 Matte, ibid. at 251 (cited in de Murias, ibid. at 21). 
217 See e.g. Haanappel, “Bilateral Agreements”, supra note 189 at 241-43 (discussing the 
example of US-Canadian bilateralism during the interwar period); de Murias, ibid. at c. 2 
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and predecessor to IATA, to coordinate operations.218 The United States 
would also move towards a more protectionist policy, closing the transpacific 
corridor to European carriers while negotiating for rights with Canada and 
Europe on the basis of specific reciprocity.219 
 Interestingly, the one area of law that exhibited a trend towards 
flexibility was in the area of ownership and control of airlines. Indeed, the 
1929 amendments to the Convention abolished the conditions requiring the 
president and directors of an airline be nationals of the state of registry, 
although it still required that there be specific national laws addressing aircraft 
nationality and registration.220 Many of these laws did in fact continue the 
system as national laws embedded the national ownership and control of its 
airlines within their internal laws and regulations.221 At the same time, a 
number of bilateral practices developed that differentiated between the 
nationality of the aircraft and the nationality of the airline. While the former 
continued to grant the “liberty of passage” to aircraft of the other 
nationality,222 states retained the right to review the designation of individual 
airlines through particular practices such as specifically naming the airline 
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designations in the agreement or by each party retaining the right to 
“scrutinize the conditions of nationality” used by the other party for its 
airlines.223 In the transatlantic core of air transport, this meant the continuance 
of a strict application of nationality standards. However, for states that did not 
have the technological or financial capacity to create fully “national” airlines, 
state practice demonstrated a diversity of ownership structures, including a 
number of multinational airlines and several foreign-owned national lines.224 
These structures often played not only to a developing country’s desire for 
national and international air services, but also to the investor airline’s interest 
in expanding its own networks. This relationship between core and periphery, 
and its influence on postwar aviation, became a subject of debate during 
ICAO’s deliberations on multilateralism. 
 
3. THE POSTWAR PERIOD: CHICAGO AND THE FAILURE OF MULTILATERALISM 
 
During the interwar period, air transport regulation had been largely a 
continental affair. The outbreak of the Second World War changed all that. As 
the Allies turned their attention towards questions of how to secure the future 
peace, it had become clear that air transport had taken on a new meaning in 
world affairs. As early as 1943, parties on both sides of the Atlantic had begun 
thinking of solutions to questions regarding the regulation of international 
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civil aviation.225 It was clear from discussions that aviation would be part of 
the new world public order that the Allies would construct over the final 
stages of the War. 
 For international civil aviation, these efforts resulted in the Chicago 
Convention, promulgated at the end of the Chicago Conference held from 1 
November to 7 December 1944.226 The basic purposes of the Conference were 
twofold. The first of its objectives was to establish a successor organization to 
ICAN, thereby ensuring continuity in the international regulation of the 
technical and safety aspects of international civil aviation.227 In this respect, 
the Conference has proven an overwhelming success, with ICAO established 
under Part II of the Convention, now governing the relations between the 190 
member states to the Convention through a set of Standards and 
Recommended Practices, attached as Annexes to the Convention and amended 
as required.228 
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 The second objective of the Conference was to “determine how and to 
what extent air transport could be subjected to international economic and 
political control.”229 But where the Conference proved a resounding success in 
its first goal, it proved an equally resounding failure in establishing a system 
for governing economic and commercial matters.230 Ultimately, the 
Conference would promulgate a number of documents, including an Interim 
Agreement on International Civil Aviation, the plurilateral International Air 
Services Transit Agreement and International Air Transport Agreement, a 
series of Draft Technical Annexes, and recommended a Standard Form 
Agreement for Provisional Air Routes.231 Yet none of these agreements, nor 
any of the debates in ICAO subsequent to the Conference, would prove 
capable of producing a multilateral solution to the questions of economic 
regulation. While the result would ultimately be a compromise, it would not 
be a compromise in the form originally intended by the delegates. 
 
3.1. The Normative Underpinnings of the International Order of the Air 
 
To understand what Chicago hoped to achieve in terms of economic 
regulation, it is necessary to contextualize the Conference in its political and 
economic environment at the time. Over the last half century, the world had 
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experienced the growth and collapse of liberalism, British-led but adopted by 
all advanced economies by the outbreak of First World War, followed by the 
catastrophic impact of depression and economic nationalism during the 
interwar period.232 States understood, through painful experience, the world to 
be nationally organized but internationally interdependent. 
 One particularly convincing explanation of the system that emerged at 
the end of the war is “the compromise of embedded liberalism”.233 Developed 
as a theory to explain the continuity of the principles and norms of the postwar 
international economic order in light of the collapse of many of its 
instruments, embedded liberalism represents a balancing act, “the story of how 
the capitalist countries learned to reconcile the efficiency of markets with the 
values of social community that markets themselves require in order to survive 
and thrive.”234 Institutionally, it rests on the two anchors of multilateralism, 
understood primarily in terms of non-discrimination, and domestic 
intervention, as a means of achieving policies in areas such as domestic 
growth, full employment and balance-of-payments equilibrium.235 This 
balance of multilateralism “predicated upon domestic intervention” found 
diplomatic expression as early as the Atlantic Charter, which contained terms 
promoting both equal access to the international markets of the world and the 
social objectives of bringing about “the fullest collaboration between all 
nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved 
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labor standards, economic advancement and social security”.236 While the 
forms and depth of intervention were left to national institutions to determine, 
all shared the basic assumptions underlying the embedded liberal 
compromise.237 
 Like the economic order more generally, Chicago represents an 
attempt at compromise. At the heart of the Conference was an attempt to 
balance a multilateral order based on non-discrimination with each state’s 
right to autonomously conduct and develop its own international air transport 
operations.238 The Convention expresses this balance as one between 
efficiency and “equality of opportunity”,239 a term given substance both in 
Article 44 of the Convention, which tasks ICAO with ensuring all states have 
a “fair opportunity to operate international airlines” and, somewhat later, in 
the bilateral agreements that would come to govern air commerce.240 The 
provisions stand as firm expressions of the parties’ commitment to the 
participation norm from an early period. 
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237 Ruggie, “Embedded Liberalism”, ibid. at 393-94. 
238 See e.g. Statement by Adolf A. Berle to the 2nd Plenary Session in US Dept of State, 
Proceedings, supra note 2 at 55-63 (laying out the US position on exchange). The Hon. C.D. 
Howe, Minister of reconstruction, Canada, likewise spoke of promoting the development of 
international air transport through a framework that “provides equality of opportunity and 
rewards for efficiency”. See Ruwantissa I.R. Abeyratne, Legal and Regulatory Issues in 
International Aviation (Irvington-on-Hudson, New York: Transnational, Publishers, Inc., 
1996) at 25 (citing ICAO Documents, vol. 1, Doc. 1, at 3 (1945)) [Abeyratne, Legal and 
Regulatory Issues]. 
239 Chicago Convention, supra note 24, Preamble, para. 3. 
240 Ibid., art. 44 (f); Final Act, infra note 287, para. 4. Cf. Air Transport Agreement between 
the Government of the United States of America and the Government of [Country], art. 11(1), 
online: US Dept of State <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/114970.pdf> 
(granting a “fair and equal opportunity to compete in providing the international air 
transportation governed by this Agreement”) [US Model Open Skies]. 
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 The American delegation had also explicitly suggested the normative 
links between Chicago, the Atlantic Charter, and Bretton Woods during the 
Conference itself. During the last week of the Conference, when it was 
becoming clear that a multilateral agreement on the commercial aspects of air 
transport would not be reached without extraordinary effort, Fiorello 
LaGuardia addressed the joint session of Committees I, III and IV in a last 
attempt to bring the parties to agreement: 
 
[The delegates] were called here [to Chicago] as a second international 
conference to deal with conditions which would eliminate the causes of 
war. The first conference at Bretton Woods was highly technical, 
difficult – and you heard today the Secretary General say that 
convention was signed by every country without any reservation … 
Have you heard this before: “We will endeavor, with due respect for 
existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all States, great or 
small, victor or vanquished, of access on equal terms to the trade and to 
the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic 
prosperity”? That’s from the Sermon on the Deck; that’s from the 
Atlantic Charter, and this is one of the first tests, whether the people of 
Europe and the people of my country will see this translated into action 
or to go into the annals of literature and poetry. I’m for translating it into 
something real.241 
 
                                                
241 Statement by Fiorello LaGuardia to the Plenary Session of Committees I, III and IV, 
December 1 in US Dept of State, Proceedings, supra note 2 at 494. 
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LaGuardia’s call to create “something real” delivers something more than just 
a historical and conceptual link to a particular set of intellectual forebears. 
There is a general tone of moral urgency in his call to action, one that suggests 
there is more at work than just that the demands of a powerful actor be 
accepted by its weaker cohorts. What it is suggestive of is, rather, a plea to 
shared commitment, to “implement the mandate” of a mutually agreed upon 
normative framework.242 It was around this mandate, moreover, which the 
Conference collapsed. 
 
3.2. Chicago and the Failure to Conjoin Form and Purpose 
 
To understand why the Conference failed to turn its shared commitments into 
the concrete structure it had set out to create, it is necessary to explore the 
roles of power and shared commitment in institution building as well as the 
content of those demands. According to the embedded liberalism thesis, 
shared commitment or “social purpose” is a necessary corollary to power: 
“power may predict the form of the international order, but not its content.”243 
Ultimately, both the form and the content would need to be negotiated. The 
parties did unanimously agree on the “freedoms of the air”, the units of 
exchange that would adapt to survive more than sixty years beyond the 
multilateral agreement they were designed to facilitate. And yet, as will be 
clear from the discussion below, ideas as to the proper balance between 
international growth and the stability required to insulate “local” and 
                                                
242 Ibid. at 498 (“Are we going to fail? Are we going to fail in that because perchance some 
one operator fears he can’t make a go of it? Or are we going to implement the mandate 
contained in the Atlantic Charter?”). 
243 Ruggie, “Embedded Liberalism”, supra note 4 at 382 [original emphasis]. 
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“regional” lines from being competed out proved to be unshared and non-
negotiable. 
 
3.2.1. The Freedoms of the Air as Units of Exchange 
 
One of the major contributions of the Conference to international air 
commerce was the development of the freedoms of the air. Introduced by the 
Canadian delegation to the Conference, each “freedom” is in fact a sort of 
privilege, a result of state sovereignty over the airspace, a working out of the 
problems in real time, and perhaps the intellectual residue of an earlier age.244 
Together, the freedoms make up a classification system for the exchange of 
traffic rights. 
 The life of the freedoms has been an evolutionary one. During the 
Conference, the delegates spoke of exchanging five freedoms of the air, with 
the major distinction being between the technical (first and second freedom) 
and the commercial (third though fifth freedom) rights. Each freedom 
represented a distinct privilege to access the granting state’s airspace, territory, 
and, in the commercial freedoms, national traffic base, and were divided as 
follows: 
 
1st Freedom: For the aircraft of State A to overfly the territory of State 
B; 
2nd Freedom: For the aircraft of State A to make technical stops in the 
                                                
244 On the source of the term, see e.g. Cooper, “Air Transport and World Organization”, supra 
note 184 at 1207. 
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territory of State B; 
3rd Freedom: For the aircraft of State A to embark passengers and cargo 
in State A and disembark them in State B; 
4th Freedom: For the aircraft of State A to embark passengers and cargo 
in State B and disembark them in State A; 
5th Freedom: For the aircraft of State A, from a service originating in 
State A, to embark passengers and cargo in State B and 
disembark them in State C. 
 
An illustration may help clarify these distinctions. Assume that Singapore 
Airlines wishes to carry passengers from Singapore to Sydney. To do so, it 
will need to operate over Indonesia, perhaps without landing (first freedom) 
but perhaps requiring a stop in Jakarta solely for purposes of refueling (second 
freedom). Once in Sydney, it will want to disembark its passengers (third 
freedom) and embark passengers destined for Singapore (fourth freedom). If, 
however, SIA wishes to embark or disembark passengers in Jakarta it will 
require additional permissions (fifth freedom) from Indonesia and Australia. 
 In addition to the five freedoms, the delegates recognized (with no 
small degree of ambivalence) a “sixth” freedom, composed of a sequential 
combination of a fourth and a third freedom operation that used the operator’s 
home state as an intermediate connecting point.245 In the example of the 
                                                
245 See e.g. ICAO, Records of the Multilateral Commission on Multilateral Agreement on 
Commercial Rights in International Civil Air Transport (Session Held at GENEVA, November 
4th-27th 1947), ICAO Doc. 5230, A2-EC/10 (1947), vol. I at 17, para. 2.2.1 [ICAO, Records of 
the Multilateral Commission]; Bin Cheng, “The Right to Fly”, supra note 185 at 110-11 
(noting that “[i]n more current usage, it [i.e., the 6th freedom] applies to the carriage of traffic 
between two foreign countries via the home State of the carrier. It is in fact a combination of 
third and the fourth freedoms, secured from different countries, so as to produce the same 
effect as the fifth freedom vis-à-vis both. But while in the first five freedoms account is taken 
only of the traffic within a specific route or service, in the so-called sixth freedom, an attempt 
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Singapore-Jakarta-Sydney route, passengers carried between the two terminal 
points, but using Garuda Indonesia instead of Singapore Airlines, would be 
carried on a sixth freedom basis, assuming Indonesia had negotiated the right 
to embark traffic in Australia destined for Jakarta (fourth freedom) and 
disembark traffic from Jakarta in Singapore (third freedom). During the 
Conference and subsequent discussions at ICAO, the sixth freedom was 
largely seen as a “problem”, with the concept of a “stopover” developed to 
distinguish legitimate carriage on a third and fourth freedom basis from an 
exercise in traffic diversion.246 This issue has never been entirely resolved, 
although there is a significant degree of toleration of the practice and outright 
acceptance in the liberal, open skies-type arrangements used in many parts of 
the world today.247 The delegates also dealt with cabotage, if only to confirm 
that every state had the right to reserve its domestic market for its national 
airline.248 
 In today’s liberal operating environment, however, it is common to 
speak of nine freedoms of the air.249 As well as recognizing the sixth freedom 
                                                
is made to take into account traffic carried on separate and distinct routes and services. It is 
still highly controversial whether, or under what circumstances, this may be regarded as a 
distinct privilege.” [emphasis added]). 
246 See Commentary on the Multilateral Agreement in PICAO, Proceedings of the Air 
Transport Agreement – Multilateral Agreement on Commercial Rights in Air Transport 
(ICAO Doc. 4014, A1-EC/1 (Reissue of PICAO Doc. 2866-AT/169)) Appendix B at para. 
3.3.1 [PICAO, Multilateral 2]; ICAO, Records of the Multilateral Commission, ibid. at 20, 
paras. 2.4.4. A similar problem exists with respect to “open jaw” cabotage. On the latter, see 
e.g. ICAO, Records of the Multilateral Commission, ibid. at 20, para. 2.5; Mendes de Leon, 
Cabotage, supra note 235 at 33-37. 
247 For an interpretation of the stopover, see e.g. Mendes de Leon, Cabotage, ibid. at 33-35. 
248 See Statement by Adolf A. Berle, to the Second Plenary Session in US Dept of State, 
Proceedings, supra note 2 at 61-62 (advocating for “the principle that the people of each 
country must have the dominant voice in their own transport systems.”); Mendes de Leon, 
Cabotage, ibid. at 7-52. Cabotage as a legal concept is discussed in detail below at 302-07. 
249 See e.g. Havel, Beyond Open Skies, supra note 10 at 103-09. There are also other 
nomenclatures, mainly further distinguishing between types of cabotage. See e.g. Henri A. 
Wassenbergh, Post-War International Civil Aviation Policy and the Law of the Air (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1957) at 69-74, 122 (identifying petit and grand cabotage) 
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as a separate, legitimate commercial right, the additional rights recognized 
speak to the possibility of exchanges of routes not bound to the state 
designating the operator as well as to cabotage: 
 
6th Freedom: For the aircraft of State A to embark passengers and cargo 
in State B, reroute them through State A, and disembark 
them in State C (this is essentially a combination of 3rd-4th 
freedoms); 
7th Freedom: For the aircraft of State A to embark and disembark 
passengers and cargo between State B and State C without 
a stop in State A; 
8th Freedom: For the aircraft of State A, from a service originating in 
State A, to embark passengers and cargo in State B and 
disembark them in another point in State B (consecutive 
cabotage); 
9th Freedom: For the aircraft of State A, from a service originating in 
State B, to embark and disembark passengers and cargo 
between two points within State B (stand-alone cabotage). 
 
Going back to the example of routes between Singapore, Indonesia, and 
Australia: if Qantas provided service between Singapore and Jakarta without 
touching Australia it would qualify as a seventh freedom operation; if between 
                                                
[Wassenbergh, Post-War Law and Policy]; Cheng, “The Right to Fly”, supra note 185 at 128-
29 (identifying sixth-freedom cabotage (also called “open jaw cabotage”), i.e., serving a 
domestic origin and destination pair via an intermediate point in another state, and “peripheral 
cabotage”, i.e. serving essentially domestic passengers through airports in the peripheral area 
immediately adjacent the state.). This study refers to nine freedoms. 
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Sydney, Surabaya, and Jakarta, then commercial service on the Surabaya-
Jakarta route segment would be provided on an eighth freedom basis;250 if 
service were only between Surabaya and Jakarta, without touching either 
Australian or Singaporean territory, the service would be on a ninth freedom 
basis. Chapter 5 discusses these rights in further detail in the context of a 
liberalized operating environment. 
 
3.2.2. Impasses in Opportunities: Liberalism, International Regulation 
and the Primacy of Local Traffic 
 
Despite lengthy discussions, the Convention itself confers very little freedom. 
While Article 5 grants the technical rights to non-scheduled services only on 
condition that the state may require a stop at an identified airport, the grant of 
commercial rights remains subject to “such regulations, conditions or 
limitations as [the state flown over] may consider desirable.”251 In contrast, 
Article 6, which governs scheduled services, simply provides that “[n]o 
scheduled international air service may be operated over or into the territory of 
a contracting State, except with the special permission or other authorization 
of that State, and in accordance with the terms of such permission or 
                                                
250 If the service is non-commercial in nature, this is called a co-terminalization right. Such 
rights are often included, but must be specified in the air services agreement. 
251 Chicago Convention, supra note 217 art. 5. In many cases, the restrictions put in place 
were (and remain) quite stringent. There were two attempts at a regional level to promote 
some form of non-scheduled traffic. Multilateral Agreement on Commercial Rights of Non-
Scheduled Air Services in Europe, singed at Paris, 30 April 1956 [Paris Agreement]; 
Multilateral Agreement on Commercial Rights on Non-Scheduled Services Among the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Manila, 13 March 1971 [Manila Agreement]. See 
also Haanappel, Ratemaking, supra note 221 at 112-13 (noting that the interpretation of the 
European agreement led to the development of a robust charter market in Europe). 
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authorization.”252 These words, written in simple, brief and clear prose, 
positively reaffirm not only the default closedness of the skies, but also 
convey the intractibility of the issue of openness as a multilateral matter 
during the Conference. 
 It is worth taking a moment to reflect on this point a bit further. One 
way of describing the politics of air transport is as a form of “middle” politics, 
falling somewhere between the “low” politics of economic activity and the 
“high” politics of security, just as the Chicago Conference fell between the 
Bretton Woods and San Francisco Conferences.253 Moreover, the balance of 
issues on both sides seemed to suggest the prudence of some form of 
international regulation. On the one hand, there are the traditional problems of 
international relations, of security and prestige that have played into the 
tendency to perceive air transportation as particularly unique, of it being more 
than “just another problem” of the international economic system.254 The 
Conference had sought to limit debate to the economic consequences of air 
transport; indeed, the dangers discussed were those of the closure of 
international connectivity – surely a reference to the disastrous consequences 
of economic nationalism and the 1930s –, not the implications of aircraft as an 
instrument of war.255 Nevertheless, air power remained very much in the 
                                                
252 Chicago Convention, ibid., art. 6. 
253 Lowenfeld, “A New Takeoff”, supra 5 at 32. Although not drawing the high-low 
distinction, Brian Havel and Gabriel Sanchez have argued for a common “cosmopolitanism” 
among postwar institutions. Havel & Sanchez, “Restoring Aviation”, supra note 21 at 12. 
254 Lowenfeld “A New Takeoff”, ibid. But compare Benjamin J. Cohen, International 
Political Economy: An Intellectual History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008) at 
22-23 (noting that the immediate postwar period had sought to depoliticize economic activity 
as much as possible (there was still a residual), but by the multiple crises of the 1970s “[t]he 
world economy could be depoliticized no longer.” Ibid. at 23). 
255 See Statement by Adolf A. Berle to the 2nd Plenary Session in US Dept of State, 
Proceedings, supra note 2 at 54-63. Berle even argued that transport aircraft were no longer 
convertible to military use: 
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minds of men, the most obvious example being the continued exclusion of 
former enemy.256 
 On the other hand, both the economic outlook and thought of the time 
suggested concern over the effects of a liberal arrangement. This was the 
result of the overwhelming dominance of US capabilities at the close of the 
War. Indeed, with 72 percent of the world market for air services, the vast 
bulk of passenger demand, an economy unscathed by physical destruction, and 
the only supply of readily available transport aircraft, the United States was 
clearly in a position to dominate international services.257 Thus, while the US 
expressed concerns over subsidies and sought to assure other states that its 
planes would be readily sold to “friendly” nations, an equally prevalent 
concern was that the US would simply outprice the other airlines out of 
existence.258 On top of this concern, however, lay a deeper issue. Economic 
                                                
 
Yet the fierce developments compelled by five years of war have vastly changed and 
advanced the art of aviation, and at the same time have vastly increased the division 
between military aviation and civil air transport. According to experts, it is not possible 
to convert a peaceful transport plane into an effective instrument of war despite a 
widespread popular misconception to the contrary; and it is very nearly impossible to 
convert a warplane into an economically viable instrument of commerce. 
 
Ibid. at 58.  
256 Chicago Convention, supra note 17, art. 93. Compare Berle’s opinion above with John 
Cooper’s postwar opinion. See John C. Cooper, “Air Power”, supra note 202. 
257 See Statement by Adolf A. Berle to the 2nd Plenary Session in US Dept of State, 
Proceedings, supra note 2 at 62; Paul Stephen Dempsey, Law and Foreign Policy in 
International Aviation (Dobbs Ferry, Transnational Publishers, Inc. 1987) at 10 [Dempsey, 
Law and Foreign Policy]; Lowenfeld, “A New Takeoff”, supra note 5 at 38 (describing “the 
economic and political realities of the time – a war ravaged world in which only the United 
States had money airplanes, and large numbers of potential travelers”). To add to this 
pressure, many US domestic carriers had in 1943 begun to lobby the US government for open 
access to international airways. See e.g. de Murias, supra note 208 at 41-43. 
258 On the US position, see Statement by Adolf A. Berle to the 2nd Plenary Session in US Dept 
of State, Proceedings, ibid. at 62. On the concern of others, see e.g. infra note 294 and 
accompanying text (citing the Canadian delegation’s concerns with free access to fifth 
freedom traffic); Lowenfeld, “A New Takeoff”, ibid. at  39 (noting that “[s]ince it was feared 
that the American carriers, geared to high volume, low markup and efficient operations, 
would seek to establish lower fares than the Europeans (and others) could keep up with, rate-
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theory of the time posited that network industries such as air transport suffered 
from market imperfections that would result in inefficient outcomes – or 
“market failures” – if left unregulated.259 One concern was that the structure of 
the air transport industry made it susceptible to natural monopoly.260 Natural 
monopolies are those industries responsive to increasing returns, such that the 
largest supplier has the lowest unit costs and that, as a result, only one firm 
can survive in a competitive forum.261 A second concern was that air transport 
suffered from high fixed and low avoidable costs, such that competition would 
drive costs below a level that permitted the recuperation of spent capital, 
certainly an “unreasonable” form of competition.262 Negotiators most certainly 
would have been aware of these theories, as they also would have been aware 
that the same theories had justified federal regulation in the United States.263 
Whether or not these particular “defects” figured prominently in the 
psychology of discussions, it is clear that states were openly concerned about 
being priced out of their own markets. 
                                                
making in IATA was based on unanimity, subject to government approval and the residual 
governmental powers provided for in the Bermuda agreements.” [emphasis added]). 
259 See e.g. de Murias, supra note 208 at 11 (noting that “although protection of the national 
airlines seems to have been an important objective in the regulation of foreign airlines 
throughout the world, there is a perfectly respectable and widely held body of opinion that all 
forms of transportation for hire require close government supervision.”). On the theory behind 
US market regulation, see Stephen G. Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform (Cambridge, MA & 
London: Harvard University Press, 1982) at 29-34 [Breyer, Reform]; Michael E. Levine, “Is 
Regulation Necessary? California Air Transportation and National Regulatory Policy” (1965) 
74 Y.L.J. 1416 at 1424 [Levine “Is Regulation Necessary?”]. The seminal article on market 
failure is Francis M. Bator “The Anatomy of Market Failure” (1958) 72 Q.J. Econ. 351. There 
is also some evidence, although inconclusive in itself, of such concern in the Convention 
itself. Chicago Convention, supra note 17, art. 44(e) (including the prevention of “economic 
waste caused by unreasonable competition” among ICAO’s objectives).  
260 Breyer, Reform, ibid.; Levine, “Is Regulation Necessary?”, ibid. at 1424-25 . Both discuss 
regulatory justifications for domestic airline regulation in the United States. 
261 Levine, “Is Regulation Necessary?”, ibid. 
262 See e.g. ibid.; Breyer, Reform, supra note 259. 
263 See e.g. de Murias, supra note 208 at 11. 
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 Collectively, these concerns resulted in three very different kinds of 
proposals from three groups of states. While each group of proposals could 
reconcile common political concerns and operational imbalances at the time, 
they diverged from each other in terms of both the level of internationalism 
and the degree of liberalism in the regulatory structure, in particular with 
respect to the fifth freedom. 
 In the area of regulatory internationalism, each of the three categories 
of proposal ranged in form and depth, from the complete absence of an 
international regulatory authority to the creation of an international operator 
with a monopoly over international trunk routes. For its part, the United States 
sought an environment free from international regulatory authority, proposing 
to allow air carriers to freely determine their own operational matters.264 
Meanwhile, the United Kingdom and Canada each proposed the creation of an 
international regulatory body with the authority to regulate tariffs and 
frequencies (and, in Canada’s case, entry) on international routes served on a 
first to fourth freedom basis.265 Australia and New Zealand went beyond this, 
proposing to internationalize the operator of trunk routes, leaving national 
airlines to operate the local routes.266 
                                                
264 See generally United States Proposal of a Convention on Air Navigation in US Dept of 
State, Proceedings, supra note 2 at 544-66 (Conf. Doc. 16). 
265 See generally United Kingdom Proposal on International Air Transport in US Dept of 
State, Proceedings, ibid. at 566-70 (Conf. Doc. 48) (noting that “[t]he right to pick up and set 
down traffic to and from destinations which are not in the country of origin of the aircraft and 
the right to engage in the cabotage of another country would be a matter for negotiation”); 
Canadian Revised Preliminary Draft of an International Air Convention in US Dept of State, 
Proceedings, ibid. at 570-91 (Conf. Doc. 50) (but reserving the right of contiguous states to 
reserve negotiations between themselves).  
266 Address of D.G. Sullivan to the Second Plenary Session, 7 November 1944 in US Dept of 
State, Proceedings, ibid. at 77-80; Address of Mr. Arthur Drakeford to the Second Plenary 
Session, 7 November 1944 in US Dept of State, Proceedings, ibid. at 82-84. 
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 Proposals also varied in relation to the relative degree of freedom 
given to fifth freedom traffic. The United States had proposed to allow “full” 
freedom of the air with respect to the first to fifth freedoms.267 Most states, 
however, opposed this degree of liberalism, seeking to limit the impact of fifth 
freedom traffic through any combination of three legal mechanisms. The first 
sought to delink traffic carried on a fifth freedom basis from a proposed 
“escalator” or “full plane” clause. The full plane clause was designed to 
increase an airline’s overall operating capacity once it could prove it was 
carrying an acceptable load factor (the percentage of seats sold relative to total 
available seats) over a particular period of time. By delinking the fifth freedom 
from the proposed measure for flexibility, states sought to reduce or eliminate 
the possibility of fifth freedom operators underpricing local operators.268 The 
other two mechanisms had similar functions. Another mechanism proposed to 
permit uplift on a “pick-up” only, as opposed to a “fill-up”, basis. Uplift on a 
“fill-up” basis permits the operator to embark and disembark passengers on 
intermediate points of the journey where it already maintains a “reasonable 
load factor” on the service between the points of origin and ultimate 
                                                
267 See generally the US position in the Joint Meetings of Committees I, III, and IV in US 
Dept of State, Proceedings, supra note 2 at 375-531 (particularly the United States Proposal 
with Reference to Article II of the International Air Convention, ibid. at 517-519 (Conf. Doc. 
426). See also e.g. Dempsey, Law and Foreign Policy, supra note 271 at 10-11. In this regard, 
see also infra note 412 (noting Dempsey’s view that open skies is essentially a re-introduction 
of its position at the Conference). But compare United States Proposal of a Convention on Air 
Navigation in US Dept of State, Proceedings, ibid. at 557, art. 8(a) (requiring that the 
commercial operations of scheduled services shall be dependent on the consent of the other 
state, as indicated by special agreement on file with the proposed organization’s Executive 
Council). 
268 See supra note 258; ICAO, Records of the Multilateral Commission, supra note 245 at 24-
29 (discussing competition between fifth and other freedoms as well as the three mechanisms 
used to control such competition). See also Wassenbergh, Post-War Law and Policy, supra 
note 249 at 47-49 (discussing the UK proposal). Anthony Sampson attributes the 
disappearance of the escalator clause from discussion to a miscommunication within the 
British delegation. See Sampson, supra note 218 at 67-68. Nevertheless, discussions 
continued to link capacity and frequency to a reasonable load factor.  
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destination, irrespective of the local lines’ capacity to provide service.269 In 
contrast, carriage conducted on a “pick-up” basis is limited to local demand 
that local carriers cannot meet.270 A final mechanism proposed a system of 
rate differentials, requiring the tariffs for carriage conducted on a fifth 
freedom basis be priced above those carried out by a local carrier on a third or 
fourth freedom.271 
 What all of these mechanisms have in common is that each attempts to 
balance a general “freedom of the air” with the more specific concern that the 
economic and political structure of the postwar period would result in one 
state’s domination of international air transport to the detriment of the others. 
This is not only in relation to the curtailment of fifth freedom operations. 
Importantly, both the UK and Canadian proposals provided exceptions from 
international regulation for fifth freedom and contiguous states, respectively, 
proposals which would have left each state the right to negotiate bilaterally – 
i.e., specifically – with the United States.272 Both relationships would have 
important continuing influences in the discussions on air transport regulation 
during the period. 
 
3.3. The Transit and Transport Agreements: Plurilateralism as 
Compromise 
 
                                                
269 See e.g. ICAO, Records of the Multilateral Commission, ibid. at 27, para. 9.2.  
270 Ibid. at 27-28, para. 9.2. 
271 Ibid. at 28, para. 9.3. 
272 See supra note 265. 
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Despite LaGuardia’s sermon on the Sermon, the delegates to Chicago were 
unable to agree on an appropriate regulatory arrangement to be included in the 
multilateral Convention promulgated at the end of the Conference. The 
delegates made a great many proposals in the last week of the Conference, and 
a decision reached only three days before the close of the event.273 That 
decision would be to promulgate two separate agreements – the International 
Air Services Transit Agreement and the International Air Transport 
Agreement – as protocols to the Convention.274 
 The Transit and Transport Agreements represent civil aviation’s first 
excursion into plurilateralism, a multilateral arrangement between a small 
group or sub-set of a larger group of states designed to be accessible to a 
broader group of states.  The agreements make the technical and commercial 
traffic rights available to members of the broader conventional framework, 
with the Transit Agreement exchanging the first two freedoms among 
signatories and the Transport Agreement providing for all five freedoms of the 
air, without requiring every member state to grant multilateral access to any 
right.275 The flexibility this provides to the overarching structure of the 
Chicago system, permitting states to adhere to the Convention without 
requiring them to surrender any traffic rights, has certainly aided in 
establishing the Convention in the international community. States desiring to 
                                                
273 See generally Minutes of the Plenary Session of Committees I, III, and IV, December 4 in 
US Dept of State, Proceedings, supra note 2 at 515. 
274 See Statement by Adolf A. Berle to the Final Plenary Session in ibid. at 110; International 
Air Services Transit Agreement, signed at Chicago, 7 December 1944 [Transit Agreement]; 
International Air Transport Agreement, signed at Chicago, 7 December 1944 [Transport 
Agreement]. 
275 Transit Agreement, ibid., art. I, s. 1; Transport Agreement, ibid., art. I, s. 1. 
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exchange more can then weigh the advantages and disadvantages of each 
agreement on an independent basis. 
 Both the Transit and Transport Agreements are liberal in their own 
right. Among their provisions, the one that most stands out in both 
Agreements is the ownership and control clause. In this respect, each 
Agreement continues to reserve for each contracting state: 
 
the right to withhold or revoke a certificate or permit to an air transport 
enterprise of another State in any case where it is not satisfied that 
substantial ownership and effective control are vested in nationals of a 
contracting State, or in case of failure of such air transport enterprise to 
comply with the laws of the State over which it operates, or to perform 
its obligations under this Agreement.276 
 
The system, in a break from both its predecessor of 1919 and the subsequent 
bricolage of bilateral agreements that gradually emerges during the latter half 
of the 1940s and which continues to legally control the vast majority of 
international exchanges, removes the element of specific bilateral reciprocity 
between contracting states, creating a space for free investment among 
signatories while preventing non-signatory members of the Chicago 
Convention from free-riding and maintaining the Convention’s exclusion of 
former enemy states.277 Other provisions are equally as liberal. In terms of 
                                                
276 Transit Agreement, ibid., art. I, s. 5; Transport Agreement, ibid., art. I, s. 6 [emphasis 
added]. 
277 See e.g. Peter P.C. Haanappel, “Airline Ownership and Control and Some Related Matters” 
(2001) 26 Air & Sp. L. 90 at 92-93 [Haanappel, “Ownership and Control”]; Wassenbergh, 
Post-War Law and Policy, supra note 249 at 62-64. On the ex-enemy states, see Chicago 
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route determination, the Transport Agreement merely requires “a route 
constituting a reasonably direct line out from and back to the homeland of the 
State whose nationality the aircraft possesses”,278 and leaves operational 
decisions in the hands of the individual airlines. Indeed, it is not until the 
United States adopted an “open skies” policy in 1992 that operational freedom 
would be so freely exchanged. 
 Despite their common birth, the Transit and Transport Agreements 
have lived very different lives. The Transit Agreement has enjoyed relative 
success in the number of ratifications since its promulgation and continues to 
receive official support from ICAO.279 It has, however, not found universal 
acceptance, and several states with favorable geographical scales and positions 
including Canada, the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China, 
remain non-signatories.280 Yet despite the absense of important geostrategic 
players within its framework, no one has suggested that it has been a failure, 
or that it would have served better as a provision in the Convention. In 
contrast, the Transport Agreement remains almost completely unratified.281 
                                                
Convention, supra note 17, art. 93; Buergenthal, supra note 228 at 18-24 (noting that the ex-
enemies had been fully incorporated by the mid-nineteen fifties). 
278 Transit Agreement, ibid., art. I, s. 1; Transport Agreement, ibid., art. I, s. 1. 
279 According to public files available at ICAO, there are currently 129 parties to the Transit 
Agreement. See generally ICAO, “International Air Services Transit Agreement Signed at 
Chicago on 7 December 1944”, online: <http://legacy.icao.int/icao/en/leb/transit.pdf>. Canada 
had originally signed on to IASTA, but withdrew effective 1988 after disputes over access to 
Heathrow, removing British flyover rights to the US. On ICAO’s continued recommendation 
for ratification, see e.g. ICAO, “Declaration of Global Principles for the Liberalization of Air 
Transport” in ICAO, Consolidated Conclusions AT/Conf 5, supra note 10 at 4-2. 
280 See ibid. The Transit Agreement nevertheless continues to apply to international transport 
to and from Hong Kong and Macau. 
281 In contrast to the Transit Agreement, currently only eleven contracting states have signed 
the Transport Agreement, with only one acceptance during the 1950s (Costa Rica in 1958), 
one acceptance during the 1960s (Burundi in 1968) and no subsequent adherents. See 
generally ICAO, “International Air Transport Agreement Signed at Chicago on 7 December 
1944”, online: <http://legacy.icao.int/icao/en/leb/transport.pdf>. Two reservations (Greece 
and Turkey) have been entered with respect to the 5th freedom. See ibid. 
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Even the United States, the original advocate for the Agreement, had 
withdrawn from the system by 1946.282 And although it is clear why the 
United States insisted on including the fifth freedom in the Transport 
Agreement (the probability that a partner at the time would independently 
surrender liberal fifth freedom traffic rights was next to nil), it was this 
provision that ultimately proved the death of it. Despite at least one rather 
passing suggestion of a possible revival in modified form,283 the Transport 
Agreement remains a virtual non-item in the field of air transport regulation. 
Rather, these rights, along with other commercial rights and ownership and 
control issues, have been reserved to the domain of the bilateral agreement. 
 
3.4. Multilateralism Beyond Chicago: ICAO and the ‘Missing Chapters’ 
 
While the delegates at Chicago were unable to conclude an agreement at the 
Conference itself, they remained both convinced of the need for a multilateral 
instrument and resolved to reach an agreement on the issues. The Conference 
itself closed with a commitment to continue negotiations within ICAO until 
the parties reached a solution.284 The Interim Assembly of the Provisional 
International Civil Aviation Organization soon confirmed this commitment, 
passing a resolution that acknowledged that, “a multilateral agreement on 
commercial rights in international civil air transport constitutes the only 
                                                
282 See e.g. Haanappel, “Ownership and Control”, supra note 277 at 92. 
283 Martin Dresner & Michael W. Tretheway, “ICAO and the Economic Regulation of 
International Air Transport” (1992) 17-2 Ann. Air & Sp. L. 195 at 211. 
284 See generally Verbatim Minutes of Plenary Session of Committees I, III, and IV, 
December 1 in US Dept of State, Proceedings, supra note 2 at 491-509 & Statement by Adolf 
A. Berle to the Third Plenary Session in ibid. at 96-98. 
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solution compatible with the character of the International Civil Aviation 
Organization created at Chicago.”285 
 The definitive loss for multilateralism came not in 1944, but at a period 
of time between the signing of the momentous bilateral air transport 
agreement between the United States and United Kingdom in Bermuda on 11 
February 1946, governed by a set of interpretative principles subsequently 
known as the Bermuda Principles, and 1953, when ICAO formally gave up its 
work on a multilateral regulatory order.286 It is impossible to precisely 
determine when this change occurred; however, certainly one of the main 
contributions was the transformation of the US-UK relationship from principal 
opponents to common proponents, the result of their concluding a bilateral 
agreement between them at Bermuda on 11 February 1946.287 Bermuda I not 
only represented the reconciliation of the two principal economic and 
geographic powers inter se: it was also a model of what an acceptable future 
multilateral might look like. Indeed, the two states presented the agreement to 
                                                
285 Provisional International Civil Aviation Organization, Interim Assembly Res. IV in PICAO 
Commission Number 3 of the Interim Assembly, Discussion on the Development of a 
Multilateral Agreements on Commercial Rights in International Civil Air Transport (PICAO 
Doc. 2089-EC/57) at IX [PICAO, Multilateral 1]. 
286 On Bermuda I, see generally below at 107-10. On the gradual process of renouncing 
multilateralism as a short term achievable objective, see ICAO, “Assembly Resolution A7-15 
on Prospects of and Methods for Further international Agreement on Commercial Rights in 
International Air Transport – Scheduled International Air Services” in ICAO, Resolutions and 
Recommendations of the 7th Session of the Assembly, Brighton, June-July 1953, ICAO Doc. 
7417, A7-P/3 (1953) at 27-28 (pronouncing that “there is no present prospect of achieving a 
universal multilateral agreement”. while nevertheless recognizing it as an objective “to the 
greatest extent possible”). The Assembly had already moved the matter to the Council as early 
as 1950 for lack of agreement. ICAO, “Assembly Resolution A4-16 on Further Action to 
Secure a Multilateral Agreement on Commercial Rights in International Air Transport” in 
ICAO, Resolutions and Recommendations of the 4th Session of the Assembly, Montreal, May-
June 1950, ICAO Doc. 7017 (1950) at 10 [ICAO, 4th Assembly]. 
287 See generally Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, signed at 
Bermuda, 11 February 1946 [Bermuda I]; Final Act of the Civil Aviation Conference, held at 
Bermuda, 11 February 1946 [Final Act]. 
 97 
PICAO as a model for multilateral exchange, while, for its part, Bermuda I 
subordinated its terms to a possible multilateral.288 
 What is most interesting about Bermuda I in the context of 
multilateralism is that it failed to find support as a basis for multilateral 
agreement despite what it represented as a concentration of power. Indeed, in 
both draft multilaterals (known as the “missing chapters” to the Conference)289 
presented within the organization, the first produced by the Committee on Air 
Transport of the Interim Council in 1946 and the second by the Air Transport 
Committee in 1947,290 the key terms – those related to an international 
regulatory authority and the relative subordination of fifth freedom rights to 
local traffic – look very little like their Bermuda I counterparts. The Bermuda 
Principles include liberal fifth freedom rights on a fill-up basis, with no 
mention of capacity restrictions and rate differentials, while the Agreement 
does away with the concept of an international regulatory authority 
altogether.291 In contrast, the 1946 draft multilateral retains provisions for both 
an international regulatory authority, proposes a system of rate differentials for 
traffic carried on a fifth freedom basis, and limits fifth freedom operations to 
                                                
288Bermuda I, ibid., art. 11. 
289 See e.g. John Gunther, “Multilateralism in International Air Transport – The Concept and 
the Quest” (1994) 19-1 Ann. Air & Sp. L. 259 at 263-65 (concluding that “[i]f the world ever 
gets around to another such attempt it may do well to dust off the history books and analyse 
what went wrong.” Ibid. at 265). 
290 PICAO, Multilateral 1, supra note 285; PICAO, Multilateral 2, supra note 246. Together 
with a special conference called in Geneva in 1947, these events constitute what has been 
called the “missing chapters” of the Conference. See Gunther, ibid. See also generally ICAO, 
Records of the Multilateral Commission, supra note 245. 
291 See Final Act, supra note 287, para. 6 (requiring that operations be related to the 
requirements of origin-destination traffic, to the requirements of through traffic, and “to the 
traffic requirements of the area through which the airline passes after taking account of local 
and regional services”). Instead of a regulatory agency, the governments agreed on certain 
consensual interventions (see infra note 293 and accompanying text) and a limited (and 
originally temporary) right for airlines to consult on tariffs, subject to a limited form of 
government intervention. 
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pick-up traffic.292 While the 1947 draft moves in the direction of Bermuda I, 
eliminating the provisions on an international authority and rate differentials, 
it nevertheless retains the requirement that fifth freedom operations be carried 
out only on a pick-up basis.293 
 Both the failure to fully introduce the terms of Bermuda I into either of 
draft multilaterals and the fact that specific provisions on key issues ran contra 
to the consolidated US-UK position generally supports the embedded 
liberalism thesis that the postwar economic order was a conjunction of power 
and common social purpose. The failure of the United States and United 
Kingdom either to persuade or assuage the other parties is evident in 
comments made by several of the delegates. No doubt the most vocal of which 
had been Canada, whose delegate made the following comment on Bermuda’s 
fifth freedom provisions: 
 
The United States, in their written comments say that the wording “after 
taking into account of” local and regional services precludes any 
possibility of destruction of local or regional services. I do not know 
how it so precludes this. It is too vague. “After taking account of” may 
mean that you will not have taken all the traffic. What is to prevent it? 
There seems to be no guarantee to preclude it.294 
 
                                                
292 PICAO, Multilateral 1, supra note 285 at XVI-XVII (draft arts. on subsidiarity of 5th 
freedom and rate differentials), XX-XXII (draft c. VII on an International Civil Air Transport 
Board), 27-52 (discussing the freedoms of the air), 64-77 (discussing subsidiarity of 5th 
freedom), 77-101 (discussing rate differentials), & 119-26 (discussing the air transport board). 
293 PICAO, Multilateral 2, supra note 246 at 21 (specifically art. 10(a)) & 30 (commentary to 
the article). 
294 Statement by the Canadian Delegation in PICAO, Multilateral 1, supra note 285 at 67. 
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For its part, neither side was willing to give in to its demands on the fifth 
freedom issue. Ultimately, the inability to conjoin multilateralism with the 
desired regulatory content resulted in the adoption of a new form of agreement 
– bilateralism based on common principles of exchange. 
 
3.5. National Ownership and Control in the Multilateral Context 
 
Before addressing the compromise of bilateralism, it is necessary to first 
comment on certain developments within ICAO’s foray into multilateralism 
related to the ownership and control of airlines. The first postwar expressions 
of ownership and control requirements had been quite liberal. Although the 
delegates at the Conference had agreed that it was important to solve the 
problem of “knowing with whom one is dealing”,295 both the Provisional 
Services Agreement, included in Chicago’s Final Act as a kind of stopgap 
until a multilateral agreement could be reached, and the Transit and Transport 
Agreements provide a more liberal regime than the national ownership and 
                                                
295 Statement by the US Delegate reported in Minutes of Meeting of Subcommittee 1 of 
Committee III, November 9 in US Dept of State, Proceedings, supra note 2 at 1283 
(discussing the Standard Form of Provisional Route Agreements). The report in full reads: 
 
We have two problems – the problem of ex-enemy or present enemy states or 
nationals, and the problem of knowing with whom you are dealing at all times. Rights 
and permits are conceded by a country or countries to another country or countries as 
part of friendly relations and not for the purpose of being peddled. For example, we 
would not care to have a group of Germans go abroad and use their ill gotten gains to 
purchase aircraft and utilize rights we might have accorded a friendly state to fly into 
the United States. 
 
Ibid. See also ibid. at 1283-84 (including the British Delegate’s statement that “a national 
company should be a national company” and expressing general agreement with the point 
made by the United States). See also Lowenfeld, “A New Takeoff”, supra note 5 at 39 (noting 
that “[a]irlines would not be multinational corporations, however, in terms of ownership and 
organization, but would be owned by the state or citizens of the state whose flag they flew.”). 
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control restrictions which eventually emerged to govern the industry.296 
Bermuda I contains a provision similar to the Transit and Transport 
Agreements, admitting airlines substantially owned and effectively controlled 
by “nationals of either Contracting Party”,297 a provision more likely reflecting 
its status as model multilateral than for any planned cross-border investment 
between the two states. 
 Yet by the time PICAO issued its second draft agreement in 1947, the 
liberal stance demonstrated at Chicago and Bermuda had been reversed.298 In 
this regard, discussions over the first draft agreement reveal two concerns that 
extend beyond that of excluding non-signatories.299 The first dealt with the 
efficacy of national regulation, particularly the ability of a national refused an 
operating license by its home state to establish an airline abroad and operate 
the same route, thus circumventing the national regulations and ultimately 
undermining the authority of the state.300 This problem, including that of 
                                                
296 See Standard Form of Agreement for Provisional Air Routes in US Dept of State, 
Proceedings, ibid. at 129, para. 7; Transit Agreement, supra note 274; Transport Agreement, 
supra note 274; supra note 276 and accompanying text. See also e.g. Haanappel, “Ownership 
and Control”, supra note 277 at 92-93. 
297 Bermuda I, supra note 287, art. 6. See also Haanappel, “Ownership and Control”, ibid. at 
93. 
298 See PICAO, Multilateral 2, supra note 246 at 21, art. 9 & 30, para. 2.6. Cf. PICAO, 
Multilateral 1, supra note 285 at XV, art. 7 (providing that “[e]ach Contracting State reserves 
the right to withhold or revoke the grant of the Freedoms in cases where substantial ownership 
and effective control of an airline which exercises the Freedoms are note vested in nationals of 
a Contracting State, or if such airline fails to operate in compliance with the laws of such 
State, or fails to perform its obligations under this agreement.”). 
299 See generally PICAO, Multilateral 1, ibid. at 58-61. 
300 Statement by the Canadian Delegate in ibid. at 59 (noting that “in its present form, a State 
may refuse permission to one of its airlines to establish a route to a foreign country; that 
airline may then become incorporated in that foreign country and, as a foreign airline, obtain 
the rights which its own government was not prepared to grant it. In this way the purposes of 
national legislation would be circumvented.”); Written Comments by the Delegation of 
Canada in ibid. at 151, art. 7. The problem of regulatory evasion continues to be a problem for 
liberalization. See e.g. ICAO, Report AT/Conf 4, supra note 16 at 24, para. 2.3.5.3; MALIAT, 
infra note 584, art. 4(1)(b) (providing the right of a receiving state to revoke or suspend a 
designation where ownership of the airline lies with nationals of the receiving state). 
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potential “flags of convenience”, would continue as a serious concern301 as 
regulatory standards would increasingly diverge among states in the decades 
after the War. The second concern related to the balance of stabilities that the 
multilateral agreement was designed to uphold. In the words of the Canadian 
delegation: 
 
We contemplate in this agreement the exchange of rights among all 
Member States so that every Member State may have fair opportunity to 
operate international airlines. Conditions that would allow any one State 
to increase its share at the expense of others, because of its ability to 
acquire widespread control of foreign airlines, either by financial or 
political methods, might endanger this objective.302 
 
 Other states held different opinions. The written comments of the 
Venezuelan delegation on the 1946 draft expressed its concern that without 
foreign equity and expertise the developing countries could ill afford to 
                                                
301 See e.g. ICAO, Report AT/Conf 4, ibid.; MALIAT, ibid.; Draft Multilateral on Investment, 
infra note 601, art. 2. 
302 Statement by the Canadian Delegate in ibid. 59. Cf. Ruggie, “Embedded Liberalism”, 
supra note 4 at 394 (noting that “[w]ithin Within the United States, the social and economic 
reforms of the New Deal had lacked ideological consistency and programmatic coherence, 
and opposition had remained firmly entrenched. […] This, of course, affected the outcome of 
the negotiations [in the international arena]. Indeed, the United States would come to use its 
influence abroad in the immediate postwar years, through the Marshall Plan, the Occupation 
Authorities in Germany and Japan, and its access to transnational labor organizations, for 
example, to shape outcomes much more directly, by seeking to moderate the structure and 
political direction of labor movements, to encourage the exclusion of Communist Parties from 
participation in governments, and generally to discourage collectivist arrangements where 
possible or at least contain them within acceptable Center-Left bounds.”) (referring to Charles 
S. Maier, “The Politics of Productivity: Foundations of American International Economic 
Policy After World War II,” (1977) 31 Int’l Org. 607; Robert W. Cox, “Labor and 
Hegemony,” (1977) 31 Int’l Org. 385). Cf. ICAO, Report AT/Conf 4, supra note 16. 
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develop viable national air transport operations.303 Nor was the Venezuelan 
position unique.304 As seen in the discussion on nationality during the interwar 
period, a number of South American (and one or two Asian) governments had 
relied heavily on foreign (and particularly US) investment to establish their 
own airlines.305 Particularly farsighted European nations might also have 
thought about the potential of foreign investment as a replacement for direct 
participation as they looked to dismantle their colonial empires.306 Yet 
ultimately the liberal opinion lay in the minority, the text supported by the 
majority requiring substantial ownership and effective control lie “in 
nationals, or in the Government, of the Contracting State or States in which the 
airline is established”.307 
 Again at issue was the balance of international and local interest. In a 
situation where both sides saw the legitimacy of the other’s concern, the 
location of discretion in institutional design centered on who would determine 
the balance. Of course, nobody challenged the theory that designated airlines 
should be owned by nationals of the designating state: the principle had been 
understood from the Conference as an assumption of the air transport system, 
                                                
303 Written Comments by the Delegation of Venezuela in PICAO, Multilateral 1, ibid. at 173 
(noting that developing countries “not having the technical and financial resources required 
for the efficient operation of an airline, need to supplement their own limited resources with 
resources obtained outside the national sphere. The formula which has proved to yield 
effective results not only in aviation, but in any other modern industrial enterprise, is to 
interest foreign capital in national enterprises to secure at the same time the technical 
collaboration which is only adequately obtained when it is combined with the financial 
interest.”). 
304 See e.g. Statement by the United States Delegate in ibid. at 59; Written Comments by the 
Delegation of the United States in ibid. at 139-40 (both noting the need to evaluate the 
provision given the desire that airlines ultimately be nationally owned with the possibility of 
short-term foreign ownership as a means of generating air transport services in the first place). 
305  See supra note 224. 
306 On this, see generally below at 213-15 & 321. 
307 PICAO, Multilateral 2, supra note 246 at 21, art. 9 [emphasis added]. 
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and any change to it was understood as an aberration.308 By giving discretion 
to the state granting access to its airspace, the majority both provided a check 
on the potential for abuse and signaled that between competing priorities, the 
right to operate locally would override the desire to expand through even 
temporary foreign participation. In other words, foreign participation would be 
evaluated not only against the necessity of such participation, but the need 
itself would be subrogated to the impact foreign participation would likely 
have on the affected local lines. 
 
4. ‘MULTILATERALISM THROUGH BILATERALISM’: BERMUDA I, THE 
INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION, AND THE 
CRYSTALLIZATION OF THE REGULATORY ORDER 
 
While Bermuda I represented a compromise between competitors in a larger 
multilateral arena, it had also introduced another form of compromise. 
Specifically, as part of the bilateral agreement, the United States had also 
agreed with the United Kingdom on a system of price controls. As part of the 
Agreement, Annex II granted the states’ airlines the right to coordinate tariffs 
by means of the International Air Transport Association, subject to change 
only if both states approved it, a mechanism understandably known as the 
                                                
308 See supra note 295; Statement by Adolf A. Berle to the Second Plenary Session, in US 
Dept of State, Proceedings, supra note 2 at 57 (noting that “traffic by air differs materially 
from traffic by sea, where commerce need have no direct connection with the country from 
which the ship may have come” and analogizing airlines to railroads, engaged in 
“connect[ing] the country in which the line starts with other countries, from which, to which, 
or through which there flows a normal stream of traffic to and from the country which 
established the line” and noting that the US would not be interested in airlines that did not 
affect the US). See also Lowenfeld, “A New Takeoff”, supra note 5 at 39 (noting one of the 
assumptions of air transport in the postwar period was that airlines would be nationally 
owned). 
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“double approval” review mechanism.309 While this system never appeared in 
the content of any of the multilateral agreements, by 1947 a minority of states, 
including the US and the UK, admitted that principled bilateralism might 
prove a better alternative to the multilateral system proposed at Chicago.310 
 It would ultimately be this system of bilateralism – held together by 
the multilateral IATA Traffic Conferences  - which emerged as the legal basis 
for international air transport. The Bermuda I–IATA system also satisfied the 
need to balance international route expansion with the stability of each 
national airline’s ability to operate local services. By the time ICAO 
renounced multilateralism as an object of study in 1953, the current cobweb 
was firmly in place and would remain so, with only minor, protectionist-
driven incursions, well into the 1980s. 
 
4.1. The International Air Transport Association and Multilateral 
Regulatory Controls 
 
It is a particularly unique and interesting piece of regulatory history that the 
spider in the web was not a government, but a number of airlines, and equally 
interesting that it should receive government sanction. Indeed, the lynchpin in 
the emergent postwar system was the near universal state acceptance of the 
International Air Transport Association’s Traffic Conferences.311 Established 
                                                
309 See e.g. Bermuda I, supra note 287, Annex II. For an explanation of the difference between 
double approval, country of origin (where only the country of the place of origin could 
intervene in pricing), and double disapproval (where both states needed to disapprove a tariff 
before it could be take off the market) mechanisms, see e.g. Haanappel, Law and Policy, 
supra note 1 at 118-19. See also infra note 418. 
310 See Statement of Minority Views in PICAO, Multilateral 2, supra note 246 at 37, para. 4. 
311 See e.g. Haanappel, Law and Policy, supra note 1 at 118-19; Havel, Beyond Open Skies, 
supra note 10 at 223-28. 
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in April 1945 as the trade organization of the world’s scheduled airlines 
(which it remains), IATA conducted its first multilateral Traffic Conference in 
1947.312 It was also, until liberalization swept through the international air 
transport industry beginning late 1970s, a government sanctioned cartel.313 
Indeed, it continues to serve a number of functions for the airline industry, 
although its most important function in the thirty years following the War – to 
provide a forum for the airlines of the world to coordinate their commercial 
activities – has long since lost its primacy of place.314 
 Like other industries, airlines compete with each other based on a mix 
of price, convenience, and service quality. A consumer may base her choice 
on the price of a particular fare, or better time, or because one service offers a 
better product (more comfortable seats; a better movie selection; a glass (or 
more) of champagne), or somewhere in a comfortable middle. IATA’s 
principal function was to make sure that no form of competition took place. 
The most basic and interrelated element of competition was through the price 
system, and in this regard the Traffic Conferences functioned as a universal, 
consensus-based system for coordinating the tariffs charged by each airline on 
                                                
312 The success of the ratemaking apparatus, which was approved by IATA (itself established 
during the Havana Conference of 16-19 April 1945) in its first Annual General Meeting 
during 16-18 October depended on its acceptance by both the UK and the US. The former 
approved the Conference on 18 December 1945, while the latter initially granted temporary 
exemptions, beginning 19 February 1945 (and subsequently in 1947, 1948 1950, 1950, 1951, 
1952, and 1954, before it was made permanent in 1955. The two governments officially 
sanctioned this method as a multilateral tool on 19 September 1946, when they issued a joint 
statement proclaiming the Bermuda Agreement as the standard pattern for bilaterals to be 
concluded by the two countries. See e.g. Haannapel, Law and Policy, supra note 1 at 12-18; 
Peter P.C. Haanappel, Pricing and Capacity Determination in International Air Transport: A 
legal Analysis (Deventer: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1984) at 28-32 [Haanappel, 
Pricing and Capacity]. IATA itself gives the 1947 date as the year of the first multilateral 
Traffic Conference. See IATA, “History – The Early Days”, online: 
<http://www.iata.org/about/pages/history_2.aspx>. 
313 See e.g. Haanappel, Ratemaking, supra note 221 at 41-46.  
314 On the pressures for IATA reform, see infra notes 397-401 (discussing the US CAB show 
cause order) & 463(noting the Ahmed Saeed decision’s effects on the IATA Traffic 
Conferences).  
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each international route.315 At the same time, it regulated almost every aspect 
of service quality to achieve an essentially undifferentiated product between 
carriers: from peanuts to seat pitch, IATA was meant to ensure that there was 
no legroom for competition.316 To ensure compliance, the Association would 
retain the power to police and punish individual members for infractions of the 
organization’s rules.317  
 But if the Traffic Conferences protected airlines from competition, 
IATA balanced this with innovations designed to expand the international 
network available to the passenger. The creation of a standardized IATA 
passenger ticket and baggage check allowed passengers access to the network 
of all IATA members by purchasing a single ticket sold at a standard price 
fixed by IATA.318 The ticket, purchased from an issuing airline, permitted the 
passenger to interline on multiple airlines, and with payment prorated between 
the airlines based on the distance carried and distributed through the IATA 
Clearing House, another innovation, established in 1946-47.319 Indeed, as a 
whole, the airlines had quite simply been able to balance the states’ own 
interests where the states themselves had not. 
 
4.2. Bilateral Regulation of Entry, Route and Capacity Issues 
 
                                                
315 For an explanation of how the ratemaking system worked during this period, see generally 
Haanappel, Ratemaking, supra note 265 at 57-63. See also generally Martin Dresner & 
Michael Tretheway, “The Changing Role of IATA: Prospects for the Future” (1988) 13 Ann. 
Air & Sp. L. 3 at 3-16 (discussing oligopolistic tendencies of ratemaking process) [Dresner & 
Tretheway, “IATA’s Changing Role”]. 
316 Ibid. 
317 Ibid. 
318 See e.g. Haanappel, Law and Policy, supra note 1 at 124. 
319 Ibid. 
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A second reason states accepted IATA was the sheer complexity of balancing 
a burgeoning number of bilateral agreements negotiated on two different sets 
of basic principles, and an even greater number of reasons for adopting one 
approach or the other.320 Of the two basic building blocks of the Bermuda I–
IATA regulatory regime, the bilateral agreement is the most independent and 
thus the one open to variability.321 It controls the vast majority of the 
regulatory elements, including matters related to entry, frequency, capacity, 
and route determinations; it also formally validates the IATA ratemaking 
mechanism and insulates the fares determined from unilateral changes through 
the “double approval” mechanism.322 So long as IATA remained an effective 
control on competition from third parties, the two parties were free to set the 
terms of exchange inter se. 
 The Bermuda I itself is often referred to as the prototype for the 
postwar agreement. It is such for a number of reasons. Structurally, it is a 
prototype for all agreements. Divided into an agreement and a set of annexes, 
the agreement itself only exchanged a very generalized set of technical rights 
– the right to designate airlines to routes, the recognition of licenses and 
operator’s certificates, the right to revoke or suspend services where they do 
not meet the nationality requirements – while the actual terms of the 
commercial exchange took place in a set of annexes.323 This structure permits 
great flexibility, and the terms of the annexes are often amended to 
                                                
320 On the set of different interests, see e.g. de Murias, supra note 208 at 10-13; Marek Zylicz, 
International Air Transport Law (Dordrecht, Boston & London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
1992) at 5-24 (analyzing the basic goals and determinants of air transport policies). 
321 Andreas Lowenfeld phrases the same point slightly differently, noting that “fares were seen 
as more interdependent than routes”. See Lowenfeld, “A New Takeoff”, supra note 5 at 39. 
322 See generally Bermuda I, supra note 287. 
323 See generally ibid. 
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substantively reflect the different sets of principles discussed below. It has 
also resulted in a great deal of opacity, and many states have averted the filing 
requirements contained in the Chicago Convention by concluding a facially 
liberal agreement while simultaneously or subsequently limiting the 
arrangement by confidential exchange of letters, memoranda of consultation 
or executive notes.324 This opacity has in many ways limited an expert’s 
ability to evaluate the system as a whole. 
 Bermuda I also provided a model for substantive exchange in more 
liberal agreements, including the model for US bilateral agreements.325 
Bermuda I has been adroitly described as a “restrictive pricing regime and 
liberal capacity arrangements and route descriptions.”326 The pricing regime 
refers to the IATA system, which was formally sanctioned, initially on a 
temporary basis, in the agreement although subject to either country’s ability 
                                                
324 See e.g. Wassenbergh, Post-War Law and Policy, supra note 249 at 64. One result of the 
high level of opacity in the system is a recent campaign by ICAO to increase the level of 
transparency in light of liberalization. See generally e.g. ICAO, Consolidated Conclusions 
AT/Conf 5, supra note 10 at 15-16, Agenda Item 2.7 (discussing the need for and measures to 
make the system more transparent). 
325 See Cheng, “The Right to Fly”, supra note 185 at 126 (noting that Bermuda I is the 
prototype for agreements adopting a “national traffic” criterion, as compared to 
predetermination type agreements using an “inter partes traffic” criterion); Lowenfeld, “A 
New Takeoff”, supra note 5 at 38 (noting that “[h]aving reached agreement along these lines 
with Great Britain, the United States insisted on making precisely the same agreement with all 
other countries (except of course for the routes) – eventually over 50 substantially identical 
bilateral air transport agreements.”). See also Haanappel, Law and Policy, supra note 1 at 113-
14 (noting that “[t]he overall importance of the Bermuda Agreement of 1946 can be described 
as follows: it became a model, as already indicated, for most countries and most bilateral 
agreements in the world; it created a compromise […] acceptable to most countries, between 
governmental interventionism (pricing) and commercial freedom for airlines (capacity 
determination); it governed at the time and until major decolonization as of the 1960s, not 
only air services between the US and the UK, but also air services involving many US and UK 
overseas territories; and, it created the precedence that the US undertook to immunize inter-
airline pricing agreements (subject again to governmental control) from the effects of US 
antitrust laws.”); Havel, Beyond Open Skies, supra note 10 at 111-12 (calling Bermuda I 
moderately liberal and noting that it shared “several conceptual affinities with the later open 
skies philosophy”). This position generally accords with the minority viewpoint arising out of 
the discussion of the second draft multilateral. Statement of Minority Views in PICAO, 
Multilateral 2, supra note 246 at 37-40. 
326 Abeyratne, Legal and Regulatory Issues, supra note 238 at 28.  
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to override a particular (passenger) fare or (cargo) rate.327 In contrast, 
Bermuda I permitted airlines to determine their own capacity requirements, 
including on fifth freedom traffic, subject to a set of general principles, called 
the Bermuda Principles, ensuring that the service bore a close relationship to 
public demand, that there be a “fair and equal opportunity […] to operate on 
any route”,328 that carriers shall take care not to “affect unduly” the services of 
the other state’s carriers, and that fifth freedom service take local and regional 
services into account.329 The Principles also contain a clause temporarily 
permitting both states to review the capacity determinations given the War’s 
effect on British industry’s capabilities, while the exercise of fifth freedoms 
remained constrained by limits placed on change of gauge rules, which limited 
a carrier’s right to change aircraft type at different stages along the route to 
maximize efficient operations.330 Route descriptions were predetermined but 
fairly liberal, although the United States itself would limit access to beyond 
routes in its later agreements – a point of contention between it and a number 
of states.331  
 Interestingly, Bermuda I provides for multiple (unlimited) air carrier 
designation, i.e. the number of airlines each state can authorize to operate 
transport services under an agreement, merely referring to “a carrier or 
carriers”.332 This is in distinction to later practice, which clearly identifies a 
                                                
327 Supra note 309. 
328 Final Act, supra note 287, para. 4. 
329 Ibid., paras. 3-6. 
330 Ibid., para. 7 (on the right to consult over disproportionate market shares); Bermuda I, 
supra note 301, Annex V (on change of gauge). 
331 Bermuda I, ibid. at Annex III. On subsequent limitations, see e.g. the discussion on Japan’s 
resistance to liberalization below at 138-41. 
332 Bermuda I, ibid., art. 2. 
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specific number, whether that be one (sole carrier designation), two (dual 
designation), or more.333 In practice, the United States demonstrated a great 
deal of comity in this area, generally matching the number of designations 
made by the other party and appointing no more than three carriers to operate 
across the North Atlantic, and two across the Pacific.334 
 While at least one commentator has tried to attribute an air of moral 
right to liberal Bermuda I-type arrangements,335 such agreements (even those 
with more limited route assignments) neither represented the majority of 
agreements, nor did they indicate a trend towards which many states 
aspired.336 These agreements, called “predetermination”-type agreements 
because they would determine the benefits each carrier would receive ex ante, 
introduced an extremely rigid form of agreement designed in principle to give 
                                                
333 On the concept of designation, see generally Haanappel, Law and Policy, supra note 1 at 
117-18. 
334 See Dempsey, Law and Foreign Policy, supra note 257 at 26 (noting two carriers 
dominated the US-Asia market (Pan Am and Northwest Orient), the US-Latin America 
market (Pan Am and Braniff) and the US-Europe market (Pan Am and TWA), and that while 
“Bermuda I and its progeny” did not specify the number of designations, “prior 
administrations had been reluctant to certificate a significantly larger number of U.S.-flag vis-
à-vis foreign-flag carriers in any particular market, thereby retaining a rough parity or a 
general quid pro quo balance” and that the US had “implicitly constructed” such a limitation 
from the agreements) & 31 (noting no more than three carriers across the North Atlantic in 
total). 
335 Wassenbergh , Post-War Law and Policy, supra note 249 at 65 (describing Bermuda I as 
the “boni mores” of international air transport relations). 
336 See ibid. Bin Cheng also noted the predominance of predetermination-type agreements 
among states: 
 
The predetermined type of agreements with equal division of inter partes traffic is 
essentially protectionist, while the Bermuda type of agreements is much more liberal. 
The limited acceptance of the latter outside a small circle of States means that the right 
of international scheduled flights is correspondingly restricted. 
 
Cheng, “The Right to Fly”, supra note 185 at 126-27 (also noting that even the UK reverted 
back to predetermination-type and/or hybrid arrangements). 
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absolute security to the airlines.337 While the core of these arrangements 
consisted of fixing capacity, rigidities could take a number of forms: they 
could limit fifth freedom operations by permitting them a purely 
supplementary role, or by wholly banning them through “no local traffic” 
rules; or they might limit competition between local operators by providing for 
a capacity or revenue sharing arrangement on an inter partes basis.338 In the 
latter case, the agreement could very well assign this task to the carriers in 
addition to the general practice of cooperatively determining tariffs.339 
 This last point serves to emphasize the interrelatedness of the two 
elements of the Bermuda I–IATA system.  The acceptability of the bilateral 
system lies in the flexibility it introduces into the terms of exchange. With a 
deadlock in the area of multilateral negotiations, such flexibility provided a 
medium for compromise between the powerful minority and the more 
conservative majority. It is indeed noteworthy in this respect that even some 
who had supported a liberal multilateral arrangement, particularly in Europe, 
either fell back on or were forced back into the more conservative practices of 
capacity and revenue sharing that had prevailed during the interwar period.340 
                                                
337 See e.g. Cheng, ibid.; Haanappel, Pricing and Capacity, supra note 312 at 34-38; 
Haanappel, Law and Policy, supra note 1 at 122 (noting that “[t]he advantage of Bermuda 
type capacity provision is commercial flexibility; its disadvantage is vagueness with the 
possibility of frequent disputes: the advantage of predetermination of capacity is certainty; its 
disadvantage is that it does not give much room for designated airlines to compete in the area 
of capacity provision, with an inherent risk of under capacity, which is not in the interest of 
the user of scheduled international air transport; under capacity may also drive up prices.”). 
338 See e.g. Haanappel, Law and Policy, ibid. at 121-22; Wassenbergh, Post-War Law and 
Policy, supra note 249 at 56, fn 2 (distinguishing between “predetermination of traffic” and 
“predetermination of capacity and frequencies”) & 65-66 (discussing no local traffic rules). 
339 See e.g. Haanappel, Pricing and Capacity, supra note 312 at 36 (noting that “[t]he system 
of governmental approval can also take one of two forms: individual airlines must seek prior 
governmental approval of capacity and frequencies; or the designated airlines must reach an 
inter-carrier agreement on capacity and related matters, subject to prior governmental 
approval.”). 
340 See generally Cheng, “The Right to Fly”, supra note 185 at 124-27 (noting that Bermuda I 
was, for the British, a move away from the more predetermination-type agreements of the 
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Yet the practice would not have worked without a means of keeping citizens 
in the seats of their respective national airlines. To a certain extent, states 
could control both airline and consumer behavior through restrictions designed 
to limit foreign penetration in the market, particularly by limiting “doing 
business” matters such as establishing sales offices and permitting repatriation 
of revenue earned from sales abroad. Such rules not only limited the airline’s 
ability to sell its services abroad, but limited consumer awareness of and 
access to a foreign airline’s service. But their efficacy would have been 
grossly undermined by competition on price or service quality. At the same 
time, conservative agreements would similarly have failed to prevent price 
competition on indirect routes operated on a sixth freedom basis.341 Disabling 
competition thus became IATA’s chief role, and it performed it outwardly 
well for decades. Together the system provided a foundation for a stable order 
of the air. 
 
4.3. Reciprocity and the Crystallization of National Ownership and 
Control Rules 
 
Bilateralism also solved the question of which form of ownership and control 
rule states would adopt. The answer lies in the particular form of reciprocity 
engaged in bilateral exchange. Reciprocity requires an exchange “of roughly 
                                                
interwar period, but that many of its subsequent agreements have fallen back on 
predetermination type or hybrid structures). See also Haanappel, Pricing and Capacity, supra 
note 312 at 25-26 (noting the strict reciprocity of many interwar agreements) & 35-36 (noting 
that while the US had more or less remained faithful to Bermuda I many others, including the 
UK, had reverted back to predeterminist policies). 
341 For example, the US has used pricing freedom over the transatlantic and transpacific as 
ways of diverting traffic away from states refusing to adopt a more liberal policy through 
those willing to do so. See generally below at 136-41. 
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equivalent values in which the actions of each party are contingent on the prior 
actions of the others in such a way that good is returned for good, and bad for 
bad.”342 Yet it may acquire different forms. One such distinction is between 
specific reciprocity, “the simultaneous balancing of quid-pro-quos by each 
party with every other at all times”, and diffuse reciprocity, an arrangement 
that “is expected by its members to yield a rough equivalence of benefits in 
the aggregate and over time.”343 It is the link between institutional form and 
type of reciprocity that broadly dictated the terms of exchange. 
 As an institution, multilateralism yields itself (although not exclusively 
so) to diffuse reciprocity.344 The many parties involved makes reaching any 
exact equivalence of exchange for every party that would balance out at any 
given point in time impracticable at best, if not entirely impossible. Exact 
values yield to general principles, such as the exchanges of traffic rights in the 
Transit and Transport Agreements, or the “pick-up” or “fill-up” formulae 
proposed during ICAO’s several discussions of multilateral regulation.345 In 
contrast, bilateralism permits a more nuanced calculation between parties.346 
                                                
342 Robert O. Keohane, “Reciprocity in International Relations” (1986) 40 Int’l Org. 1 at 8. 
See also Erwin von der Steinen, National Interest and International Aviation (Alphen aan den 
Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2006) at 55 (of reciprocity: “Third and Fourth Freedoms are 
fairly straightforward, invariably pared and a classic example of reciprocity. ‘I get to fly to 
you and back; you get to fly to me and back.’”). 
343 John Gerard Ruggie, “Multilateralism: the Anatomy of an Institution” (1992) 46 Int’l Org. 
561 at 571-72 [Ruggie, “Multilateralism”]. 
344  Ibid. at 571-72 & 583. But Keohane has also noted that this is not a wholly fixed 
correlation. See ibid. at 23 (noting that the EC was, for a time, at the verge of moving from a 
situation of diffuse to one of specific reciprocity). However, the example is one of small 
numbers and with a long and well-documented history of exchange, making quantification 
with precision easier.  Keohane, supra note 342 at 19-24 (linking diffuse reciprocity to 
sentiments of obligation and noting that sequential reciprocity promotes long term cooperation 
more effectively than simultaneous exchange, points which will come back in Chapter 6. See 
also Ruggie, ibid. at 583). 
345 See generally above at 85-103. 
346 Ruggie, “Multilateralism”, supra note 343 at 571-72 (noting that “[b]ilateralism […] is 
premised on specific reciprocity, the simultaneous balancing of specific quid-pro-quos by 
each party with every other at all times.”). 
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Whereas the exact value of exchange could not always be quantified and 
exchanged in multilateralism, bilateralism lends itself precisely to such 
mechanisms.  
 The shift from multilateral to bilateral negotiations did two closely 
interrelated things to the negotiation of traffic rights. First, the shift from 
diffuse to specific reciprocity tightened the grip of a system of ownership and 
control that kept benefits with the state that had negotiated them: any 
alteration would destroy the quid-pro-quo that had been negotiated.347 The 
second shift in thought brought on by bilateralism and specific reciprocity 
relates to the valuation of rights and the distribution of benefits. Under 
bilateral exchanges, states could individually and collectively value requested 
routes, and that value could then be bargained for and distributed among the 
two states’ airlines.348 Airlines would also become involved with setting 
government agendas, if not present at the negotiation itself. Where the 
requested rights were unequal in value, or where an airline was subsequently 
acquired by foreign interests, any inequivalence could be balanced in a 
number of ways: a state could acquire additional traffic rights, or 
predetermination-type clauses might be used to redistribute the benefits, or 
direct monetary payments of an equivalent amount to the other state’s airline 
might even be required.349 These types of stories were near ubiquitous in the 
                                                
347 See e.g. Havel, Beyond Open Skies, supra note 10 at 357 (describing airline regulation as 
“micromanagement”). 
348 This, of course, was a necessary precondition for predetermination-type policies. 
349 See e.g. Hans Raben, “Deregulation: A Critical Interrogation” in Wassenbergh & van 
Fenema, supra note 109, 13 at 16-18 (noting several examples of exact recalibrations in 
bilateral relationships); Roberto H. Lim, “Aviation in World and State Economics” in 
Wassenbergh & van Fenema, supra note 109, 45 at 48 (noting that Alitalia required a payment 
of USD600,000 annually for Philippines Airlines’ right to operate Manila to Rome). On 
subsequent foreign ownership, see e.g. Pablo Mendes de Leon, “A New Phase in Alliance 
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heyday of Bermuda bilateralism, and had a clear impact on the role of 
efficiency in the postwar order. 
 The question remains as to whether the Bermuda I–IATA system 
actually altered the fundamental premises of the international order – that is to 
say, whether the changes remained “norm-governed” or were themselves 
“norm-transforming”.350 In the present case, it would appear that the 
appropriate answer would be that it did both, altering the form to preserve the 
essential content. With regard to the principle of multilateralism, or even non-
discrimination, there seems little doubt that the system, even as a system of 
“multilateralism through bilateralism”,351 broke with principle. To argue 
otherwise would stray so far from the facts as to be unforgivable in any 
coherent analysis. Yet on a broader level, by breaking with the system of 
multilateralism, the states parties were able to develop a system – a rather 
nuanced one at that – that did maintain the principle of balance, a balance on 
which even multilateralism had been predicated.352 The sacrifice of one upheld 
the other, and in this way maintains the essential content, even while forfeiting 




                                                
Building: The Air France/KLM Venture as a Case Study” (2004) 53 ZLW 359 at 362 
(discussing Aerolinas Argentina) [Mendes de Leon, “A New Phase”]. 
350 Ruggie, “Embedded Liberalism”, supra note 4 at 384 & 404-13. 
351 Abeyratne, Legal and Regulatory Issues, supra note 238 at 28. 
352 Many saw the Bermuda I-IATA regime as a balanced one. See e.g. Christer Jonsson, 
International Aviation and the Politics of Regime Change (London: Pinter, 1987) at 31-35 
(describing the system as “fair”); Knut Hammarskjold, “Oneworld or Fragmentation – the 
Tool of Evaluation in International Air Transport” (1984) 9 Ann. Air & Sp. L. 79 (using “one 
world” as a symbol for the general approval (at the time) of the Bermuda I-IATA system). 
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The international legal order that appeared at the beginning of the postwar 
period, a mosaic of bilateral regulatory arrangements held together by the 
cement of multilateral inter-airline collaboration on tariffs, continued to 
diffuse through the international community, unchanged, unquestioned, and 
unchallenged, for the better part of thirty years. While the content of most 
bilateral agreements demonstrated some shift towards the more predeterminist 
side of the spectrum, the legal order remained for the most part in a state of 
relative stasis. Underlying the stability of the legal practices of the time 
however, were a number of dramatic changes to the political and economic 
conditions at the time. The successes of reconstruction, decolonization, and 
the major technological advances to aircraft achieved during the 1950s and 
1960s changed many of the fundamental aspects of regulatory governance, as 
did a number of other fundamental shifts in the structure of economic 
organization more generally. Chapter 3 begins by examining the impact of 












CHAPTER 3: LIBERALIZATION: TRANSITIONS AND PARTIAL 








Chapter 2 describes the development of the postwar order of the air as situated 
within a larger international order centered on the nation-state. This order, 
however, no longer adequately describes today’s increasingly globalized 
economic order. Beginning with the United States in 1978, a number of 
governments have gradually begun relaxing their regulatory holds on the 
industry, introducing measures to deregulate, liberalize, and privatize their air 
transport markets. Groups of states have begun exploring non-bilateral and 
non-national forms of organization. These measures, however, have been 
limited in scope and scale in a number of areas. Importantly, market access 
issues, particularly to domestic markets, and the ownership and control clauses 
found in many bilateral agreements remain in place in the vast majority of 
bilateral relationships. Airlines have responded to these changes by organizing 
themselves into cooperative groups of alliances within the current regulatory 
structure, even as they begin to demand for structural reforms. 
 Like Chapter 2, Chapter 3 sets itself both a formal and contextual task, 
tied to analyzing the actual legal and policy content of change as well as 
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placing it within an overarching normative framework. In doing so, it first 
analyzes the ongoing processes of regulatory transformation, first with respect 
to formal institutional changes centered on the North Atlantic and the 
increasing demands for multilateral institutional restructuring. It then looks at 
air carriers’ responses to liberalization, in particular their efforts at 
restructuring services and the resultant shifts in their demands on regulatory 
institutions. At the same time, it discusses the role of specific instruments such 
as particularly antitrust immunity as a means of balancing attempts to leverage 
competitive advantage to the benefit of their national industry with the 
participation norm, as well as the limits to these processes thus far. 
 
2. THE BREAKDOWN OF THE POSTWAR ORDER OF THE AIR 
 
For approximately thirty years following the War, international air transport 
experienced steady growth. Supported by Bermuda I, stabilized by the IATA 
Traffic Conferences, and buoyed by reconstruction and innovations in aircraft 
technology, airlines sailed along on the crest of thirty years of economic 
growth.353 Although periodic tensions arose, this near constant growth helped 
foster a relatively complacent attitude towards changes in the market as well 
                                                
353 See e.g. Dempsey, Law and Foreign Policy, supra note 257 at 21-22 (also noting that rapid 
growth did not necessarily translate into profitability); Dresner & Tretheway, “IATA’s 
Changing Role”, supra note 315 at 6-7 (contrasting the high growth rates and outward 
appearance of cohesiveness with Straszheim’s analysis of internal conflict (citing Knut 
Hammarskjöld, Address in Final Report of the International Aviation Symposium, Kingston, 
Jamaica, 1970 at 48; Mahlon R. Straszheim, The International Airline Industry (Washington, 
DC: The Brookings Institution, 1969) at 133-39)). For a periodized, regionalized analysis, see 
Michael E. Levine, “Air Transport Demand: What Drives It? How Can We Cope With It?” in 
Pablo Mendes de Leon, ed., Air Transport Law and Policy in the 1990s: Controlling the Boom 
(Dordrecht, Boston & London: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1991), 7 at 8-10 (giving a broad 
worldwide overview); Haanappel, Ratemaking, supra note 265 at 131-39 (concentrating on 
the North Atlantic). 
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as a general optimism over future trends.354 To the extent US market shares 
declined relative to its European counterparts, or scheduled to non-scheduled 
airlines, concerns were offset by the overall positive market trends. Aircraft 
orders continued in advance of receipt.355 All was well. 
 As this extended period of economic growth broke down in the early 
1970s, so did contentedness with the legal regime supporting it. Bearable 
irritants ten or even five years back became too much in the economic climate 
of the 1970s.356 At the heart of discontent lie the technological changes that 
resulted in aircraft capable of carrying significantly more in significantly less 
time at significantly lower cost, capabilities that would affect the underlying 
structures of both supply and demand.357 Demand for leisure travel, the source 
of so much revenue during this period of growth, proved highly price-elastic 
and largely disappeared with rising costs and shrinking expendable income.358 
The few passengers willing to spend looked to lower-cost alternatives. They 
found these in the growing charter airline market, which were not subject to 
IATA tariff restrictions and could therefore underprice its members.359 This 
                                                
354 See ibid. As Andreas Lowenfeld noted at the time: 
 
[h]ad one looked back at the Bermuda settlement in say, 1965 … one would have had 
to be pleased with the results – not in every detail but in overall effect. … Ten years 
later, in the context of economic stress, the Bermuda compromise looks very different. 
 
Lowenfeld, “A New Takeoff”, supra note 5 at 41.  
355 Dempsey, Law and Foreign Policy, supra note 257 at 22. 
356 See supra note 354. 
357 See e.g. Haanappel, Ratemaking, supra note 221 at 131-39. 
358 See e.g. ibid. at 93-101. For a general discussion of the price-elasticity of demand for air 
travel, see generally e.g. Michael W. Thretheway & Tae H. Oum, Airline Economics: 
Foundations for Strategy and Policy (Vancouver: Centre for Transportation Studies, 1992) at 
11-17. 
359 See e.g. Haanappel, Ratemaking, ibid. at 108-18. 
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set of demand- and supply-side factors had an appreciable impact on the 
scheduled carriers. 
 For many scheduled airlines, the focus of frustration and concern fell 
on the IATA Traffic Conferences. The Conferences had been designed to 
rigidify prices in order to quash competition between airlines; however, it was 
unable to provide the flexibility needed to compete with the charters for 
passengers’ patronage.360 Indeed, the whole process was made more rigid by 
the burgeoning number of member airlines following decolonization.361 For its 
part, IATA attempted to compete directly with the charters by introducing 
charter-like discount fares and by attempting to co-opt them by giving limited 
membership to non-scheduled airlines, which would have required charters 
abide by the transatlantic rates set by the scheduled carriers.362 Neither 
mechanism worked. At the same time, thinning profits, the rather small 
                                                
360 See e.g. ibid. at 118-20. According to Professor Haanappel, scheduled fares, even at the 
discount rate, could not compete with charter competition: 
 
The latest development in the field is probably that IATA carriers are no longer 
satisfied with APEX fares as a means to combat charter competition. Although APEX 
and Super-APEX fares are the lowest available scheduled fares on the North Atlantic – 
they are lower than the traditional North Atlantic 22-45 day excursion fares, and only 
slightly higher than the average charter fare – they are, according to IATA carriers, not 
low enough to efficiently combat charter competition. 
 
Ibid. at 120. For a detailed description of the ratemaking process, see ibid. at 57-68. 
361 See e.g. Dresner & Tretheway, “IATA’s Changing Role”, supra note 315 at 8-9 (noting 
number and type of carrier entries) & 14-16 (noting size of industry as one problem in 
policing and punishing cheaters). Haanappel notes two categories of non-participant airlines: 
those under Communist states whose political ideology keeps them outside the capitalist 
system and those under states that remain outside for reasons of economic competitiveness. 
Haanappel, Ratemaking supra note 221 at 106. A number of Southeast Asian states are 
included in both lists. See infra note 667. 
362 Charter-like products included the APEX and Super-APEX fares, which aimed 
(unsuccessfully) at competing with charter fares. See Haanappel, Ratemaking, ibid. at 120. 
Non-scheduled airlines’ participation in the Traffic Conferences would have been limited to 
agreeing to abide by, but not participating in the determination of, fares related to charter 
traffic across the North Atlantic. The proposal caused a great deal of reluctance from the 
charters, and was ultimately never implemented, a result of the US CAB’s never granting its 
approval to the resolution. See e.g. ibid. at 61-62. 
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likelihood of detection, and the small cost of disciplinary measures relative to 
revenues gained made defection a commonplace within the organization.363 
Designed to please everyone yet now in the face of economic stress unable to 
appease anyone, IATA’s role in the balance of stabilities gradually dissolved 
in the face of competition. 
 
3. REWRITING THE BALANCE: COMPETITION AND COLLABORATION ON THE 
TRANSATLANTIC 
 
As the 1970s unfolded, the structures that Bermuda I–IATA supported 
increasingly came into conflict with the types of transactions taking place in 
the market. This is true in at least two senses. In one sense, the order had 
conceived of competition as being almost exclusively between scheduled 
services: the rise of charters challenged not only IATA, but also the order as a 
whole. But more deeply, it demonstrated that the industry had become 
increasingly dependent on a number of factors outside both the industry’s and 
                                                
363 For an analysis of the issues, see generally Dresner & Tretheway, “IATA’s Changing 
Role”, supra note 315 at 7-16. In addition, the authors provide the following summary: 
 
It seems evident from many developments of the 1970s and 1980s that it would be 
difficult for IATA to resume the preeminent role it had prior to the late 1960s in the co-
ordination of international air tariffs. Developments which weakened IATA’s control 
over tariff co-ordination include the growth in the number of airlines operating 
international air services, many of which are new scheduled or charter carriers that do 
not adhere to IATA pricing; the increasing diversification of product offerings by 
carriers, which makes price co-ordination more difficult to achieve; the maturity of the 
airline industry, which has contributed to lower growth rates in the demand for air 
services, thereby exacerbating problems of overcapacity which, in turn, lead to 
problems of illegal discounting; the continued opportunities for secret price-cutting 
through the offering of rebates to travel agencies; and the advent of the liberal bilateral, 
which has lowered substantially the barriers to entry on many important international 
routes and has resulted in a regime of competitive, rather than co-ordinated, price 
setting. 
 
Ibid. at 16-17. 
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the individual state’s sphere of control.364 Like other institutions, its operations 
had become increasingly influenced by a deepening, broadening 
interdependence. 
 These changes have in turn triggered an ongoing renegotiation of the 
balance between the efficiency and participation norms that stresses adaptation 
towards a more flexible, efficient system as a whole. While these demands 
have not been particular to international air transport, the highly politicized 
status of the industry, the non-economic roles of air transport in a number of 
political communities, the entrenched nature of structural nationalism in both 
international and domestic legal orders, and the bilateral structure of the 
regime, have all made these demands particularly hard to meet. Nevertheless, 
a rebalancing has been taking place, one that has increasingly come to define 
air transport as a global activity and seeking to restructure it as such. 
 As with the postwar system, the frontier of large-scale structural 
change has historically resided over the North Atlantic. Beginning with US 
airline deregulation in 1978, both sides of the transatlantic have seen a great 
number of transformations, both in the instruments governing activities in the 
US, the EU, and across the North Atlantic and in the structure and the interests 
                                                
364 Lowenfeld provides the following list of “favorite explanations”, with emphasis placed on 
non-aviation-specific explanations: 
 
excessive expansion and premature conversion to the jumbo jet; the decline in the 
value of the dollar relative to European currencies; the energy crisis and the high cost 
of fuel; the worldwide economic slump; excessive growth of charter services; the rigid 
mechanisms for international rate-making; excessive (or inadequate) subsidies; too 
much competition, in terms of price or services; arrogant or complacent airline 
management; discrimination by governments against foreign carriers, especially those 
of the United States; violation of the basic rules governing international civil aviation; 
excessive adherence to those rules, and so on. 
 
Lowenfeld, “A New Takeoff”, supra note 5 at 36 [emphasis added]. 
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of the industry itself. Indeed, for a time it looked as though the nation-bound 
industry might be liberated, caught up in the discussions of possibly lifting 
foreign ownership and control restrictions and even possibly access to seventh 
freedom and cabotage markets.365 Yet for those who saw the negotiations 
between the US and the EU as potentially changing the face of aviation, the 
parties’ failure to agree to such transformation in the form of a TOAA came as 
a bitter disappointment. This section looks first to the events and motivations 
underlying liberalization and integration in the US and the EU, respectively, as 
well as the legal and political problems arising therefrom. It then turns to the 
broader transatlantic relationship. 
 
3.1. The United States: Deregulation and Its Export Abroad 
 
From an early period, the United States has led the efforts to increase the level 
of flexibility in the current nation-bound system.366 Internationally, the US had 
been a proponent of the few initiatives designed to increase the basis for 
competition within the Bermuda I–IATA system.367 The economic strains of 
                                                
365 See e.g. Havel, Beyond Open Skies, supra note 10 (holding the possibility of a Second 
Stage Agreement out as potentially revolutionary). But see Havel & Sanchez, “Restoring 
Aviation”, supra note 21 (taking the EU-Canada agreement as a new example as the EU-US 
Second Stage Agreement had failed to move beyond the principles of nation-boundedness 
currently governing the air transport industry). 
366 This is also true of the system of embedded liberalism more generally. See Ruggie, 
“Embedded Liberalism”, supra note 4 at 394 & 405-06 (noting that “[i]t is against this starting 
point that subsequent developments must be assessed.”). 
367 See generally Haanappel, Ratemaking, supra note 221 at 131-39. There were two 
exceptions to this rule during the crises of the 1970s, both over the North Atlantic. The first 
was the CAB’s sanction of a series of a series of capacity-reduction agreements between Pan 
Am, TWA, BA and British Caledonian on flights between London and New York, Chicago, 
Boston, and Washington D.C.; the second involved a route transfer agreement between Pan 
Am and TWA. See e.g. Paul Stephen Dempsey, “The International rate and Route Revolution 
in North Atlantic Passenger Transportation” (1978) 17 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 393 at 417-19 
[Dempsey, “Route and Rate Revolution”]. 
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the 1970s gave the US another opportunity to confront this system of 
regulated governance. But deregulation was as much a revision to the 
domestic system of regulation by the CAB as it was to the international order. 
As the executive agency overseeing the air transport system, the CAB was 
responsible for regulating route entry and price determinations, as well as 
certificating airlines for international service and approval of IATA tariffs.368 
But as stagflation set in and oil prices spiked, revisionist theories and popular 
sentiment, supported by empirical evidence from the (deregulated) California 
and Texas intra-state markets, sought to dismantle the system of direct 
regulation that had been in place since 1938.369  It was the ethos of direct 
regulation as a whole that the US challenged; its institutions as a whole that it 
sought to reform. 
 
3.1.1. The Domestic Transformation 
 
From 1938 until the US Airline Deregulation Act (ADA) of 1978, domestic 
regulation in the United States functioned in a manner very similar to its 
international counterpart,370 with the seat of regulatory authority residing in 
the CAB. From the time of Civil Aeronautics Act in 1938, the CAB controlled 
all matters related to entry, capacity and frequency; it reviewed (and changed) 
fares and rates by predetermined formulae; and it retained the discretion to 
                                                
368 See e.g. Havel, Beyond Open Skies, supra note 10 at 242-48. See also Lowenfeld, “A New 
Takeoff”, supra note 5 at 38 (noting that the international system was in its essential form 
much like the system of US domestic regulation). For a historical overview of US air transport 
regulation through 1938, see e.g. Levine, “Is Regulation Necessary?”, supra note 259 at 1417-
23.  
369 See e.g. ibid. at 1417-23. For an overview of revisionist theories, see Levine, “Revisionism 
Revised”, supra note 183 at182-85. 
370 See ibid. 
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disapprove changes in market structure or, alternatively, propose changes 
itself.371 The result was a fairly rigid structure in which the CAB oversaw 
sixteen airlines, designated as either domestic or international, all 
grandfathered into the system, and without a single new carrier entering an 
interstate market between 1938 and 1878.372 
 The ADA instituted domestic regulatory reform, resulting in drastic 
changes to the market. How the Act introduced these changes remains a 
subject of considerable debate. Some argue that it was a gradual, incremental 
affair; others describe it as an instantaneous “big bang”.373 There is, however, 
some truth to both accounts. As an overall process, the de jure rules certainly 
demonstrate a measure of gradualism, one of paring away layers through a 
graduated set of deadlines or “sunsets”. The ADA ended CAB route regulation 
31 December 1981; fare regulation (after a period of flexible “zones”) on 1 
January 1985.374 The Act sunseted the CAB itself on 1 January 1985, with 
authority to apply the antitrust laws to the domestic market transferred to the 
Department of Transportation until 1 January, 1989, with authority residing 
                                                
371 Havel, Beyond Open Skies, supra note 10 at 242-48 (giving the example of the Domestic 
Passenger Fare Investigation (DPFI), which calculated fare levels designed to give a 12 
percent return at a 55 percent load factor, and the anticompetitive 1971-75 capacity reduction 
agreements between United, American and Trans World Airlines as emblematic of the first 
and second points). 
372 See e.g. Havel, Beyond Open Skies, ibid. at 242-44; Levine, “Reregulated?”, supra note 38 
at 7. 
373 Cf. Havel, Beyond Open Skies, ibid. at 252-54 (noting that “[i]t is important to recognize, 
in comparing the U.S. and European deregulatory endeavors, that despite growing academic 
and legislative fervor for airline deregulation in the United States, there was no so-called big 
bang to launch deregulation of the U.S. airline industry.” Ibid. at 252); Dempsey, Law and 
Foreign Policy, supra note 271 at 23-46; Andreas F. Lowenfeld “Deregulation – Is It 
Contagious?” in Wassenbergh & van Fenema, eds., supra note 109, 25 at 25-29 [Lowenfeld, 
“Is It Contagious?”]. Havel cites, inter alia, Eugenie Kalshoven-van Tijnen, “The EEC 
Commission as the European Version of the CAB?” (1990) 15 Air L. 257 (cited in Havel, 
Beyond Open Skies, ibid. at 252, fn 79 (referring to a statement that notes “[d]eregulation in 
the USA happened almost overnight”). 
374 See e.g. Havel, Beyond Open Skies, ibid. at 255-63. 
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with the Department of Justice (DOJ) thereafter.375 But a number of legal and 
administrative factors also offset this formal gradualism. To the extent that the 
ADA dissolved CAB authority in one legislative movement, it was certainly a 
“big bang”: once enacted, reform was only possible through the legislative 
process.376 The ADA also introduced a number of provisions supporting 
immediate new entries: it reversed the burden of proof on the need to prove 
public convenience;377 it freed up entry on dormant routes; it granted each 
carrier automatic entry on one new route for each year that routes remained 
regulated.378 President Carter’s appointment of Alfred Kahn as Chairman of 
the CAB in 1977 also had a monumental effect on the shape of deregulation. 
Kahn began a process of de facto deregulation by administrative fiat, using 
CAB authority to remove entry and pricing regulation well in advance of the 
formal deadlines, resulting in an initial window of opportunity for new 
entrants in the US domestic market.379  
 Deregulation resulted in a number of deep structural changes to the 
industry. For its part, the reforms delivered their principal promise to enhance 
the efficiency of the system, providing generally lower fares and increased 
                                                
375 See ibid. 
376 Kenneth Button has made the same point. Havel, Beyond Open Skies, ibid. at 252, fn 79 
(citing Kenneth Button, “Airlines”, Paper Presented to the Meeting of STELLA/STAR Focus 
Group 5: Institutions, Regulations and Markets in Transportation, Athens (4-5 June 2004)). 
377 Whereas, prior to the ADA, the burden of proof sat with the airline applying for entry as to 
why the new route was needed, the ADA required airlines opposing the potential entrant to 
prove why the proposed new route did not constitute a public convenience. See e.g. Havel, 
Beyond Open Skies, ibid. at 242-44. 
378 Ibid. at 255-58. Compare this with the negotiated nature of the European transition below 
at 149-63. 
379 Many have seen Kahn’s appointment as being as important to US deregulation as the 
ADA. For such opinions, see e.g. Lowenfeld, “Is It Contagious?”, supra note 389 at 26-27 
(Professor Dempsey uses Lowenfeld’s description as introduction to his own criticism of US 
international unilateralism in Dempsey, Law and Foreign Policy, supra note 257 at 23-46). 
See also Havel, Beyond Open Skies, ibid. at 266 (noting that “[b]y the late fall of 1977, the 
CAB was allowing airlines to implement their own pricing strategies.”). 
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connectivity, all without negatively impacting safety standards.380 There were 
also unintended consequences of deregulation. Importantly, freeing airlines to 
make economic decisions resulted in the airlines restructuring their route 
networks, abandoning the CAB’s linear, point-to-point system in favor of 
more efficient hub-and-spoke networks. Hub-and-spoke systems allow an 
airline network to serve far more points with fewer aircraft.381 They also 
allowed the large domestic airlines to effectively challenge, and eventually 
replace, the international operators, aided by the CAB’s efforts to open 
international entry to US domestic airlines and by a policy of appointing 
airlines with major operations at regional gateways as a way of expanding 
connectivity beyond the United States.382 The effectiveness of the domestic 
airlines is born out in the fifteen years following deregulation: by 1995, the 
dominant international carriers were also the ones operating the nation’s 
largest domestic networks.383 
                                                
380 See e.g. Andrew R. Goetz & Christopher J. Sutton, “The Geography of Deregulation in the 
US Airline Industry” (1997) 87 Ann. Assoc. Am. Geo. 238 at 240-41. 
381 On airline network organization, see generally e.g. Tretheway & Oum, supra note 372 at 
60-94. Tretheway and Oum demonstrate the importance of hub-and-spoke networks for 
rationalizing services in the following manner: 
 
If a new station … had been added to the non-hub route structure … then only a 
handful of new city pairs would be viable. … In contrast, adding a new station to a hub 
already serving (N-1) cities, opens up service to N new origin-destination pairs 
(including the OD pair from the new station to the hub). Theoretically, a hub system 
with N stations (including the hub) will provide zero or one stop service to N(N-1)/2 
stations. This greatly “levers” the effect of adding stations to an existing hub. For 
example, by increasing the number of stations connected to a hub from 9 to 14 (total 
stations including the hub rise 50% from 10 to 15), the number of OD pairs served 
more than doubles from 45 to 105. 
 
Ibid. at 25. 
382 See US DOT, 1995 Policy Statement, supra note 61 at 591-94. See also Dempsey, “Route 
and Rate Revolution”, supra note 367 at 423-34 (discussing the shift in route allocation policy 
from designated international airlines to airlines with strong regional presence). 
383 US DOT, 1995 Policy Statement, ibid. at 594. 
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 Yet while deregulation has delivered its ultimate objectives, it has not 
been without its surprises, faults, and costs. Indeed, the deregulated air 
transport market did not respond as theorists had originally predicted. In 
particular, theorists had not properly understood the importance of an airline’s 
ability to draw on and process information and to distribute information to 
consumers, the strong presence of incumbents, and their influence over 
intermediaries (particularly travel agencies), each of which came to play a 
critical role in the bitter free-for-all of American deregulation in the 1980s.384 
The Reagan-era CAB/DOT, supported by theories of perfect contestability, 
exacerbated anticompetitive behavior by refusing to intervene in the market, 
adopting a pattern of virtual retreat from the market to the criticism of a 
number of eminent persons, including Kahn.385 This is particularly true of 
non-intervention in mergers that effectively destroyed any remaining form of 
competition at the airlines’ hub airport.386 Hub concentration has also resulted 
in increased tariffs to/from the hub airport, counteracting the price reductions 
seen in the system as a whole.387 
 The DOT’s loss of power over domestic antitrust review in 1989 
placed domestic review with the DOJ. The DOT’s approach starkly contrasts 
with the DOJ’s general willingness to interpret and apply antitrust rules to air 
                                                
384 See generally Levine, “Competition in Deregulated Markets”, supra note 41 at 425-34. 
385 Two mergers, Northwest/Republic and TWA/Ozark, came under particular criticism 
because the airlines were principal competitors at their Minneapolis/St. Paul and St. Louis 
hubs, respectively. See Kahn, “Schizophrenia”, ibid. at 1062-63. On Kahn’s more general 
reactions to developments in the 1980s, see Alfred E. Kahn, “Surprises of Airline 
Deregulation” (1988) 78 Am. Econ. Rev. 316 at 318-20 [Kahn, “Surprises”]. See also Havel, 
Beyond Open Skies, ibid. at 348-52. 
386 See ibid. 
387 See e.g. Goetz & Sutton, supra note 380 at 254-58 (and noting that a core-periphery model, 
which can address issues of corporate control, spatial location, and market concentration, is 
better equipped to predict effects on prices than one based purely on market size). See also 
Kahn, “Surprises”, ibid. at 320 (suggesting the use of price ceilings on certain routes). 
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transport concerns. In contrast to the 1980s, the DOJ let it be known that it 
would not approve further concentration at a hub airport, approving only one 
merger between two large domestic carriers – US Airways and American 
West – two carriers with largely complementary end-to-end networks.388 This 
policy only changed with the Delta-Northwest merger in mid-2008 and, more 
recently, the United-Continental merger announced in May 2010, approved in 
August of the same year.389 These consolidations appear to be following a 
global concentration in aviation networks centered on the three global 
alliances discussed in Chapter 1. 
 Another defining feature of US deregulation has been the volatility of 
the whole thing, together with its impact on the industry’s various 
stakeholders.390 The decade of unmanaged market rationalization, the closures 
                                                
388 Havel, Beyond Open Skies, supra note 10 at 352-56 (discussing the shift in policy after the 
transfer of domestic antitrust review power from the DOT to the DOJ in 1989). With respect 
to US/American West, the two carriers had established themselves principally on the east and 
west coast of the United States, respectively. A similar “end-to-end” policy rationale can be 
seen in the DOT’s antitrust immunity decisions prior to its SkyTeam I decision. See US DOT, 
Joint Application of Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane-S.p.A., Czech Airlines, Detla Air Lines, Inc., 
KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, Northwest Airlines, Inc., and Société Air France for Approval of 
and Antitrust Immunity for Alliance Agreements under 49 U.S.C. ss. 41308 and 41309, Dkt 
No DOT-OST-2005-19214-0195, Order 2005-12-12, Order to Show Cause (22 December 
2005) at 3, 31-32 [US DOT, SkyTeam I SCO]. 
389 See Dealbook, “The Delta-Northwest Merger Agreement” New York Times (23 April 
2008), online: <http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2008/04/23/the-delta-northwest-merger-
agreement/>; Marilyn Adams, “Delta Takes Its Time to Get Northwest Merger Right” USA 
Today (10 March 2009), online: <http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/travel/2009-03-
09-airline-merger-northwest-delta_N.htm>; “How to Merge Two Airlines” New York Times 
(18 May 2011), online: <http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/05/18/business/delta-
northwest-merger-graphic.html>; Jad Mouawad, “Delta-Northwest Merger’s Long and 
Complex Path” New York Times (18 May 2011), online: 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/19/business/19air.html?pagewanted=all>; “United and 
Continental Announce Merger” New York Times (3 May 2010), online: 
<http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/05/03/united-and-continental-announce-merger/>; Jad 
Mouawad, “United-Continental Merger Clears Federal Hurdle” New York Times (27 August 
2010), online: <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/28/business/28air.html> (the agreement 
grants Southwest eight pairs of slots at LaGuardia as part of the deal); Ben Mutzabaugh, 
“United, Continental Now Single Airline to FAA” USA Today (30 November 2011), online: 
<http://travel.usatoday.com/flights/post/2011/11/united-continental-operating-
certificate/575175/1>. 
390 See e.g. Levine, “Reregulated?”, supra note 38 at 277-79; Kahn, “Surprises”, supra note 
385 at 316-18. American Airlines’ November 2011 bankruptcy filing is the most recent. See 
 130 
of several important airlines (including US specialist international carriers Pan 
American and TWA), and the post-9/11 reorganizations have had an 
incredible impact not only on corporate operators: they have had equally 
dramatic effects on creditors, shareholders, employees, and municipalities that 
have invested in airport infrastructure. Michael Levine captures these social 
dislocations in the following terms, although continuing to support 
competition governed by antitrust as the best available form of governance: 
 
All this bankruptcy reorganization and liquidation, merger activity and 
transformation has wreaked havoc on creditors, who have seen security 
impaired and unsecured bonds repudiated; on shareholders, who have 
been wiped out; and most dramatically on unionized employees working 
under contracts that were products of the regulated era. Tens of 
thousands of such employees have lost their jobs. Those who have not 
have seen their high-paying and work-rule-protected jobs replaced by 
lower-paying and harder-working ones, often at considerable personal 
cost. Civil interest have lost some service, or, more often, built facilities 
to accommodate airlines that ultimately disappeared or reorganized their 
route networks so that the facilities were not needed and then were left 
                                                
e.g. Kyle Peterson & Matt Daily, “American Airlines Files for Bankruptcy” Reuters (29 
November 2011), online: <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/30/us-americanairlines-
idUSTRE7AS0T220111130>. Airlines for America, a trade group comprise of the principle 
US airlines, has recorded “well over” 100 bankruptcies and cessation of services since 1978. 
See Airlines for America, “U.S. Airline Bankruptcies and Service Cessations”, online: 
<http://www.airlines.org/Pages/U.S.-Airline-Bankruptcies-and-Service-Cessations.aspx> 
(although noting that the data is unofficial and “provided as a service rather than an 
authoritative source”). 
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holding the bag for the underlying debt when the airlines repudiated 
their obligations in bankruptcy.391  
 
Given this account, it should not be surprising that many US interests, and 
especially “legacy labour”,392 are reticent to proposals to “de-nationalize” the 
industry, even where further liberalization may yield further gains or even 
greater stability. It also explains the Commission’s deliberate efforts to 
distance its own efforts to liberalize air transport within the EC (discussed 
below) with the nation-wide disruptions that its member states and their 
airlines must certainly have viewed with trepidation. 
 
3.1.2. National Interests and International Liberalization 
 
The late 1970s also marks the United States’ turn towards the liberalization of 
the international system, beginning with the International Air Transportation 
Competition Act (IATCA) of 1979 and culminating in the development of an 
“open skies” policy. Like domestic deregulation, the origins of international 
liberalization have both a de jure and a de facto element, with legal change in 
many cases following CAB action. Unlike the domestic context, however, the 
international nature of the agreement requires at least one other partner (or 
                                                
391 See e.g. Levine, “Reregulated?”, ibid. at 279. Anthony Sampson reports Levine as 
confessing that “[w]e [i.e. the deregulators] didn’t realize they’d be so vulnerable”. Sampson, 
supra note 218 at 141 (also noting Kahn’s surprise at the intensity of opposition from unions). 
392 A term borrowed from Mifsud, supra note 11 at 127. The term “legacy” is often used to 
refer to airlines operating during the period of regulation. “Legacy labor” refers to the relative 
high wage-labor contracts when compared to post-deregulation entrants’ costs. 
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more in the case of pluri-/multilateral agreements) to “deregulate” an 
international market.393 
 To achieve these ends, the United States adopted a twofold approach to 
change. First, it pursued a number of unilateral actions within the international 
system. These efforts were particularly immediate. One area of unilateral 
action was in the realm of multiple designation and market entry by 
abandoning self-imposed limitations where the agreement itself did not 
specify an exact number as part of a policy of increasing market access to 
regional gateways.394 Where an agreement did limit entry, as did the Bermuda 
II Agreement from 1977 (see below),395 the agency adopted a policy of 
promoting access to/from regional gateways rather than continuing the 
domestic/international divide previously characteristic of US designation 
policy.396 
 The Board dropped the real diplomatic bombshell, however, in June 
1978 when it issued a “show cause order” requesting interested parties to 
provide information as to why it should not remove antitrust immunity for the 
IATA Traffic Conference.397 The order was universally vilified abroad and 
challenged at home, repeatedly limited, and ultimately dismissed by the DOT 
                                                
393 See Havel, Beyond Open Skies, supra note 10 at 272-73 (noting that, while the US could 
control implementation of the ADA, the “legislative impact of the IATCA, in contrast, would 
be unavoidably one-dimensional”). 
394 See Dempsey, Law and Foreign Policy, supra note 257 at 26-28 (noting, inter alia that the 
US added the following five new carriers to the transatlantic market between 1978 and 1980: 
Air Florida, Braniff, Delta, Northwest, and Western). 
395 See below at 137-38. 
396 Dempseay, Law and Foreign Policy, supra note 257 at 27-28. For a detailed account of the 
selection process during the Transatlantic Route Proceedings, see Dempsey, “Route and Rate 
Revolution”, supra note 367 at 423-34. 
397 See Haanappel, Pricing and Capacity, supra note 312 at 61-63 & 157-67; Jean-Louis 
Magdalénat, “The Story of the Life and Death of the CAB Show Cause Order” (1980) 5 Air 
L. 83. 
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in 1985.398 Nevertheless, it was to have its intended effects. In 1983 and again 
in 1984, the US and the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) 
negotiated an agreement introducing discount zones for fares across the North 
Atlantic as a fixture in the transatlantic regulatory architecture.399 More 
importantly, IATA reorganized itself in October 1979, separating the 
ratemaking function from its work as an international trade association.400 In 
1980, US carriers were required to abandon their participation in the 
Conferences over the North Atlantic.401 
 Second, the United States began the gradual, long-term development of 
a new international aviation policy. Like its unilateral efforts, the impetus to 
positively define a new approach to aviation has its origins in the late 1970s, 
particularly the IATCA, which emphasizes a policy designed to achieve “the 
greatest degree of competition that is compatible with a well-functioning 
international air transportation system”.402 
 Finding an instrumental form that would achieve this aim and which 
would be acceptable to a number of like-minded partner states, however, 
would take some time.  Initial “liberal” agreements neither completely opened 
international routes to competition nor completely relaxed regulatory 
                                                
398 See generally ibid. 
399 Haanappel, ibid. at 164-67. 
400 Haanappel, ibid. at 6-63, 157-63; Magdalenat, supra note 397 at 85. 
401 See e.g. Haanappel, ibid. at 161. 
402 Havel, Beyond Open Skies, ibid. at 274-75 (noting that the original House version of the act 
contains the phrase “including the attaining of opportunities … to maintain and increase their 
market share in foreign air transportation” and that act “reveals more legislative finess but is 
undoubtedly inspired by the same conservative impulses” (quoting Legislative History, 
International Air Transportation Competition Act of 1979 at 74)). The quote is from 49 U.S.C. 
s. 1502(b) (1980) (recodified in 49 U.S.C. s. 40101(e)). 
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supervision over prices.403 These agreements, known as “Benelux”-type 
agreements – named after the first partner states –, did substantially increase 
access to US gateway and beyond points and replaced double approval pricing 
with more limited forms of intervention, such as the “country of origin” 
(allowing the originating state to unilaterally interfere with pricing) or “double 
disapproval” (requiring both states disapprove a tariff before interfering with 
it) mechanisms.404 Many of these agreements also began providing for non-
scheduled and cargo services and relaxed restrictions on doing business 
abroad. 
 These experiments with various liberal forms of agreement gradually 
crystallized into a singular “open skies” policy, beginning with the US-
Netherlands bilateral air transport agreement in 1992. The open skies 
agreement grants full operational flexibility – an “equal opportunity to 
compete”405 – for traffic carried on a first to sixth freedom basis (with an 
option to extend this flexibility to seventh freedom all-cargo services), as well 
as a full range of ancillary “doing business” rights.406 A new International Air 
Transportation Policy Statement followed in 1995, after a multi-year, multi-
                                                
403 See e.g. Dempsey, Law and Foreign Policy, supra note 257 at 33-35 (noting the 
introduction of the Benelux-type agreement) & 58-75 (comparing major provisions of 
bilateral agreements). 
404 Ibid. at 33-35; Haanappel, Law and Policy, supra note 1 at 118-19. See also Havel, Beyond 
Open Skies, supra note 10 at 270 (noting increased gateway access provided the “diplomatic 
sweetener” for liberalization). There was an explicitly strategic element to this policy as well, 
designed to put pressure on those unwilling to liberalize. This aspect of liberalization is 
discussed below at 136-41. See also supra note 323. 
405 US Model Open Skies Agreement, supra note 240, art. 11(1). 
406 See e.g. Havel, Beyond Open Skies, supra note 10 at 12-17; Chang, Williams & Hsu, supra 
note 52 at 163 (also noting that some comments had recommended including 
ownership/control and cabotage as issues, but that the DOT expressly rejected such 
considerations). Cf. US Department of State, Office of Aviation Negotiations, Bureau of 
Economic, Energy and Business Affairs, “Fact Sheet: Open Skies Agreement Highlights” (30 
January 2009), online: <http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/fs/2009/119760.htm> [US DOS, “Open 
Skies Fact Sheet”]. The US “open skies” model is discussed in more detail below at 280-81. 
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body review of the industry.407 Despite the European Commission’s efforts to 
bring the United States beyond these doctrines, they remain the United States’ 
template for international air transport relations. 
 Whether Benelux or open skies, liberalization has always carried an 
explicitly strategic role in the international arena. In fact, it has carried two. 
The first strategic quality of US liberalization lies in its general approach to 
liberalization as a method of procuring a system more advantageous to the 
interests of US airlines. This role emerges early on in discussions within the 
US government. Professor Brian Havel notes that beyond promoting 
competition, IATCA’s central motivating tenets lie in “the enhancement of the 
competitive position of U.S. air carriers”408 and to protect US carriers from 
arguably anticompetitive behavior both in the form of aggressive action and 
(more importantly) protectionist-motivated refusals to award further rights to 
US carriers under an existing agreement.409 Professor Dempsey has noted a 
similar shift in stated executive policy during the mid- to late-1970s.410 The 
following quote, taken from DOT’s 1995 Policy Statement, clearly 
demonstrates that these goals remain in place: 
 
                                                
407 US DOT, 1995 Policy Statement, supra note 61. 
408 Havel, Beyond Open Skies, supra note 10 at 274-75 (working through IATCA’s “soft law” 
approach derived from its general “Declaration of Policy” as well as the House version of the 
text). 
409 Havel, Beyond Open Skies, ibid. at 275-79 (working through IATCA’s “hard law” 
approach involving administrative review of foreign practices impairing on US airlines’ 
competitive positions via Articles 9 and 23 of the International Air Transportation Fair 
Competitive Practices Act of 1974). As the Japan case illustrates (see infra notes 417-22 and 
accompanying text) these measures were in fact used to force negotiations desired by one or 
more carriers. 
410 Dempsey, Law and Foreign Policy, supra note 257 at 29-31 (listing the points of Kahn, 
Carter, and Ford’s respective international aviation policies, while noting the disappearance of 
important aspects of comity from all but the last). 
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Our airlines are well positioned to be primary participants in all aspects 
of the future global marketplace. In recent years, our largest domestic 
carriers have become our primary international carriers, replacing 
specialized international operators. After operating in a deregulated 
domestic market for more than 15 years, our carriers have developed 
operating efficiencies that give them a cost advantage over their major 
foreign competitors. Moreover, the financial positions of our carriers are 
improving due to their cost-cutting measures and improving economic 
conditions. Coupled with their cost efficiencies, their improving 
financial status will further enhance their competitive capabilities. Over 
time, however, trends toward privatization and increased productivity of 
major foreign competitors may affect the current cost advantage U.S. 
airlines enjoy. We must try to provide our carriers with the flexible 
rights and economic environment that will enable them to respond to the 
dynamics of the marketplace.411  
 
The Policy Statement clearly carries forward the instrumental aims of IATCA. 
Importantly, however, and to its credit, the DOT has shown a great deal of 
flexibility in applying these ideas. This flexibility, discussed further below, 
has played a crucial role in establishing the current structure of the industry. 
 The second strategic element of US international aviation policy is 
directly related to specific states that have resisted revisiting (and adopting) 
                                                
411 US DOT, 1995 Policy Statement, supra note 61 at 594 (arguing that the executive agency 
must “try to provide our carriers with the flexible rights and economic environment that will 
enable them to respond to the dynamics of the [global] marketplace” in order to capitalize on 
its national advantages). 
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the “freedom of the air”.412 Not every state has been as liberal-minded as the 
Netherlands. Indeed, both the United Kingdom and Japan – the primary 
transoceanic gateways – vociferously opposed any liberalization for decades. 
The single-most influential event shaping the US’ “divide and conquer” 
strategy was Britain’s denunciation of Bermuda I in 1977, resulting in its 
replacement with the more restrictive Bermuda II Agreement that same 
year.413 Bermuda II included restrictions on fifth freedom services, controlled 
capacity, retained (with limited exceptions) a dual approval pricing 
mechanism, used the lowest local fare (i.e., traffic carried on a third/fourth 
freedom basis) as a price floor, limited the number of cities that could receive 
non-stop service from London Heathrow and Gatwick.414 Its most onerous 
provisions, however, related to access to London Heathrow, which limited 
designations to two US carriers (originally Pan Am and TWA, later United 
and American) and two UK carriers (originally British Airways and British 
Caledonian, later BA and Virgin Atlantic), limited the number of non-stop city 
pairs from which airlines could operate to the airport, and permitted both 
airlines to operate (i.e. dual designation on a city-pair basis) on only two city-
                                                
412 See Dempsey, Law and Foreign Policy, supra note 257 at 31 (noting that liberalization has 
been “something of a déjà vu of the approach the United States had advocated decades earlier 
at Chicago.”); Havel, Beyond Open Skies, supra note 10 at 111-12 (noting that Bermuda I held 
some of the same philosophical principles as open skies).  See also supra note 267 and 
accompanying text. 
413 See generally Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland and the Government of the United States of America concerning Air 
Services, done at Bermuda, 23 July 1977 [Bermuda II]. For a summary of its rigidifying 
effects in a political context, see e.g. Havel, Beyond Open Skies, supra note 10 at 116-19 & 
290. 
414 See e.g. US DOT, U.S.-U.K. Alliance Case, Dkt No DOT-OST-2001-11029-0069, Order 
2002-1-2, Order to Show Cause (25 January 2002) at 4. See also Dempsey, “Route and Rate 
Revolution”, supra note 367 at 415-38. 
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pairs.415 For the liberal-minded Americans, the Bermuda II represented “the 
greatest step backward in forty years of attempting to bring market-oriented 
competition to international aviation.”416  In part for its content and in part for 
its effrontery to stated US policy at a critical stage, Bermuda II continued to 
provoke the ire of US officials until the EC-US First Stage Agreement 
superseded it when the latter came into force in March 2008. 
 While Japan raised similar concerns, its approach to resisting 
liberalization was considerably different. While refusing to formally renounce 
the US-Japan Air Transport Agreement of 1952, it consistently held that the 
liberal terms of the 1952 agreement were the result of occupation and hence 
unfair.417 As a result, beginning in 1977, Japan consistently resisted US 
relaxations over a period spanning two decades,418 resulting in bilateral 
                                                
415 Bermuda II, supra note 413, art. 3(2) (limiting designations) & 3(5) (giving the accepting 
state the right to consider and reject additional requests), Annex I (providing combination and 
cargo routes). The US DOT has treated these provisions as privileges in its analysis, and has 
(exceptionally) required the incumbents to surrender slots as compensation for this advantage. 
See US DOT, U.S.-U.K. Alliance Case, ibid. (the applicants involved were American/BA and 
United/bmi); US DOT, oneworld SCO, supra note 68 at 3-4 (giving a brief history of the 
AA/BA applications for immunity). 
416 Dempsey, Law and Foreign Policy, ibid. at 29 (quoting Remarks of Senate Commerce 
Committee Chairman Howard Cannon, 124 Cong. Rec. S12264 (daily ed. 1 August 1978)). 
See also Sampson, supra note 218 at 144-46. 
417 Others working on the transpacific have argued that Japan’s claims are in many ways 
legitimate. See e.g. Sumner J. La Croix & David Jonathan Wolff, “The Asia-Pacific Airline 
Industry: Economic Boom and Political Conflict” (1995) 4 East-West Center Special Reports 
at 17-25; Tae Hoon Oum & Yeong Hook Lee, “The Northeast Asian Air Transport Network: 
Is There a Possibility of Creating Open Skies in the Region?” (2002) 8 J. Air Trans. Man. 325 
at 326-28 (also finding that “[i]t appears that Japan’s concerns about 5th freedom rights are 
justified.”).  
418 See e.g. Yoshinori Ide, “Recent Developments in Air Transport Relations between Japan 
and the United States” (1998) 23 Ann. Air & Sp. L 119 at 125-29; Hirotaka Yamauchi & 
Takatoshi Ito, “Air Transport Policy in Japan” in Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Christopher 
Findlay, eds., Flying High: Liberalizing Civil Aviation in the Asia Pacific (Washington, DC: 
Institute for International Economics, 1996), 33 (both discussing issues related to the fifth 
freedom, designations, traffic shares, route imbalances, and slot allocations); Dempsey, ibid. 
at 203-08 (discussing disputes arising from Continental Air Micronesia’s applications to add 
new routes and capacity between Japan and Guam/Saipan by Continental Air Micronesia from 
1977-80 and 1982-83, United’s 1980 application for entry into the US-Japan market (resolved 
in 1983 with limited access to Tokyo from Seattle and Portland), threats to reject or suspend 
rights arising from Nippon Cargo Airline’s 1985 application for additional rights, and a 
requested investigation over limits on sixth freedom from Asia-Pacific to Europe over 
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relationship developing the reputation of being “probably … civil aviation’s 
longest running bilateral dispute”419 and a “dogfight” concealed in formal 
cordialities.420 Disputes arising out of entry and capacity increases between the 
US and Japan as well as fifth freedom services led to no fewer than three 
formal amendments in the 1980s (1982, 1985, and 1989), as well as a 1996 
Memorandum liberalizing all-cargo services.421 In 1998, the US and Japan 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding that would provide a new set of 
market access conditions for passenger traffic, divided between relatively 
liberal rights for two incumbent airlines (but with restrictions on fifth freedom 
operations) and a more restrictive set of third/fourth freedom rights for up to 
four (and after 2000, five) new entrants, as well as more liberal designations 
for a set of cargo airlines and, importantly, a set of change of gauge rules 
applicable to both nationalities.422 
                                                
Anchorage). For a discussion of Japan’s “dissatisfaction” through the 1990s, see also Garrick 
L.H. Goo, “Deregulation and Liberalization of Air Transport in the Pacific Rim: Are They 
Ready for America’s “Open Skies”?” (1996) 18 U. Haw. L. Rev. 541 at 552-57. 
419 David J.J. Yang, “The New Dimension of the Fifth Freedom – The Conflict of Interest 
Between Asian and American Airlines” (1995) 20 Air & Sp. L. 332 at 325. 
420 Dempsey, Law and Foreign Policy, supra note 257 at 203 (quoting Bernard Wysocki, Jr., 
“Talks of the U.S. and Japan on Pacific Air Fars Show Differing Styles” Wall Street Journal 
(22 January 1985)). 
421 See Ide, supra note 418 at 124-25 (noting a 1982 MOC (on Micronesian routes), a 1985 
MOU (introducing seven new entries and new route rights), a 1989 MOU (expanding route 
rights and some entries), and a 1996 MOU (liberalizing all-cargo). On the two earliest 
agreements see also Demspey, Law and Foreign Policy, ibid. at 203-08. 
422 See generally Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United 
States of America and the Government of Japan relating to the Civil Air Transport Agreement 
signed at Tokyo on 11 August 1952, done at Washington, 14 March 1998 [1998 US-Japan 
MOU]. More specifically, the MoU requires fifth freedom service between the Americas and 
Asia to be no more than the aggregate of service on third/fourth freedom between the US and 
Japan and the points of origin and ultimate destination and that the third/fourth freedom 
service between point of origin and ultimate destination be 25% or more of fifth freedom 
services, calculated based on six month aggregates of passenger miles. Ibid., Part I(A)(2). For 
traffic to/from Europe, incumbents were required to demonstrate that the fifth freedom 
segment be equal to or less than origin-destination traffic. Ibid. In contrast, non-incumbent 
combination airlines were entitled to 28 weekly third/fourth freedom services without 
restriction on points, 42 weekly frequencies to select points, as well as unlimited frequencies 
between Guam/Saipan and a select number of points in Japan (limited to two non-
incumbents). Ibid., Part I(B) (also providing a limited right to switch selections). See also 
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 To weaken these and other states’ recalcitrance to liberalization, the 
US has pursued a deliberate policy of negotiating liberal terms with alternative 
gateways (i.e. international points of service) as a means of diverting traffic 
through secondary gateways willing to sign liberal agreements.423 The 
principal partner states have been the Netherlands and South Korea, both of 
which signed a Benelux-type agreement in 1978 and using significant sixth 
freedom traffic as a means of promoting carrier growth and enhancing 
competitiveness.424 While the Netherlands was the first partner to sign an open 
skies agreement, South Korea inked its agreement with the US on 9 June 
1998, three months after Japan reconfigured its relationship with the United 
                                                
Ibid. Part IX(A) (providing a select number of additional frequencies between 2002 and 
2005). The agreement also provides first-fifth freedom rights for two Japanese and three US 
incumbent cargo airlines (ibid., Part II(A)) and more limited opportunities for non-incumbents 
under the 1980s amendments and one new designation (ibid., Part II(B)). See also ibid., Part 
III (Charters), IV (Cooperative Marketing Arrangements), V (Change of Gauge), VI 
(Operational Flexibility), VII (Pricing and Distribution) & VIII (Future Negotiations). For a 
summary, see also Ide, ibid. at 130-35.  
423 On the development of “divide and conquer” as a policy, see e.g. Sampson, supra note 218 
at 144-46; Dempsey, “Route and Rate Revolution”, supra note 367 at 444 (noting that “[t]here 
remains the possibility of rectifying the deleterious effects of Bermuda II upon competition in 
the transatlantic market by seeking competitive opportunities elsewhere. Much of the traffic 
that flows through the London gateway merely employs that point as a conduit through which 
it acquires access to the European continent; many passengers who have traditionally flown 
the New York-London route are part of the greater U.S.–Europe market, and would settle for a 
point other than London in order to secure access to the Continent. Hence, the U.S. may well 
be able to exploit this phenomenon in order to persuade the British to reevaluate their 
position.”); Havel, Beyond Open Skies, supra note 10 at 32, fn 23 (citing Rex S. Toh, “Toward 
an International Open Skies Regime” (1998) 3 J. Air Transp. World Wide 61 at 66 (noting 
that the encirclement theory worked and attributing the idea to Michael Levine). For a formal 
statement, see generally US DOT, 1995 Policy Statement, supra note 61 at 598 (noting that 
“there may be strategic value in adopting liberal agreements with smaller countries where 
doing so puts competitive pressure on neighboring countries to follow suit.”).  
424 On Benelux, see e.g. Dempsey, Law and Foreign Policy, supra note 257 at 31-32. On 
increased gateway access, see e.g. Paul Stephen Dempsey, “The Evolution of Air Transport 
Agreements” (2008) 33 Ann. Air & Sp. L. 127 at 149-62 (discussing both Benelux 
Agreements and the Cities Programs as designed to influence small states with little to lose 
from liberalization to sign on to liberal agreements with the United States). Statistical analysis 
has proved the efficacy of this strategy on both short- and long-term growth. See e.g. The 
Brattle Group, supra note 103 at 5-1 to 5-10. 
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States.425 In terms of formal renegotiation, this phase of strategic liberalization 
policy has effectively ended by the coming into force of the EC-US First Stage 
Air Transport Agreement (as secured by the Second Stage Agreement) and, on 
the transpacific, by the amendment of the US-Japan Air Transport Agreement 
on 25 October 2010, following a 2009 Memorandum and a preliminary 
finding by the US DOT in favor of granting antitrust immunity to American 
Airlines/Japan Airlines and ANA/Continental/United on 6 October 2010.426 
 Taken together, these two strategic elements emphasize the role of 
competitive advantage in economic relations, a consideration and concern that 
consistently emerges as a leitmotif in later discussions of liberalization. For its 
part, the DOT has also developed a second leitmotif in its international air 
transport relations, involving the use of at least two mechanisms designed to 
insulate foreign industries from a level of competition unacceptable to the 
other party and thereby giving voice to the participation norm. The first of 
these is the use of transitional or sectoral agreements as an interim to open 
skies as part of the US’ continued efforts to “help” third parties “appreciate the 
benefits that unrestricted air services can bring to their economies and 
industries.”427 Chapter 5 discusses two such agreements – the US-China Air 
Transport Agreement and the US-Vietnam Air Transport Agreement – in the 
context of managing market access relaxations, while Chapter 6 analyzes the 
                                                
425 Cf. 1998 US-Japan MOU, supra note 422; Air Transport Agreement between the 
Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Korea, 
done at Washington, 9 June 1998 [US-Korea Agreement]. 
426 On the US-UK relationship, see EC-US First Stage Agreement, infra note 536, arts. 3 & 
26. See also generally below at 175-76. On the US-Japan relationship, see generally 
Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Japan and the Government of the 
United States of America, Tokyo, 25 October, 2010; Memorandum of Understanding between 
the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America, signed at 
Washington D.C., 11 December 2009; US DOT, US-Japan Final Order, supra note 65. 
427 US DOT, 1995 Policy Statement, supra note 61 at 598. 
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preferential aspects of the US-China Agreement in considerable detail.428 
According to the 1995 Policy Statement, transitional arrangements 
contemplate “that both sides would agree, from the beginning, to a completely 
liberalized air service regime that would come into effect at the end of a 
certain period of time.”429 This objective does not always accord with practice, 
a point Chapter 5 generally emphasizes with its discussion of US-China and 
US-Vietnam relations. 
 The second method protecting the participation norm is through the 
DOT’s granting antitrust immunity to international airline alliances, which the 
DOT retains through Title 49 U.S. Code sections 41308 and 41309.430 The 
importance of antitrust immunity on the shape of the industry cannot be 
underestimated: as Jeffrey Shane noted, “[t]he confluence of Open Skies 
agreements, alliances, and anti-trust immunity has spawned a fundamental 
reinvention of the global air transport industry.”431 Indeed, in practical terms 
the antitrust immunity/open skies relationship has almost become a tautology. 
While the US Department of Transportation continues to require open skies as 
a precondition for antitrust immunity, foreign governments have consistently 
conditioned open skies on an immunized alliance,432 and in select cases the 
balance has even been reversed, the DOT granting immunity prior to but made 
                                                
428 See generally below at 285-89 & 347-80. 
429 US DOT, 1995 Policy Statement, supra note 61 at 598. 
430 49 U.S.C. ss. 41308-09. 
431 Knibb, supra note 21.  
432 See e.g. US DOT, Joint Application of Northwest Airlines, Inc. and KLM Royal Dutch 
Airlines for Approval and Antitrust Immunity of an Agreement Pursuant to Sections 412 and 
414 of the Federal Aviation Act, as amended, Dkt No DOT-OST-1995-579-0034, Order 93-1-
11, Final Order (11 January 1993) at 11-13 (discussing comity and foreign policy as part of 
the public interest standard). See also 49 U.S.C. s. 309(B)(1)(a) (including “international 
comity and foreign policy considerations” as part of its “important public benefits” test). On 
the process of approval and grant of immunity, see generally infra notes 435-39 and 
accompanying text. 
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conditional upon the partner state either agreeing to open skies or a 
transitional agreement coming into effect.433  
 Two points come out of the DOT’s use of antitrust immunity in 
pursuing its open skies policy. First, it is undeniable that antitrust immunity 
plays a critical role as both poise and counterpoise to what might otherwise be 
considered a confrontation to the participation norm. Within the bilateral 
context, immunity offers considerable protection from the threat of head-to-
head competition with US airlines. Within a global air transport system, things 
are a little more complicated. As the US’ “divide and conquer” policy itself 
emphasizes, cost and network benefits can critically influence the position of 
third party airlines; indeed, the threat of traffic diversion has played an 
important role in many states’ decisions to agree to an open skies policy with 
the United States,434 and once agreed offers its own advantages vis-à-vis other 
third parties resisting liberalization. Thus, protection in the bilateral context 
becomes an advantage in a larger, multilateral world still governed largely by 
bilateral agreement. The overall effect of this has been the evolution towards 
three global airline systems. 
 Second, foreign policy considerations play an important role in 
determining whether the DOT should grant antitrust immunity even where it 
                                                
433 In the case of the American Airlines/Canadian Airlines International and United/Air 
Canada decisions, the DOT granted immunity despite the fact that the schedule of phase-ins 
required by the bilateral agreement had not yet been completed. US DOT, Joint Application of 
United Air Lines, Inc and Air Canada under 49 USC ss 41308 and 41309 for Approval of and 
Antitrust Immunity for Commercial Alliance Agreement, Dkt No OST-96-1434-33, Order 97-
9-21, Final Order (19 September 1997). The DOT has also considered tentatively granting 
immunity to alliances pending an open skies agreement with the partner airline’s government 
where an open skies agreement is not yet in place. See US DOT, U.S.-U.K. Alliance Case, 
supra note 414. 
434 See e.g. The Brattle Group, supra note 103 at 5-9 & 5-10. (discussing the domino effect the 
US-Netherlands agreement had on other continental European states’ agreements with the 
US). 
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could substantially reduce or eliminate competition. Under 49 U.S.C. 41308, 
agreements must first be approved under s. 41309 of the Code before being 
considered for antitrust immunity, which requires a “competitive analysis” to 
determine whether an agreement is adverse to the public interest because it 
would substantially reduce or eliminate competition.435 Where the agreement 
is found to be not adverse to the public interest, 49 U.S.C. 41309(b) directs the 
DOT to approve the agreement.436 However, even if an agreement does 
substantially reduce or eliminate competition, it may nevertheless receive 
approval if it is necessary to meet a serious transportation need or it achieves 
important public benefits, including international comity and foreign relations 
concerns, where such benefits cannot be met by other reasonably available 
alternatives that are materially less anticompetitive.437 Agreements falling 
under this section 41309(b)(1) exception are then automatically approved 
                                                
435 49 U.S.C. ss. 41308(b)-(c) & 41309(b). See also e.g. US DOT, US-Japan Alliance SCO, 
supra note 65 at 4-5. 
436 49 U.S.C. s. 41309(b). See also e.g. US DOT, US-Japan Alliance SCO, ibid. 
437 49 U.S.C. s. 41309(b)(1). The DOT provides the following summary of the competitive 
analysis (including agreements found to be anticompetitive but which meet a serious transport 
need or achieve other public benefits): 
 
Under 49 U.S.C §§ 41308-41309, we normally engage in a two-step analysis of foreign 
air transportation agreements submitted for our approval. We first determine under § 
41309(b) whether the agreements are adverse to the public interest because they would 
substantially reduce or eliminate competition (the “competitive analysis”). If we make 
that affirmative determination, § 41309 (b)(1)(A) directs us to decide whether they are 
nevertheless necessary to meet a serious transportation need or to achieve important 
public benefits; U.S. foreign policy goals are a key element of these benefits. If we 
make that finding, and also find that those public benefits cannot be met or achieved by 
reasonably available and materially less anticompetitive alternatives, we must approve 
the agreements pursuant to § 41308(b) [sic]. Section 41309(c)(2) provides that a party 
opposing approval has the burden of showing that the agreement or request would 
substantially reduce or eliminate competition and that less anticompetitive alternatives 
are available. On the other hand, the party seeking approval of the agreement or request 
must establish the transportation need or public benefits. 
 
US DOT, US-Japan Alliance SCO, ibid. On the required exemption, see infra note 439 and 
accompanying text. 
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under section 41308(c).438 For agreements that are not adverse to the public 
interest, exemption requires a “public benefits analysis”, authorizing (but not 
requiring) the DOT to exempt the agreement when it is “required by the public 
interest”, a higher standard than the “adverse to” requirement of s. 
41309(b).439 
 Traditionally, reaching open skies has been not only a precondition but 
also a way to increase network reach and competition in broader markets, and 
to encourage third parties to adopt open skies, a carrot to the stick of traffic 
diversion.440 In contrast, the development of metal neutrality as a solution to 
the problem of intra-alliance competition (a problem known as “double 
marginalization”)441 over the transatlantic arose out of the need for airlines to 
create benefits through deeper market integration where existing open skies 
agreements precluded the types of foreign policy and international comity 
arguments that had justified the initial exemptions from antitrust law.442 In 
                                                
438 49 U.S.C. s. 41308(c). See also e.g. US DOT, US-Japan Alliance SCO, ibid. at 4. 
439 49 U.S.C. s. 41308(b). To continue the DOT’s summary of the immunity test in supra note 
437: 
 
If, however, we do not find the agreements to be adverse to the public interest, § 
41309(b) directs us to approve them. In that event, we next decide whether there are 
sufficient public benefits to grant immunity under 49 U.S.C. § 41308(b) (the “public 
benefits analysis”). In that subsection, Congress has given the Department the authority 
to exempt airlines from the antitrust laws to the extent necessary to allow a proposed 
transaction to proceed, provided that the exemption is required by the public interest. 
While the public interest determination under both §§ 41309(b) and 41308(b) entails a 
comparison of anti-competitive effects and public benefits, the standard in § 41308(b) 
(“required by” rather than “not adverse to”) is higher. 
 
US DOT, US-Japan Alliance SCO, ibid. at 5. 
440 See generally US DOT, SkyTeam I SCO, supra note 388 at 30-43. 
441 See e.g. US DOT, SkyTeam II SCO, supra note 68 at 3, 14. 
442 See e.g. ibid. at 14-15. See also Mifsud, supra note 11 at 123-25 (discussing metal 
neutrality). The DOT, in justifying antitrust immunity to Star Alliance members on the 
transatlantic, described the concept and its benefits in the following terms: 
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other parts of the world, including important East Asian states like China and 
Vietnam, immunity remains a critical element in their changing relationship 
with the US. 
 Importantly, in the short term at least, metal neutrality (whether 
complete or with current “gaps” in global coverage)443 may also represent the 
outer bound of global integration. The United States remains within the 
paradigm of the “nation-bound” airline; the domestic institutions it has 
developed for its own airlines remain embedded in the framework of 
nationality. Thus, while efforts such as the 2010 Draft Multilateral on 
Investment and, to a limited degree, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation’s 
(APEC) Multilateral Agreement on the Liberalization of International Air 
Transport (MALIAT) represent genuine efforts at lifting the veil of 
nationality, it continues to exempt itself from this new paradigm that it 
invokes for others.444 For, as will be seen, both Draft Multilateral and 
MALIAT address only the international restrictions on ownership (and, in the 
                                                
DOT tentatively approved this application [for antitrust immunity] conditioned upon 
the implementation of a revenue-sharing agreement that is structured to create ‘metal 
neutrality’ – a commercial environment in which joint venture partners share common 
economic incentives to promote the success of the alliance over their individual 
corporate interests. We affirm that tentative finding. By pooling resources to improve 
the overall service offering, and by sharing financial gains and losses, we find that the 
partners are able to harmonize the global network and become indifferent as to which 
of them collects the revenue or operates the aircraft over a given itinerary. They are 
thus able to focus their efforts on gaining the customer’s business by providing the best 
available fare, schedule, and routing between two cities. We therefore affirm our 
tentative finding that granting antitrust immunity in this case is necessary to enable 
carriers to achieve merger-like efficiencies and deliver public benefits that would not 
otherwise be possible. 
 
US DOT, Star Transatlantic Final, supra note 68 at 15 (cited in Mifsud, supra note 12 at 
124). 
443 Mifsud, supra note 11 at 122-23. 
444Compare this with Brian Havel’s comment that the 1995 Transport Policy Statement 
“shrank from any reference, explicit or implicit, to [the] elimination of the central legal pillars 
of the prevailing Chicago system of protective bilaterals – the principle of cabotage […] and 
the nationality rule”. Havel, Beyond Open Skies, supra note 10 at 27. 
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case of the Draft Multilateral, control);445 the domestic laws continue to 
qualify inward investment restrictions into the United States. At the same 
time, MALIAT’s own structure is exemplary of an unwillingness to consider 
market access exchanges beyond the fifth freedom for passenger traffic (and 
seventh for cargo), as later discussions make clear.446 Given the history, it is 
hard to read these market access restrictions without reading a subtext of 
reciprocity and competitive advantage into them. 
 Another important point is that underlying the formal limits of US 
policy lay a serious set of tensions between the executive and the legislature. 
For its part, the US DOT has recognized the utility of relaxing (if not wholly 
removing) the foreign ownership and control restrictions contained in US law. 
Within its own sphere of discretion, it has recognized a foreigner’s right to 
own up to 49 percent of total shares, so long as voting interests remain below 
25 percent, the US receives similar opportunities, and the foreigner’s home 
state has signed an open skies agreement with the United States.447 It has also 
proven willing to recognize other states’ attempts to rationalize air transport 
markets, whether or not these directly benefit US opportunities to invest 
abroad, at least within the open skies framework.448 In contrast, moves to even 
partially relax the ownership and control rules that require Congressional 
                                                
445 See generally below at 190-93 & 194-97. 
446 See generally below at 190-93. 
447 See e.g. Havel, Beyond Open Skies, supra note 10 at 138-43. The US confirmed its position 
in relation to EU investors in the EC-US First Stage Agreement. EC-US First Stage 
Agreement, infra note 536, Annex IV, art. 1. See also generally US DOT, 1995 Policy 
Statement, supra note 61 at 597 (noting that lifting the ownership and control ceilings might 
be used as an inducement to other states to liberalize air services “to the extent that it is 
consistent with U.S. economic and security interests.”).  
448 See below at 174-80. It is also worth comparing the case of the EC with the Aerolineas 
Argentinas case, in which the US required a grant of additional market access rights in 
exchange for recognition of the carrier after Iberia became a majority shareholder. On the 
latter, see e.g. Mendes de Leon, “A New Phase”, supra note 349 at 362. 
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approval consistently fail. The DOT’s 2005 attempt to raise the limit on 
foreign ownership of voting shares to 49 percent through a notice of proposed 
rulemaking failed as Congress made public its opposition to the idea.449 
Indeed, where Congress has discussed legislative amendment to the ownership 
and control laws, it has been to further restrict foreign access to the US 
market.450 As Chapter 1 already noted, security concerns in the United States 
have had an enormous impact on the discourse of nationality in the US,451 and 
have certainly been reinforced by both the events of 9/11 and the Dubai Ports 
World controversy that eventually required the company to sell the six US 
ports in the acquired company’s portfolio to US firm AIG’s asset management 
division.452  Given the coded language, one could reasonably assume that 
individual politicians are also concerned with the loss of political capital that 
the appearance of flip-flopping would entail. The limits of the US position 
have been tested by the EU’s (failed) attempts at an open aviation area, 
discussed further in section 3.3. 
 
3.2. The European Union: Towards a Regional Aviation Market 
 
                                                
449 US DOT, Actual Control of U.S. Air Carriers, 70 Fed. Reg. 67,389 (7 November 2005). 
See also Havel, Beyond Open Skies, ibid. at 155-62; Don Philips, “U.S. Withdraws Plan on 
Foreign Investment in Airlines, Disrupting Open-Skies Treaty” New York Times (6 
December 2006), online: 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/06/business/worldbusiness/06skies.html>. 
450 See e.g. Havel, Beyond Open Skies, ibid. at 87, fn 267; Havel & Sanchez, “Restoring 
Aviation”, supra note 6 at 23 (discussing Congressman Jim Oberstar’s repeated efforts to 
introduce additional restrictions on a foreign person’s or enterprise’s ability to control US 
airlines). 
451 See generally supra note 103. 
452 On DP World, see e.g. Havel, Beyond Open Skies, supra note 10 at 166-67. On the sale to 
AIG, see e.g. Heather Timmons, “DP World to Sell Contentious U.S. Port Holdings to AIG” 
International Herald Tribune (11 November 2006): New York Times 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/11/business/worldbusiness/11iht-ports.3860165.html>. 
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Developments in the United States did not go unanswered. Across the 
Atlantic, the European Community – since December 2009 the European 
Union – has also reorganized itself to compete in the new, flexible “global” 
market. Like the United States, the EU has adopted a market model of 
regulation. However, several features distinguish it from its North American 
counterpart. 
 The most important distinction is that the EU is not a state, a simple 
fact that has complex, manifold repercussions within the Union itself as well 
as externally. Internally, it has required an upward rescaling of the air 
transport market – both a legal act and an act of political will.453 This 
international dimension, together with a deeper set of regulatory interventions 
and more often than not the presence of a state-owned flag-carrier, has given 
intra-Community reform an added significance that did not exist in the United 
States. Externally, the nationality clauses in bilateral agreements restrict the 
Union from integrating its separate national transport systems into a single 
regional unit, requiring it to renegotiate sufficient agreements to permit the 
industry to successfully Europeanize.  
 
3.2.1. The Internal Dimension: Integration in ‘Packages’ 
 
The origin of the single internal aviation market contains both a specific and a 
general component, both a legal and a political element, to it. Across the 
                                                
453 Legally, issues arise from both Community and aviation law. Importantly, this discussion 
does no touch upon the relationship between the EU, ICAO and the Chicago Convention. For 
a summary of issues related to intergovernmental organizations and ICAO, see e.g. Jason R. 
Bonin, “Regionalism in International Civil Aviation: A Reevaluation of the Economic 
Regulation of International Air Transport in the Context of Economic Integration” (2008) 12 
S.Y.B.I.L. 113 at 129-30 (discussing, inter alia, issues of regional representation at ICAO) 
[Bonin, “Regionalism”]. 
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water, US deregulation had proven the airline industry to be inefficient and 
capable of being regulated through antitrust, spurring consumer groups and 
new entrants to demand similar reforms in Europe.454 The US DOT was 
simultaneously dismantling the international institutions that had compensated 
for individual airline’s relative inefficiencies, threatening to increase US 
market shares vis-à-vis its European competitors.455 These demands provided 
the immediate political pressures necessary to bring air transport into the 
Community sphere. 
 Air transport also fell into a broader set of European initiatives 
designed to reinvigorate the supranational project. This is not to say that 
Europe would not have moved in the direction of “Europeanizing” the skies 
without it. The Community had previously expanded the scope its powers 
without formal amendment to the Treaty of Rome, and the Commission’s 
1984 Civil Aviation Memorandum No. 2 speaks of a common aviation market 
as the ultimate objective of a Community air transport policy, while providing 
an immediate framework designed to flexibilize air transport by gradually 
                                                
454 See e.g. Commission, Memo No. 2, supra note 182 at 12, para. 20 & 26-27, para. 43. See 
also Sharon A. Williams, “Internal Market and Common Market – the Single European Act 
versus the Treaty of Rome: Protectionism or Competitiveness in European Civil Aviation?” in 
Peter P.C. Haanappel, George Petsikas, Rex Rosales & Jitendra Thaker, eds., EEC Air 
Transport Policy and Regulation, and Their Implications for North America (Deventer and 
Boston: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1990), 3 at 17 (noting that “[d]eregulation in 
the United States internal market caused radical restructuring in that country of the civil 
aviation industry and appeared to indicate that adjusting costs and prices under the pressure of 
competition neutralized the effects of the crisis” and that it was “with this scene in mind” that 
the Commission proposed entry into air transport) [Williams, “Internal and Common 
Market”]. 
455 Ibid.; Comité des Sage for Air Transport to the European Commission, Expanding 
Horizons: Civil Aviation in Europe, An Action Programme for the Future (January 1994). See 
also Kenneth J. Button, “Toward Truly Open Skies” (2002) 25 Reg. 12 at 15 (noting that 
“[b]etween 1984 and 1990, the six European countries with the most liberal bilateral air 
services agreements with the United States […] lost market share, while those with the more 
restrictive agreements […] gained market share. Over the same period, American carriers took 
a larger proportion of the fast-growing non-US-citizens traffic on the Atlantic.”). 
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introducing the regulation of competition by Community law.456 Nevertheless, 
the institutional commitment to the full integration of air transport is taken up 
in the 1985 White Paper on integration.457 The two processes appear in this 
regard to be conjoined, the single aviation market becoming an essential part 
of a larger program to create both the single European market and a single 
European market.458 
                                                
456 The Commission put it in the following manner: 
 
In the long-term the objective of a Community air transport policy must be the creation 
of a common air transport market. This will take a long time to achieve. The 
Commission takes the view, however, that in the shorter term it is possible and 
desirable to relax the existing system. Such a relaxation would result in a wider variety 
of choice for the consumer, lower costs and therefore lower prices, more scope and 
more profits for the efficient and innovative airline and a growth stimulus to the air 
transport industry. In the long-term this will provide more jobs and contribute towards 
the coherence of the internal market. The Commission further believes that this 
relaxation can take place without losing the significant benefits which the present 
system of air transport has so far provided to the Member States of the Community; 
that it can be so organised that the Community and its Member States can, acting 
together, control the process of change and ensure that national, social and economic 
objectives are safeguarded; and that at the same time the internal Community market as 
a whole can be promoted in a way that would not be possible, or at least would be 
much more difficult, for Member States acting individually. 
 
Commission, Memo No. 2, supra note 182 at 2, para. 3. 
457 See Commission of the European Communities, Completing the Internal Market: White 
Paper from the Commission to the European Council (Com(85) 310 final, 14 June 1985) at 
paras. 108-12 [Commission, White Paper]. For a discussion of the progression from an earlier 
Memo No. 1 designed to raise air transport as a possible area of Europeanization (see 
generally Commission of the European Communities, Contribution of the European 
Communities to the Development of Air Transport Services – Memorandum of the 
Commission (Com(79) 311 final, 6 July 1979) [Commission, Memo No. 1]) to the White 
Paper, see Williams, “Internal and Common Market”, supra note 454 at 14-19. 
458 Part of the rationale for this “transformation” was structural in nature: as numbers grew and 
positions increasingly varied between member states, the threat of institutional stagnation 
through consensus loomed among the member states. Weiler, supra note 137 at 2456-57. But 
transformation was also ideological in nature. Joseph Weiler made this point particularly well: 
 
A “single European market” is a concept that still has the power to stir. But it is also a 
“single European market.” It is not simply a technocratic program to remove the 
remaining obstacles to the free movement of all factors of production. It is at the same 
time a highly politicized choice of ethos, ideology, and political culture: the culture of 
“the market.” 
 
Ibid. at 2477. 
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 The Treaty also raised a specifically legal hurdle to integration. At the 
time, Article 84 of the Treaty of Rome firmly stated that its provisions 
governed matters of road, rail and inland waterway transport; however, section 
two then went on to provide that “[t]he Council may, acting unanimously, 
decide whether, to what extent and by what procedure appropriate provisions 
may be laid down for sea and air transport.”459 The Article was ambiguous as 
to whether it applied only with respect to Title IV (the Transport Title), or 
whether its restrictions applied to the entire Treaty, particularly the rules on 
competition.460 While the Commission advanced the former reading in its 
Memorandum No. 2, it was the European Court of Justice’s (ECJ) decision in 
Nouvelles Frontieres that removed the ambiguity.461 Confirming the 
Commission’s interpretation, the Court ruled that Article 84(2) only concerned 
the Transport Title and that, therefore, principles not within Title IV, including 
the provisions on competition, applied to intra-Community air transport.462 
The Court extended this reasoning further in its Ahmed Saeed decision, 
obliging tariffs set at the IATA Traffic Conference be non-binding and 
extending the Treaty provisions on abuse of dominance to services between 
                                                
459 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, done at Rome, 25 March 1957, 
art. 84(2). The Single European Act replaced the term “unanimously” with “by a qualified 
majority”. Single European Act, done at Luxembourg, 17 February 1986, art. 16.5. This 
provision was changed entirely in the Treaty of Lisbon. Cf. Treaty of Lisbon Amending the 
Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community, signed at 
Lisbon, 13 December 2007, art. 2, para. 75 (“The European Parliament and the Council, acting 
in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, may lay down appropriate provisions 
for sea and air transport. They shall act after consulting the Economic and Social Committee 
and the Committee of the Regions.”). 
460 See e.g. Carl Otto Lenz, “The Decisions of the European Court of Justice on the 
Applicability of the Rules of the Treaty of Rome to Air Transport” in Haanappel et al., eds., 
supra note 454, 33 at 33-34. 
461 Ministere Public v. Asjes, C-209-213/84 [1986] E.C.R. I-1425 [Nouvelles Frontieres]. 
462 Ibid. at paras. 44-45 (referring to Commission v. French Republic, C-167/73 [1974] E.C.R. 
359 [French Seamen] (finding the same with reference to sea transport)). 
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member and non-member states.463 Together, the Memorandum, as exemplary 
of broader transformations in the Community’s political architecture, and the 
ECJ’s decisions, as a judicial clearing of legal impediments to the process, 
shaped the path to creating the single internal aviation market. 
 In terms of its actual restructuring, developing the single internal 
market has been a matter of unambiguous gradualism. The Community 
achieved this between 1987 and 1993 through the “three packages” – i.e., 
three sets of legal instruments guiding the process from regulated industry 
governed by a nationality-based system of bilateral agreements to a single 
internal market regulated at the Community level.464 Each package gradually 
increased the level of flexibility in the market, both in terms of the depth of 
relaxation and the segment of the market to which the rules applied, with the 
ultimate objective of complete freedom of movement for air transport services 
                                                
463 See generally Ahmed Saeed and Silver Line Reiseburo v. Zentrale zure Bekaempfung 
Unlauteren Wettbewerbs, C-66/86 [1989] E.C.R. I-803. See also Ludwig Weber, “The EEC 
Internal Air Transport Market and Its Impact on the Airline Industry” in Haanappel et al., 
eds., supra note 454, 49 at 58-63. This position is distinct from the provisions on agreements 
in restraint of trade, which according to the Court only applied to intra-Community transport. 
464 The instruments comprising the first package include: EC, Council Regulation (EEC) No 
3975/87 of 14 December 1987 laying down the procedure for the application of the rules on 
competition to undertakings in the air transport sector, [1987] O.J. L 374/1; EC, Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 3976/87 of 14 December 1987 on the application of Article 85(3) of the 
Treaty to certain categories of agreements and concerted practices in the air transport sector, 
[1987] O.J. L 374/9; EC, Council Directive of 14 December 1987 on fares for scheduled air 
services between Member States (87/601/87), [1987] O.J. L 374/12; EC, Council Decision of 
14 December 1987 on the sharing of passenger capacity between air carriers on scheduled 
air services between Member States and on access for air carriers for scheduled air-service 
routes between Member States (87/602/87), [1987] O.J. L 374/19. The second package is 
comprise of: EC, Council Regulation (EEC) No 2342/90 of 24 July 1990 on fares for 
scheduled air services, [1990] O.J. L 217/1; EC, Council Regulation (EEC) no 2343/90 of 24 
July 1990 on access for air carriers to scheduled intra-Community air service routes and on 
the sharing of passenger capacity between air carriers on scheduled air services between 
Member States, [1990] O.J. L 217/8; EC, Council Regulation (EEC) No 2344/90 of 24 July 
1990 amending Regulation (EEC) No 3976/87 on the application of article 85(3) of the treaty 
to certain categories of agreements and concerted practices in the air transport sector, [1990] 
O.J. L 217/15. The third package is comprised of: EC, Council Regulation (EEC) No 2407/92 
of 23 July 1992 on licensing of air carriers, [1992] O.J. L 240/1; EC, Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 2408/92 of 23 July 1992 on access for Community air carriers to intra-Community 
air routes, [1992] O.J. L 240/8; EC, Council Regulation (EEC) No 2409/92 of 23 July 1992 on 
fares and rates for air services, [1992] O.J. L 240/15. The third package has since been 
consolidated, with slight modification, by EC, Reg 1008/2008, supra note 176. 
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within the Community. This was finally achieved on 1 April 1997, when 
Regulation (EEC) 2408/92 abolished the final restrictions on cabotage 
traffic.465 
 The difference in regulatory approaches between the US and the 
Community arises from the supranational context of the European program. 
US deregulation had been a domestic affair; although regulated, airlines were 
privately owned; most importantly, the government had deemed the market 
instabilities and their attendant social costs politically acceptable.466 In 
contrast, the reserved, almost ad hoc style of the EC’s approach to internal 
market integration suggests an altogether different set of political concerns. 
Unlike in the US, airlines were state-owned, owned by different states, and 
operated according to different policy agendas.467 A carrier’s exit from the 
European market would have a significantly different political meaning in this 
context,468 and it is almost certain that both airlines and the governments they 
represented looked across the waters at the tumultuous fracas of entries and 
exits with a considerable degree of trepidation. The result of this deep-seated 
concern for the stability of its national airlines was an emphasis on increasing 
the flexibility of the network rather than on dismantling regulation.469 It 
                                                
465 EC, Reg. 2408/92, ibid., art. 3(2). 
466 The Commission itself made these points in its Memo No. 2. See Commission, Memo No. 
2, supra note 182 at 26-27, para. 43. 
467 See ibid. at 21-26 (discussing market conditions in Europe). 
468 See ibid. at 6-7, paras. 9-11 & 13 (noting legacy carrier and labor concerns over 
liberalization (cf. the pro-liberalization stance of new entrants ibid. at 6, para. 12)) & 27-29, 
paras. 44-46 (reaffirming an approach that attempts to balance carrier and labor interests). 
469 Ibid. at 27, para. 43 (noting that the question is “not whether the Community should 
deregulate air transport, but whether the present system can be made sufficiently flexible so as 
to contain within itself enough pressures to ensure that airlines increase their productivity and 
provide their services at the lowest possible cost.”). See also ibid., Annex IV, para. 17; Jan 
Winter “EC Supervision of State Aids in the Air Transport Sector” in Haanappel et al., eds., 
supra note 454, 81 at 83 (noting the same). 
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should thus be no surprise that Europe’s experience with internal market 
integration looks quite different than the US model of domestic deregulation, 
and pays explicit attention to maintaining a relatively stable balance 
throughout the integration process. 
 To retain stability, each European package incrementally introduced 
flexibility in the areas of entry, market access, capacity, and pricing, first on a 
third and fourth freedom basis, then successively expanding into services 
provided on a fifth, then on a seventh, eighth, and ninth freedom basis. It 
brought the industry under the purview of the Community competition laws, 
although they were initially to be applied flexibly.470 It introduced mutual 
recognition of licenses among member states, standardized through ECAC’s 
Joint Aviation Authorities and later Europeanized through the European 
Aviation Safety Agency.471 And it opened investment among member states 
by creating the concept of the “Community carrier”, an airline collectively 
owned and controlled by any member state or its nationals.472 
 While later discussions in Chapter 6 highlight particular instruments 
used to both channel and break up the integration process,473 the following 
provides a general discussion of the overall process of integration, beginning 
with the first package. As a general matter, the first package both marks the 
base of the process and introduces the first steps towards market integration. It 
                                                
470 See ibid. This flexible application has proven somewhat entrenched in the case of some 
states, particularly Italy and Greece. During the two decades following integration and 
flexibilization, both governments granted multiple state aids, falling afoul of the competition 
rules in both cases. The Greek case even involved an attempt to channel assets into a new 
company, an act found to be in violation of EC law. Both carriers have since been 
reorganized. For a short but comprehensive summary of issues prior to reorganization, see e.g. 
Havel, Beyond Open Skies, supra note 10 at 497-502.  
471 See generally infra notes 953-56. 
472 See generally infra note 486. 
473 See below at 347-80. 
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relaxes multiple entry on a country-pair basis, as well as on a city-pair basis 
when either passenger volumes or plane movements exceeded a given 
threshold, which are then gradually relaxed on an annual basis.474 It 
simultaneously opens entry on routes between hub and regional airports with 
some specified exemptions, also phased out during the stages of integration.475 
The package introduces relaxations on pricing and capacity controls. In 
addition to tying tariffs to costs, two price bands – the “discount” and the 
“deep discount” zone – permit fares below the agreed standard fare, provided 
they meet the conditions specified for the relevant fare class.476 
 Otherwise, fares remain subject to double approval, with price 
leadership reserved for third/fourth freedom operators (although other airlines 
can match these tariffs).477 It flexibilizes capacity shares carried on a 
third/fourth freedom basis, initially on a 55:45 ratio and widened to 60:40 
from 1989.478 Finally the package establishes a system to review 
anticompetitive practices, providing for a review of individual exemptions 
granted after notification to and review by the Commission479 as well as a set 
                                                
474 EC, Dec. 87/602/87, supra note 464, art. 5. On the thresholds, see below at 368-69. 
475 Ibid., art. 6. The article also removed restrictions on capacity shares for aircraft of 70 seats 
or less. Ibid., art. 6(3). See also generally below at 368. 
476 EC, Dir. 87/601/87, supra note 464, art. 3 (requiring tariffs to be “reasonably related to the 
applicant air carrier’s long-term, fully allocated relevant costs.”) & art. 5 (providing for zones 
of flexibility). 
477 Ibid., art. 4. But see ibid. art. 4(4) (exempting indirect routes where the combined stage 
length is 20 or more percent longer than the length of the direct route). 
478 EC, Dec. 87/602/87, supra note 464, art. 3. However, with respect to the second 
adjustment, a member state could petition the Commission for a review prior to 1 August 
1989, in which case, after demonstrating that the member states’ air carriers had suffered 
“serous financial damage” from the initial relaxation, the Commission could review the 
circumstances and decide whether or not to apply the second relaxation in full or in part. Ibid., 
art. 4. 
479 EC, Reg. 3975/87, supra note 464. See also Haanappel, Law and Policy, supra note 1 at 
138-39. 
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of block exemptions applicable to the industry as a whole.480 At the time, these 
rules remained confined to transportation within the Community. 
 Issued in 1990, the second package continues the work of the first. It 
extends the timeline on block exemptions, while introducing consultations on 
cargo rates into the list of exemptions.481 It deepens the flexibility of 
third/fourth freedom operations, annually deepening relaxations on multiple 
entry until they disappeared and further relaxing capacity shares by lifting 
absolute limits but limiting annual increases in market share to seven and a 
half percent.482 It also introduces a third price zone – the “normal economy 
fare zone” –, and subjected fares above the discount zones to a double 
disapproval review mechanism.483 
 The second package also widens the scope of Community regulations 
to fifth freedom traffic. Whereas the first package had treated fifth freedom 
operations restrictively, keeping carriers from competing on a cost basis, 
restricting operations to intra-regional airports, and capping fill-up capacity at 
                                                
480 See EC, Reg. 3976/87, supra note 464, art. 2; amended by EC, Reg. 2344/90, supra note 
464; as amended by EC, Council Regulation (EEC) No 2411/92 of 23 July 1992 amending 
Regulation (EEC) No 3976/87 on the application of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty to certain 
categories of agreements and concerted practices in the air transport sector, [1992] O.J. L 
240/19 (making the provisions applicable to domestic as well as international intra-
Community air transport, and revising and extending the application of art. 2); EC, 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 1617/93 of 25 June 1993 on the application of Article 85 
(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of agreements and concerted practices concerning joint 
planning and coordination of schedules, joint operations, consultations on passenger and 
cargo tariffs on scheduled air services and slot allocation at airports, [1993] O.J. L 155/18 
(on IATA Tariff Conferences and Slot Conferences). See also Haanappel, Law and Policy, 
supra note 1 at 139-40. 
481 EC, Reg. 2344/90, supra note 464. 
482 EC, Reg. 2343/90, supra note 464, arts. 6 (multiple designation) & 11-12 (shares of 
capacity, while retaining the review mechanism for cases of serious financial harm). See 
generally below at 361-62 & 368-69. 
483 EC, Reg. 2342/90, supra note 464, art. 4(3)-(4). Fares not within this structure continued to 
fall under a double approval mechanism. Ibid. art. 4(5). But see ibid. art. 3(3) (providing that 
states shall disapprove fares unreasonably high or low, notwithstanding the provisions on 
upward flexibility). See generally below at 357-59. 
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30 percent,484 the second package brought fifth freedom traffic within the cost-
based provisions, extended the application of flexible capacity shares to fifth 
freedom traffic, and relaxed the ceiling on fill-up traffic to 50 percent of 
seats.485 These provisions introduced a new set of dynamics to competition in 
intra-Community air transportation. 
 While the first two packages introduced a significant degree of 
flexibility on international routes within the Community, they had not 
integrated the various national markets into a single internal aviation market. 
Restrictions on seventh freedom and cabotage remained, and individual 
member states still regulated the licensing of carriers. Although the concept of 
a “Community” air carrier runs back to the first package, networks remained 
de facto tied to the nationality of the designating state.486 The third package 
changed all this in a truly transformative way. Under Regulation (EEC) 
2407/92, any airline substantially owned and effectively controlled by 
Community interests, whose principal place of business and registered office 
is in that member state, and whose main occupation remains air transportation 
became entitled to receive an operating license from any state.487 Furthermore, 
once established, that airline was also entitled to operate any intra-Community 
route by virtue of Regulation (EEC) 2408/92.488 A single transitional measure 
– which allows cabotage only on a consecutive basis where capacity on the 
                                                
484 EC, Dec. 87/602/87, supra note 464, art. 8. 
485 EC, Reg. 2342/90, supra note 464, art. 3(6) (permitting price leadership when fares fall 
within the discount zones); EC, Reg. 2343/90, supra note 464, art. 8. 
486 See e.g. EC, Dir 602/87, supra note 464, art. 2(f). But cf. e.g. EC, Reg. 2343/90, ibid., art. 
3(1) (providing that “[t]his Regulation shall not affect the relationship between a Member 
State and air carriers licensed by that State regarding market access and capacity sharing.”). 
487 EC, Reg. 2407/92, supra note 464, art. 4. 
488 EC, Reg 2408/92, supra note 464, art. 3(1). 
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cabotage segment was less than 50 percent of total capacity – ended 1 April 
1997.489 Table 3.1. summarizes this process in table form. 
 
Table 3.1: Summary of Integration by Package 
Regulatory Area Measure 
First Package 
Entry Multiple entry on a country-pair basis; 
 
Multiple entry on a city-pair basis, determined by 
passengers carried annually or number of annual 
return flights; 
 
Market Access Free access on routes between category 1 and 
categories 2 and 3 airports (with specified 
exemptions); 
 
Fifth freedom fill-up limited to 30 percent of traffic 
carried; 
 
Pricing Freedom Cost-based, but subject to double approval; 
 
Exception on two discount price bands: “discount” 
and “deep discount”; 
 
Price-leadership remains with third/fourth freedom 
service provider; 
 
Market Shares From 1988: third/fourth freedom traffic on a 55:45 
ratio; 
 
From 1989: third/fourth freedom traffic on a 60:40 
ratio; 
 
Block Exemptions On: capacity coordination, revenue sharing 
arrangements, voluntary tariff coordination, slot 
allocation, CRS, ground handling, passenger/freight 







                                                
489 Ibid., art. 3(2). 
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Entry Multiple entry on a country-pair basis; 
 
Multiple entry on a city-pair basis, determined by 
passengers carried annually or number of annual return 
flights; 
 
Market Access Free access to community airports; 
 
Fifth freedom fill-up limited to 50 percent of traffic 
carried; 
 
Pricing Freedom Cost-based, double-approval; 
 
Exception on three discount price bands: “discount”, 
“deep discount”, and “normal economy fare zone”; 
 
Fifth freedom allowed to compete on cost; 
 
Market Shares From 1990: annual increase in market share by seven 
and a half percent; 
 
Block Exemptions Consultation on cargo rates. 
 
Third Package 
Entry Multiple entry on all city-pairs; * 
 
Market Access From 1 January 1993: full access on first through 
seventh freedom basis; consecutive cabotage where 
cabotage segment ≤ 50 percent total capacity; 
 
From 1 April 1997: full access on first through ninth 
freedom basis; 
 
Pricing Freedom Full pricing freedom on all routes; 
 
Market Shares Competitively determined on all routes; 
 
Licenses Recognition of all member states’ licenses for 
Community owned and controlled air carriers. 
 




 For most intents and purposes, the single internal market functions as 
if it were a single domestic market, like the United States. One distinction, 
 161 
however, lies in the international character of many intra-Community routes. 
This means the same cabotage protections that prevent foreign airlines 
entering the New York-Los Angeles market do not apply to many important 
intra-Community routes such as London-Frankfurt or Madrid-Paris. The 
Community tried to mitigate this intrusion under Regulation 2409/92 by 
reserving price and product leadership to Community carriers until Regulation 
1008/2008, which consolidated the third package with slight variation to its 
rules on licensing and public service obligations, removed this provision from 
the market.490 The Commission has also asserted the existence of a “Euro-
cabotage” area vis-à-vis third parties, principally in its negotiations with the 
United States.491 It is prevented from doing so not because there is an 
ontological constraint against the selective exchange of international routes, 
but from its existing commitments in bilateral agreements.492 These 
agreements also contain a second distinction between the US and EU markets, 
related to the national restrictions on ownership and control contained in 
bilateral agreements with third parties. The next section addresses the EU’s 
ongoing efforts to replace these national norms with European ones. 
 The internal market has had an enormous impact on the number and 
range of intra-Community services. By 2007, the number of routes had 
increased by 170 percent; there was an increase in the number of players in the 
                                                
490 EC, Reg. 2409/92, supra note 464, art. 1(3). EC, Reg. 1008/2008, supra note 176. 
491 On “Euro-cabotage”, see e.g. Pablo Mendes de Leon, “Euro-cabotage: A Level for 
Liberalization of International Civil Aviation” in Haanappel et al., eds., supra note 454, 191; 
Henri A. Wassenbergh, “EEC-Cabotage After 1992!” (1988) 13 Air L. 282; Jan Ernst C. de 
Groot “Cabotage Liberalization in the EEC and Article 7 of the Chicago Convention” (1989) 
14 Ann. Air & Sp. L. 139; Jeffrey R. Platt, “The Creation of a Community Cabotage Area in 
the European Community and its Implications for the US Bilateral Aviation System” (1992) 
17 Air & Sp. L. 183; Allan I. Mendelsohn, “Myths of International Aviation” (2003) 68 J. Air 
L. & Com. 519 at 520-23. 
492 See generally the discussion on cabotage below at 302-06. 
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market; routes with more than two competitors had increased by over 300 
percent, resulting in corresponding tariff reductions.493 Many of these 
developments are attributable to the rise of new business models, particularly 
the LCC.494 At the same time, the EU continues to Europeanize both the 
industry and the instruments governing their actions. Concentration among 
Europe’s full service network carriers continues to increase around the Air 
France-KLM, IAG, and Lufthansa holding groups.495 The Council has 
extended the reach of the Community’s general competition laws to air 
transport, including its application to transportation between member and non-
member states,496 and has gradually whittled away the scope for block 
exemptions.497 Yet the European Union is restrained from fully consolidating 
the gains from integration of the sector.498 These restraints lie in the 
                                                
493 Tan, “Prospects for ASAM”, supra note 44 at 270-71 (citing The European Union’s 
Commitment to Cooperation with the World Aviation Community, paper presented by Portugal 
on behalf of the European Community and its member States, ICAO Assembly, 36th session, 
September 2007, at 2). On early tariff reductions, see also Commission of the European 
Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament: Impact of the Third Package of Air Transport Liberalization Measures (Com(96) 
514 final, 22 October 1996) at 5-7 (linking price reductions on intra-Community international 
routes with three or more competitors (as compared to monopoly or duopoly markets, where 
prices continued to rise), noting reductions in fares in a number of domestic markets, while 
noting only a small percentage of competition was carried out on a fifth freedom or cabotage 
basis). 
494 Tan, “Prospects for ASAM”, ibid. (noting the market share for LCCs on intra-EU routes 
rose from one percent in 1993 to 28 percent in 2006). Compare this with AirAsia’s growth in 
the Malaysia-Thailand market, discussed in Intervistas-ga2, supra note 10 at 52-58. 
495 See generally above at 25. 
496 EC, Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the Implementation of the 
Rules on Competition Laid Down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, [2003] O.J. L 1/1; EC, 
Council Regulation (EC) 411/2004 of 26 February 2004 repealing Regulation (EEC) No 
3975/87 and amending Regulations (EEC) No 3976/87 and (EC) No 1/2003, in Connection 
with Air Transport between the Community and Third Countries (repealing the remainder of 
Reg. 3975/87), [2004] O.J. L 68/1. See also Havel, Beyond Open Skies, supra note 10 at 416-
17. 
497 EC, Commission Regulation (EC) No 1459/2006 of 28 September 2006 on the Application 
of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Agreements and Concerted Practices 
Concerning Consultations on Passenger Tariffs on Scheduled Air Services and Slot Allocation 
at Airports, [2006] O.J. L 272/3. See also Havel, Beyond Open Skies, ibid. at 417-18. 
498 For a quantitative analysis of the gains to be made from consolidation, see generally The 
Brattle Group, supra note 103 at c. 3-6. Importantly, the report notes, nearly 80 percent of 
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international instruments (i.e. bilateral agreements) governing relations with 
non-member states, impediments that the EU continues to address through its 
external policy. 
 
3.2.2. The External Dimension 
 
The external dimension of international air transport relations has an 
enormous impact on the EU’s ability to realize the benefits of a truly 
integrated market. At least two issues beyond the traditional anticompetitive 
clauses in bilateral agreements – the limitations on entry, capacity 
determination, and route selection – relate specifically to efforts to rationalize 
scale at a European level. First, there is the mismatch between the national 
ownership and control provisions contained in bilateral agreements and the 
transnational dimension of the single European market. To ensure that non-
member states do not invoke the right to revoke or suspend an airline’s 
operating rights when it is acquired by another member state’s airline, 
European airline groups have invented rather elaborate structures involving an 
assortment of holding companies, minority shareholdings, and put and call 
options, such as the division between beneficial and economic ownership of 
KLM discussed in Chapter 1.499 While these arrangements have been accepted 
by third states, they are not entirely unchallengeable nor do they permit the 
total realization of efficiencies expected from a merger. 
                                                
euro 2.9 billion annual savings from productive efficiency gains would come from intra-EU 
rationalizations. Ibid. at vii. See also Booz Allen Hamilton, The Economic Impacts of an Open 
Aviation Area between the EU and the US, Final Report (January 2007) at cs. 7-10. 
499 For a note detailing the concentrations in the EU, see supra note 60. A similar phenomenon 
is occurring in ASEAN among low-cost carriers. See e.g. above at 18-20 & below at 263-66. 
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 Second, the combination of single internal and fragmented external 
aviation policy leaves individual member states room to unilaterally 
manipulate traffic patterns to and from the region. Early liberalization beyond 
the EU provides a particular combination of competitive advantages, 
particularly lower prices and increased connectivity, incentivizing traffic 
behind the gateway to flow through that state’s network.500 This type of traffic 
diversion may induce neighboring member states to adopt similar policies 
(this was certainly the United States’ intention), but it also affects the balance 
within the internal market.501 Indeed, when combined with the nationality 
restrictions on the ownership and control of the operator, these agreements 
create clear structural advantages for the first-mover’s national carriers beyond 
the bilateral relationship – an example emphasized by the apparent long-term 
effects of early liberalization on transatlantic traffic patterns to and from the 
Netherlands.502 
 The Commission had anticipated these problems. In 1990 and again in 
1992, it proposed a common external aviation policy, justifying its extension 
of power through the common commercial policy provisions of the Treaty of 
Rome.503 According to the Commission, a common policy, upheld by the 
                                                
500 See e.g. The Brattle Group, supra note 103 at 5-1 to 5-10 (providing a quantitative analysis 
of shifts in traffic patterns due to liberalization on the transatlantic over the 1990s). 
501 Ibid. at 5-9 & 5-10. 
502 See ibid. 
503 Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a Council Decision on a 
Consultation and Authorization Procedure for Agreements Concerning Commercial Aviation 
Relations between Member States and Third Countries (Com(90) 117 final, 23 February 
1990); Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to 
the Council, Air Transport Relations with Third Countries (Com(92) 434 final, 21 October 
1992) [Commission, Com(92)]. See also Ludwig Weber, “External Aspects of EEC Air 
Transport liberalization” (1990) 15 Air L. 277; G.I. Close, “External Competitive for Air 
Policy in the Third Phase – Trade Policy or Transport Policy?” (1990) 15 Air L. 29; Piet 
Eeckhout, The European Internal Market and International Trade: A Legal Analysis (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1994) at 87-99. 
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Commission, would benefit from collectivizing interests, harmonizing what 
the Commission perceived as an inequality between the rights of Community 
air carriers and airlines of non-member states operating to, through and within 
the Community.504 At the same time, bloc negotiations would strengthen the 
member states’ bargaining position as a whole against important trade partners 
with strong negotiating positions,505 while also facilitating the amendment of 
the sundry bilateral agreements between member states and non-members by 
reducing the number of negotiations required to implement the Community 
policy. 
 Like the United States, the Commission had also begun to think of air 
transportation in terms of global markets. It made this point explicit in its 1992 
Memorandum, arguing that competition between EC and US carriers exists 
not only over the transatlantic, but in places such as Japan.506 Indeed, if there 
has been a singular focus to the Community’s external dimension, it has been 
to create a rough equivalence with conditions in the United States – in terms 
of operating costs, system-wide efficiency, and even, through the concept of a 
                                                
504 Commission, Com (92), ibid. at 10-16 (noting both the disequilibrium between rights 
granted to the US vis-à-vis rights received from the US and the varying levels of intra-
Community fifth freedom rights granted to Japanese carriers). 
505 Ibid. at 23-24, para. 57 (particularly subpara. (a)) & Annex IV (setting out the EC/US 
Market as an example for Community-level negotiations). 
506 Commission, Com(92), supra note 503 at 14-15, paras. 28-31 (noting that “[i]t is worth 
noting that the bilateral agreements between Member States and third countries are not the 
only factors which determine the competitive situation. Strong worldwide competition exists 
for example between EC and US air carriers. The fact that the bilateral agreement between 
e.g. the US and Japan is less restrictive than the agreements between Member States and 
Japan means that the US carriers can develop a much better position in Japan and thereby in 
the global competition. As a consequence Community carriers become less attractive for a 
number of business passengers. This example shows that it is important for Community air 
carriers engaged in global competition to be able to operate under the best possible regulatory 
regime. In fact, if other governments, due to their strong negotiating position, are able to 
secure a better, more flexible regime, Community carriers may loose [sic] market share. In 
order to be competitive Community air carriers should therefore benefit from at least as 
flexible agreements as their competitors have.” Ibid. at 14, para. 28). 
 166 
“Euro-cabotage” zone, structural parity.507 To achieve this parity, the EC 
began (and the EU continues) a comprehensive program to renegotiate its 
member states’ bilateral agreements to reflect a Community dimension to 
ownership and control. Yet in order to do so, the Commission needed the 
competence to negotiate these changes. Obtaining this competence would 
prove a difficult task. 
 Despite identifying the problem as early as 1990, the first real 
breakthrough in a Community-level external policy came only in 2002. For 
roughly a decade, the Commission and the Council remained deadlocked on 
the issue.508 An early threat to bring the matter to the ECJ resulted in a limited 
“split” mandate, granting the Commission the right to negotiate some “soft” 
regulatory issues such as competition policy, inward investment opportunities, 
and the introduction of a Community ownership and control clause.509 If the 
Commission achieved significant results in these areas, then the Council 
would grant it the right to negotiate the more substantive issues of market 
access.510 In 1998, after failing to broach any meaningful sort of dialogue with 
the US, the Commission reinstituted proceedings against eight member states 
                                                
507 See e.g. ibid. at 5, paras. 8-9; Comité des Sages, supra note 455; High Level Group for the 
Future European Aviation Regulatory Framework, European Aviation: A Framework for 
Driving Performance Improvement (July 2007). On the history and problems of “Euro-
cabotage”, see supra note 491. On the Single European Sky see generally Pablo Mendes de 
Leon & Daniel Calleja Crespo, eds., Achieving the Single European Sky: Goals and 
Challenges (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2011). 
508 While the Commission had originally proposed assuming responsibility for all external 
relations, it also proposed to share competences through a delegation procedure, using a 
variety of factors including size including the size and importance of the bargaining partner, 
whether the bargaining partner had a special relationship with the EC legal regime, and 
whether the negotiations were between economic blocs. Commission, Com(92), ibid. at 21-28 
& Annex I. However, given the importance of the transatlantic market, it has always been the 
Commission’s intention to renegotiate its relationship with the United States. See e.g. ibid., 
Annex IV; Havel, Beyond Open Skies, supra note 10 at 34-40, 57-61. 
509 Havel, ibid. at 37-39. 
510 Ibid. Havel has noted that perhaps the most important outcome of the 1995 mandate is the 
Council’s recognition of the principle of a common external policy. Ibid. at 39-40. 
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on the grounds that their bilateral agreements with the United States violated 
Community law.511 
 The Court broke the deadlock in November 2002 by finding that the 
nationality-based ownership and control clauses contained in the member 
states’ bilateral agreements were not in conformity with Community law. 
Specifically, it found that by excluding Community carriers not owned by 
nationals of the member state the nationality requirements violated the right of 
establishment protected in then Article 52 of the Treaty of Rome, requiring 
international agreements afford the same protections to all Community 
enterprises.512 
 The Court did not give the Commission all that it had asked for. It 
refused to recognize the Commission’s exclusive external competence over all 
air transport matters (it did, however, recognize an exclusive competence in 
                                                
511 See collectively Commission of the European Communities v. United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland, C-466/98 [2002] E.C.R. I-09427; Commission of the European 
Communities v. Kingdom of Denmark, C-467/98 [2002] E.C.R. I-09519; Commission of the 
European Communities v. Kingdom of Sweden, C-468/98, [2002] E.C.R. I-09575; 
Commission of the European Communities v. République de Finlande, C-469/98 [2002] 
E.C.R. I-09627; Commission of the European Communities v. Kingdom of Belgium, C-471/98, 
[2002] E.C.R. I-09681; Commission of the European Communities v. Grand Duchy of 
Luxemburg, C-472/98, [2002] E.C.R. I-09741; Commission of the European Communities v. 
Republic of Austria, C-475/98 [2002] E.C.R. I-09797; Commission of the European 
Communities v. Federal Republic of Germany, C-476/98, [2002] E.C.R. I-09855 [Commission 
v. Germany]. See also Havel, Beyond Open Skies, supra note 10 at 57; Pablo Mendes de Leon, 
“The Future of Ownership and Control Clauses in Bilateral Air Transport Agreements, 
Current Proposals and Legal Objections” in Consequences of Air Transport Globalization 
Proceedings of the Workshop, 8/9 May 2003 in Cologne (Cologne: Institute of Air and Space 
Law, University of Cologne, 2003). 
512 See e.g. Commission v. Germany, ibid. at paras. 144-62. According to the Court: 
 
[i]t follows [from the substantial ownership and effective control clause] that 
Community airlines may always be excluded from the benefit of the air transport 
agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States of 
America, while that benefit is assured to German airlines. Consequently, Community 
airlines suffer discrimination which prevents them from benefiting from the treatment 
which the host Member State, namely the Federal Republic of Germany, accords to its 
own nationals. 
 
Ibid. at para. 153. 
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the areas of tariffs, reservation systems, and slot allocation) and it did not 
grant the Commission the competence to renegotiate the ownership and 
control clauses contained in the member states’ bilateral agreements 
directly.513 However, the decisions did create the political momentum for the 
Commission and Council to negotiate two new mandates in May 2003.514 The 
first, a more radical “vertical” mandate, gave the Commission an exclusive 
right to renegotiate a comprehensive new agreement with the United States,515 
a TOAA that would include the right of establishment and cabotage among its 
provisions. The process and results of these negotiations are discussed in 
further detail below. A second, “horizontal” mandate grants the Commission 
the right to bring air transport agreements in line with the “open skies” 
decisions.516 The mandate is one of mixed competence – member states may 
simultaneously conduct their own bilateral negotiations to achieve the same 
effect.517 Between June 2003 and December 2008, member states have 
                                                
513 In addition to discrimination claims, the Commission had argued for exclusive competence 
in external relations on the basis of Opinion 1/94, granting the Community exclusive 
competence to conclude an international agreement even in the absence of a Community 
provision in the area where such an agreement was necessary to obtain the Treaty’s 
objectives, and on the basis that external relations would affect the content of the internal 
market, an argument based on the AETR judgment. See e.g. ibid. at paras. 71-90 (discussing 
and passing judgment on arguments falling under Opinion 1/94) & paras. 91-137 (discussing 
and deciding on argument with respect to the AETR judgment). On the areas where the 
Community did possess exclusive competence, see Ibid. at paras. 123-32. 
514 See e.g. Havel, Beyond Open Skies, supra note 10 at 65-66. These decisions were based on 
a Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and Council. See 
Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission on 
Relations between the Community and Third Countries in the Field of Air Transport: 
Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Regulation on the Negotiation and 
Implementation of Air Service Agreements between Member States and Third Countries 
(Com(2003) 94 final, 26 February 2003), paras. 29, 35 & 75 (also cited in Havel, Beyond 
Open Skies, ibid. at 65). 
515 Havel, Beyond Open Skies ibid. at 65-66; H.S. Rutger Jan Toe Laer, “The ECJ Decisions: 
‘Blessing in Disguise’?” (2006) 31 Air & Sp. L. 19 at 28-30. 
516 See Havel, ibid.; Toe Laer, ibid. at 30-31. 
517 In this regard, see EC, Regulation (EC) No 847/2004 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 29 April 2004 on the Negotiation and Implementation of Air Service 
Agreements between Member States and Third Countries, [2004] O.J. L 195/3; EC, 
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negotiated changes with 60 partners, representing 132 agreements, while the 
Commission has itself negotiated with 37 states and one region of eight 
member states, representing another 651 agreements.518 It is certain that more 
have since been amended to reflect Community norms. 
 The horizontal agreement does present certain challenges. One 
potential problem arises from the possibility that in bringing the ownership 
and control clause in line with EU law, a non-member state may confer 
unreciprocated third party rights to third party member states.519 In amending 
the provisions, the Community seeks to ensure “each and every EU Member 
State the possibility to designate one or more eligible Community carriers 
under the prevailing bilateral with a specific third country, provided that there 
is room for the newcomer in the sense of (a) the number of airlines permitted 
by the respective clause and (b) the number of unused frequencies 
available.”520 However, such a scenario might result in one member state 
designating a carrier owned by another member state that either has no 
agreement with the non-member state or an agreement with fewer 
opportunities, effectively permitting one member state’s airlines to “free ride” 
                                                
Commission Decision 29/03/2005 on Approving the Standard Clauses for Inclusion in 
Bilateral Air Services Agreements between member States and Third Countries Jointly Laid 
Down by the Commission and the Member States. Importantly, art. 4(3) of Reg. (EC) 
847/2004 provides that a member state may nevertheless be authorized to conclude an 
agreement not in accordance with the standard clauses provided that “this does not harm the 
object and purpose of the Community common transport policy”. Ibid., art. 4(3). See also Toe 
Laer, ibid. at 31-33. 
518 See European Commission, “External Aviation Policy – Horizontal Agreements”, online: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/international_aviation/external_aviation_policy/horiz
ontal_agreements_en.htm> (last updated 9 November 2012). 
519 See e.g. Peter van Fenema, “EU Horizontal Agreements: Community Designation and the 
‘Free Rider’ Clause” (2006) 31 Air & Sp. L. 172; Alan Khee-Jin Tan, “Singapore’s New Air 
Services Agreements with the E.U. and the U.K.: Implications for Liberalization in Asia” 
(2008) 73 J. Air L. & Com. 351 at 357-63 [Tan, “Singapore’s Agreements”]. 
520 van Fenema, ibid. at 180. 
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off of another member state’s agreement.521 To prevent this, states like 
Singapore, Chile, and New Zealand have negotiated a “free rider” – or rather 
an “anti-free rider” – clause that allows the non-member state to suspend, or 
limit an airline’s operating rights where there is no bilateral agreement 
between the state where the airline is established and the non-member state, or 
when the designation circumvents limitations under their bilateral 
agreement.522 
 Still other states have used the opportunity provided by the horizontal 
mandate to renegotiate the substance of their bilateral agreements in exchange 
for recognition of the Community carrier principle. For example, the South 
Koreans used the renegotiations with France to negotiate access for Asiana, 
while limiting each country’s overall designations to two.523 Such an approach 
is important not only in the immediate sense that it limits the number of 
competitors in the market: it also suggests a limit to the acceptability of the 
US-EU agreement, which offers multiple designation between all points in the 
US and EU, as a plurilateral initiative, a point taken up later in this Chapter. 
 In addition to the vertical mandate for the TOAA, the Community also 
pursues a widening of the internal market with its geographical neighbors. 
This policy can be sub-divided into two branches. The first involves the 
creation of a European Common Aviation Area (ECAA), an extension of 
Community’s aviation acquis through a series of agreements that have come 
                                                
521 Ibid. at 180-83; Tan, “Singapore’s Agreements”, supra note 519. 
522 Ibid.; Tan, “Horizontal Mandate”, supra note 168 at 448-49 (also noting that, alternatively, 
Australia opted to negotiate an undertaking by the Commission to increase access to points in 
the Community). 
523 Tan, “Singapore’s Agreements”, ibid. at 354-57 (also noting that some states such as 
Thailand and Indonesia have used similar tactics, and criticizing Singapore’s agreement with 
the EU for not taking advantage of the opportunity to increase overall capacity to the region). 
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to include the European Economic Area (comprising the twenty-seven 
member states, Iceland, Norway and the Principality of Liechtenstein), 
Switzerland and, in December 2005, its Southeast European neighbors 
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia 
and Kosovo.524 The second extension involved the Euromed Aviation Project, 
an initiative to create a Euro-Mediterranean Common Aviation Area between 
the EU and Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Lebanon, Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey.525 In the area of air transport 
liberalization, the Commission, together with EuropeAid, had developed a 
Road Map for the Project in 2009, as well as an Impact Assessment, of which 
a Second Draft is currently publicly available.526 These plans have yet to 
materialize into a concrete legal agreement. 
                                                
524 Agreement between the European Community and the Swiss Confederation on Air 
Transport, [2002] O.J. L 114/73 [EC-Swiss Agreement]; Multilateral Agreement between the 
European Community and its Member States, The Republic of Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, The Republic of Bulgaria, The Republic of Croatia, the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, The Republic of Montenegro, The Kingdom of Norway, Romania, The 
Republic of Serbia and The United nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo on the 
Establishment of a European Common Aviation Area, [2006] O.J. L 285/3. See also Havel, 
Beyond Open Skies, supra note 10 at 489-91. The ECAA has since been expanded to Georgia. 
See Common Aviation Area Agreement Between the European Union and its Member States, 
of the One Part, and Georgia, of the Other Part, done at Brussels, 2 December 2010. Some 
economists have predicted this kind of further expansion based on relative economic size. 
Fujita, supra note 112 at 4 (noting that “the geographical extent of the EU (even the expanded 
25- [now 27-] country configuration) is considerably smaller than that of NAFTA and of East 
Asia. This suggests the possibility of further expansion of the EU in the future.”). 
525 See generally Euromed Aviation Project, “Welcome”, online: 
<http://www.euromedaviation.org/>. The Project falls within a broader project known as the 
Union for the Mediterranean or Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, founded in 2008 as a 
continuation of the Barcelona Process. See generally European Union External Action, “Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership (EUROMED)”, online: 
<http://www.eeas.europa.eu/euromed/index_en.htm>. 
526 See generally European Commission & EuropeAid, Road Map Towards the Euro-
Mediterranean Common Aviation Area, Final Draft (November 2009), online: 
<http://p23680.mittwaldserver.info/fileadmin/download/Aviation/Road_Map/Euromed_Aviati
on_-_Road_Map_final_draft_Nov_09.pdf>; European Commission & EuropeAid, Impact 
Assessment, 2nd Draft (17 November 2009), online: 
<http://p23680.mittwaldserver.info/fileadmin/download/Aviation/Road_Map/Impact_Assess
ment_2nd_draft_17Nov.pdf>. The final Impact Assessment was planned for release in 
January 2010. See “Euromed Transport Aviation: Impact Assessment”, online: 
<http://p23680.mittwaldserver.info/581.0.html> (providing a timeline for the preparation of 
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 Notably, while each of these efforts is an important contribution to 
efficiency, there is also a particularly strategic dimension to the EU’s external 
aviation policy. Part of this has been achieving parity with the United States. 
Another side of the EU’s external relations has been to leverage its own 
competitive advantages, particularly after the benefits of integration, in its 
relationships with other third parties. 
 In this regard, two dimensions stand out as particularly advantage-
seeking. Firstly, there is an explicitly selective interest in the terms it sets for 
external engagement. For example, while the Commission has conveyed a 
deep interest in liberalization with China, India, Japan and South Korea as 
“desirable partners”, it has simultaneously expressed a reticence to engage 
with countries like Singapore, which require careful assessment “in the light 
of their economic repercussions, the competitive situation and the long-term 
objective of reforming the regulative framework governing the international 
air transport sector.”527 At the same time, mixed competence means that 
                                                
the Impact Assessment). In addition to liberalization, the Euromed Project has flagged the 
harmonization of safety and security standards, as well as the extension of the Single 
European Sky initiative, for discussion. See generally EuroMed Transport Project & European 
Commission, Regional Transport Action Plan for the Mediterranean region 2007-2013 
(2007) at 21-23. 
527 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission: 
Developing the Agenda for the Community’s External Aviation Policy (Com(2005) 79 final, 
11 March 2005) at 10, para. 2.2.2. The Commission’s comment on Asia as a region, minus a 
paragraph on technical cooperation in China and India, reads as follows: 
 
The Asian region will require special efforts to be made over the coming years. 
 
This is particularly true of China and India. These two partners have been identified by 
the principal European companies as target countries for the Community policy. These 
pivotal Asia region players, backed by the largest populations in the world and by 
rapidly expanding economies, are spoken for in terms of sustained air traffic growth 
(about + 9% per annum for China and + 6% per annum for India between now and 
2007 for passenger traffic). With their considerable but largely protected markets, they 
are currently pressing ahead with aviation sector reforms combining greater access and 
modernisation, all of which could usefully be boosted by cooperation with the EC. 
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bilateral, country-to-country relations remain an important path to 
liberalization. As an example, the UK-Singapore Air Transport Agreement 
relaxes market access on a seventh, eighth, and even ninth freedom basis and 
replaces the substantial ownership and effective control rules with a form of 
principal place of business and effective regulatory control provisions 
discussed below, modified for UK designations to fit with EU law 
requirements on Community ownership and control.528 It is but one example 
of how mixity continues to shape the EU’s external air transport relations. 
 Secondly, the extension of the acquis to non-member states as part of 
the development of a larger common aviation area requires that the non-
member states’ agencies and airlines adopt European safety and technical 
standards, a point that potentially translates into significant costs for those 
airlines.529 This is a point that interests in the Middle East are well aware of, 




Japan and South Korea, both with prosperous markets, should also be considered as 
desirable partners. 
 
In the Asia-Pacific area, requests by third countries for more open markets with the EC 
(Australia, New Zealand, Singapore) should be carefully assessed in the light of their 
economic repercussions, the competitive situation and the long-term objective of 
reforming the regulative framework governing the international air transport sector. 
 
Ibid. 
528 Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Singapore, done in London, 21 November 
2007 [UK-Singapore Agreement]. See also Tan, “Singapore’s Agreements”, supra note 519 at 
362-65 (discussing the terms of the agreement). 
529 See infra notes 953-56; Juan Carlos Salazar, “European Laws, Policies, Regulation & the 
Middle East” (Presentation to the International Conference on Air Transport, Air Law and 
Regulation, Singapore, 24-26 May 2010), online: Centre for International Law 
<http://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/European-Laws-Policies-Regulation-
Middle-East_Juan-Carlo.pdf> (noting the difficulties of adapting to European standards and 
regulations among Middle Eastern EMCAA states). 
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and some have expressed concerns over the advantages conferred by ascribing 
to the EU’s demands.530 In contrast, the proposed TOAA leaves each national 
agency the authority to proscribe independent standards, agreeing rather to 
recognize the other’s standards while keeping a line open through the Joint 
Committee to deal with any concerns.  
 
3.3. The EU-US Agreements: Towards an Open Aviation Area or the 
Failure of a Program? 
 
The cumulative effect of these ideological, regulatory, and operational 
changes on both sides of the North Atlantic has been an attempt to 
comprehensively renegotiate the regulatory institutions governing the 
transatlantic corridor. These negotiations occurred over eight years and in two 
stages, with each stage comprised of multiple rounds of negotiation. Some had 
seen these negotiations as having the potential to bring the industry out of its 
national organizational structure into a global form of organization.531 In the 
end, they did result in a comprehensive EU-US Air Transport Agreement. 
However, although it is unique in many ways and recognizes Europe’s own 
efforts at internal rescaling, the Agreement fails to bring about institutional 
changes that can properly be described as transformational. 
                                                
530 Ibid. 
531 See generally e.g. Havel, Beyond Open Skies, supra note 10. But see Havel & Sanchez, 
“Restoring Aviation”, supra note 21 (noting that it is the EU-Canada Agreement, not the EU-
US Agreement, that explicitly provides for the transition to a transnational mode of 
governance interregionally and discussing that agreement in both the context of the failure of 
the EU-US Second Stage to do so and the broader global discussions towards thinking of 
aviation in terms beyond nationality). See also Knibb, supra note 21. 
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 From its inception, the Europeans had hoped for nothing less than a 
reordering of the air. Originally conceived by the Association of European 
Airlines in 1999 as a Transatlantic “Common” Aviation Area, the Commission 
later amended its adjectival form to “Open” after the US’ reception of the 
original proposal proved lukewarm at best.532 Whether Common or Open, 
from the outset of negotiations in 2003 the substance of the Commission’s 
proposal for transport within and between the two continents was nonetheless 
revolutionary. The Commission sought not only to gain recognition of the 
Community carrier clause, but also to trade the right of establishment between 
the two entities as well as an exchange of cabotage rights.533 Yet while the 
United States was unambiguously willing to sign off on the Community 
carrier clause from the start, it proved more reticent to kick away the 
foundations of its own policy, leading to a series of spats over the content of 
the agreement, and whether it should be negotiated in two stages or at a go.534 
 The result was an agreement concluded in two stages, the first in April 
2007, the second in March 2010.535 The EC-US First Stage Air Transport 
Agreement, which entered into force on 30 March 2008, is essentially an 
“enhanced” open skies agreement, with some key novelties including US 
recognition of the “Community carrier clause” and the formation of a “Joint 
                                                
532 See e.g. Havel, Beyond Open Skies, ibid. at 41-42, 551-2; Lelieur, supra note 52 at 122-23. 
533 This plan, adapted from the TCAA, its contested nature and the process of negotiation are 
all discussed in detail in Havel, Beyond Open Skies, ibid. at 55-71. 
534 The negotiations up to the EC-US First Stage Agreement are documented in ibid. at 67-78. 
On the US recognition of the Community Carrier clause, see also Mendelsohn, supra note 491 
at 523-27. 
535 Air Transport Agreement between the European Communities and Its Member States, on 
the One Hand, and the United States of America, on the Other Hand, done at Brussels and 
Washington, D.C., 25 and 30 April 2007 [EC-US First Stage Agreement]; Protocol to Amend 
the Air Transport Agreement between the United States of America and the European 
Community and Its Member States, signed on April 25 and 30, 2007, 25 March 2010 [EU-US 
Second Stage Agreement]. 
 176 
Committee” to pursue common interests and strategies in areas of technical 
and regulatory competences as well as address the “social effects of the 
Agreement” and to develop “appropriate responses to concerns found to be 
legitimate”.536 Critically, the United States gained market access to several 
non-open skies markets, most importantly the UK and London Heathrow.537 
Seventh freedom cargo rights were also included, although US rights were 
limited to the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, 
Portugal, and the Slovak Republic.538 EC airlines also gained access to the US 
government’s civil contracting program, although the CRAF program remains 
exclusive to US carriers.539 
 If the First Stage Agreement disappointed those pushing for a single 
comprehensive agreement, its consolation was that it readily acknowledged its 
being an interim agreement, requiring a more comprehensive Second Stage 
                                                
536 For a list of “keynote” provisions, see Havel, Beyond Open Skies, supra note 10 at 79-82 
(listing the following 17 key terms: the creation of a joint committee; self-identification as a 
plurilateral agreement; second stage negotiations explicitly contemplated; unrestricted 3rd-5th 
freedom rights exchanged in body of agreement; 7th freedom all-cargo rights (geographically 
restricted for US carriers in Europe); recognition of the Community carrier clause; 
clarification of ownership and control rules; open pricing rules with no emergency measures 
(except intra-EU price leadership); no unilateral capacity/change of gauge restrictions; 
franchising provisions; reciprocal wet-leasing (except domestic market); recognition of 
importance of working to minimize regulatory divergence; novel provisions on government 
subsidies and support; novel provisions on competition law; novel provisions on 
environmental matters; novel provisions on consumer protection; and novel provisions on 
traffic uplift preferences (particularly for non-DOD US government contracts)). Havel also 
notes that “[o]ther than the generous seventh freedom concession by the United States, most 
of the provisions in the 2007 U.S./EC Air Transport Agreement are not startlingly 
innovative.” Ibid. at 81. 
537 EC-US First Stage Agreement, ibid., art. 3(c)(i). See also e.g. Havel, Beyond Open Skies, 
supra note 10 at 116-19 (discussing Bermuda II, an amendment in 1995, and discussions 
between 2000 and 2002 before negotiations were subsumed by the EU-US negotiation 
process). The agreement also had an appreciable impact on the DOT’s demands in exchange 
for antitrust immunity. See e.g. US DOT, U.S.-U.K. Alliance Case, supra note 414 (noting the 
conditions required of AA/BA, including, inter alia, divestiture of sixteen daily slot pairs, or 
224 weekly slots, and carving out the Chicago/Heathrow and Dallas/Ft Worth-
Gatwick/Heathrow markets); US DOT, oneworld SCO, supra note 68 (subject to the release 
of four daily slot pairs, or 56 weekly slots, for a period of ten years and not imposing carve-
outs).  
538 EC-US First Stage Agreement, ibid., Annex 1, s. 3. 
539 Ibid., Annex 3. 
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Agreement be negotiated by 15 November 2010 and giving individual EU 
member states a means of unilaterally revoking the Agreement should the 
parties fail to conclude a final agreement by the November deadline, while 
explicitly including relaxations on market access to the US domestic market 
and ownership and control restrictions within the scope of discussion.540 The 
EU-US Second Stage Air Transport Agreement marks the end of the mandated 
negotiations between the EU, which took over from the EC after the Lisbon 
Treaty,541 and the United States. A culmination of five rounds of negotiation 
over a 24-month period, the 2010 Second Stage Agreement also ends an 
individual EU member state’s right to unilaterally revoke the agreement.542 
 Yet the Second Stage Agreement fails to generate the type of 
regulatory reform that could properly be considered transformative: it is 
certainly far from the TOAA the Commission originally envisioned.543 Its 
provisions offer no substantive changes to the existing ownership and control 
rules, particularly the 25 percent limit on voting shares embedded in US 
legislation. A new Article 6 bis does provide for the reciprocal recognition of 
regulatory determinations with regard to airline fitness and citizenship;544 
                                                
540 Ibid., art. 21. Were the agreement not reached by the 18-month deadline, individual 
member states would have the right to unilaterally denounce the agreement as a whole. Ibid., 
art. 21(3). See also Havel, Beyond Open Skies, supra note at 83-85 (outlining the timeline 
from the First Stage Agreement to an effective denunciation). 
541 See generally EU-US Second Stage Agreement, supra note 536, Preamble, para. 3. 
542 Cf. EC-US First Stage Agreement, supra note 536, art. 21; EU-US Second Stage 
Agreement, supra note 536, art. 6 (replacing art. 21 of the First Stage Agreement). See also 
Havel, Beyond Open Skies, supra note 10 at 84-85. 
543 Havel, ibid. Havel & Sanchez, “Restoring Aviation”, supra note 21 at 32-35 (noting that 
the EU-Canada Agreement “created a mechanism that ultimately would allow them to 
overcome the blockage on foreign ownership and cabotage rights that remains embedded in 
the U.S./EU air services agreement.” Ibid. at 32); Knibb, supra note 21 (noting the 
Commission’s continued insistence that the Agreement represents “a commitment to engage 
in a process.”). 
544 EU-US Second Stage Agreement, supra note 536, art. 2 (introducing art. 6 bis into the EU-
US Agreement). 
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however, the provision contains a critical caveat that permits a party to 
suspend its application if the criteria employed by either state changes.545 At 
the same time, while the Agreement recognizes a “shared goal of continuing to 
remove market access barriers […] including enhancing the access of their 
airlines to global capital markets”,546 it makes no substantive move forward. 
Ownership and control reform is instead placed in the hands of the US 
Congress, which must remove the legislative restrictions on inward investment 
in the US before any executive action can take place.547 While there are 
incentives, in the form of guarantees by the EU that it will remove similar 
restrictions and a conditional market access relaxation on seventh freedom 
services between the EU or US and five other states once Congress passes the 
required changes,548 it is highly doubtful such incentives are enough to remove 
Congressional opposition.549 The Agreement thus places further reform in the 
hands of a domestic political process that even without geostrategic neo-
mercantilist undertones has patently refused to consider the benefits of 
transnationalizing aviation markets. There is no discussion of cabotage 
anywhere in the Agreement. 
 The Agreement also reveals the role of labor relations in moving 
beyond the national paradigm, emphasizing the role of social bargains in 
adjusting institutional structures.550 In particular, Article 17 bis addresses the 
                                                
545 Ibid. (art. 6 bis, para. 2). 
546 Ibid., art. 9 (art. 21(1)). 
547 Ibid. (art. 21(3)). 
548 Ibid., art. 9 (art. 21(2)-(3)). 
549 See generally the discussion on Congress above at 147-48. 
550 Compare the ability of labor interests to use the political process to withhold attempts to 
liberalize in aviation with the general ease of other industries to restructure. See e.g. generally 
Ruggie, “Taking Embedded Liberalism Global”, supra note 3. Both The Brattle Group and 
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role of labor relations in achieving further liberalization.551 Article 17 bis 
acknowledges the desirability of high labor standards, recognizing that “the 
opportunities created by the Agreement are not intended to undermine labour 
standards or the labour-related rights and principles contained in the Parties’ 
respective laws.”552 These principles – the objective of which is to reach a 
transnational social bargain between one key stakeholder in the system – are 
to guide the Joint Committee in their considerations regarding the social 
effects of liberalization.553 
 But if Article 17 bis is an attempt to solve the problem, it is equally a 
statement on the issue’s intractability. So far, the European Commission has 
convened the EU-US Aviation Forum on Liberalisation and Labour, which 
met twice during the course of negotiations on the Second Stage Agreement, 
to address transnational labor relations.554 Importantly, the Forum noted that 
labor’s objections were not to increased openness itself, but to the failure to 
indentify adequate concrete measures to guide the process through.555  Labor 
groups also recognized that the industry’s current organizational structure may 
also have negative impacts on labor conditions, and that these issues would be 
                                                
Booz, Allen & Hamilton address labor issues at length in their reports. See The Brattle Group, 
supra note 103 at c. 8; Booz Allen Hamilton, supra note 498 at 77-133. 
551 EU-US Second Stage Agreement, supra note 536, art. 4 (art. 17 bis). 
552 Ibid. (art. 17 bis, para. 1). 
553 See ibid., arts. 4 (art. 17 bis, para. 20 & 5 (art. 18(4)(b)). 
554 To this end, see European Commission, Directorate-General for External Relations & 
Directorate-General for Energy and Transport, EU-US Aviation Forum on Liberalisation and 
Labour: Past, Present and Future, Executive Summary (Washington, DC, 3-4 December 
2008), online: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/transport/air/events/doc/executive_summary_labour_forum.pdf> 
[Commission, First Labour Forum]; European Commission, Directorate-General for External 
Relations & Directorate-General for Energy and Transport, EU-US Second Aviation Forum on 
Liberalisation and Labour, Executive Summary (Brussels, 22-23 June 2009), online: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/transport/air/events/doc/2009_06_22_executive_summary.pdf> 
[Commission, Second Labour Forum]. 
555 Ibid. 
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addressed by further liberalization.556 Yet in exploring particular intra-firm 
and international responses to transnational labor concerns, the Forum was 
unable to generate any real positive legal commitments to accommodate party 
interests.557 Given the current deadlock of the industry’s most organized 
stakeholders and the recalcitrance to reform of the ownership and control rules 
in the US legislature, it appears that changes to the institutional framework 
over the transatlantic are far from finished, even as the EU-US negotiations 
themselves have reached their conclusion. 
 
4. BROADER REFORMS: MULTILATERAL AND PLURILATERAL INITIATIVES FOR 
A NEW ORDER OF THE AIR 
 
The transatlantic is not the only stage reflecting the general shifts in thought 
from localized bilateral to globalized multilateral air transport markets. 
Beginning in the late 1980s, multilateralism – in both its global and regional 
variations – has found renewed interest among a number of states, with the US 
and the EU increasingly asserting their policy leadership in the first decade of 
the 21st century. In all but one instance (the first), these proposals have been 
sector specific in nature, building on the collective momentum of a number of 
developments to advance an alternative regulatory mechanism to the 
bilateral/national system. Nevertheless, the process remains far from fixed. 
The following analyzes the efforts to multilateralize or plurilateralize air 
transport regulation within a liberal context, first by evaluating a set of 
                                                
556 Ibid. 
557 See generally ibid. 
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individual initiatives for multi-/plurilateral liberalization and then discussing 
these developments in the context of an emerging core/periphery relationship. 
 
4.1. Global Scripts in Multilateral and Plurilateral Initiatives 
 
4.1.1. A GATS Approach to Air Transport 
 
The first proposal for a global multilateral approach to air services regulation 
since ICAO’s failed attempt in the 1940s and 1950s came not from ICAO but 
from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). As part of the 
Uruguay Round negotiations, GATT formed a Group of Negotiations on 
Services (GNS) to determine whether services could be liberalized consistent 
with GATT-like norms and ultimately resulting in the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS) within the new World Trade Organization.558 
 Originally, the GNS had included air services within the scope of its 
work. This proposal confronted an industry with a singularly high level of 
strictness in reciprocity with the rather blunt equalizers of most favored nation 
(MFN) and national treatment.559 For many, the universal application of the 
MFN and national treatment principles seemed inimical (as it continues to do) 
to the deep-seated regulatory rules that have governed the system for so long. 
                                                
558 The GNS was constituted out of Part II of the Punta del Este Ministerial Declaration of 20 
September 1986 constituting the Uruguay Round. See generally e.g. A. Jane Bradley, 
“Intellectual Property Rights, Investment, and Trade in Services in the Uruguay Round: 
Laying the Foundations” (1987) 23 Stan. J. Int’l L. 57 (discussing the lead-up to Uruguay and 
including the Ministerial Declaration as an Appendix to the article). For the result of the 
discussions, see generally General Agreement on Trade in Services [GATS]. 
559 The Organization has summarized its organizing principles as follows: non-discrimination 
(including MFN and national treatment); (gradually) lowering barriers to trade; binding and 
transparent commitments; promoting fair competition; and encouraging development. WTO, 
Understanding the WTO, 3rd ed (World Trade Organization: Geneva, 2004) at 10-13. 
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This is true not only of the exactness of exchange, but also of principles such 
as the near universal reservation of cabotage as well as specific programs such 
as the US’ CRAF.560 Also, beyond the general commitments of MFN and 
transparency, market access and national treatment issues require specific 
commitments from each member state.561 As opponents to GATS-type 
regulation point out, these asymmetric commitments add little substantive 
value to the transparency of the system while seriously disadvantaging airlines 
in states that do substantially open their markets.562 Experts have proposed 
adopting a “conditional” MFN principle, which would apply each nation’s 
most favorable terms only to states that are willing to reciprocate that 
exchange, to address such a problem.563 This would eliminate the problem of 
                                                
560 See e.g. Daniel M. Kasper, Deregulation and Globalization: Liberalizing International 
Trade in Services (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1988) at 95-
100. Kasper notes, inter alia, the difficulty of getting industry and domestic political support 
for such a proposal. Also, the system of exchange is much like that proposed at ICAO during 
the 1940s, and it should be little surprise that a more entrenched system found it equally as 
hard to agree to a similar set of norms. See e.g. infra note 566 (noting that ICAO had 
mentioned this point in its discussions with the GNS). For an analysis critical of many of these 
concerns – particularly labor and CRAF-related arguments – see generally Hindley, supra 
note 103 at c. 4.; Kasper, ibid. at 100-04. Specifically, GATS requires that “each Member 
shall accord services and service suppliers of any other Member treatment no less favourable 
than that provided for under the terms, limitations and conditions agreed and specified in its 
Schedule.” GATS, supra note 558, art. XVII(1).See Kasper, ibid., at 100-01 (identifying the 
following practices in international air transport as conflicting with the principle of national 
treatment: practices in relation to the offering of commercial services, establishing offices, and 
providing ‘self-handling’, i.e. allowing a carrier to provide its own ground-handling services; 
in relation to charter services, a right of first refusal to provide charter service; government 
requirements that all official government travel must be carried by national airlines (both 
generally and for the purposes of supporting a reserve fleet); and route discrimination, 
especially in relation to cabotage traffic). Chicago Convention, supra note 24, art. 7. See also 
Statement of Adolf Berle to the Second Plenary Session in US Dept of State, Proceedings, 
supra note 2 at 61. Daniel Kasper acknowledged this conflict, noting that “[a]pplying the 
national treatment principle to all aspects of air services would raise thorny – perhaps 
intractable – legal and conceptual problems.” Kasper, ibid. at 100. 
561 GATS, ibid., arts. XVI-XVII. 
562 See e.g. OECD, 2002 Revision, supra note 52 at 27, paras. 22-23. 
563 See e.g. Kasper, supra note 560 at 109-11, 117-21. In terms of reciprocity, making MFN 
conditional has the effect of moving it from the sphere of diffuse reciprocity to the sphere of 
specific reciprocity. Keohane, supra note 342 at 4. 
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asymmetric exchange; however, lack of support has thus far relegated the 
proposal to a world of ideas. 
 Faced with the choice between two contrasting systems, many states 
and the industry at large chose to continue with bilateralism or limited forms 
of context-specific multilateralism rather than risk the uncertainties of a 
sudden shift to a new regulatory paradigm. There are, of course, proponents 
for GATS-like regulation, many of whom see GATS as a welcome means of 
overcoming a system that has become increasingly antiquated, even if the idea 
of a universal trade in air transport services has come before its time.564 Yet 
ultimately air transport was placed in Annex II of the GATS, exempting the 
“hard” rights related to traffic rights and covering only a limited number of 
“soft” rights, including aircraft repair maintenance, repair and overhaul 
(MRO), the selling and marketing of air transport services, and computer 
reservation systems (CRS) services.565 The Annex also provides for a periodic 
review of air transport commitments, with a view to evaluating the possibility 
of further liberalization under GATS, taking place no later than every five 
years after the entry into force of the agreement.566 So far, despite two review 
                                                
564 For more favorable reviews of a GATS-based approach, see e.g. Hindley, supra note 103; 
Henri A. Wassenbergh, “The Application of International Trade Principles to Air Transport” 
(1987) 12 Air L. 84; Yun Zhao, “Liberalization of Air Transport Services Under the 
Framework of the WTO: Confronting the Challenge of the Twenty-First Century” (2003) 8 
Asian Yearbook Int’l L. 3. See also ICC, supra note 8 at 6 (and cited in infra note 1218). 
565 The Annex on Air Transport Services specifically excludes traffic rights and “services 
directly related to the exercise of traffic rights” from the Agreement GATS, supra note 558, 
Annex on Air Transport Services, art. 2(a)-(b). For the provisions governing sales, MRO and 
CRS services, see ibid. art. 3(a)-(c). 
566 Ibid. art. 5. There have been two reviews thus far, the first between 2000 and 2003, while 
the second is ongoing. See generally WTO “Services: Transport – Air Transport”, online: 
<https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/transport_e/transport_air_e.htm>. The WTO 
has published two books of background documentation, one for each five-year period 
preceding review. See generally WTO, Air Transport and the GATS: Documentation for the 
First Air Transport Review Under the General Agreement on Trade in Services 1995-2000 in 
Review (Geneva: WTO Publications, 2006); WTO, Air Transport and the GATS: 
Documentation for the Second Air Transport Review Under the General Agreement on Trade 
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periods, the GATS approach has not made any concrete headway into the core 
of “hard” rights. 
 
4.1.2. The International Civil Aviation Organization 
 
While the movement towards a GATS-type approach has stagnated, ICAO has 
reasserted its role as a discursive forum for progressive multilateral regulatory 
reform. This was not always the case. ICAO’s initial response to deregulation 
had been to reaffirm the ratemaking system in a response addressed as much 
to the instrumentalities of the postwar order as to American unilateralism.567 
However, as liberalization diffused into an increasingly acceptable 
proposition, ICAO has since taken a more assertive role and positive stance in 
the global discussion of liberalization. 
 Part of this newfound assertiveness came from what ICAO appears to 
have taken to be challenges by the GNS to its role in the air transport system. 
Reacting to the GNS’ initial proposals (which had not included the 
Organization in its deliberations), ICAO issued a number of positive 
statements, distancing air transport from the general service sector as not just 
another industry, drawing attention to the number and particularity of bilateral 
agreements, the previous failures at multilateralism, and the rejection of 
GATT concepts for alternative norms, and asserting its role as the appropriate 
agency for reform, one with the “mandate … experience and expertise in a 
                                                
in Services 2000-2005 in Review (Geneva: WTO Publications, 2007), vol. 1. There are also 
two addenda to the 2000-2005 review. See WTO, “Services: Transport – Air Transport: 
Second Review”, online: 
<https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/transport_e/review2_e.htm>. 
567 See e.g. Magdalénat, supra note 397 at 98 (noting the 2nd Worldwide Air Transport 
Conference’s role in confirming IATA’s role in tariff regulation). 
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wide range of air transport matters – technical, economic and legal.”568 Its 
success in this effort can be judged from the reception of its subsequent 
actions designed to develop a positive agenda as an agent of change. 
 The first step towards building this positive agenda was to convene a 
multilateral Worldwide Air Transport Colloquium in 1992.569 While a 
somewhat cautious reentry into the field of commercial air transport, the 
Colloquium served as a diagnostic of the strengths and weaknesses of various 
bilateral and multilateral approaches to regulation – it was not designed to 
produce any new legal considerations or to preference a particular set of 
institutions.570 The forum was nevertheless a watershed for its frank, open, and 
informative discussion of concepts and recent events concerning the industry: 
it identified the concerns of several groups with a GATS-type approach to air 
                                                
568 Statement by the International Civil Aviation Organization on the Occasion of the 
Ministerial Meeting of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Montreal, 5-8 December 
1988) in ICAO, News Release, “GATT Apprised of ICAO Views on Air Transport Services” 
(5 December 1988), online: <http://legacy.icao.int/icao/en/nr/1988/pio198814_e.pdf>. ICAO 
went on to note that it would nevertheless “continue to co-operate with GATT and the GNS in 
its trade in services discussions in order that ICAO’s views and concerns and the particular 
features of the international air transport sector are properly taken into account by GATT and 
the GNS.” Ibid. [emphasis added]. For the Assembly’s official position, see ICAO, “Assembly 
Resolution A26-14 on Air Transport Related Activities by Other International Bodies 
Interested in Trade in Services” in ICAO, Resolutions Adopted by the Assembly and Index to 
Documentation, 266h Session, Montreal, 23 September – 10 October 1986, ICAO Doc. 9495 
(1986) at 74; ICAO, “Assembly Resolution A27-14 on Trade in Services” in ICAO, 
Resolutions Adopted by the Assembly and Index to Documentation, 27th Session, Montreal, 19 
September – 6 October 1989, ICAO Doc. 9551 (1989). See also Gunther, supra note 289 at 
271 (noting that rather than “throwing down the gauntlet” GNS had simply been driven by a 
non-exclusionary agenda of its own). For its part, the Council on Trade in Services conferred 
observer status on ICAO in 1998. See Lelieur, supra note 52 at 143-44. 
569 See Ruwantissa I.R. Abeyratne, “The Air Traffic Rights Debate – A Legal Study” (1993) 
18-1 Ann. Air & Sp. L. 3 at 4 (noting that “[t]he Colloquium was a seminal event in the annals 
of ICAO in that it was to be the first global review of the regulation of air transport since the 
adoption of the Chicago Convention in 1944 and subsequent efforts to develop a multilateral 
structure to apply to international air services.”) [Abeyratne, “Air Traffic Rights”]. 
570 See ibid. at 3-6, 15. 
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transport;571 it also resulted in further ICAO initiatives, this time aimed at 
identifying alternative control mechanisms and guiding substantive change. 
 The most important initiatives have been two global conferences: the 
Fourth and Fifth Worldwide Air Transport Conference, held in 1994 and 2003, 
respectively. The Fourth Air Transport Conference built upon the issues 
identified at the Colloquium, as well as the work of a Group of Experts on 
Future Regulatory Arrangements, appointed by ICAO in the two years 
between the Colloquium and the Conference to evaluate both the present state 
of affairs and the possibilities for regulatory change.572 In the area of future 
regulatory content, the Conference evaluated a number of issues, including the 
objectives of regulation (developed around the primary objectives of 
participation and adaptation discussed in Chapter 1),573 concerns over market 
access and ownership and control, safeguards, “structural impediments” 
involving subsidies and infrastructural constraints, and broader issues related 
to the operating and business environment.574 As might be expected, the 
Conference drew a variety of opinions, resulting in the conclusion that the 
global regulatory framework would – and could – remain an amalgamation of 
bilateral and multilateral orders. 
                                                
571 Ibid. at 37-38 (and noting at least two speakers’ (Dr. Gunter Eser, then IATA’s Director 
General, and Vijay Poonoosamy) explicit preference for ICAO). Cf. the views of Mr. Gary 
Sampson, Director of the GNS Division of GATT in ibid. at 38. 
572 See e.g. Vijay Poonosamy, “Developing Countries in the Wake of Aeropolitical Changes” 
(1994) 19-2 Ann. Air & Sp. L. 589 at 598-601 (noting the composition of the body 
(Abdeljaouad Daoudi (Morocco); Robert Esperou (France); Ali Ghandour (Jordan); John Kerr 
(Australia); Juan Pablo Langlois (Chile); Aruna Mascarenhas (India); Vijay Poonosamy 
(Mauritius); Hans Raben (Netherlands); Kenneth Rattray (Jamaica); Mathew Samuel 
(Singapore); Jeffrey Shane (USA); Sir Gil Thompson (UK)), the topics of and assumptions 
underlying the debate, and the dates of the meetings (17-19 November 1993 and 22-24 
November 1993)); ICAO, Report AT/Conf 4, supra note 16. 
573 Supra notes 16-18 (also noting three lesser objectives: enhancement, simplification, and 
flexibility). Compare this with Ruggie’s dichotomy between norm-governed and norm-
transforming change in Ruggie, “Embedded Liberalism”, supra note 4 at 404-13. 
574 See supra note 569. See also e.g. Poonosamy, supra note 572 at 603-19. 
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 It was the Fifth Air Transport Conference that represents a true 
transformation of approaches to the regulatory order.575 Part of this 
transformation reflects nearly a decade of regulatory change in all parts of the 
globe. Unlike in 1992 or 1994, it is clear from the presentations made by the 
stakeholders present at the Conference that all had, in the nine years between 
the two Conferences, experienced some degree of liberalization in one context 
or another.576 Much of the discussion also centered on the positive 
contributions made by ICAO to the liberalization agenda.577 Principal among 
these was the development of the “principal place of business [and permanent 
residence]” and “effective regulatory control”578 criteria as an alternative to 
the traditional substantial ownership and effective control provision. These 
provisions had developed out of the work of ICAO’s Air Transport Regulation 
Panel, which had recommended replacing nationality rules with a principal 
place of business plus “a strong link” in 1997, and further work done by the 
ICAO Secretariat and the Panel from 2001 until the Conference.579 They are 
analyzed further in Chapter 5. 
                                                
575 Former IATA Director General Giovanni Bisignani has described it as “a shift in 
government thinking from discussing whether liberalization was needed to identifying ways to 
make it happen”. Giovanni Bisignani (Speech at Agenda for Freedom Summit, Montebello, 
Canada, 15 November 2009), online: <http://www.iata.org/pressroom/speeches/pages/2009-
11-15-01.aspx>. 
576 See e.g. ICAO Secretariat, Background and Overview of Conference Task, ICAO Doc. 
ATConf/5-WP/4 (11 February 2003); ICAO Secretariat, Case Studies on Liberalization, 
ICAO Doc. ATConf/5-WP/5 (17 February 2003). 
577 The agenda for the Conference included an examination of key regulatory issues (including 
ownership and control, market access, fair competition and safeguards, consumer interests, 
product distribution, dispute resolution, and transparency), a review of a template air services 
agreement for bilateral, regional and plurilateral liberalization, and the consideration of a 
global framework for liberalization (including ICAO’s role in the process). See generally 
ICAO, Consolidated Conclusions AT/Conf 5, supra note 10. 
578 Ibid. at 3-5, Agenda Item 2.1. See also generally below at 331-39. 
579 The work of the Air Transport Regulation Panel (from 1997-2002) is discussed as the basis 
for work on participation and preferential measures. See infra notes 1097-1103 and 
accompanying text. See also Lelieur, supra note 52 at 145-47. 
 188 
 Another outcome of these events was that they made transparent the 
wide variety of opinions with respect to liberalization generally and 
multilateralism in particular. Reports of the Colloquium in 1992 note a rather 
intense divide over liberalization in any form, with delegates from, inter alia, 
Japan and India expressing their concern over unleashing an economic “law of 
the jungle”, particularly in the face of the new US mega-carriers, while others 
like Singapore extolled the virtues of liberalizing market access and 
competition as a driver of efficiency in the system.580 Beyond the transatlantic, 
the comment most representative of many countries’ concerns over 
liberalization is perhaps that of Ali Ghandour from Jordan, who noted in 1992 
that: 
 
                                                
580 See Abeyratne, “Air Traffic Rights”, supra note 569 at 10-11 (noting then-Chairman of 
Japan Airlines Susumu Yamaji’s comments that “[m]y conversation is supporting evidence 
that American mega-carriers have established an advantageous position over foreign carriers 
in the international market by offering frequent flier and hub-and-spoke systems. Those 
programs become doubly effective through integration with their huge domestic market, 
which provides mega-carriers with 70 to 80% of their revenue. On the other hand, although 
foreign carriers can get some access to the US domestic market through code-sharing 
arrangements or marketing cooperation with smaller domestic carriers, it is quite impossible 
to secure the same competitive level as the mega-carriers. […] Most Asian countries, 
including Japan, are not in a position to accept the sort of “law of the jungle” competition in 
which, I am sure, the strong mega-carriers would be the only survivors in control of the 
market and the consumer. I cannot think of any country which will allow the loss of their 
airline to excessive freedom of competition, for in allowing so, they would be losing their own 
independent access to third and fourth freedom transport. If liberalization abandons the 
adjustment of difference in competitive ability among carriers, it will result in the demise of 
the smaller carriers.”) & 11-13 (quoting Air India’s Aruna Mascarenhas as noting that 
“[n]ational interest has now led some of the larger countries whose airlines are positioned to 
dominate the industry, to push for liberalization, and to “go beyond” the bilateral system”, that 
“[t]he point is that national sovereignty and national pride are as relevant today as they were 
in 1944. And governments need airlines, almost as much as airlines need governments.” and 
“[i]f one were to pick horses for courses, the multilateral is an obvious choice for the one or 
two countries in the world who have strong airlines but limited home markets and who have 
very little left to offer in return for additional rights under a bilateral exchange. Nor 
surprisingly, Singapore, which typifies this category, is amongst the strongest supporters of a 
global multilateral. Conversely, bilateralism would appeal to a vast majority of countries like 
India, with substantial markets but whose airlines are at a disadvantage in terms of size and 
staying power in a global free-for-all.”). 
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[t]he bilateral country-to-country approach, which served the 
world well under given prolonged circumstances, is now 
deemed to have outlived its purpose…with the U.S. and 
European markets accounting for two thirds of the world’s 
aviation market, the world looks in eagerness and anxiety to the 
future course of development. The Americans are in position, 
as they always have been, and the Europeans in great haste 
have to organize amongst themselves multilaterally and 
negotiate with the United States en bloc bilaterally.581  
 
This ambivalence to liberalization seems to have carried through in both 
Conferences, although it is also obvious that ICAO’s work between the two 
Conferences had done much to familiarize the parties with the more universal 
alternative organizing principles.582 
 One point that becomes apparent in the records of both Conferences is 
a notably higher comfort level with regional models of liberalization. This is 
certainly true of the Conference in 1994, where the conclusions expressly 
mention such a preference.583 While not expressly stated in the conclusions 
                                                
581 Ibid. at 9. See also Poonosamy, supra note 572 at 621-22 (discussing competitiveness and 
mature markets as rationales for liberalization, questioning the “openness” of the policies and 
the propriety of such types of policies for states that consider air transport primarily a public 
utility). 
582 See e.g. ICAO, Report AT/Conf 4, supra note 16 at 21-25; Stefanie Hoerstke, “Air Carrier 
Ownership and Control Revisited at the Fifth Worldwide ICAO Air Transport Conference” 
(2003) 28 Ann. Air & Sp. L. 19 (providing an excellent summary of the different positions 
taken at the Fifth Worldwide Air Transport Conference in 2003). 
583 It is worth reproducing the relevant section of the Report here: 
 
There was broad support for the idea that the traditional ownership and control criteria 
could be broadened to include ownership and control within a pre-defined group of 
States, which could be either parties to an agreement on market access as outlines in 
the first proposed broadened criteria  […] or, in a variant based on the “community of 
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drawn at the 2003 Conference, the continued advocacy of a multi-path 
approach, coupled with the statements of a number of groups suggest that 
regionalism remains a preferred vehicle for dealing with the world.584 The 
continued importance of regionalism is also seen in movements in Asia, 
including APEC. 
 
4.1.3. MALIAT: An APEC Plurilateral Initiative 
 
Plurilateralism also found a revitalized platform on which to stand. APEC’s 
MALIAT, or the Kona Agreement, negotiated from 31 October to 2 
November 2000, signed at Washington D.C. on 1 May 2001 by the United 
States, Brunei Darussalam, Chile, New Zealand, and Singapore, and entered 
into force on 21 December 2001, represents a first concrete step towards a 
regime “beyond” nationality.585 
 MALIAT is essentially a plurilateral open skies regime, open to APEC 
member economies, including a grant of fifth freedom passenger rights and 
                                                
interest” concept in Assembly Resolution A24-12, could also be any regional economic 
or other predefined grouping. 
 
A substantial number of States expressed reservations concerning the second proposed 
broadened criterion […], that of “headquarters central administration or principal place 
of business” in the designating State. This criterion was perceived as a means of 
securing market access by indirect means and was phrased in terms which were vague 
and imprecise; it could therefore lead to abuses and encourage “flags of convenience” 
in air transport with consequent adverse safety and social effects. 
 
ICAO, Report AT/Conf 4, ibid. at 23-24, paras. 2.3.5.2-.5.3. Compare this with the discussions 
in 1944 above at 99-103. 
584 See e.g. Hoerstke, supra note 582. 
585 Multilateral Agreement on the Liberalization of International Air Transportation, done at 
Washington, D.C., 1 May 2001 [MALIAT]. For an overview, see generally “Multilateral 
Agreement on the Liberalization of International Air Transportation”, online: MALIAT 
<http://www.maliat.govt.nz/>. 
 191 
seventh freedom rights for all-cargo services.586 MALIAT’s central innovation 
is a modified ownership and control rule, replacing national ownership 
requirements with the airline’s place of incorporation and principal place of 
business.587 It retains the traditional nationality requirements for effective 
control, and addresses the concern over problems of “flags of convenience” 
and regulatory evasion by permitting the state whose nationals own a foreign 
airline to suspend or revoke its permission to operate to that country.588 A 
more radical departure is found in the Protocol to the Agreement, negotiated in 
conjunction with MALIAT itself and entering into force on the same date, 
which exchanges seventh freedom and cabotage traffic rights for passenger 
and combination services.589 A US supplied initiative, it represents in many 
respects a first step towards regulatory innovation in line with the US’ general 
policy directives. 
 Yet while MALIAT represents an innovation in regulatory product, it 
has found few buyers. A list of signatories demonstrates its limitations: since 
signature, only six states – Chile, Cook Islands, Mongolia, Peru, Samoa, and 
Tonga – have acceded to the Agreement.590 Of these, Peru withdrew in 
January 2005 and Mongolia has limited its application to all-cargo services (an 
option introduced by amendment in 2004 as Article 15 bis).591 The Protocol 
                                                
586 See Havel, Beyond Open Skies, supra note 10 at 53-54. 
587 See MALIAT, supra note 585, art. 3(2)(b).  
588 Ibid., art. 3(2)(a); art. 4(1)(a)-(b). Cf. above at 99-103 (discussing ownership and control in 
the context of ICAO’s early attempts at multilateralism). 
589 See generally Protocol to the Multilateral Agreement on the Liberalization of International 
Air Transportation, done at Washington D.C., 1 May 2001, art. 2 [MALIAT Protocol]. 
590 “Country Matrix”, online: MALIAT <http://www.maliat.govt.nz/country/matrix.shtml>. 
591 Ibid.; “Other Issues”, online: MALIAT <http://www.maliat.govt.nz/other/index.php> 
(providing a background to the amendment and the text of Article 15 bis). See also Tan, 
“Prospects for ASAM”, supra note 44 at 260-61. 
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has had even less success: presently, only Brunei, Chile, Cook Islands, New 
Zealand and Singapore are signatories, with Chile and New Zealand being the 
only states with any capacity to generate domestic traffic.592 
 There are at least two explanations for MALIAT’s failure to generate 
any real interest as a plurilateral initiative. On the one hand, its slightly 
enhanced open skies regime has not generated any significant traffic beyond 
that to and from the United States. According to Paul Fitzgerald, as of May 
2010, of the four most important members – Chile, New Zealand, Singapore 
and the US –, other than services to the US, only Singapore-New Zealand 
receives daily service and there was no daily non-stop between Chile and New 
Zealand and no direct service between Chile and Singapore.593 Many of the 
other APEC member economies either have open skies agreements with the 
US, or are not willing or yet ready to liberalize.594 There is thus very little 
value added to present conditions by accession. On the other hand, there are 
considerable issues regarding the disparities in the reciprocity of exchange and 
industrial competitiveness between countries within the region – a point of 
fact emphasized by Australia’s concerns over granting fifth freedom rights to 
                                                
592 Ibid.; Paul Fitzgerald “The Future of MALIAT” (Presentation to the International 
Conference on Air Transport, Air Law & Regulation, Singapore Aviation Academy, 
Singapore, 24-26 May 2010) at sl. 14, online: Centre for International Law 
<http://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/Focus-on-Asia_Paul-Fitzgerald.pdf>. 
593 Fitzgerald, ibid. at sl. 13 (noting the only provider at the time was SIA). Jetstar Asia has 
since launched a daily flight to Auckland. See Susie Nordqvist & Grant Bradley, “Jetstar 
Launches Daily AKL-Singapore Flights” New Zealand Herald (9 June 2010), online: 
<http://www.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/article.cfm?c_id=3&objectid=10650710>. 
594 See e.g. Tan, “Horizontal Mandate”, supra note 168 at 435-39, especially at 439 (noting 
that “[t]he reality, of course, is that the USA would insist on its preferred policies through 
bilateral negotiation in any event, whether or not MALIAT existed. Hence, the aversion to 
MALIAT may have little to do with the USA after all. Evidently, there are States which are 
willing to grant the USA the concessions it demands, but not the same to other MALIAT 
parties. This explains why many countries which already have open-skies agreements with the 
USA (and there are no less than a dozen of these in the region) are not in a hurry to accord 
each other such advantages.”). 
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competitive carriers such as Singapore Airlines.595 This might change with the 
development of an ASEAN, or even an East Asian, “community” carrier, as 
MALIAT would then allow airlines from ASEAN to expand the available pool 
of financial resources while retaining market access rights to the United 
States, New Zealand, several South American states, as well as other potential 
signatories an expanded market base might attract. 
 
4.1.4. The EU-US Agreement as Plurilateral Initiative 
 
The other significant plurilateral initiative developed thus far is that 
contemplated under the EU-US Air Transport Agreement. Both First Stage 
and Second Stage Agreements grant the Joint Committee the right to consider 
the “conditions and procedures, including any necessary amendments to this 
Agreement, that would be required for additional third countries to accede to 
this Agreement”.596 The Agreements also contemplate US or EU ownership 
and control of third party airlines, waiving each entity’s right to revoke or 
suspend services when an airline is owned by any of the parties, and to waive 
the effective control requirement with respect to a set of states, including a US 
waiver with respect to Community ownership within the ECAA (including 
EEA members and Switzerland) and with respect to African states which have 
signed an open skies agreement with the United States at the time of the 
                                                
595 See Tan, “Horizontal Mandate”, ibid. at 239; Tan, “Prospects for ASAM”, supra note 44 at 
261 (linking Australia’s refusal to join MALIAT to Singapore’s participation). 
596 EC-US First Stage Agreement, supra note 536, art. 18(5); EU-US Second Stage Agreement, 
supra note 536, art. 5 (amending art. 18, para. 5 (tasking the Joint Committee to continue 
work to this end)). It also indicates that the interest in extending the terms of agreement is 
based in the particular goal of maximizing “the benefits for consumers, airlines, labour, and 
communities on both sides of the Atlantic”. Ibid. 
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Agreement, and a joint waiver with respect to third parties determined by the 
Joint Committee to have a record of cooperation with the two parties.597 
 Yet the Second Stage Agreement fails to achieve a number of 
objectives necessary to function as a global plurilateral agreement.598 
Critically, the parties’ failure to meaningfully transcend the restrictions 
regulating ownership and control removes the principal incentive that might 
otherwise draw in other major economies such as Brazil, Russia, India, or 
China. Indeed, without such fundamental changes the Agreement is to some 
states like South Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia that have sought to limit the 
impact of the horizontal mandate (through restrictions on, e.g., the number of 
designations)599 a second best option to negotiating bilaterally with the two 
aviation powers. The Agreement must also now compete with several other 
new regulatory instruments, such as IATA’s Agenda for Freedom and a US-
sponsored proposal for a multilateral agreement on ownership and control put 
forward at the ICAO Assembly’s 37th Session in 2010,600 both of which 
introduce a degree of separation between the issues concerning ownership and 
control and those concerning traffic rights. 
 
4.1.5. The 2010 US Draft of a Multilateral Convention on Foreign 
Investment in Airlines 
 
                                                
597 See EC-US First Stage Agreement, ibid., Annex 4, art. 2; EU-US Second Stage Agreement, 
ibid., Annex 6. 
598 As in the bilateral context, its basic failure is tied to its failure to move “beyond” open 
skies. See generally above at 174-80. 
599 On this see e.g. Tan, “Singapore’s Agreements”, supra note 519 at 354-56; above at 169-
70 (distinguishing between policies designed to remove free rider issues from other, strategic 
negotiation policies). 
600 See below at 194-97 & 204-07. 
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In 2010, the US reasserted its policy leadership by proposing a multilateral 
treaty on the ownership and control of airlines during the ICAO Assembly’s 
37th Session.601 Building on ICAO’s work from the Fifth Air Transport 
Conference, the EU-US Air Transport Agreement, IATA’s Agenda for 
Freedom, as well as through its own solicitation of comments, the US offered 
a Draft of a Multilateral Convention on Foreign Investment in Airlines for the 
members’ consideration.602 
 The Draft Convention incorporates two distinct initiatives. Its core 
consists of a reciprocal waiver of the right to revoke, suspend, or otherwise 
limit the rights of another party’s authorized carrier under an existing 
agreement where either the ownership or effective economic control of the 
carrier become vested in non-nationals, so long as its principal place of 
business is in and regulatory control remains with the designating state.603  
This right is subject to two qualifications.604 First, all parties involved must be 
signatories of the Convention.605 Second, each state party involved – the 
designating state, the authorizing state, and the state(s) whose nationals invest 
in the airline – must inscribe all of the others in a Partner List A.606 The 
Convention provides for a Depositary to maintain each party’s Partner List, 
which is to make every List collectively available to the parties, including 
                                                
601 United States, Facilitating Airline Access to International Capital Markets, ICAO Doc. 
A37-WP/190, EC/12 (13 September 2010). 
602 Multilateral Convention on Foreign Investment in Airlines, Revised Discussion Draft (10 
September 2009) in ibid., Appendix [Draft Multilateral on Investment]. 
603 Ibid., art. 2. 
604 See generally e.g. Havel & Sanchez, “Lex Aviatica”, supra note 21 at 665-67. The authors 
criticize the agreement for not going far enough. In their estimation, the agreement should 
contain a simple multilateral exchange of obligations. Ibid. at 667. 
605 Draft Multilateral on Investment, supra note 602, art. 2. 
606 Ibid. 
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online.607 Thus, if Singapore Airlines operates to Australia from Singapore as 
a designated carrier under the Singapore-Australia air transport agreement, it 
would not risk losing its rights if it were subsequently acquired or controlled 
by German nationals, so long as Australia, Singapore, and Germany are all 
parties to the Agreement and had each included the others in their Partner List 
A and Singapore Airlines continued to be operated from and regulated by 
Singapore. Moreover, each state party may also add or delete partners from 
their List, effective thirty days or the end of the IATA traffic season (one 
year), respectively, from notification.608 Unlike MALIAT, state parties may 
also include themselves in their Partner Lists, thereby waiving the right to 
limit an authorization where its own nationals become the owner and operator 
of a foreign-based airline, so long as the authorizing state has also included the 
party on its own Partner List.609 Thus, Australian nationals could also acquire 
and continue to operate Singapore Airlines from Singapore where both 
Australia and Singapore are included in both states’ Partner Lists. While it 
could remove these rights, it would take one year to affect the change, and 
would not discriminate against individual carriers. 
 The Draft Convention’s second initiative is a discretionary mechanism 
for reciprocally removing the internal lock of ownership and control, subject 
to the same caveats as the waiver rules. This is done by submitting a Partner 
List B, which lists partner states “as to which it shall not limit on the basis of 
nationality the ownership or control of airlines of that Party by nationals of 
                                                
607 Ibid., art. 6(4). 
608 Ibid., art. 4(2). 
609 Ibid., art. 2(2). 
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one or more of those partners.”610 The partner states are then free to invest in 
the first state’s transport system, provided that the partner states have also 
included the first state on its own Partner List B and the state granting the 
inward investment rights removes the related impediments (if any) in its 
domestic law.611 Unlike the waiver provisions, however, no state party is 
obligated to make use of this instrument.612 
 Despite its forward thinking, the Draft Convention remains open to a 
number of criticisms. For one, while each party must provide a Partner List A, 
it does not have to inscribe anyone in it,613 leading two students of the industry 
to criticize the mechanism, suggesting that interests would best be served by a 
multilateral agreement.614 More damaging to the Convention’s efficacy is the 
non-binding nature of its provisions on the internal lock of ownership and 
control. While removing the external lock of regulation is a necessary step in 
regulatory reform, it is not in itself sufficient to permit the industry’s 
restructuring.615 As Havel and Sanchez note, “[s]o long as states do not 
relinquish their internal moratoria on foreign ownership and control of airlines 
within their territory, even a blizzard of diplomatic waivers of the nationality 
clause will not produce significant pan-regional restructuring.”616 
 
                                                
610 Ibid., art. 4(1)(b). 
611 Ibid., art. 3. 
612 Ibid., art. 5. 
613 See e.g. Havel & Sanchez, “Lex Aviatica”, supra note 21 at 667. 
614 Ibid. 
615 Ibid. 
616 Ibid. at 667-68. See also generally e.g. Havel, Beyond Open Skies, supra note 12 at 135-36, 
548 (noting the “double lock” of the substantial ownership and effective control, the bilateral 
clause providing the external lock and national laws on foreign ownership and control 
providing the internal lock). 
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4.2. From International Markets to Global Aviation Market: Finding a 
Balance 
 
Among the principal observations drawn from all these initiatives, including 
US deregulation and EU integration, is a gradual but as of yet un-crystallized 
shift from a strictly national form of organization to a plurality of 
organizational levels along which a globalizing market might be organized. 
This is true both of the ongoing displacement of the national ownership and 
control clause with alternative forms of recognition, whether regional or 
nationally regulated but globally invested in and potentially managed, and of 
the relaxing of market access beyond what has already been set out in open 
skies.617 Yet the formal uptake of these instruments into a sizable body of 
legal agreements has been less than encouraging. 
 Perhaps the most serious, systemic criticism of efforts thus far is that 
they fail to achieve an appropriate balance in the structure of interests. This is 
true in at least two ways. One imbalance is in the structure of concessions: 
while states are willing to consider a waiver of the nationality provisions with 
respect to other states’ traffic, few seem willing to grant a substantive right of 
establishment to foreign interests in their own market. This imbalance is 
clearly apparent in the legal instruments proposed for global multilateral 
reform, including the Draft Convention on Foreign Investment (discussed 
above) and the Agenda for Freedom (discussed below). In this respect, the 
United States’ position on ownership and control remains at the center of 
global reform.  
                                                
617 In this regard, Chapter 5 offers another lens on both the presence of change and the 
multiformity of its conduits. 
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 A second imbalance lies in the economic geography of interests 
represented. In particular, interests supporting multilateral reform represent 
either financial centers with mature (and thus low growth) and competitive air 
transport markets or small states with competitive airlines at entrenched hubs 
or geographically peripheral states; major emerging markets, including China, 
Brazil, Russia, India, and Indonesia, primary markets for foreign investors but 
also for the very same reasons states concerned with the content and context of 
liberalization, remain virtually absent from initiatives like MALIAT or the 
Agenda for Freedom.618 Whether caused by disinterest or resistance, special 
interests or a national discourse that defines participation in non-economic 
terms, these sorts of agreements have not been received particularly well by 
this growing segment of interest. In this regard, regional integration projects 
along the lines of the EU have replaced national organization; it has absorbed 
and replaced national conceptions of reciprocity and competitiveness with 
regional ones, rather than replaced them with new ideas.619 Yet there may also 
be reasons for preferring access to global financial markets as compared to 
regional ones, a point that Chapter 4 briefly explores with respect to ASEAN 
member states.620 
 
                                                
618 India’s absence from initiatives such as the Agenda for Freedom is particularly surprising 
given its open investment laws in the domestic market. On India’s investment requirements, 
see e.g. Chang, Williams & Hsu, supra note 52 at 162, Table 1. Indeed, India would be a 
primary beneficiary from such an initiative, given the current financial constraints of many of 
its carriers. 
619 Compare this to Australia and the SAMANZ, which has used internal integration to 
support network growth but continues to maintain a particularly national conception of its 
industry as a whole. See generally Australian Government, Flight Path to the Future: 
National Aviation Policy White Paper (Canberra: Department of Infrastructure, Transport, 
Regional Development and Local Government, December 2009). 
620 See generally below at 269-72. See also below at 336-37 (discussing the difference 
between Europe’s concept of the “right of establishment” and that of ICAO and the OECD). 
 200 
5. SPECIAL INTERESTS AND PRIVATE SECTOR INITIATIVES 
 
Airlines also play an intimate role in shaping the demands of regulatory 
reform. Beyond the protectionist lobbying of some national industries to their 
national governments, two structures stand out as particularly influential on 
the shape and pace of regulatory reform. First, airlines use contracts between 
each other to recreate many of the efficiencies of a transnational merger and to 
circumvent (or seek the protection of or exemption from) national and 
international laws. One of the principal cumulative effects of these contractual 
relationships, described in Chapter 1,621 has been the formation and integration 
of the Star Alliance, SkyTeam, and oneworld alliances. Second, through IATA 
and its Agenda for Freedom, airlines have also become directly involved in 
lobbying governments for regulatory change at the international multilateral 
level. This section touches upon these private initiatives and their effects on 
the demand for institutional reform. 
 
5.1. From Inter-Line to On-Line: The Role of Global Alliances 
 
One of the key developments of airline liberalization has been in the area of 
inter-airline cooperation, particularly in the form of alliances. Earlier, this 
study noted that alliances – contractual and inter-corporate relationships 
between airlines of varying degrees – often serve the functions of protecting 
participation by insulating the participating network carrier (often the flag 
carrier) from threatening forms of competition in the bilateral market while at 
                                                
621 See generally above at 23-25. 
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the same time enhancing or maintaining its competitiveness in larger, more 
open international markets. As Chapter 1 covers the general expansion and 
integration of major international airlines into one of the global alliances,622 
the following touches upon the effects alliances have on transaction structures 
and the qualities of the demands for regulations. 
 One of the most important effects of alliance formation is the role it 
has in breaking down the universal system of inter-lining into competing on-
line systems. While individual cooperative relationships can be composed of 
many different elements (including, e.g., ticketing and baggage handling, joint 
ticketing or joint participation in frequent flier programs to more 
comprehensive forms of cooperation in the areas of joint purchasing of 
equipment, joint sales agreements, joint scheduling and tariff determinations 
and ultimately the promotion of a global brand identity),623 on-lining remains 
the central feature of inter-airline cooperation.624 On-lining is achieved 
through codeshare arrangements, involving an agreement between two or 
more airlines to permit one to display its designator code and flight number on 
                                                
622 See generally above at 23-28 & 33-34. 
623 See e.g. US GAO, International Aviation: Airline Alliances Produce Benefits, But Effect on 
Competition is Uncertain (GAO/REC-95-99, April 1995) at cs. 1-2 [GAO, Alliances] 
(identifying “merger”, “investor”, and “marketing + code-share” models of cooperation); 
Havel, Beyond Open Skies, supra note 10 at 201 & 199 (noting that “[a]n alliance can include 
almost any aspect of delivering service to passengers, from fairly rudimentary joint operations 
in ticketing and baggage handling or reciprocal participation in frequent flier programs to the 
most sophisticated network collaboration in codesharing and scheduling operation at 
international hubs (the Star, oneworld and SkyTeam global alliances for example) and even 
(as with the original KLM/Northwest concept) the promotion of a global brand identity.”). See 
also Dempsey, “Fiefdoms”, supra note 63 at 251-80 (identifying the following possible 
features of alliances: ticketing and baggage agreements; joint-fare agreements; reciprocal 
airport agreements; blocked space relationships; computer reservation system joint ventures; 
joint sales offices and telephone centers; e-commerce joint ventures; frequent flyer program 
alliances; traffic and revenue pooling; code-sharing; and antitrust immunity). 
624 See Havel, Beyond Open Skies, supra note 10 at 208. 
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flights operated by another.625 The result creates the appearance of a seamless 
network operated between the two carriers from the point of origin to the point 
of ultimate destination. 
 Seen from the perspective of the cooperating airlines, on-line services 
create a product superior to IATA’s universal interline system. Combined with 
other programs designed to reduce costs and generate revenues, on-lining 
creates a product that is both more convenient (e.g., only one passenger and 
baggage check-in for the entire length of the journey)626 at lower costs than 
any one airline could individually offer.627 Codeshare partners gain a 
competitive advantage in terms of the same information economies and 
principal-agent relationships that have driven consolidation in the US and 
European markets. In terms of the global air services production system, the 
practices of on-lining/codesharing result in fostering competition among the 
three airline alliance groups. This competition between airline systems 
                                                
625 See e.g. GAO, Alliances, supra note 623 at 13 (defining codesharing as “the practice of 
two airlines each placing its two-character designating code (e.g., “NW” for Northwest 
Airlines) on the same flight when listing that flight in computer reservation systems (CRS) 
used by travel agents to book flights.”); Havel, Beyond Open Skies, ibid. at 208-09 (defining 
code-sharing as listing “their separate connective flights in CRS and on e-tickets under a 
single two-letter code identifier, as though the same carrier were providing the entire flight”). 
626 Codesharing has also raised consumer protection issues related to both the display of the 
actual operator (see e.g. Havel, Beyond Open Skies, ibid. at 220-22 (discussing regulations in 
the EC and US)) and the display of information on computer reservation services (see e.g. 
ibid. at 189-94). Since the advent of online reservation systems, both the US and the EU have 
relaxed their supervision of CRS. See US DOT, Computer Reservations System (CRS) 
Regulations, Dkt No OST-97-2881, Final Rule, 14 C.F.R. Part 255, 69 Fed. Reg. 976 (7 
January 2004); EC, Regulation (EC) No 80/2009 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 14 January 2009 on a Code of Conduct for computerized reservation systems and 
repealing Council regulation (EEC) No 2299/89, [2009] O.J. L 35/47. Havel discusses the 
former in Havel, Beyond Open Skies, supra note 10 at 192-94)). 
627 See e.g. Jan Brueckner & W. Tom Whalen, “The Price Effects of International Airline 
Alliances” (2000) 43 J.L. & Econ. 503 (finding alliance partners charge interline fares that are 
on average 25 % below those charged by non-allied partners); Jan Brueckner, “International 
Airfares in the Age of Alliances: The Effects of Codesharing and Antitrust Immunity” (2003) 
85 Rev. Econ. & Stat. 105 (finding that codeshares reduce fares by 8 to 17 %, antitrust 
immunity reduce fares by 13-21%, and a combination of codesharing and antitrust immunity 
reduces fares by 17-30%). 
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provides the minimum level of competition necessary to generate downward 
pressures on price. 
 Taken together with the trends of airline privatization and 
commercialization, the increasing interdependence that both the alliances 
themselves and inter-alliance competition promote can also lead the airlines 
themselves to make (sometimes incomplete) demands for integration through 
cross-border mergers.  The early Northwest/KLM and US Airways/Lufthansa 
alliances provide one example of the critical link between foreign capital in 
supporting a competitive aviation market, while American Airlines is 
presently courting fellow oneworld member British Airways as a possible 
source of equity investment.628 However, there are still some limits to what 
alliances can deliver. Although the general arc of alliance building has been 
                                                
628 See generally supra note 63 (US Airways/Lufthansa, Northwest/KLM, and 
Continental/SAS equity purchases) British Airways had considered investing in US Airways 
in 1992. The GAO summarized the agreement in the following terms: 
 
In late July 1992, British Airways announced it would invest $750 million in US Air. 
The proposed investment would give US Air new equity capital and representation on 
British Airways’ Board of Directors. In exchange, British Airways would receive about 
44 percent of USAir’s total equity, 21 percent of USAir’s voting stock, and 
representation on USAir’s Board of Directors. 
 
The two airlines plan to integrate their services so that their jointly operated services 
will be competitive with other airlines’ stand-alone services. 
 
The proposed investment has other benefits for the two airlines as well. It would give 
British Airways a secure partnership with a U.S. airline that can feed U.S. passengers 
to its international flights. In addition, the agreement would allow US Air, an airline 
with a very small international route system, to “catch up” with American, Delta, and 
United – airlines that have greatly expanded their international route systems over the 
last few years by purchasing international route authority from struggling U.S. airlines. 
 
GAO, FDI in Airlines, supra note 63 at 25-26 (it is interesting to note the purely commercial 
language used in this description). Ultimately, BA backed out over fears the agreement would 
not be approved in the US. In this regard it is also interesting that both BA and US Airways 
are now potentially co-investors in American. See e.g. “American Airlines and US Airways 




one from a period of trial and error in the 1990s to one of deeper and more 
lasting cooperation centered on the three global alliance brands,629 individual 
airlines will exit an alliance upon merger. The most recent examples come fro 
the US, where Continental left SkyTeam in 2010 to merge with United, 
already a member of a rival global alliance, Star, while US Airways CEO 
Doug Parker has already stated that the airline would leave Star Alliance for 
oneworld if it were to merge with American.630 This last agreement has found 
support from IAG, the holding company of oneworld members British 
Airways and Iberia, as well as United’s CEO Jeff Smisek, who has stated that 
United would not challenge the move.631  
 
5.2. The International Air Transport Association and the ‘Agenda for 
Freedom’ 
 
Undoubtedly the best indicator of the airline industry’s changing opinion 
towards international capital mobility came in 2008 when the industry 
addressed governments directly through the Agenda for Freedom. The Agenda 
                                                
629 See e.g. Havel, Beyond Open Skies, supra note 10 at 163 (noting that “while alliances were 
justifiably criticized in the 1990s as transitory, incapable of creating genuine operating 
efficiencies, anticompetitive, and generally uneven in their performance, a more stable, 
contract-based system of global alliances (comprising Stare Alliance, oneworld, and 
SkyTeam) had emerged by the middle of the first decade of the new century.”). 
630 See e.g. David Koenig, “Continental Airlines Leaves SkyTeam for Star Alliance” USA 
Today (27 October 2009), online: <http://www.usatoday.com/travel/flights/2009-10-27-
continental-star-alliance_N.htm>; Tanja Trejos, “US Airways to Exit Star Alliance if It 
Merges with American Airlines” USA Today (18 July 2012), online: 
<http://travel.usatoday.com/flights/post/2012/07/us-airways-would-exit-star-alliance-if-it-
merges-with-american/806454/1>. 
631 “IAG May Take Stake in Combined U.S. Airline” Reuters (2 September 2012), online: 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/02/us-amr-usairways-iag-
idUSBRE88104Z20120902>; Andrew Parker, “United Backs US Airline Consolidation” 
Financial Times (26 June 2012), online: <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9893fbf4-bf90-11e1-
a476-00144feabdc0.html#axzz25grDLqtI>. 
 205 
for Freedom – IATA’s response to concerns over a fragmented, liberalized but 
nation-bound international air transport markets – remains the industry’s best 
statement of demands for governments to perfect the liberalization process 
globally.632 As part of the Agenda, IATA has actively engaged states in a 
number of ways: it has convened two Summits; it has endorsed a number of 
state practices it sees as “best” (although by no means homogenous) practices; 
and it has developed a (non-binding) Multilateral Statement of Policy 
Principles on liberalization for states to unilaterally adhere to.633 It is the 
Statement of Principles that is of particular interest. 
 The Principles developed by IATA advocate states take unilateral 
action in relaxing existing policy by adopting waivers in the three key areas of 
ownership and control (the freedom to access capital markets), market access 
(the freedom to do business), and price determination (the freedom to price 
services), each made on the basis of reciprocity.634 It simultaneously pushes 
states to adopt the same principles in new legally binding agreements,635 while 
expressly acknowledging that any deviation that would deny a formal 
“equality of opportunity to compete” could be answered by not applying the 
Principles to that state.636 
                                                
632 See Agenda for Freedom, “Agenda for Freedom”, online: <http://www.agenda-for-
freedom.aero/Pages/default.aspx>; Havel & Sanchez, “Lex Aviatica”, supra note 21 at 662-65. 
633 See e.g. Agenda for Freedom, “About”, online: <http://www.agenda-for-
freedom.aero/about/Pages/index.aspx>; Agenda for Freedom, “Meetings”, online: 
<http://www.agenda-for-freedom.aero/meetings/Pages/index.aspx>; Statement of Policy 
Principles Regarding the Implementation of Bilateral Air Services, done at Montebello, 
Québec, Canada, 16 November 2009 [Agenda for Freedom Policy Principles]. 
634 Agenda for Freedom Policy Principles, ibid. arts. 1-3. On the three “freedoms” see IATA, 
Press Release, “Governments Sign Principles for Liberalization – Historic Achievement” (16 
November 2009), online: <http://www.iata.org/pressroom/pr/pages/2009-11-16-01.aspx>. 
635 See generally Agenda for Freedom Policy Principles, ibid. (calling each the “freedom to 
access capital markets”, “freedom to do business”, and “freedom to price services”, 
respectively).  
636 See ibid., arts. 4-5. 
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 The Statement of Policy Principles is most certainly an innovation in 
private demands for legal reform – a globally organized industry lobbying 
governments multilaterally for global regulatory reform.637 While seven states 
(Chile, Malaysia, Panama, Singapore, Switzerland, the United Arab Emirates, 
and the United States) signed and the European Commission endorsed the 
Statement, the Principles had been developed by IATA and governments 
invited by the organization on the premise that each would officially agree to 
the waiver provisions.638 The Statement has also found additional support 
since the Second Agenda for Freedom Summit at Montebello, Canada in 2009 
in the form of signatures by Bahrain, Kuwait, Lebanon and Qatar.639 It is also 
an advance in the discussion of regulatory governance. While not legally 
binding, the commitments contained in the Statement of Principles do have 
value as instruments that influence reputation – at the least non-compliance 
threatens reputational harm.640 
 Still, reputational harm may not be enough to bring about consensus: it 
is certainly hard to measure when compared to the relatively clear statement of 
binding rights and duties contained in a treaty, and the state is anyway likely 
                                                
637 See e.g. Havel & Sanchez, “Lex Aviatica”, supra note 6 at 661-65 (noting such unilateral 
declarations of waiver as one of two “techniques” in developing an emerging “lex aviatica”). 
638 See Agenda for Freedom, “Library”, online: <http://www.agenda-for-
freedom.aero/library/Pages/index.aspx>. 
639 See ibid. 
640 On reputation, see e.g. Andrew T. Guzman, “Reputation and International Law” (2006) 34 
Ga. J. Int’l L. 379; George W. Downs & Michael A. Jones, “Reputation, Compliance, and 
International Law” (2002) 31 J. Legal Studies S95 (noting states maintain multiple 
reputations). For example, there have been some instances of waivers of revocation rights in 
the area of national ownership and control requirements that have required a grant of 
additional operating rights to the waiving state. Particular reference is made to the case of 
Spanish investment in Aerolinas Argentina. See e.g. Mendes de Leon, “A New Phase”, supra 
note 349 at 362. Under the Agenda for Freedom, governments waive the right to make such 
demands. 
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to “comply” where the pay-off set was in his favor.641 Indeed, looking again at 
the structure of national and industrial interests, a pattern fairly similar to 
MALIAT emerges, albeit on a grander scale: on the one hand, there are the US 
and the EU, large markets but mature and consequently with entrenched (if not 
entirely solvent) players and slow growth;642 on the other hand, there are states 
with highly competitive carriers from small states that need access to 
international markets for growth.643 Both sets of states and their representative 
carriers are more interested in outward investment than inward. Absent again 
are larger, populous states with high levels of growth such as Brazil, India, 
Indonesia, and China, states that might be able to take advantage of the time-
sensitive nature of liberalization by “pushing back”644 against it until their 
airlines are better situated to take advantage of the gains. Like the Draft 
Multilateral on Investment, the Policy Principles suffer from a lack of any 
reference to the internal lock of ownership and control liberalization. Again, 
underlying the (global) agreement is an imbalanced politics of (national) 
geography, wealth, and welfare. 
 
                                                
641 On this last point, see e.g. Guzman, ibid. at 384 (noting that “[i]n order to understand the 
reputational consequences of playing “comply or “defect,” it is first necessary to know 
something about the state’s non-reputational payoffs. If the non-reputational payoffs give the 
state an incentive to comply, then it will do so whether or not the treaty obligation is in 
place.”). 
642 Poonosamy, supra note 572 at 622. The author goes on to note that the US candidly 
considers its national interest as the only legitimate objective of US aviation policy. Ibid. at 
622-23. See also Knibb, supra note 21 (noting the US’ position that national interest remains 
paramount in aviation relations). 
643 Perhaps the only exception is Malaysia, which has a fairly sizable domestic market but 
which is otherwise strong competitively and whose low cost carrier, AirAsia, has repeatedly 
lobbied for more access within the region. 
644 The term is taken from the title of a book on regulation in Asia. It is particularly useful in 
that it captures the idea of reaction as both resisting and delaying a process, in this case 
globalization. See generally John Gillespie & Randall Peerenboom, Regulation in Asia: 




At the beginning of the 21st century, discussions of liberalization have taken 
two forms. One is of Liberalization, with a capital “L”, the ideal of a global 
industry with universalized access to capital, knowledge, and markets. The 
other is of liberalizations, the actual multiple processes of negotiating change, 
its plurality signifying the different threads in a tapestry woven together by 
myriad forms of politics and interests. Both states and the industry have 
reached agreement on Liberalization. They have, with few exceptions, failed 
thus far to find a common basis for negotiating the second. 
 Chapter 3 has explored these themes in terms of a set of global events 
and discussions that have shaped liberalization in both its idealized and plural 
forms. Yet other discussions are also taking place. Like the EU and the 
creation of the Single European Aviation Market, such discussions play 
critically into the broader processes of liberalization, even as the role of the 
transatlantic core continues to wane at the beginning of the Asian century. 
They may also be better able to handle the variety of interests that go into 
balancing issues of participation and efficiency. Chapter 4 analyzes the 
processes and state of reform in East Asia as a new and increasingly important 






CHAPTER 4: EAST ASIAN REGIONALISM AS A PILLAR OF INTERNATIONAL 









As a whole, Chapters 2 and 3 focus on the broad legal changes in the 
transition from localized international markets to global aviation market. With 
few exceptions, the transatlantic has been at the historical center of these 
narratives. Ali Ghandour’s observation of the world’s mixture of “eagerness 
and anxiety” in watching the US and EU determine the shape of institutional 
reform portrays this well.645 The same mixture of sentiments must have been 
equally present among third world delegates when LaGuardia questioned 
“whether the people of Europe and the people of my country will see this 
[multilateral agreement on the economic regulation of international air 
transport] translated into action or go into the annals of literature and 
poetry.”646 
 In this regard, one of the starkest changes in the structure of 
contemporary international political economy has been the rise of a number of 
                                                
645 Supra note 581 and accompanying text. 
646 Statement by Fiorello LaGuardia to the Plenary Session of Committees I, III and IV, 
December 1 in US Dept of State, Proceedings, supra note 2 at 494. The text is quoted supra 
notes 241-42 and accompanying text. 
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emerging economies in a relatively short period of time. This is particularly 
true of East Asia. With regional GDP and intra-regional trade shares roughly 
equal to that of North America and Europe, and with regional growth pushing 
trade volumes up, Asian air transport has surpassed its North American and 
European counterparts in many respects.647 It is also true of air transport. 
According to IATA, four of the five largest airlines by market capitalization 
are now based in East Asia, and Asia-Pacific, driven by traffic originating in 
or destined for China, now represents the largest transport market in the 
world.648 Nor have other regions failed to notice this shift to the East. The 
United States officially stated its intention to shift focus to the transpacific in 
its 1995 Policy Statement; the European Union has also noted its interest in 
opening major Asian markets to European traffic.649 Yet underlying growth 
are serious disparities in economic capabilities, in terms of both levels of 
economic development and the relative competitiveness of national air service 
suppliers. Although East Asia will increasingly need to be accommodated in a 
reworking of global aviation institutions, it remains by and large an importer 
of regulatory knowledge. 
 East Asian states have also begun to recognize their collective interest 
in opening and possibly integrating international air transport markets, and to 
collaborate on key regulatory issues facing the region. Chapter 4 takes the 
formal and contextual scripts developed in Chapters 2 and 3 and reframes 
                                                
647 See e.g. supra note 12. 
648 See e.g. ibid.; “Asia is Now World’s Biggest Air Travel Market: IATA” The Guardian (1 
February 2010), online: <http://www.independent.co.uk/travel/news-and-advice/asia-is-now-
worlds-biggest-air-travel-market-iata-1885598.html>. 
649 See US DOT, 1995 Policy Statement, supra note 61 at 591; supra note 527 (quoting the 
Commission’s Communication on external aviation policy). See also Tae Hoon Oum & 
Chunyan Yu, Shaping Air Transport in Asia Pacific (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000) at 1-2 (noting 
1996 as the year the US formally included Asia in its open skies strategy). 
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them in relation to air transport markets in East Asia. In doing so, it 
concentrates on current, rather than historical, structures, an approach 
explained by the relatively late development of East Asian economies. In 
doing so, it frames these developments through four lenses. The first briefly 
links the region to broader historical developments. The second analyzes the 
current, market-based initiatives taking place in the region, presenting 
cooperative efforts to liberalize or integrate services within ASEAN, 
Northeast Asia, and East Asia as a regional unit. The third lens is that of the 
private entity, viewed from the perspective of the new entrant and the 
incumbent airline. Finally, the fourth lens reframes the regional issues back 
within the context of the new global, “globalized” whole. 
 
2. FROM TAKERS TO MAKERS: THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF EAST ASIA IN 
GLOBAL REGULATORY CHANGE 
 
While East Asia currently plays a central role in contemporary air transport, 
this was not always the case. As a whole, Asia remains an inheritor of a legal 
architecture that its members are only now beginning to influence and 
shape.650 Indeed, during the postwar period it was the North Atlantic states 
that retained the greatest power to establish the norms and instruments 
governing a particular activity.651 This scenario has gradually given way to an 
                                                
650 See e.g. Ruggie, “Embedded Liberalism”, supra note 4 at 413-14 (discussing the roles of 
regime makers and regime takers in the embedded liberal system). 
651 See e.g. PICAO, Multilateral 2, supra note 246 at 7-13 (noting the members of the 
subcommittee designed to draft the 2nd Draft Multilateral (Canada, China, United States, 
France, Iraq, Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) and the vote in favor of a resolution to 
adopt the draft (for: Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, the Netherlands, and Norway; 
against: China, India, the United Kingdom, and the United States). 
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increase in the number of states capable of influencing the content of 
international instruments, a rise of the rest that challenges the traditional 
transatlantic approach to global institution building. Yet the increasing focus 
on actors and interests in the region also serves to identify the plurality of 
interests among them. This section briefly turns to highlight this plurality of 
interests, both present and historical, placing them broadly within the global 
scripts discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. 
 
2.1. From Pre-War to Independence 
 
There are two points that distinguish the historical development of East Asia 
from its North American and European counterparts as a whole. First, East 
Asian states were relatively absent from the deliberative processes of 
institutional design. Representation at Chicago, where only China and the 
Philippines were invited as delegates and the Thai Minister in Washington 
invited as an observer,652 offers but one illustration. While both delegations 
operated airlines, China relied on CNAC, a joint venture between the Chinese 
government and Pan American and which the US government supported 
during the Chinese Republic’s war with Japan, while Philippines Air Lines 
(whose government was under US administration prior to the War) would be 
shut down by the Japanese invasion just shortly after its founding.653 Indeed, 
                                                
652 List of Governments and Authorities to Whom Invitations Were Extended in US Dept of 
State, Proceedings, supra note 2 at 13. 
653 CNAC is exemplary of the broader discussions on ownership during PICAO/ICAO 
discussions on multilateralism. The CNAC venture, as well as a similar one involving 
Lufthansa as a foreign partner, used both equity and the division of expertise (as well as air 
mail subsidies) as a means of developing air services within and to/from the country. See 
Leary, supra note 214 at 36 (noting that the Chinese kept two thirds of the ownership interest, 
appointed six of nine directors to the board, and, unlike with CNAC, shared responsibilities 
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only Japan had developed autonomous air transport and aircraft manufacturing 
industries prior to the War, and these industries would be dismantled during 
the American occupation.654 The rest of the territory remained represented by 
Western interests,655 a point which helps explain much of the concern with 
prestige in the postcolonial developing world. 
 Second, East Asian states pursued a plurality of paths as development 
strategies for a national industry. Some states adopted – successfully – the use 
of foreign expertise as a means of developing their own national industries, an 
argument going back at least to Venezuela’s stated position at PICAO.656 At a 
minimum, this meant importing technical expertise to meet labor 
requirements, as Japan Airlines did for a number of decades.657 Early on, 
Philippines Airlines developed close cooperation with TWA, as the latter 
sought to compete with Pan American in the transpacific,658 although later 
                                                
for the administration and operation of the corporation). Discussion over whether to 
nationalize CNAC effectively ended at the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. See ibid. at 83. 
See also generally Wo-Chiang Lin, “The Development of Aviation and Aeronautical Law in 
China” (1931) 2 J. Air L. 159. On the Philippines, see Sampson, supra note 218 at 167. To 
place such practices in the context of global debate, see supra notes 68-69 (discussing foreign 
and joint ownership during the interwar period) & 92-96 and accompanying text (discussing 
ownership and control within ICAO’s discussions on multilateral regulation in the 1940s). 
654 See generally Oum & Yu, supra note 649 at 31-101 (roughly outlining the state (and some 
history) of each state’s development); Grayson Kirk, “Wings Over the Pacific” (1942) 20 
Foreign Affairs 293 (discussing, inter alia, Japan’s air transport system in the context of rising 
military expansion). 
655 Kirk spends a great deal of time discussing the political and economic roles of developing 
air routes to the Pacific colonies. Kirk, ibid. He had also noted the likelihood of its continued 
influence after the war. Ibid. at 299 (noting that “[p]lainly the future development of 
commercial air services in the Pacific will be influenced to a great extent by the character of 
the peace made at the end of the present war. If, for example, an agreement should be reached 
providing for the internationalization of all civil aviation, or if all dependencies were placed 
under the administrative control of a revived League of Nations, the result in either case 
would be to usher in a new era in Pacific aviation, an era in which present lines of 
development would be abruptly terminated. This, however, is unlikely. In all probability the 
peace settlement will not disturb fundamentally the imperial structure of the victor states.”). 
656 See above at 101-02. 
657 See Oum & Yu, supra note 649 at 37 (noting that, in 1955, Japan Airlines’ Japanese pilots 
only operated domestic lines, while in 1982 it employed as many as 200 pilots were foreign). 
658 Sampson, supra note 218 at 167. 
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nationalization and mismanagement would gradually bring the airline into 
bankruptcy in the 1990s. Undoubtedly the deepest links were to those airlines 
in which non-Asian interests held equity or director’s positions in the airline. 
Both Thai Airways International and Malayan Airways (later Malaysian 
Airlines Limited (1963) and Malaysia-Singapore Airlines (1966) before 
splitting into Malaysian Airline System and Singapore Airlines in 1972) were 
for a number of years owned jointly by a mix of national government and 
foreign interests.659 SAS held a minority shareholding (initially 30 percent) of 
Thai from its founding in 1960 until the government nationalized it in 1977.660 
In the case of Malayan Airways, foreign holdings, split between the British 
Overseas Airways Corporation and Qantas, represented a majority – 51 
percent – of the company’s shares.661 Indeed, initially the Federation’s three 
local governments (Malaya, British North Borneo, and Singapore) each held 
only a five percent interest, the remaining portion being sold to local interests 
in Malaya.662 This would change only in 1966, when BOAC and Qantas’ 
collective interest were reduced to just over 36 percent (evenly divided 
between the two airlines), and would be altogether removed upon the split of 
the airline in 1972.663 
                                                
659 See K. Raguraman, “Airlines as Instruments for Nation Building and National Identity: 
Case Study of Malaysia and Singapore” (1997) 4 J. Transp. Geo. 239 at 243-46. 
660 See e.g. Oum & Yu, supra note 649 at 79. 
661 Sing., Legislative Assembly Debates, vol. 4, col. 2692 (16 October 1957) at cols. 2698-99 
(Mr. Francis Thomas) [Sing., Debates]; See also Raguraman, supra note 656 at 245 (also 
noting that foreign ownership was a “bone of contention” in many newly 
independent/developing states. This tension is clearly seen in Rep. Lee Kuan Yew’s 
questioning during the Singapore Legislative Assembly Debates). 
662 Ibid. 
663 Raguraman, supra note 659 at 246 (noting that a capital injection of $15 million bought the 
governments a controlling shareholding (33.74 percent each), with 13.2% remaining with 
BOAC, 13.2% with Qantas, and the remaining 6.12% by the Brunei government, the Straits 
Steamship and Ocean steamship companies, and the general public). 
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 Such developments generally reflect the discussions in PICAO and 
ICAO during the 1940s, and particularly developing countries’ concerns with 
financing and operating airlines without an initial period of foreign aid. While 
foreign interests looked for ways of feeding their long-haul routes and perhaps 
retaining colonial influence, many developing states focused their concerns on 
issues involving the maintenance of high technical and managerial standards 
while gradually localizing the workforce and the need to apportion a limited 
number of funds across a wide range of development initiatives and perhaps 
borrow elsewhere in the meantime.664 
 Other states had other concerns. Political violence, and particularly war 
– for independence, for control of government – not only retarded the 
development of an air transport system, but also cut the state off from the most 
                                                
664 On foreign interests in “third world” airlines, see e.g. Sing., supra note 661 at cols. 2706-
11 (Rep. Lee Kuan Yew) (questioning, inter alia, the carriers’ underlying interests in the 
airline). While the response given did not state this (see ibid. at col. 2713 (Mr. Francis 
Thomas) (noting that “the obvious answer is that they wanted to control the thing” and that 
investors would naturally be concerned when giving judgment to “ill-judged and 
inexperienced people”), one rationale might be to maintain colonial networks. This 
corresponds with investments elsewhere, including investments in the Pacific Islands and 
UTA’s investment in multinational Air Afrique, and from a similar failed venture between UK 
and Australian interests. See Raguraman, ibid. at 245 (citing Christopher Kissling & Michael 
Taylor, “National Sovereignty and Corporate Dependence in South Pacific Aviation” in 
Christopher Kissling, ed., Transport ad Communications for Pacific Microstates (Suva: 
University of South Pacific, 1984), 97 at 102 (on the South Pacific) Raguraman extends this 
scenario to Malaya); infra note 1011 and accompanying text (noting Air France/UTA’s 
investment in Air Afrique). See also Statement by the Delegate of Australia in PICAO, 
Multilateral 1, supra note 285 at 90-92 (noting that the Australians would be able to provide 
more frequent and improved services on a through basis than the local carriers on a local 
basis); Sampson, supra note 218 at 52 (noting that the British and Australians had operated a 
Singapore-based joint venture, Qantas Empire Airways, creating a connection between 
Singapore and Australia). Other issues concerned the effect of exit, sale and monopolization, 
as well as “Malayanizing” the workforce. Sing., ibid. at cols. 2706-11 (Rep. Lee Kuan Yew). 
In response, see ibid. at col. 2703 (noting that “[i]f Singapore had had to find from public 
funds – from the surplus funds of the Government – the capital now needed for Malayan 
Airways, the burden would have been very considerable indeed. It could only be met by 
sacrificing other development – schools, hospitals, a unified transport system, or flood control 
or some other equally important work.”), cols. 2712-13 (noting that air services “must be a 
monopoly [sic] if they are to pay” and that “the simple fact is there: We are just hard up for 
money.”) & col. 2716 (again noting funding concerns). Thai Airway’s history also notes 
similar rationales. See Thai Airways International, “THAI Company Information: History”, 
online: <http://www.thaiairways.com/about-thai/company-profile/en/history.htm>. 
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likely channels of foreign expertise and funding. Some of these wars, such as 
that between Indonesia and the Netherlands, led to a dramatic expulsion of 
foreign interests over a short period of time (between 1952 and 1954), 
resulting in a national approach resting on autonomous development while 
still operating within the international order.665 Whether colonial or civil, war 
was not simply about who governed, but about what ideas governed. The 
Communist victories in China, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos resulted in those 
states’ exit from the capitalist system until relatively recently.666 It would not 
be until the 1980s that the Communist states would gradually begin to enter 
into exchange with the capitalist world, a re-entry that continues to have 
dramatic effects on the structure of those orders. 
 
2.2. Liberalization in East Asia: A Plurality of Approaches 
 
East Asia is also actively engaged in the debate over market reform. During 
the 1970s, several states, including Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand, 
rejected the IATA ratemaking system in favor of a more open, competitive 
operating environment, emphasizing their own competitive advantages, 
                                                
665 Sampson, supra note 218 at 167-68. 
666 China did not extend its networks beyond close political allies until the 1970s, and it was 
not until 1980 that CAAC made its first flight to the United States. See generally Oum & Yu, 
supra note 649 at 52-53. Air transport in the CLMV states has remained underdeveloped until 
recently as a result of conflict, economic underdevelopment, and ideology. See e.g. ibid. at 95-
97 (surveying development in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam – it has left out Myanmar). 
Interestingly, the growth of several lucrative routes between these countries (particularly 
China) and South Korea led the South Korean government to revise its guidelines on entry 
and capacity on international routes. See Kim, “Multiple Designation”, infra note 670 at 77; 
Kim, “Regulation in Korea”, infra note 670 at 66-68. 
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primarily in terms of lower input (labor) costs.667 While insufficient to tip 
IATA’s applecart, the pressure did require the organization to suspend its 
conditions on particular areas and routes in the region.668 
 Despite this early development in the region, liberalization largely 
remains an incomplete phenomenon in Asia. Indeed, a multiformity of levels 
and approaches – many of them with conservative and/or protectionist 
elements to them – continues to govern Asian skies. Importantly, South Korea 
and Japan (in 2010) have gradually shifted from a cagey evaluation of 
liberalization towards an acceptance of an open skies model and (possibly) 
even further regional liberalization, while China continues to prove more 
resistant to liberalization.669 Common in all three states’ approaches to 
liberalization has been a high level of involvement by the state in directing the 
transition to deregulation. In South Korea, the Guidelines for Supervision and 
Development of the Multiple National Carriers, issued in 1990 and revised in 
1994, established rules for allocating routes between Korean Airlines and 
                                                
667 Haanappel, Ratemaking, supra note 221 at 107 (noting that certain airlines in the Far East 
chose to compete on (heavily advertised) service quality rather than price). Anthony Sampson 
provides a much more colorful description: 
 
SIA, like other Asian airlines, including Korean, has refused to join IATA: so it could 
dole out free drinks and free gifts as it liked and even for a time hired Filipino singers 
to provide live entertainment flying to Australia. Above all it projected an image of 
productive service, advertising the “Singapore Girl” in a sarong with shameless 
sexism, showing her through a soft-focus haze with a singer changing “I want to stay 
up here with you for ever”.” 
 
Sampson, supra note 218 at 170. Chang, Williams and Hsu also make a connection between 
liberal-minded Asian states and early US interest in liberalization, noting that “[t]he idea of an 
US Open Skies Policy was first raised in 1979 with a number of Asian countries in mind. It 
was over another decade however, before the concept was implemented.” Chang, Williams & 
Hsu, supra note 52 at 163. 
668 See e.g. Haanappel, Ratemaking, supra note 221 at 107. 
669 See generally below at 252-55. 
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Asiana Airlines, established in 1988 as a second flag carrier.670 The Guidelines 
were eventually phased out in 2006 with the establishment of the Aviation 
Transportation Consultation Committee. At the same time, both the South 
Korean and Japanese governments have generally taken an explicitly strategic 
approach to negotiations with partners, as illustrated by both the distinction 
between incumbent and non-incumbent carriers in the US-Japan Agreement as 
amended in 1998 and the recent amendment to the South Korea-France 
Agreement.671 
 Undoubtedly the largest change in Northeast Asia has been in China, 
which through government-guided reforms over the last thirty years has 
restructured air services production from a single carrier commanded by the 
state to a commercial economy organized around three mega-carriers which 
now operate in a liberalized domestic market, although China maintains 
relatively high levels of regulation in international transport.672 At the same 
time, the government continues its involvement in reform, “encouraging” 
cooperation and consolidation between the Big Three and smaller companies, 
                                                
670 See e.g. Jongseok Kim, “The Regulation and Growth of Civil Aviation in South Korea” in 
Hufbauer & Findlay, eds., supra note 423, 63 [Kim, “Regulation in Korea”]; Jongseok Kim, 
“Multiple Designation Policy in Korea” in Christopher Findlay, Chia Lin Sien & Karmjit 
Singh, Asia Pacific Air Transport: Challenges and Policy Reforms (Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 1997), 74 [Kim, “Multiple Designation”]. 
671 See generally above at 138-39 (discussing the 1998 MoU between the US and Japan) & 
170 (discussing the designation clause in the South Korea-France agreement). On Japan, see 
also e.g. Yamauchi & Ito, supra note 418; Hirotaka Yamauchi, “Air Transport Policy in 
Japan: Limited Competition Under Regulation” in Findlay et al., eds., ibid., 106.  
672 On the history of China’s restructuring, see e.g. Yahua Zhang & David K. Round, “China’s 
Airline Deregulation Since 1997 and the Driving Forces Behind the 2002 Airline 
Consolidations” (2008) 14 J. Air Transp. Man. 130; Anming Zhang & Hongmin Chen, 
“Evolution of China’s Air Transport Development and Policy towards International 
Liberalization” (2003) 31 Transp. J. 31; Alan Williams, Contemporary Issues Shaping 
China’s Civil Aviation Policy: Balancing International with Domestic Priorities (Farnham & 
Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2009) at 77-91 (discussing domestic market reform) &177-91 
(discussing international liberalization) [Williams, China’s Policy]. See also Jason R. Bonin, 
“Strategic Liberalization Policies in Bilateral and Multilateral Settings: The Case of China and 
Vietnam” (2009) 34 Air & Sp. L. 371 at 377-82 [Bonin, “Strategic Liberalization”]. 
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and also plans to merge cargo operations into a single cargo “champion” as a 
competitor to large cargo carriers and international integrators such as DHL 
and Fedex.673 
 China also provides an interesting comparison with US deregulation in 
that the Chinese government intervened to both restructure and reregulate the 
domestic market for a period between 1997 and 2002.674 After relaxations on 
entry and pricing in the mid-1990s resulted in a series of price wars and 
exposed weaknesses in the regulator’s safety oversight capabilities.675 When 
airlines failed to observe (and the regulator proved incapable of policing) the 
price bands, the government imposed revenue sharing arrangements on all 
domestic routes.676 In 2002, the government restructured the market by 
consolidating its government-owned airlines into the Big Three currently in 
                                                
673 The most recent being China Eastern-Shanghai Airlines. See e.g. Katie Cantle, “CAAC 
Clears China Eastern-Shanghai Merger” Air Transport World (31 August 2009), online: 
<http://atwonline.com/airports-routes/news/caac-clears-china-eastern-shanghai-merger-0309>. 
On the current plans to restructure, see e.g. Jamil Anderlini, “Beijing plans air cargo 
‘champion’” Financial Times (25 May 2010), online: 
<http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/4179e6ca-6818-11df-a52f-
00144feab49a.html#axzz1f3nzEcG3>; “China’s Big Three Airliners to be Combined into a 
Super Air Cargo Company” Global Times (1 June 2010), online: 
<http://business.globaltimes.cn/industries/2011-04/537528.html>. 
674 See e.g. Zhang & Round, supra note 672; Anming Zhang, George W.L. Hui, Lawrence C. 
Leung, Waiman Cheung, & Yer Van Hui, Air Cargo in Mainland China and Hong Kong 
(Aldershot and Burlington VT: Ashgate, 2004) at 24-26. These points are summarized in 
Bonin, “Strategic Liberalization”, supra note 672 at 379-80. 
675 From 1978 to 1997, China had engaged in a pattern of phased deregulation. The first 
process, that of breaking up the national carrier, can be further subdivided into two phases, the 
first (1978-1986) concentrating on localizing accountability and the second (1986-1992) 
through separating the regulatory and operational functions of the CAAC. See e.g. Bonin, 
ibid. From 1993, the Chinese government encouraged local and regional administrations to 
invest in local airlines and introducing price bands on routes. Ibid. See also Williams, China’s 
Policy, supra note 672 at 19-25 (dividing post-1978 reforms into two broad periods, the first 
encompassing the attempts and interventions through 2000, the second the post-2000 
reorganizations). 
676 Ibid. at 380; Zhang & Round, supra note 672 at 133. 
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operation; it also began a recently completed project of relaxing restrictions on 
pricing and entry for a second time.677 
  ASEAN member states also continue to proceed with varying levels of 
domestic and international liberalization, although the region remains uneven 
in terms of levels of economic development and industrial competitiveness. 
Clearly Singapore remains the most liberal-minded state, and has consistently 
supported all forms of liberalization. States such as Malaysia have only 
recently taken a clearly pro-liberalization stance. Vietnam still requires 
approval for new entry, and places price ceilings on domestic routes for 
Vietnamese citizens,678 measures designed to keep air travel accessible to a 
population where air transport remains a costly mode of transportation. 
Others, including Indonesia and the Philippines, remain ambivalent if not 
wholly reluctant to commit to market-based governance at the international 
level.679 In 2011, the Philippines reversed its fairly protectionist position on 
liberalization by opening market access to all airports except Ninoy Aquino 
International Airport.680 The more protectionist stance, embodied in Executive 
Order (EO) 500-A and put in place on 22 August 2006, was itself a reversal of 
a more liberal position to open Clark/Diosdado Macapagal and Subic Bay 
International Airports to international traffic taken in Executive Order (EO) 
                                                
677 Bonin, “Strategic Liberalization”, ibid. at 380; Zhang & Round, ibid. at 134-42. 
678 See e.g. “Higher Domestic Airfares a Setback for Travel Agents” Thanh Nien Daily (16 
December 2011), online: <http://www.thanhniennews.com/2010/pages/20111220-higher-
domestic-airfares-a-setback-for-travel-agents.aspx>. 
679 See e.g. Tan, “Prospects for ASAM”, supra note 44 (discussing the processes and possible 
impediments to ASAM); Tan, “Policy in the Philippines”, supra note 45 (discussing 
liberalization in the Philippines in detail). As of March 2011, the Philippines has made a 
substantial step forward, signing Executive Order (EO) 29, permitting liberalization of market 
access to all points except Ninoy Aquino International Airport. See generally below at 233-35. 
680 Executive Order No. 28 Reorganizing the Philippine Air Negotiating Panel and the 
Philippine Air Consultation Panel, 14 March 2011 [EO 28]; Executive Order 29 Authorizing 
the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Philippine Air Panels to Pursue more Aggressively 
International Civil Aviation Liberalization Policy, 14 March 2011 [EO 29]. 
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500 on 27 January 2006.681 Since 2005, Indonesia has placed a restriction on 
international LCCs operating to/from the country.682 And neither has ratified 
all of the ASEAN air transport agreements up to open skies.683 ASEAN 
member states have also expressed differences of opinion in the scope, depth, 
and shape of liberalization or integration beyond open skies, differences that 
will in turn affect whether ASEAN can achieve its stated objective of creating 
an ASAM. The following section analyzes these differences, as well as the 
concerns underlying them. 
 
3. FROM INDEPENDENCE TO INTERDEPENDENCE TO INTEGRATION: REGIONAL 
AIR TRANSPORT ARRANGEMENTS IN EAST ASIA 
 
Certainly the most significant development in the region has been the ongoing 
efforts to rearticulate regulatory reform in terms of one or more regional 
projects. By far the most institutionalized of these projects is the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations, formally imbued with international legal 
personality by the ASEAN Charter in 2008.684 Other initiatives, including 
efforts at trilateral cooperation between the three dominant Northeast Asian 
economies and wider cooperation between ASEAN and Northeast Asia, have 
                                                
681 Executive Order No. 500 Providing for the Expansion of Air Services to the Diosdado 
Macapagal International Airport, 27 January 2006; Executive Order No. 500-A Amending 
Executive Order (EO) No. 500 dated January 27 2006, and Providing for the Expansion of 
Air Services to the Diosdado Macapagal International Airport (DMIA) and Subic Bay 
International Airport (SBIA), 22 August 2006. See also generally Tan, “Policy in the 
Philippines”, supra note 45 at 291-97. 
682 See e.g. Tan, “Prospects for ASAM”, supra note 44 at 262. 
683 See generally below at 231-37. 
684 See generally ASEAN Charter, supra 148. For analyses of ASEAN’s de facto international 
legal personality, cf. generally Paul J. Davidson, ASEAN: The Evolving Legal Framework for 
Economic Cooperation (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 2002) at 14-50; Chesterman, 
supra note 149 (both discussing the question of ASEAN’s international legal personality). 
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also grown in recent years, although they are of relatively recent origin and 
lack the institutional thickness of ASEAN.685 
 Air transport is deeply embedded in these regional projects, because of 
both liberalization’s consequences on broader trade relationships and its actual 
presence in the discourse of economic liberalization and integration. By far the 
most ambitious program is ASEAN’s proposed ASAM, itself deepening an 
ongoing effort to establish an ASEAN open skies regime. Although not 
institutionalized to the level of the ASEAN initiative, liberalization has also 
entered into discussions in Northeast Asia as well as on an ASEAN+3 basis. 
This section addresses each of these three programs, including the institutional 
constraints specific to them and the presence of alternative proposals within 
the discussions. 
 
3.1. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
 
Undoubtedly, the fulcrum of Asian regionalism to date remains ASEAN. 
Established in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and 
Thailand as a cooperative security arrangement against the further incursion of 
communism into Southeast Asia, ASEAN has since grown both in terms of 
membership – it now includes Brunei and the CLMV (Cambodia, Lao PDR, 
Myanmar, and Vietnam) states – and its scope of governance.686 Its members 
made a critical step in this latter area in 2003, when they adopted Bali 
Concord II, establishing three pillars of cooperation – political-security, 
                                                
685 For a historical introduction to broader East Asian forms of cooperation, see e.g. Dent, 
supra note 13 at 149-81 (discussing the East Asian Economic Grouping/Caucus, ASEAN+3, 
and the East Asia Summit). 
686 See generally ibid. at 85-115. 
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economic, and socio-cultural – and creating a corresponding ASEAN 
Community for each pillar.687 
 Within the economic sphere, the ASEAN member states committed 
themselves to creating an ASEAN Economic Community, identified as a 
single market and production base, first by 2020 but moved forward in 2007 to 
2015.688 An ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint, also adopted in 2007 
and supported by the Charter, provides a framework for the creation of a 
“single market and production base” comprised of free movement of goods, 
services, skilled labor and freer movement of capital.689 The Blueprint 
identifies the creation of an ASAM by 2015 as an integral component of the 
AEC Community.690 
 The Blueprint, however, is not the region’s first foray into air transport 
regulation. In 1970, the member states signed an early multilateral agreement 
relaxing restrictions on non-scheduled services unrelated to current 
discussions of liberalization and integration.691 ASEAN member states 
established the beginnings of a more comprehensive policy space in 1995, 
when during the Fifth Summit the ASEAN Leaders mooted the idea of an 
                                                
687 Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II), done in Bali, Indonesia, 7 October 
2003 [Bali Concord II]. The origins of Bali Concord II lie in the ASEAN Vision 2020, done in 
Kuala Lumpur, 15 December 1997, online: ASEAN <http://www.asean.org/asean/asean-
summit/item/asean-vision-2020>. 
688 Bali Concord II, ibid. at B; Cebu Declaration on the Acceleration of the Establishment of 
an ASEAN Community by 2015, done at Cebu, Philippines, 13 January 2007. 
689 ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint, done in Singapore, 20 November 2007 at II.A 
[AEC Blueprint]; ASEAN Charter, supra note 174, art. 1(5); Bali Concord II, supra note 687, 
art. B.1. 
690 AEC Blueprint, ibid., para. 50. 
691 Manila Agreement, supra note 251. The Agreement closely tracked an early, successful 
multilateral agreement in Europe. See Paris Agreement, supra note 251. See also Haanappel, 
Ratemaking, supra note 221. 
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ASEAN open skies arrangement by 2015.692 Over the next nine years, the 
ASEAN Transport Ministers would develop a positive agenda for open skies 
by 2015. The result has been that, as of 2004, ASEAN has been engaged in 
two distinct objectives of regulatory reform, the first aimed at open skies, the 
second at a single integrated aviation market. 
 
3.1.1. From Vientiane to Brunei via Manila: Implementing ASEAN 
Open Skies 
 
Like the European experience with its internal market, the development of an 
ASEAN open skies policy has been a gradual and incremental process. 
Conceptually rooted in the Fifth Summit’s Plan of Action for Transport and 
Communications (1994-1996) as well as the Framework Agreement on 
Services,693 the Transport Ministers first began to cultivate the idea the 
following year in the Development of a Competitive Air Transport Services 
Policy. The ASEAN Leaders reaffirmed these commitments in 1997 in the 
ASEAN Vision 2020 and in 1998 in the Hanoi Plan of Action, the first six-
year plan designed to progressively implement the ASEAN Vision.694 
                                                
692 See also Tan, “Prospects for ASAM”, supra note 44 at 256 (noting that the former mooted 
the idea of an open skies regime, while the later provided “the foundation for discussing air 
services”); Peter Forsyth, John King & Cherry Ann Rodolfo, “Open Skies in ASEAN” (2006) 
12 J. Air Transp. Man. 143 at 144 (noting the development of an open skies policy within the 
Plan of Action is linked to the Agenda for Greater Economic Integration) [Forsyth et al., 
“ASEAN Open Skies”]. 
693 See generally ASEAN Plan of Action in Transport and Communications (1994-1996), 
online: <http://www.asean.org/communities/asean-economic-community/item/asean-plan-of-
action-in-transport-and-communications-1994-1996>; ASEAN Framework Agreement on 
Services, done at Bangkok, 15 December 1995. See also ibid. 
694 See generally ASEAN Vision 2020, supra note 687 (resolving to meet increasing demands 
for infrastructure and communications by, inter alia, “promoting open skies policy”); Hanoi 
Plan of Action, para. 2.10.1.g, online: <http://www.asean.org/asean/asean-summit/item/hanoi-
plan-of-action> (providing for the institution of “the policy framework and modalities by the 
year 2000 for the development of a Competitive Air Services Policy which may be a gradual 
 225 
 Over the next eight years, ASEAN member states gradually elaborated 
a set of first steps and overall objectives for liberalization. In 1999, the 
ASEAN Transport Ministers (ATM) established a basic framework for a 
staged, progressive transition to open skies, targeting two areas – the all-cargo 
sector and the ASEAN sub-regions – for advance liberalization.695 All-cargo 
liberalization received an initial push in September 2002, when the ATM 
signed the Memorandum of Understanding on Air Freight Services, permitting 
both multiple airlines to operate one hundred tons weekly on select routes on a 
third and fourth freedom basis and codeshare arrangements among airlines.696 
The ASEAN sub-regions had already seen some liberalization between them. 
In particular, the Brunei-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines East ASEAN Growth 
Area (BIMP-EAGA), the Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle 
(IMT-GT) and the CLMV countries,697 had already implemented some 
relaxations on intra-(sub)regional third/fourth freedom traffic in the mid-
1990s.698 Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines further relaxed fifth freedom 
services within the BIMP-EAGA sub-region between 1999 and 2000.699 In 
                                                
step towards an Open Sky Policy in ASEAN”). See also Forsyth et al., “ASEAN Open Skies”, 
supra note 692 at 144-46. 
695 See Tan, “Prospects for ASAM”, supra note 44 at 25-57; Forsyth et al., ibid. 
696 Memorandum of Understanding on Air Freight Services, done at Jakarta, Indonesia, 19 
September 2002. The Memorandum was later amended to increase capacity and number of 
points. See Protocol to Amend the ASEAN Memorandum of Understanding on Air Freight 
Services, done at Bangkok, Thailand, 8 February 2007. 
697 A fourth sub-region, the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth Triangle (IMS-GT), has 
not been brought into the sub-regional groups targeted for advanced liberalization. For a brief 
discussion of the IMS-GT, see generally Davidson, supra note 684. 
698 Indeed, both IMT-GT and BIMP-EAGA significantly relaxed portions of access within the 
sub-regions even before the 5th ATM Meeting. For a discussion of these arrangements, see e.g. 
Peter Forsyth, John King, Cherry Lyn Rodolfo & Keith Trace, Preparing ASEAN for Open 
Sky, Final Report (REPSF Project 02/008, February 2004) at 64-69, online: AusAID 
<http://www.ausaid.gov.au/publications/pdf/asean_open_skies.pdf> (including proposed 
extensions of these growth areas) [Forsyth et al., Preparing ASEAN]. 
699 See ibid. at 28. 
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1998, the CLMV states introduced an initiative to relax market access between 
the states on a third to fifth freedom basis, culminating in a sub-regional open 
skies arrangement by 2003.700 During the 9th ATM Meeting in 2003, the 
Transport Ministers adopted the Roadmap for the Integration of ASEAN: 
Competitive Air Services Policy, committing the region to implementing open 
skies by 2015.701 This policy has been kept in place in the ASEAN Transport 
Action Plan 2005-2010 and the Brunei Action Plan (ASEAN Strategic 
Transport Plan) 2011-2015, and expressed in the three legal agreements and 
their respective protocols discussed below.702 
 The first concrete steps towards implementing open skies came in 
2004 when the 10th ASEAN Summit promulgated a Framework Agreement 
for the Integration of Priority Sectors as part of the Vientiane Action Plan (the 
successor to the Hanoi Plan of Action).703 The Framework Agreement 
                                                
700 See ibid. at 64-69; Tan, “Prospects for ASAM”, supra note 44 at 259; Cambodia, Lao 
People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar and Viet Nam, Sub Regional Cooperation on Air 
Transport Among Cambodia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Myanmar and Viet Nam 
(CLMV), ICAO Doc. ATConf/5-WP/58 (12 February 2003). 
701 See Forsyth, et al., Preparing ASEAN, ibid. at 39; Forsyth et al., “ASEAN Open Skies”, 
supra note 692 at 144. 
702 See e.g. ASEAN Transport Action Plan 2005-2010, para. 12, online: 
<http://www.asean.org/16596.htm>; Brunei Action Plan (ASEAN Strategic Transport Plan) 
2011-2015, at 19, para. 42 online: <http://www.asean.org/documents/BAP%202011-
2015.pdf> (providing that “[i]n order to achieve this goal [i.e. the ASAM], all [member states] 
are encouraged to ratify and implement the already-concluded agreements to implement the 
ASEAN Open Sky Policy, i.e. the MAAS, the MAFLAFS, the MAFLPAS and their 
respective Protocols”) [BAP 2011-2015]. 
703 Originally there were eleven priority sectors: electronics, e-ASEAN, healthcare, wood-
based products, automotives, rubber-based products, textiles and apparels, agro-based 
products, fisheries, air travel and tourism. ASEAN Framework Agreement for the Integration 
of Priority Sectors, done at Vientiane, Lao PDR, 29 November 2004 [Framework for Priority 
Sectors]. Priority sector integration was part of a larger plan put together at Vientiane. See 
generally Vientiane Action Programme 2004-2010, done at Vientiane, Lao PDR, 9 November 
2004 [Vientiane Action Programme]. See also ASEAN, Media Release, “ASEAN Accelerates 
Integration of Priority Sectors” (29 November 2004), online: 
<http://www.asean.org/asean/asean-summit/item/media-release-asean-accelerates-integration-
of-priority-sectors>. Logistics was added as a twelfth priority sector in 2006. See ASEAN, 
“Fact Sheet: Priority Sectors for Economic Integration” (25 January 2007), online: Center for 
Southeast Asian Studies, Xiamen University 
<http://59.77.27.55/Article/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=729>. 
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contains both general guidance material for the integration of the identified 
sectors and sector-specific Annexes for each priority sector.704 The provisions 
for air transport are contained in Annex II of the Framework Agreement, 
which includes the Annex – the ASEAN Sectoral Integration Protocol for Air 
Travel or Action Plan for ASEAN Air Transport Integration and Liberalisation 
2005-2015 – as well as the Roadmap for Integration of Air Travel Sector 
(RIATS), attached as an Appendix to the Action Plan.705 
 The Action Plan itself is a broad, general document establishing a 
basic framework for the integration of the sector. Specifically, it identifies 
three key elements for advancing integration: it defines the ultimate objective 
of the efforts undertaken as “the progressive, expeditious and systematic 
integration of the air travel sector”; it develops the relationship between air 
transport integration and the wider process of creating the ASEAN single 
market; and it positively locates the authority to develop specific measures to 
advance integration, permitting the ASEAN Transport Ministers to act through 
the Senior Transport Officials Meeting (STOM) or through any appointed 
Working Group(s) to both conduct additional negotiations and consider new 
regulatory measures for the air transport industry.706 It also adopts RIATS as 
an initial set of measures to advance its overall objectives.707 It is the 
                                                
704 See generally Framework for Priority Sectors, ibid. 
705 ASEAN Sector Integration Protocol for Air Travel, online: ASEAN 
<http://www.asean.org/asean/asean-summit/item/asean-sectoral-integration-protocol-for-air-
travel> [Action Plan]; Roadmap for Integration of Air Travel Sector, Appendix I to the 
ASEAN Sector Integration Protocol for Air Travel, online: ASEAN 
<http://www.asean.org/asean/asean-summit/item/appendix-i-roadmap-for-integration-of-air-
travel-sector> [RIATS]. 
706Action Plan, ibid., art. 3(1) On the last point, see also AEC Blueprint, supra note 689, para. 
20 (providing that “[n]egotiation of some specific services sectors such as financial services 
and air transport are carried out by their respective Ministerial bodies.”). 
707 Ibid., art. 2(3). 
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Roadmap that establishes an initial implementation framework for both all-
cargo and passenger services within ASEAN. 
 According to its own stated objectives and despite the use of 
“integration” in its title, RIATS advances “the full liberalisation of air 
transport services in ASEAN”708 through an initial set of staged, progressively 
deeper relaxations ending the full liberalization of air cargo and the 
liberalization of traffic within and between the three ASEAN sub-regions and 
capital cities on a third, fourth, and fifth freedom basis by December 2010.709 
This process is to occur over a series of milestones, including two for all-cargo 
services: 
 
December 2006: Liberalization of air freight between points within the 
2002 MoU, with increased points and tonnage; 
December 2008: Full liberalization of air freight; 
 
and six for passenger services: 
 
December 2005: Liberalization of third and fourth freedom passenger 
services within each ASEAN sub-region; 
December 2006: Liberalization of third and fourth freedom passenger 
services between sub-regions for at least two points in 
each country;  
December 2006: Liberalization of fifth freedom passenger services 
                                                
708 RIATS, supra note 705 at I. 
709 Ibid. 
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within the ASEAN sub-regions;  
December 2008: Liberalization of fifth freedom passenger services 
passenger services between sub-regions for at least two 
points in each country;  
December 2008: Liberalization of third and fourth freedom passenger 
services between capital cities; 
December 2010: Liberalization of fifth freedom passenger services 
between capital cities.710 
 
It does not go so far as to offer a plan for the full liberalization of passenger 
transport, leaving a significant amount of third, fourth, and fifth freedom 
traffic uncovered; nor does it bind member states to implement the identified 
relaxations.711 Both are left to later agreements to address. 
 Two agreements, the Multilateral Agreement on the Full Liberalisation 
of Air Freight Services (MAFLAFS) and the Multilateral Agreement on Air 
Services (MAAS),712 perfect the RIATS process as a set of legally binding 
obligations. Indeed, because of their relationship to RIATS the two 
Agreements, finalized at the 14th Transport Ministers Meeting in Makati, 
Manila in November 2008 and signed on 20 May 2009, have collectively 
earned the epithet “the RIATS Agreements”.713 Each Agreement is comprised 
                                                
710 Ibid. 
711 While RIATS itself enumerates a set of positive commitments (“concrete actions that 
ASEAN Member Countries shall pursue to achieve greater and significant air transport 
liberalisation in ASEAN”) among the transport ministers, it does not create a system for state 
ratification and formal entry into force as a legally binding obligation. Ibid. at II, para. 3. 
712 ASEAN Multilateral Agreement on the Full Liberalisation of Air Freight Services, done at 
Manila, Philippines, 20 May 2009 [MAFLAFS]; ASEAN Multilateral Agreement on Air 
Services, done at Manila, Philippines, 20 May 2009 [MAAS]. 
713 See e.g. BAP 2011-2015, supra note 702 at 20. 
 230 
of a text and a series of Annexes and Protocols. The text of both MAFLAFS 
and MAAS themselves address issues common to bilateral agreements, 
including ownership and control (including some optional variations discussed 
below),714 safety, security, user charges, customs duties, and dispute 
settlement.715 As with other liberal agreements, the two Agreements also 
provide for an equality of opportunity to compete, the operation of leased 
aircraft, and the ancillary “doing business” rights.716 The Agreements, 
however, also have key differences with other prototypical liberal agreements 
such as open skies. Both expressly allow for tariff filing where a member 
state’s national law requires it, subject to the principle of reciprocity.717 At the 
same time, both agreements introduce safeguards,718 and remain permissive of 
state aids or subsidies so long as they are transparently given and “shall not 
distort competition among the designated airlines of the Contracting 
Parties”.719 Such a provision presumably permits public service obligations 
and the support of unviable routes but prevents more pernicious forms of 
subsidization. 
 Like so many bilateral air services agreements, however, the critical 
provisions lie in the annexes. While Article 2 of each Agreement provides for 
                                                
714 MAFLAFS, supra note 712, art. 3(2); MAAS, supra note 712, art. 3(2). For an analysis of 
the variations, see infra notes 748-52 and accompanying text. 
715 MAFLAFS, ibid., arts. 5 (safety), 6 (security), 11 (user charges), 12 (customs duties), 18 
(dispute resolutions); MAAS, ibid., arts. 5, 6, 10, 11, 17. 
716 MAFLAFS, ibid., arts. 8 (operation of leased aircraft), 9 (commercial activities), 13 (fair 
competition); MAAS, ibid., arts. 8, 9, 12. 
717 MAFLAFS, ibid., art. 7; MAAS, ibid., art. 7. 
718 MAFLAFS, ibid., art. 14; MAAS, ibid., art. 13. 
719 MAFLAFS, ibid., art. 14(4) MAAS, ibid., art. 13(2). Each state is simultaneously charged 
with ensuring a fair and equal opportunity to compete in providing services and eliminating all 
forms of discrimination or anti-competitive practices that it deems adversely affects the 
competitive position of another party or designated airline. MAFLAFS, ibid., art. 13; MAAS, 
ibid., art. 12. 
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the exchange of technical rights, provisions on market access for commercial 
rights and capacity regulations are housed within Protocols to the respective 
Agreements. Each Protocol responds to a particular liberalization measure 
undertaken in RIATS: thus, MAFLAFS has two such Protocols, while MAAS 
has six.720 In order to bring a particular measure into force, both the 
Agreement and that Protocol must be subsequently ratified by that state – and 
in the case of MAFLAF, the MAFLAF Protocols, MAAS, and MAAS 
Protocols 4 and 5, by a minimum of three states (and with MAAS Protocols 3 
and 4, three states in at least two sub-regions) –, after which the Protocol will 
come into force only among those states that have ratified the specific 
instrument.721 As at the present time, all instruments of the RIATS 
Agreements have entered into force, although they do not as of yet apply to 
the entire region. As of October 2012, neither Indonesia nor the Philippines 
has ratified both Agreements and all their Protocols.722 Indonesia stands out 
                                                
720 See MAFLAFS Protocol 1 on Unlimited Third, Fourth and Fifth Freedom Traffic Rights 
Among Designated Points in ASEAN, done at Manila, Philippines, 20 May 2009 [MAFLAFS 
Protocol 1]; MAFLAFS Protocol 2 on Unlimited Third, Fourth and Fifth Freedom Traffic 
Rights Among All Points with International Airports in ASEAN, done at Manila, Philippines, 
20 May 2009 [MAFLAFS Protocol 2]; MAAS Protocol 1 on Unlimited Third and Fourth 
Freedom Traffic Rights within the ASEAN Sub-Region, done at Manila, Philippines, 20 May 
2009 [MAAS Protocol 1]; MAAS Protocol 2 on Unlimited Fifth Freedom Traffic Rights within 
the ASEAN Sub-Region, done at Manila, Philippines, 20 May 2009 [MAAS Protocol 2]; 
MAAS Protocol 3 on Unlimited Third and Fourth Freedom Traffic Rights between the ASEAN 
Sub-Regions, done at Manila, Philippines, 20 May 2009 [MAAS Protocol 3]; MAAS Protocol 
4 on Unlimited Fifth Freedom Traffic Rights between the ASEAN Sub-Regions, done at 
Manila, Philippines, 20 May 2009 [MAAS Protocol 4]; MAAS Protocol 5 on Unlimited Third 
and Fourth Freedom Traffic Rights between ASEAN Capital Cities, done at Manila, 
Philippines, 20 May 2009 [MAAS Protocol 5]; MAAS Protocol 6 on Unlimited Fifth Freedom 
Traffic Rights between ASEAN Capital Cities, done at Manila, Philippines, 20 May 2009 
[MAAS Protocol 6]. The MAAS Protocols are all contained in MAAS, supra note 703, Annex 
II. 
721 MAFLAFS, supra note 712, art. 20(3); MAAS, ibid., art. 19(3); MAFLAFS Protocol 1, ibid., 
art. 7(3); MAFLAFS Protocol 2, ibid., art. 6(3); MAAS Protocol 1, ibid., art. 5(2); MAAS 
Protocol 2, ibid., art. 5(2); MAAS Protocol 3, ibid., art. 5(3); MAAS Protocol 4, ibid., art. 5(3); 
MAAS Protocol 5, ibid., art. 4(3); MAAS Protocol 6, ibid., art. 5(3). 




here, having ratified only MAAS and its Protocols 1 and 2. The Philippines 
has gone significantly further in this respect, having fully ratified MAFLAFS 
and its Protocols as well as MAAS and its Protocols 1 through 4. It has, 
however, refrained from implementing the critical Protocols 5 and 6 that 
would grant unlimited access to Manila on a third to fifth freedom basis.723 
 Despite the incomplete implementation of the RIATS Agreements, on 
12 November 2010 the ATM formally promulgated the last of the open skies 
agreements: the Multilateral Agreement on the Full Liberalisation of 
Passenger Air Services (MAFLPAS).724 Like the RIATS Agreements, the 
terms of MAFLPAS are divided between an Agreement and two Protocols, 
with the same basic division of labor between the forms of agreement and the 
same basic ratification requirements (i.e., three to enter into force, and only 
against the ratifying member states).725 The Protocols themselves introduce 
the freedom to operate between all international airports within ASEAN on a 
third, fourth, and fifth freedom basis: specifically, Protocol 1 grants member 
states third and fourth freedom rights to all international points within ASEAN 
by 30 June 2010 (six months before inter-capital fifths and five months before 
the Agreement was signed), while Protocol 2 extends this right to fifth 
freedom traffic by 30 June 2013.726 As with the RIATS Agreements, 
                                                
ATIFICATION-SORT%20BY%20DATE-Web-October2012.pdf> [ASEAN, “Table of 
Treaty Ratifications”]. 
723 On issues in the Philippines, see also generally below at 290-91. 
724 ASEAN Multilateral Agreement on the Full Liberalisation of Passenger Air Services, done 
at Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam, 12 November 2010 [MAFLPAS]. 
725 See generally ibid.; MAFLPAS Protocol 1 on Unlimited Third and Fourth Freedom Traffic 
Rights between Any Points in Contracting Parties, done at Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei 
Darussalam, 12 November 2010 [MAFLPAS Protocol 1]; MAFLPAS Protocol 2 on Unlimited 
Fifth Freedom Traffic Rights between Any Points in Contracting Parties, done at Bandar Seri 
Begawan, Brunei Darussalam, 12 November 2010 [MAFLPAS Protocol 2]. 
726 MAFLPAS Protocol 1, ibid., art. 1. 
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ratification remains low. Indeed, as of October 2012, only six countries – 
Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam –, 
which have ratified all of the commitments, had ratified a single document of 
this new “package” of measures.727 
 Whereas ASEAN member states have expressed differing visions as to 
the ultimate level of integration acceptable to all, they have agreed generally 
that open skies is a desirable outcome benefiting all.728 In this regard, the 
failure to achieve full and timely ratification are commonly (and correctly) 
read as representing the political contests between the airlines of less 
competitive states within their respective domestic political system. In the 
Philippines, these contests between incumbent airlines and a combination of 
new entrants and business interests have had two faces. On the one hand, a 
conflict between the business community’s demands for increasing openness 
and the airlines’ demands for protection has resulted in the conveying and 
retracting of powers to the executive, beginning with Executive Order (EO) 
253 of 2003, which unilaterally relaxed market access to Clark Special 
Economic Zone and Subic Bay Freeport Zone for all-cargo services on a third 
to seventh freedom basis, through the first (failed) attempt to introduce similar 
first to fifth freedom relaxations for passenger traffic in the form of EOs 500 
and 500-A, and to the present scenario as defined by EO 29.729 Both EO 253 
and 500 awarded these rights irrespective of whether a carrier was designated 
                                                
727 ASEAN, “Table of Treaty Ratifications”, supra note 714 at 10-11. 
728 See e.g. Thomas et al., supra note 116 at 69 (noting that no state objected to intra-ASEAN 
open skies by 2014-15, although Thailand remained concerned about ownership and control 
standards). 
729 See generally Executive Order No. 253 Providing for the Expansion of Air Services to the 
Diosdado Macapagal International Airport (DMIA) and Subic Bay International Airport 
(SBIA), 3 December 2003 [EO 253]; supra notes 680-81 and accompanying text. See also 
Tan, “Policy in the Philippines”, supra note 45 at 289-97. 
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under the bilateral agreement between the two countries.730 Yet despite having 
the intended impact on fares and frequencies,731 the airlines were able to 
successfully lobby for a retraction of EO 500 through EO 500-A, which 
limited the executive’s ability to open market access to services operated on a 
third/fourth freedom basis and only to airlines designated under bilateral 
agreements with the Philippines.732 Carriers seeking further rights could apply 
to the Philippines CAB, thus making beyond rights “not automatically 
disallowed but made subject to explicit CAB approval on a case-by-case 
basis.”733 In this regard, EO 29 represents a successful attempt by the business 
community to lobby for the repeal of EO No. 500-A.734 This shakeup 
represents a drastic alteration in the structure of airlines’ traditional influence 
over market decisions in Philippines aviation policy and also explains the 
country’s radical new approach to open skies in ASEAN. 
 On the other hand, incumbent airlines have also resisted foreign 
investment in second tier or new entrant airlines in efforts similar to the equity 
investments in US second-tier airlines during the late ‘80s and early ‘90s. The 
history of Tiger Airways’ acquisition of a 40 percent share of Philippine 
SEAir in June 2012 demonstrates the effectiveness of such resistance. Tiger 
Airways sought to ally its company with SEAir as early as 2006,735 around the 
                                                
730 Tan, “Policy in the Philippines”, ibid. 
731 Ibid. at 292. 
732 Ibid. at 293. 
733 Ibid. at 293-94. 
734 Ibid. at 294 (noting a business lobby for “EO 500-B”). On the airline’s continued 
resistance, see e.g. “Aquino Warned Against Signing EO Advocating ‘Open Skies’” 
Philippine Daily Inquirer (14 August 2010), online: 
<http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/view/20100814-286840/Aquino-
warned-against-signing-EO-advocating-open-skies>. 
735 See e.g. “Tiger buys”, supra note 45. See also Tan, “Prospects for ASAM”, supra 44 at 
265-67. 
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same time as the issuance of EO 500. Tiger’s involvement with the small 
Philippine carrier has been persistently and vociferously – and until 2012, 
effectively – resisted by the likes of Cebu Pacific, which has argued that Tiger 
was seeking to or would in fact be circumventing the constitutional limitations 
of foreign involvement in domestic aviation.736 From 2006 until 2012, Tiger 
had therefore limited its involvement with SEAir to leasing the airline two 
aircraft.737 It is easy to see how limiting such involvement affects the level of 
competition in the domestic market and therefore the efficiency of the system 
as a whole. 
 Undoubtedly the member state furthest from open skies at this point in 
time remains Indonesia. Indonesia’s failure to formally ratify any of the major 
agreements beyond movements within BIMP-EAGA and the IMT-GT also 
demonstrates a conflict between demands for industrial protection and for 
increased openness. In 2005, the government introduced a prospective ban on 
international LCCs operating to the four major cities of Jakarta, Medan, 
Surabaya, and Denpasar, an issue that limits the degree of competition on the 
market.738 Because it is prospective in nature, AirAsia and Valuair remain 
unaffected by the entry restrictions; however, newer LCCs such as Tiger 
Airways continue to be restricted from operating to and from the 
archipelago,739 although Tiger has nevertheless found a way into the 
Singapore-Jakarta market, while increasing its presence in Indonesia by 
                                                
736 See Tan, “Prospects for ASAM”, ibid. This argument has also been used to challenge 
Tiger’s operations on the Clark-Singapore segment of a circle operation between Singapore, 
Macau, and Clark. Ibid. 
737 See ibid. 
738 Ibid. at 262, 267. 
739 Ibid. 
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acquiring a 33 percent share in Indonesian Mandala Airlines in January 2012, 
which now operates between Jakarta-Medan, Jakarta-Kuala Lumpur, and 
Singapore-Medan.740 The ban has also meant that Jetstar, which acquired 
Valuair in July 2005, has had to maintain the latter’s separate identity in order 
to it preserve its operating rights to Jakarta and to permit it to expand 
operations to destinations like Bali, Medan, and Surabaya.741 
 At the same time, Indonesia has intimated that it might take a more 
restrictive reading of “open skies” than might be expected. In May 2010, then-
Director of Air Transportation for the Indonesian Ministry of Transport Mr. 
Tri Sunoko was reported as saying that Indonesia would only be capable of 
fully relaxing restrictions on five points – Jakarta, Medan, Surabaya, 
Denpasar, and Makassar – by the 2015 deadline,742 a statement which, if 
accurate, would place Indonesia significantly behind in its open skies 
commitments 
 In the meantime, Indonesian airlines have begun to make a bid to 
catch-up with regional rivals, with Garuda planning to double its fleet from 92 
to 194 aircraft by 2015 and Lion Air has recently receiving government 
approval to launch full service Batik Air and poised to enter the Malaysian 
market starting in May 2013 with LCC joint venture Malindo.743 AirAsia has 
simultaneously moved to shore up its position in Indonesia by both acquiring, 
                                                
740 See e.g. CAPA, “Tiger-Backed”, supra note 45. 
741 Ibid. 
742 Karamjit Kaur, “Indonesia Throws a Wrench in ASEAN’s Open-Skies Policy” The Straits 
Times (9 May 2010), online: The China Post <http://www.chinapost.com.tw/commentary/the-
china-post/special-to-the-china-post/2010/05/09/255723/Indonesia-throws.htm>. 
Nevertheless, six months later the Indonesian Transport Minister signed off on MAFLPAS, 
including the Protocols and timelines. 
743 “Garuda Indonesia Plans to Double Fleet in Time for Open Skies” The Jakarta Globe (9 
July 2012), online: <http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/business/garuda-indonesia-plans-to-
double-fleet-in-time-for-open-skies/529357>. 
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together with its local partner, failed local airline Batavia Air in August this 
year and relocating its holding company, AirAsia ASEAN, to Jakarta.744 
Whether Mr. Sunoko’s statement will hold or Indonesia succeeds in 
implementing a more rigorous liberalization program at the latter stages of the 
process remains to be seen.  
 
3.1.2. Towards an ASEAN Single Aviation Market? 
 
Since the ASEAN Transport Ministers identified ASAM as a target in 2007, 
building it into the AEC Blueprint that same year, the open skies initiative has 
also fallen into a larger, ostensibly comprehensive project of rationalizing the 
diverse, fragmented national markets into an individual whole.745 Indeed, the 
Brunei Action Plan 2011-2015 extends integration beyond the strict provision 
of air services to include matters of “aviation safety, aviation security, civil 
aviation technology, [an] air transport regulatory framework and human 
resource development”, while retaining the 2015 deadline.746 To this end, the 
Transport Ministers issued an Implementation Framework of the ASEAN 
Single Aviation Market on 15 December 2011.747 The Framework provides a 
                                                
744 Nurfika Osman, “Regulator Gives Batavia Air Nod to Sell to AirAsia” The Jakarta Post 
(31 August 2012), online: <http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/08/31/regulator-gives-
batavia-air-nod-sell-airasia.html>; Inneke Lady, “Batik Air Secures License to Operate as 
Full-Service Carrier” The Jakarta Globe (5 September 2012), online: 
<http://www.thejakartaglobe.com/business/batik-air-secures-license-to-operate-as-full-
service-carrier/542285>; Nangoy, supra note 153; Nambiar, supra note 153. 
745 See ASEAN, “Joint Ministerial Statement of the Thirteenth ASEAN Transport Ministers 
(ATM) Meeting”, Singapore, 1 November 2007, para. 10, online: ASEAN 
<http://www.asean.org/news/item/the-thirteenth-asean-transport-ministers-atm-meeting-
singapore-1-november-2007-joint-ministerial-statement>; AEC Blueprint, supra note 677, 
para. 50. 
746  BAP 2011-2015, supra note 702 at 19, para. 41.  
747 ASEAN Transport Ministers, Declaration on the Adoption of the Implementation 
Framework of the ASEAN Single Aviation Market, adopted in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 15 
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skeleton of measures and deadlines for addressing matters of economic and 
technical concern, although the content of the Framework suggests an 
implementation date beyond 2015. 
 Even before Brunei or the ASAM Framework, the RIATS Agreements 
and MAFLPAS had introduced some intimation of change in the area of 
airline ownership and control. Specifically, each agreement supplements the 
traditional substantial ownership clause with two additional provisions, one 
providing an ASEAN carrier clause, the other replacing ownership with a 
principal place of business criterion.748 Both alternatives also replace the 
effective control with effective regulatory control.749 Yet these alternatives 
also contain critical limitations that ultimately render them inutile. At one 
level, the principal place of business clause is limited by the requirement that 
“such arrangements will not be equivalent to allowing airline(s) or its 
subsidiaries access to traffic rights not otherwise available to that 
airline(s)”.750 Such a clause addresses concerns such as Thailand’s that non-
member states might use the liberal provisions to gain access to ASEAN 
markets.751 Yet even where free riding by non-member states is not a concern, 
                                                
December 2011, online: ASEAN <http://www.asean.org/images/archive/documents/111219-
17th%20ATM_Agenda%20Item%208%20Declaration-ASAM.pdf>; ASEAN Transport 
Ministers, Implementation Framework of the ASEAN Single Aviation Market, online: ASEAN 
<http://www.asean.org/images/archive/documents/111219-
17th%20ATM_Agenda%20Item%208%20ASAM%20Implementation%20Framework.pdf> 
[ATM, ASAM Implementation Framework]. 
748 MAFLAFS, supra note 712, art. 3(2)(ii)-(iii); MAAS, supra note 712, art. 3(2)(ii)-(iii); 
MAFLPAS, supra note 724, art. 3(2)(ii)-(iii). 
749 Ibid. On effective regulatory control more generally, see above at 187-90 (discussing 
ICAO’s principal place of business and effective regulatory control criteria); below at 332-39 
(providing a more substantive discussion of these provisions). 
750 MAFLAFS, supra note 712, art. 3(2)(iii); MAAS, supra note 712, art. 3(2)(iii); MAFLPAS, 
supra note 724, art. 3(2)(iii). 
751 See e.g. Thomas et al., supra note 116 at 63, 67 & 199 (also cited in Tan, “Prospects for 
ASAM”, supra note 44 at 268 & 275-76). 
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the airline still may not fly. Indeed, both alternatives remain merely 
suggestive: they do not require ASEAN member states to accept designations 
under either the ASEAN or principal place of business criterion.752 All this 
means that the agreements do little more than ask member states to consider 
the potential alternatives to nationality – an objective which, while no means 
ignoble, does very little for concrete change. 
 In 2010, ASEAN member states also took another step towards ASAM 
by adopting a common external policy with its dialogue partners. The 
substance of this measure, as well as its limitations, is presented in the 
following section. 
 The ASAM Framework builds on these rather modest suggestions by 
introducing a roadmap listing a series of specific measures to be taken with 
respect to the economic and technical elements of the proposed market. With 
respect to economic matters, the Roadmap for the Economic Elements of the 
ASAM lists a number of targeted goals with respect to such elements as 
market access, charters, ownership and control, tariffs, commercial activities, 
competition law, consumer protection, airport user charges, dispute resolution, 
and relations with Dialogue Partners.753 In some areas this means integration 
with wider ASEAN legal developments, such as ASEAN “all-sector” 
consumer protection and competition laws, or the ASEAN Enhanced Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism, by 2015.754 In other areas, such as charters on routes 
not served by scheduled airlines, tariff filing and commercial activities not 
                                                
752 Supra note 748 (permitting an ASEAN- or foreign-owned airline to operate “subject to the 
acceptance by a Contracting Part receiving such application” for permission). 
753 ATM, ASAM Implementation Framework, supra note 747 at IV, para. 7.A, VII. 
754 Ibid. at VII. 
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subject to existing contractual obligations, the Roadmap targets the conclusion 
of air transport agreements with Dialogue Partners such as India and South 
Korea, based on the principle of ASEAN centrality, with further agreements to 
be negotiated in the period 2016-2020.755 In the technical areas of safety, 
security, and air traffic management, the Roadmap for the Technical Elements 
of the ASAM establishes important proposals in the areas of information 
exchange, regulatory harmonization, and ultimately integration, spread across 
a timeline that indicates 2012, 2015, and beyond 2020 (2015 in the case of air 
traffic management) as critical periods to achieve its particular objectives.756 
 However, for the important provisions on market access and ownership 
and control, ““twin” features [that] lie at the heart of any meaningful air 
services liberalization policy”757 and the subject of Chapter 5, the Roadmap 
for the Economic Elements of the ASAM gives very little guidance. For one, 
the Roadmap does not figure market access relaxations beyond MAFLPAS 
into the Framework; rather, it merely calls for member states to review the 
implementation of open skies and to discuss further relaxations “if 
necessary”.758 The latter point seems to confirm Professor Alan Tan’s reading 
that the ASAM might ultimately end up a less ambitious project than initially 
thought.759 In the area of ownership and control, the Roadmap targets the 
introduction of the principal place of business and effective regulatory control 
criteria by 2015, while “commenc[ing] discussion on further liberalization of 
                                                
755 Ibid. On the idea of ASEAN centrality, see below at 246-48. 
756 ATM, ASAM Implementation Framework, ibid. at VIII. 
757 Tan, “Prospects for ASAM”, supra note 44 at 267. 
758 ATM, ASAM Implementation Framework, supra note 747, VII. 
759 Tan, “Prospects for ASAM”, supra note 44 at 283. See generally the quotation in infra note 
773 and accompanying text. 
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ownership and control of ASEAN Member States, including the concept of an 
‘ASEAN Community Carrier’” only during the subsequent five year period.760  
 Ultimately, the ASAM Framework leaves open a number of questions 
regarding both ownership and control and market access provisions, and 
ultimately the final structure of the initiative. Perhaps the most prominent 
question raised invokes the relationship between the ASEAN carrier clause, 
the principal place of business and effectively regulatory control clause, and 
market access relaxations.  The last comprehensive report on member states’ 
attitudes to integration is contained in a 2008 report by CAPA Consulting 
commissioned by the ASEAN Secretariat on the prospects of establishing an 
ASAM and on handling ASEAN’s external relations.761 While a number of 
states supported the idea of a principal place of business plus effective control 
clause, only Malaysia and Singapore supported the ASEAN ownership and 
control provisions in the short term.762 Others, including Indonesia and Brunei, 
saw the ASEAN airline as a longer-term goal, while others were more reticent 
to take up an ASEAN approach.763 At the same time, only two states 
(Singapore and Brunei) supported the idea of even seventh freedom 
relaxations: five (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam) 
opposed the idea while three (the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia) 
                                                
760 ATM, ASAM Implementation Framework, supra note 747, VII. 
761 Thomas et al., supra note 116 at 63-98. Altogether, the report identified twelve areas 
(ownership and control, market access, tariffs, commercial opportunities, safety/technical 
regulation, dispute resolution, competition law and state aid, consumer protection, 
environmental regulations, airport use, air traffic management, and social impact provisions) 
relevant to creating a single internal market. It also considered external relations (see below at 
246-48), recommending ASEAN member states move towards a European-style horizontal 
mandate. See generally ibid. at 187-99. 
762 Ibid. at 65. 
763 Ibid. at 65-66. 
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remained non-committed.764 No member states suggested exchanging 
cabotage, although Singapore remained open to the idea.765 Table 4.1 lists 
each member state’s response to each proposal.  
 
Table 4.1: ASEAN Member State Opinions on Ownership & Control 
and Market Access Rules 
 
















































































                                                





















 Ultimately, ASEAN member states have yet to determine a concrete 
shape and form for the ASAM, leaving a broad range of possibilities open to 
member states. The most comprehensive suggestion again lies in the CAPA 
Consulting Report (of which Professor Tan was a member), which 
recommends an ASEAN community carrier approach, together with gradual 
market access relaxations on a seventh freedom and cabotage basis through 
2023.766 These relaxations would be agreed on by the 2015 deadline for 
ASAM; however, given the political atmosphere of such relaxations, the 
Report lays out a “base case” for integration that would be phased into three 
periods – 2014-15, 2019-20, and 2022-23.767 The terms could then be speeded 
up or slowed down depending on member states’ willingness to push ASAM 
through its final stages. For ownership and control, the report advocates the 
use of an ASEAN ownership and control provision, adopted in 2014-15 but 
which individual states can delay applying until 2019-20.768 Similarly, market 
access commitments would remove all restrictions on first to fifth freedom 
rights as well for all-cargo sevenths, access to unserved routes on a seventh 
                                                
766 Ibid. at 64-75. 
767 See generally ibid. at 13-27 (providing an executive summary of recommendations) & 118-
22 (providing a timeline and alternative scenarios for implementing the recommendations). 
768 Ibid. at 68-69. 
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and even eighth freedom basis by 2015.769 This would be followed by the 
removal of restrictions on inter-capital sevenths, eighths (subject to local lines 
setting the price floor), charters, and (optionally) ninths.770 All remaining 
restrictions would then be removed by the 2023 deadline.771 Table 4.2 
provides a summary of the suggested base case phase-ins. 
 
Table 4.2: Integration Packages Suggested by CAPA Consulting’s 2008 
Report (Scheduled Passenger Services Only) 
 
 Market Access 
 
Ownership & Control 
 
2014-15 1. Unrestricted third to 
sixth freedom traffic; 
 
2. Seventh freedom access 
on unserved routes; 
 
3. Eighth freedom access 
on city pairs unserved by 
direct flights; 
1. ASEAN ownership and 
control clause introduced; 
 
2. Designations based on 




3. Opt-out for home carriers 
permitted; 
2019-20 1. Seventh freedom access 
between capitals; 
 
2. Eighth freedom to all 
city pairs subject to a 
minimum pricing rule; 
 
3. Ninth freedom services 
(opt-out possible); 
1. Opt-out provisions for 
home carriers phased out; 
 
2. Designation remains based 
on principal place of 
business/effective 
regulatory control. 
2022-23 Restrictions lifted for 





 Other forms of integration are equally plausible. Member states might 
choose to adopt a principal place of business for the ownership and control 
                                                




provisions while bifurcating the control standard into an “ASEAN effective 
economic control” standard while maintaining effective regulatory control 
with the member state in which the airline’s business seat resides. Such a 
clause would relax control over business relations in scenarios where member 
states ultimately decide to retain market access restrictions on traffic rights 
beyond the fifth freedom. 
 A second alternative might be to open ownership and control standards 
on a principal place of business plus effective regulatory control basis, but 
extend favorable market access provisions to airlines collectively owned and 
controlled by ASEAN interests. Under such a provision, a group of US 
interests that form a Singaporean company might be permitted access to routes 
within ASEAN on a first to fifth freedom basis, while a Singaporean company 
collectively owned and controlled by Indonesian and Vietnamese interests 
could access intra-ASEAN routes on a first through ninth freedom basis. 
Australia and New Zealand provide similar preferential arrangements for 
Australian and New Zealand interests under the SAMANZ, discussed further 
in Chapter 5.772 
 Still, it is impossible not to acknowledge that ASEAN’s integration 
project may fall short of a fully integrated internal market. With less than full 
support for market access liberalization beyond open skies (and as of 2008 
almost none for cabotage), Thailand’s concerns over the nationality of its own 
air transport system, and the Philippines’ constitutional limitation of foreign 
investment in its system, it quite possible that the ASAM “will end up being a 
single market arrangement purely in name, with only modest relaxation being 
                                                
772 See generally below at 310-11 & 328-31. 
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adopted for the regional air transport sector”,773 a risk that relates to the 
leverage ASEAN member states stand to gain in terms of competitive 
advantages in other regions, including the United States, the EU, and 
Northeast Asia.774 Whether the member states will bear that risk in lieu of 
other (economic and non-economic) risks associated with integration is a 
subject that permeates much of the following discussion. 
 
3.1.3. External Relations and Dialogue Partners 
 
ASEAN member states do recognize the benefits ASEAN-wide re-
organization would have on the sphere of external relations. In November 
2010, the ten states took their first formal step in institutionalizing a 
specifically “ASEAN-wide” regional approach with the promulgation of the 
Memorandum of Understanding on the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations’ Air Services Engagement with Dialogue Partners.775 The 
Memorandum follows the acknowledgement of the 15th ASEAN Transport 
Ministers Meeting in December 2009 that ASEAN should prioritize intra-
ASEAN efforts at liberalization over those undertaken with ASEAN Dialogue 
Partners.776 This requirement is in compliance with the principal of ASEAN 
                                                
773 Tan, “Prospects for ASAM”, supra note 44 at 283. 
774 Ibid. at 284 (noting that “[i]t thus behooves upon ASEAN policymakers to conclude as 
extensive and ambitious an SAM as possible, so as to enable the region to negotiate with 
Northeast Asia (and eventually with South Asia and other regions) from a position of relative 
strength and regional unity. This is ultimately the only direction for ASEAN States to move, 
and it is thus imperative for governments and their carriers to be persuaded to see beyond the 
ends of their noses in promoting a collective regional interest.”). On Europe, see generally 
Tan, “Horizontal Mandate”, supra note 168 at 441-52. 
775 Memorandum of Understanding on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ Air 
Services Engagement with Dialogue Partners, done at Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei 
Darussalam, 12 November 2010 [MoU on Dialogue Partners]. 
776 See ibid., Preamble, para. 3. 
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centrality in external relations, as provided in Article 2(2)(m) of the ASEAN 
Charter.777 It also commits individual member states to the ASEAN 
liberalization process where that state wishes to take advantage of the benefits 
of a consolidated negotiating position through ASEAN. 
 The Memorandum itself requires ASEAN member states to first ratify 
the ASEAN-wide Agreements and Protocols granting a particular set of rights 
before ratifying an agreement between ASEAN and a third party granting the 
same rights.778 Thus, Indonesia cannot take advantage of the ASEAN-China 
Agreement’s relaxations on third/fourth freedom traffic (discussed below)779 
without first ratifying the intra-ASEAN agreements and their Protocols up to 
an equivalent level of coverage. To ensure this takes place, it requires the 
ASEAN Secretary-General to maintain an accurate and updated register of 
ratifications for this purpose and that the member states be automatically 
accorded the same rights given to Dialogue Partners should a member state 
first ratify an agreement with a Dialogue Partner.780 In other words, if 
Indonesia were to ratify the ASEAN-China Agreement and Protocol it would 
also result in a de facto ratification of the ASEAN-wide agreements 
addressing third/fourth freedom. 
 The Memorandum is designed to address the particular institutional 
character of ASEAN. As already noted, ASEAN does not maintain 
                                                
777 Ibid. (noting that such a policy corresponds with the principle of the centrality of ASEAN 
in cooperating with Dialogue Partners contained in the ASEAN Charter). ASEAN Charter, 
supra note 148, art. 2(2)(m) (providing that “ASEAN and its Member States shall act in 
accordance with the following principles: […] the centrality of ASEAN in external political, 
economic, social and cultural relations while remaining actively engaged, outward-looking, 
inclusive and non-discriminatory.” [emphasis added]). 
778 MoU on Dialogue Partners, ibid., para.2-3. 
779 See below at 256-60. 
780 MoU on Dialogue Partners, supra note 775 para. 4-5. 
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supranational authority over its member states, nor has it been assigned a 
specific competence to bind member states to agreements with Dialogue 
partners. Again, ratification – this time of all member states, unless 
provisional effect is allowed for under domestic law – is required to both bring 
the Memorandum into force and bind the member states to the terms of the 
agreement.781 The fact that only Cambodia, the Philippines and Vietnam have 
ratified the instrument means that the document has not yet entered into 
force,782 let alone applies to the entire region. Despite this, the political 
consequences of acting against a particular commitment linked to a mutually 
agreed norm, once created, may nevertheless remain high. 
 At the same time, the Memorandum leaves open the right to 
independently negotiate bilaterally with Dialogue Partners and other third 
parties, a point that, like Europe, could significantly alter the structure of 
traffic flows to/from the region. Liberal agreements such as the UK-Singapore 
Air Transport Agreement will continue to both affect the patterns of air 
transport services and put pressure on recalcitrant states to adopt liberal 
stances as the politics of gateway status vie with demands for protection. 
 
3.1.4. Flexible Paths for ASEAN Air Transport Markets: Networked 
Regionalism and ASEAN Minus X 
 
Despite the prolonged negotiation period, incremental liberalization, and the 
consensual nature of ASEAN institution-building, ASEAN member states 
have failed to fully implement ASEAN open skies or even agree on concrete 
                                                
781 Ibid., para. 7. 
782 See ASEAN, “Table of Treaty Ratifications”, supra note 722 at 8. 
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measures beyond it. As noted in the previous sections, none of the agreements 
have received full ratification.783 Such a failure to implement the previously 
agreed upon instruments emphasizes two dimensions of ASEAN that 
distinguish it from similar efforts in the United States or Europe. The first is 
ASEAN’s lack of superior authority to bind member states with direct effect, a 
power the United States possesses through federalism and the EU through 
constitutional developments at the European level from 1957 onward. The 
second is the concept of “ASEAN Minus X” (or “ASEAN–X”). Both 
introduce a significant degree of flexibility not existent in the contexts 
discussed so far. 
 Central to the idea of both American federalism and European union is 
the notion of a collective of territorial bodies that surrender a degree of 
autonomy to a higher set of institutions that possess the right to make 
decisions that both override the constituent unit’s authority and that are 
directly applicable in each constituent unit. This characteristic is absent in 
ASEAN. Indeed, the ASEAN member states remain committed to the 
autonomy of each state as a basic organizing principle of the organization as a 
whole.784 Thus, member states remain free to implement (or not implement) a 
particular ASEAN instrument or set of instruments, a point which the 
                                                
783 See generally ibid. at 5-8 & 19-23; BAP 2011-2015, supra note 702 at 20 & 42. 
784 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, done in Denpasar, Bali, 24 February 
1976, art. 2 (providing the following guiding principles for ASEAN: mutual respect for the 
independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity and national identity of all nations; 
the right of every State to lead its national existence free from external interference, 
subversion or coercion; non-interference in the internal affairs of one another; settlement of 
differences or disputes by peaceful means; renunciation of the threat or use of force; effective 
cooperation among themselves). These principles make up the core of “the ASEAN Way”. 
See e.g. Michael Ewing-Chow, “Culture Club or Chameleon: Should ASEAN Adopt 
Legalization for Economic Integration?” (2008) 12 S.Y.B.I.L. 225 at 226.  
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requirement of domestic ratification for each of the ASEAN air transport 
agreements to come into force against that country makes obviously apparent. 
 Furthermore, the ability to exit a particular set of instruments has itself 
been institutionally sanctioned through a modality of variable geometry called 
the “ASEAN–X” Formula. Under the Formula, one or more member states 
may  “opt out from certain economic schemes that it is not yet ready to 
participate, although it has taken part in determining and approving such 
economic schemes in the first place”,785 while two or more states may also 
agree to integrate further or faster than consensus permits.786 An example of 
the latter (which is also called “ASEAN 2 +X”) is the Multilateral Agreement 
for the Liberalization of Air Passenger Services, or MALAPS, an agreement 
between Singapore, Thailand, and Brunei signed in February 2004 essentially 
granting each party unrestricted third/fourth freedom market access rights.787 
Air transport has been consistently marked by this modality of variable 
geometry, being incorporated into the 2004 Framework Agreement for the 
Integration of Priority Sectors,788 the AEC Blueprint  (which accommodates 
                                                
785 ASEAN, Media Release, “ASEAN Leaders Sign ASEAN Charter”, Singapore, 20 
November 2007, online: <http://www.asean.org/21085.htm>. 
786 See generally AEC Blueprint, supra note 689, para. 20. See also Ewing-Chow, supra note 
784 at 227 (noting that the AEC Blueprint adopts a modality of variable geometry (ASEAN 
Minus X) and that this “raises the question of whether ASEAN has the necessary legal 
frameworks and institutions to transform this economic vision into reality.”). 
787 See Tan, “Prospects for ASAM”, supra note 44 at 259 (also noting a similar agreement 
with respect to air cargo services concluded just prior to MALAPS and the fact that the 
agreement “stops short” of according unlimited fifth freedom rights and does nothing to 
change the traditional ownership and control rules). 
788 Framework for Priority Sectors, supra note 703, art. 5(c) (requiring member states to 
“integrate trade in services by: […] applying the ASEAN-X formula”); Framework 
Amendment, art. 3 (amending art. 5 to require member states to “accelerate the liberalisation 
of trade in priority services sectors by 2010. This could be achieved through: […] (f.) 
applying the ASEAN-X formula”). RIATS also specifically identifies ASEAN–X, as well as 
bilateralism, as a means of moving beyond the general terms proposed for the region as a 
whole, while simultaneously providing for backward flexibility by requiring that states “be 
provided flexibility with regard to the implementation of the proposed timeline for the specific 
measures.” RIATS, supra note 705 at II, para. 3. 
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such “pre-agreed flexibility” for the liberalization of services, while at the 
same time preventing “back-loading” of commitments), and the ASAM 
Implementation Framework.789 Indeed, these principles do much to explain 
both the number of Protocols and the liberties taken in the 
ratification/implementation process. 
 This is not to cast variable geometry in an inherently negative light. 
The ability to participate in generating group norms while simultaneously 
allowing individual states to Selectively Exit790 from them gives members the 
opportunity to establish a system normatively desirable to all while giving 
states desiring deeper, faster integration the opportunity to do so without 
isolating those joining later. This permits a two- (or more) speed process that 
may be desirable in the context of groups with vastly differing levels of 
development such as that between states such as Singapore and others such as 
Cambodia or Laos.791 “ASEAN Minus X” ensures the legitimacy of those 
institutions when countries like the Philippines or Indonesia eventually decide 
to ratify those commitments. 
 Yet variability, whether two-speed or even a buffet-style arrangement 
where each state picks and chooses its desired programs, may also become the 
source of conflict and tension within the system. Three issues come 
immediately to mind. One potential problem relates to the fact that a two or 
                                                
789 AEC Blueprint, supra note 689, para. 20; ATM, ASAM Implementation Framework, supra 
note 474 at 3, VI, para. 11. This last point is observable inter alia in the MAFLPAS Protocols, 
which explicitly exclude points between capital cities.  
790 For a discussion of the roles of Total and Selective Exit and Voice in shaping regional 
institutions, see below at 390-93. 
791 See e.g. Forsyth et al., “ASEAN Open Skies”, supra note 692 at 144-46. To put the 
differentials in capacity in perspective, a recent acquisition of two Airbus A320s has doubled 
Lao Airlines’ capacity. See CAPA Centre for Aviation, “Laos Market Poised for Major 




more speed system is capable of creating a substantial degree of discordance 
between what is on paper and what will be implemented.792 A second issue 
lies in the potential that sanctioning selective exit from group commitments 
can have on the strength of reputational benefits and harms associated with 
compliance and non-compliance, respectively.793 A third issue, related to the 
second, pertains to the incentives a technocratic body has to create an 
agreement that can be implemented in the national legislature of each state, 
versus simply an agreement on paper, as a measure of success. In addition to 
these points, the effects of flexible liberalization may either increase or 
decrease recalcitrance to the regime – a point taken up as a subject in Chapter 
6. Given the current state of affairs, air transport may well fall within those 
categories of controversy. 
 
3.2. Northeast Asia: The Possibility of Trilateral Cooperation 
 
While ASEAN remains the only institutionalized form of regional air transport 
cooperation in the region, another proposal that has gained attention in recent 
years is one to establish a Northeast Asian trilateral aviation bloc composed of 
South Korea, Japan and China. Such a proposal is significant because of the 
effects a trilateral arrangement would have both in terms of rationalizing air 
transport services across an incredibly dense field of interaction among Asia’s 
                                                
792 As if to emphasize this point, in May 2010 Mr. Tri S. Sunoko, then director of air 
transportation at the Indonesian Ministry of Transport, was reported as saying that, for various 
reasons, Indonesia would only be capable of relaxing restrictions on five points in Indonesia – 
Jakarta, Medan, Surabaya, Bali, and Makassar – by 2015. Kaur, supra note 742. Nevertheless, 
six months later the Indonesian Transport Minister signed off on MAFLPAS, including the 
Protocols and timelines. 
793 On reputational harm, see generally supra notes 640-41. 
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largest economies and the effects trilateral cooperation in air transport would 
have on the process of wider regional air transport liberalization and 
integration.794 
 The idea of a Northeast Asian aviation bloc has existed within 
academic circles for almost a decade.795 More recently, political elites 
themselves have begun to discuss the possibility of relaxing access between 
the three states. In 2010, the China-Japan-South Korea Trilateral Summit, an 
annual initiative between the three governments begun in 2008, brought the 
development of transport and logistics networks within its Trilateral 
Cooperation VISION 2020. Vision 2020 sets out a fourfold working program 
in the areas of economic activity, sustainable development and environmental 
protection, human and cultural exchange, and peace and stability, and 
institutionalized the relationship through a Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat, 
based in Seoul, which opened in September 2011.796 The Leaders have 
                                                
794 On the potential effects a Northeast Asian trilateral agreement would have on an 
ASEAN+3-type transport market, see Tan, “Prospects for ASAM”, supra note 44 at 283-84 
(noting its role in promoting an ASAM); Thomas et al., supra note 116 at 160-62. 
795 See e.g. Thomas et al., ibid.; Tan, “Prospects for ASAM”, ibid. at 284, fn 89 (noting that 
“[d]iscussions in Northeast Asia have so far been initiated by academics and think-tanks”); 
Sumner La Croix, “Liberalizing and Integrating Aviation Markets in Northeast Asia: 
Prospects and Perils” Working Paper 02-2 (January 2002), online: University of Hawaii 
<http://www.economics.hawaii.edu/research/workingpapers/WP_02-2.pdf>; Oum & Lee, 
supra note 417. The University of Tokyo Graduate School of Public Policy’s International 
Transport Policy Research Unit has hosted a number of air transport seminars, including three 
on liberalization. See International Transport Policy Research Unit, University of Tokyo, 
“ITPU Seminar”, online: <http://www.pp.u-tokyo.ac.jp/ITPU/en/seminar/index.htm> (listing 
six seminars, including the 6th ITPU International Seminar, “Further Liberalization and 
cooperation in North East Asia” (11 June 2010), the 2nd ITPU Seminar, “Liberalization and 
Cooperation in North East Asian Skies” (2 March 2007), and the 1st ITPU Open Seminar, 
“Globalization, Regionalism and International Transport – Challenges for Air Transport in 
Japan and East Asia” (15 December 2005)). 
796 Japan-China-Republic of Korea Trilateral Summit, Trilateral Cooperation VISION 2020, 
Jeju, Korea, 30 May 2010, online: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan 
<http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/jck/summit1005/vision2020.html>. See especially 
ibid. at 2-3 (providing the following: “We recognize that establishing a coordinated and 
efficient transport and logistics system among the three countries will benefit the reduction of 
production costs and the improvement of international competitiveness. Therefore, we 
advocate to continuously take full advantage of the China-Japan-Korea Transport and 
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identified air transport liberalization within this broader structure as a 
facilitator of tourism development and cultural exchange.797 Yet trilateral 
discussions have so far been tentative, theoretical, and at a high level of 
abstraction, with more substantive measures yet to be reported. 
 Indeed, while the sector has been tentatively earmarked for 
liberalization among heads of state, this has not yet translated into liberal 
policies between the three countries. The main advocate for integration has 
been South Korea, which has consistently maintained a liberal relationship 
with the US, including an open skies agreement signed in 1998,798 lower unit 
costs than Japan, and which seeks to improve its position as a significant sixth 
freedom hub for traffic to and from a burgeoning China.799 China and Japan 
have moved more cautiously in opening their markets. Yet with Japan’s recent 
shift from conservative/protectionist to liberal international air transport policy 
may signal a potential breakthrough in the three states’ relationships. Indeed, 
Japan and Korea recently took a significant step forward when in December 
2010 they signed a bilateral agreement that will remove restrictions on Narita 
from summer of 2013, although access to Haneda will remain restricted, 
                                                
Logistics Ministerial Conference and bilateral policy dialogues to push forward the 
development of transport and logistics network in Northeast Asia, for the purpose of a 
seamless logistics system.”). See also “Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat Opens in Seoul” 
Xinhua (27 September 2011), online: People’s Daily Online 
<http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90883/7606468.html>. 
797 See Fourth Japan-China Republic of Korea Trilateral Summit, Summit Declaration, Tokyo, 
22 May 2011, online: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-
paci/jck/summit1105/declaration.html>. It is interesting to note that while air transport is 
discussed in the context of tourism and cultural exchange, land and sea transport are discussed 
in a separate paragraph on logistics. 
798 See generally US-Korea Agreement, supra note 425. 
799 See e.g. Tan, “Singapore’s Agreements”, supra note 519 at 368-69 (noting both South 
Korea’s interest and China and Japan remaining “cool to the idea”, appearing “content to 
pursue bilateral relaxations at their own pace.”); Thomas et al, supra note 116 at 161. 
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apparently due to slot restrictions.800 Yet significant restrictions remain on 
flights between Korea and Japan on the one hand and China on the other. 
Indeed, China has taken an extremely protectionist approach to liberalization 
with its neighbors, opening market access rights to only two provinces, 
Shandong and Hainan island as of 2010.801 Whether South Korea and Japan 
can collectively engage China and what those outcomes might be have yet to 
be determined, although given China’s current process of consolidating its 
domestic market and the competition for transpacific hub status that 
liberalization will necessarily entail, it is unlikely that significant gains, 
especially to the coastal hubs of Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou, will be 
immediately forthcoming. 
 
3.3. Broader East Asian Cooperation 
 
There remains the question of broader air transport cooperation within the 
region. Indeed, economic and transport geographies hint at a functional 
                                                
800 See e.g. “S. Korean Airlines Allowed ‘Limitless’ Flights to Japan’s Narita” Yonhap News 
Agency (22 December 2010), online: 
<http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/business/2010/12/22/40/0501000000AEN20101222008000
320F.HTML>. Prior to this, Tokyo had been excluded from an otherwise liberal agreement 
between the two countries in 2007. Nicholas Ionides, “Japan Agrees Liberal Bilateral with 
Korea” Airline Business (21 August 2007), online: Flight Global 
<http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/japan-agrees-liberal-bilateral-with-korea-
216190/>. 
801 See Gun Young Lee, “Toward Integrated NE Asian Air Transport Market – Air Services 
Liberalization Policies and Strategies in NE Asia (Presentation to the International Conference 
on Air Transport, Air Law and Regulation, Singapore, 24-26 May 2010), online: Centre for 
International Law <http://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/Focus-on-Asia_Lee-
Gun-Young.pdf> [Lee, “Toward Integrated NE Asian Market”]; Yeong Heok Lee, “The 
Effects of Open Sky and its Prospects in NE Asia” (Presentation to the International 
Conference on Air Transport, Air Law and Regulation, Singapore, 24-26 May 2010), online: 
Centre for International Law <http://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp/wp-
content/uploads/2010/05/Liberalisation-of-Air-Transport_Lee-Yeong-Heok.pdf> (noting, 
inter alia, that Korea-China talks on unrestricted third/fourth freedoms had stalled, and a 2007 
“open skies” agreement between Japan and Korea had excluded Tokyo). 
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economic space comprised of the region as a whole – that is, both Northeast 
and Southeast Asia.802 The institutional architecture for such an arrangement 
has also begun to take on more substance. 
 In this regard, the region boasts an extremely flexible set of 
institutional forms, centered on “ASEAN+X”, another formula stretching 
ASEAN’s territorial geometry, this time outwardly.803 The formula has 
already been expanded to include China (ASEAN+1), China, South Korea, 
and Japan (ASEAN+3), the East Asia Summit, comprised of ASEAN+3 plus 
India, Australia, and New Zealand (ASEAN+6), and the East Asia Summit 
plus Russia and the United States (ASEAN+8), with ASEAN+8 beginning to 
shade into other forums such as APEC.804 There is a strategic element to this 
approach. Just as the EU creates the scale necessary to engage the US as 
equal, the shape of negotiations allows ASEAN to leverage its collective size 
to its advantage with its larger Asian neighbors.805 
 Within this paradigm, ASEAN and China undertook the first formal 
step towards air services liberalization between Northeast and Southeast Asian 
states in 2007, when they adopted the ASEAN-China Aviation Cooperation 
                                                
802 See e.g. Fujita, supra note 112 at 2-6; ASEAN, “Top Ten Sources of Foreign Investment 
Inflow to ASEAN”, (15 August 2011), online: 
<http://www.asean.org/images/pdf/resources/statistics/table27.pdf> (noting that for the period 
2008-10 Japan was the second (USD16.287 billion), China the fourth (USD8.5 billion) and 
Korea the sixth (USD6.837 billion) largest source of foreign (non-ASEAN) investor to the 
region as a whole). 
803 See e.g. Dent, supra note 13 at 1-38. 
804 See e.g. ibid. at 23 (producing a diagram demonstrating the overlap between regional 
projects). 
805 See e.g. Tay, supra note 149 at 155-56 (noting three factors driving ASEAN’s post-
1997/98 integration: the permeation of the Asian Financial Crisis into all ASEAN economies; 
the economic rise of China and India; and the need to gain political influence vis-à-vis other 
regional powers); Ewing-Chow, supra note 784 at 234-36. 
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Framework.806 The parties had been discussing the project for some time. In 
2002, a Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-Operation 
between ASEAN and the People’s Republic of China included a plan to 
extend a proposed ASEAN-China free trade area to cover matters of 
transport.807 A Memorandum of Understanding followed in 2004, outlining 
areas of cooperation in each mode of transportation, including potential air 
services agreements “on a bilateral, regional, or sub-regional basis” that would 
support the movement of passengers and cargo within the region, promoting 
cooperative arrangements between airlines, and the exchange of information 
on air safety and aircraft accidents and incidents.808 The Cooperation 
Framework concretized these plans into a set of objectives designed to 
liberalize passenger and cargo services in the areas of market access on a first 
to fifth freedom basis, multiple designation, and capacity and frequency 
determination.809 Absent is any reference to freedom in matters of price 
determination, although the Framework itself notes the provisions outlined are 
merely exemplary in nature.810 
 The parties added flesh to bones in November 2010 when they signed 
an ASEAN-China Air Transport Agreement, the first such agreement between 
                                                
806 ASEAN-China Aviation Cooperation Framework, online: ASEAN 
<http://www.asean.org/images/2012/Economic/ATM/other_doc/ASEAN-
China%20Aviation%20Cooperation%20Framework.pdf>. 
807 Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Co-Operation between ASEAN and 
the People’s Republic of China, done at Phnom Penh, 4 November 2002, art. 7(2). 
808 Memorandum of Understanding between the Governments of the Member Countries of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Government of the People’s Republic of 
China on Transport Cooperation, done at Vientiane, Lao PDR, 27 November 2004. 
809 ASEAN-China Aviation Cooperation Framework, supra note 806, para. 6. 
810 Ibid. 
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ASEAN and a Dialogue Partner.811 Both structurally and in terms of content, 
the Agreement takes on many of the characteristics of the “ASEAN-wide” 
agreements. Provisions on fair competition, tariff approval, and safeguards 
remain the same in their essential qualities.812 Like the ASEAN-wide 
agreements, it introduces an ASEAN carrier clause as an alternative to the 
traditional ownership and control clause, permitting an airline with its 
principal place of business in an ASEAN member state, is substantially owned 
by ASEAN member states or their nationals, and with effective regulatory 
control exercised by the designating state to operate within the area, “subject 
to the acceptance by a Contracting Party receiving such application from an 
ASEAN Member State”.813 As with the ASEAN-wide agreements, the proviso 
removes much of its functional value. 
 It also defines and exchanges commercial rights through a set of three 
Annexes.814 As with MAAS Annex I, the first set of Annexes to the ASEAN-
China Agreement define its scope with respect to scheduled and non-
scheduled transport, respectively.815 Annex I provides the designated airlines 
of each state the right to operate from the designating state to the state 
accepting the designation as well as between and beyond points (behind points 
                                                
811 Air Transport Agreement between the Governments of the Member States of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Government of the People’s Republic of 
China, done at Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam, 12 November 2010 [ASEAN-
China Agreement]; Protocol 1 on Unlimited Third and Fourth Freedom Traffic between Any 
Points in Contracting Parties, done at Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei Darussalam, 12 
November 2010 [ASEAN-China Protocol 1]. 
812 ASEAN-China Agreement, ibid., arts. 9, (tariffs), 10 (safeguards), 11 (fair competition). 
813 Ibid., art. 3; supra notes 748 and accompanying text. 
814 Ibid., 2(2)(c). 
815 See generally ibid., Annex I: Scheduled Air Services; Annex II: Non-Scheduled/Charter 
Air Services. 
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are not mentioned), with full operational flexibility on those routes.816 The 
exchange is also made based on states: because each state has to 
independently sign and ratify the Agreement for it to enter into force (and only 
as to the ratifying state), ASEAN is not taken as a regional entity.817 
Interpreted restrictively, these provisions could limit the scope of an ASEAN 
carrier’s feed. The result would be that, unlike the EU-US Agreement, an 
ASEAN carrier such as Singapore Airlines cannot (expressly) draw traffic 
from other points in another ASEAN member state through its hub, at least 
without raising questions of interpretation.818 This high level of 
interpretational flexibility is also found in Annex II, which establishes the 
conditions for non-scheduled and charter operations, permitting non-scheduled 
services provided the airline request prior permission fourteen or more days 
before the flight and that “in accordance with its own laws and regulations, the 
non-scheduled/charter air services of the designated airline(s) of each 
Contracting Party shall not unduly affect the operation of the agreed services 
on the routes.”819 
 As with the ASEAN-wide agreements, it is the Implementing 
Protocols that convey the substantive operating rights. Currently, the 
contracting parties have promulgated one such Protocol, which exchanges 
third and fourth freedom rights for both passenger and cargo services between 
                                                
816 Ibid., Annex I, s. 1 (route schedule) & s. 2 (operational flexibility). 
817 Ibid., Annex III, Protocol 1, art. 1 (identifying routes) & 2 (excluding Hong Kong and 
Macau Special Administrative Regions). Cf. EC-US First Stage Agreement, supra note 536, 
art. 3(c)(I) & (ii).  
818 See ibid. 
819 Ibid., Annex II. Cf. supra note 251 (noting the terms of the Paris and Manila Agreements 
on non-scheduled services). 
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the individual ASEAN member states and China.820 The Protocol also lifts 
capacity and frequency restrictions for such services.821 Further exchanges 
have yet to be negotiated, although it is likely that a second Protocol will 
exchange unlimited fifth freedom traffic rights, either within the parties’ 
territory or to external points. If the latter, market access might further be 
limited in terms of point of access and/or overall capacity. 
 ASEAN continues to be the focal point of air transport regionalism in 
East Asia more broadly. It is currently in talks with South Korea on an 
ASEAN-ROK Air Transport Agreement.822 Japan has also expressed interest 
in pursuing open skies with ASEAN member states.823 Outside East Asia, 
India and ASEAN adopted an ASEAN-India Aviation Cooperation 
Framework at the 14th ASEAN Transport Ministers’ Meeting on 6 November 
2008.824 Yet the question remains whether developments in the area might 
alter the approach. On the one hand, the emergence of trilateral cooperation in 
Northeast Asia may or may not alter the timing of attempts at a broader 
regionalism, as Northeast Asian states try to align themselves to negotiate 
bloc-to-bloc with its Southeast Asian neighbors.825 In this regard, the limited 
                                                
820 ASEAN-China Protocol 1, supra note 811, art. 1. 
821 Ibid., art. 2. 
822 See e.g. “Joint Media Statement of the Tenth Meeting of ASEAN, China, Japan and 
Republic of Korea Tourism Ministers (10th M-ATM Plus Three)”, Phnom Penh, 18 January 
2011, para. 3, online: <http://www.asean.org/news/asean-statement-communiques/item/joint-
media-statement-of-the-tenth-meeting-of-asean-china-japan-and-republic-of-korea-tourism-
ministers-10th-m-atm-plus-three-phnom-penh-18-january-2011>. 
823 See ibid. 
824 See “Statement of the 7th ASEAN-India Summit”, Cha-am Hua Hin, Thailand, 24 October 
2009, online: ASEAN <http://www.asean.org/23588.htm>; “Plan of Action To Implement the 
ASEAN-India Partnership for Peace, Progress and Shared Prosperity (2010-2015)”, para. 25, 
online: ASEAN <http://www.asean.org/25551.htm>. See also M. Dinesh Varma, “ASEAN 
Wants to Firm Up Open Skies Regime with India” The Hindu (24 January 2010), online: 
<http://www.thehindu.com/news/article94013.ece>.  
825 See e.g. Thomas et al., supra note 116 at 25 (noting that “[t]he development of a trilateral 
grouping between China, Japan and Korea could slow the process of engagement with 
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dialogue between Northeast Asian states and the failure of past bilateral talks 
on free trade initiatives suggest that the ASEAN+X mechanism remains the 
most likely focal point of liberalization in the region. However, the 
considerable backsliding between ASEAN member states may suggest more 
space for Northeast Asia to organizationally “catch up” to its Southeast Asian 
neighbors. 
 On the other hand, if ASEAN continues to negotiate externally with 
Dialogue Partners as a group of states (rather than as a regional unit) and 
without having implemented a significant degree of liberalization among its 
own members, it may negatively impact its carriers’ positions vis-à-vis its 
Dialogue Partners.826 Agreements such as the ASEAN-China Air Transport 
                                                
ASEAN, as this grouping would first need to reach a common position before engaging with 
the region on a bloc-to-bloc basis.”) & 193 (noting that “[a]rriving at this position could be 
difficult and protracted, since each region would have to arrive at a common internal position 
first before engaging the other. However, it could also simplify negotiations significantly, 
since there would essentially be only two sets of rules and positions to reconcile. Hence, it is 
necessary for ASEAN to track parallel developments in the EAS to see how the latter’s 
envisioned “trilateral” may turn out.”). 
826 See generally Tan, “Prospects for ASAM”, supra note 44 at 278-83, especially 280-83 
(discussing the potential issues arising out of the ASEAN-China Aviation Cooperation 
Framework). Tan states that, in the context of an exchange of 3rd-4th freedoms between 
ASEAN and China: 
 
the ASEAN States must commit to begin parallel negotiations among themselves 
(ideally in the context of the SAM) to lift fifth and seventh freedom restrictions, and to 
possibly insert such rights into the agreement with China at a later date. […] In the 
absence of such parallel movements, it would actually not be in the ASEAN States’ 
interest to conclude a limited agreement with China that provides only unlimited 
third/fourth freedom rights. This is true for all other third State partners – principally 
India, Japan, and Korea – that may show interest in concluding an agreement with 
ASEAN. 
 
Ibid. at 281-83. Cf. Thomas et al., supra note 116 at 193 (noting that “[f]rom ASEAN’s 
perspective, negotiations with the individual ASEAN Plus 3 states can and should proceed 
immediately in the next few years in parallel with the ASAM’s own development (as well as 
the ASEAN Plus 3 states’ own discussions on a “trilateral” agreement). There is no reason 
why ASEAN should have to wait for either its own single aviation market or the ASEAN Plus 
3 states to emerge first before engaging China, Japan and Korea on an individual basis. If need 
be, any early agreements with these states can later be harmonised and “folded” into a larger 
inter-regional agreement.”). For ASEAN’s part, it has targeted expansion of its own 
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Agreement also emphasize the internal conflicts within ASEAN, which 
continues to struggle to relax even third and fourth freedom traffic rights 
between its member states. Nevertheless, the agreements such as the ASEAN-
China Agreement may ultimately prove more a boon than a disadvantage, as 
increased market access to major markets along with the ASEAN-centered 
approach adopted in 2010 might prove sufficient sweetener for more 
recalcitrant states to relax access to their own markets.827 
 
4. CORPORATE INTERESTS AND GLOBAL NETWORKS: THE ROLE OF ALLIANCES 
IN LIBERALIZATION AND INTEGRATION 
 
States do not develop policy in isolation from the opinions and interests of the 
special interest groups within the state. Indeed, the structure of stakeholder 
interests – in the form of, inter alia, consumers, airlines, labor, and localities, 
the strength and types of demands made, and the relation of demands from one 
group on those of the others – that shapes political action.828 Among those 
                                                
liberalization initiatives with Dialogue Partners as part of its 2011 ASAM Implementation 
Framework. ATM, ASAM Implementation Framework, supra note 747 at VII. 
827 Professor Tan has made the point in the following manner: 
 
it seems illogical to speak of exchanging fifth freedom rights with China when the 
ASEAN States themselves have yet to liberalize such rights among themselves! In 
essence, it is ironic that while the ASEAN States labor over the deadlines for phased 
liberalization among themselves, their preliminary discussions with China and India 
have instantly exposed how inadequate their internal arrangements are. The silver 
lining, hopefully, is that the talks with China should provide ballast for ASEAN 
member States to abolish fifth freedom restrictions among themselves well ahead of 
2015, and to accelerate the RIATS timetable at a more ambitious rate. 
 
Tan, “Prospects for ASAM”, supra note 44 at 281. 
828 Indeed, it explains both the move to liberalization (see e.g. Memo No. 2, supra note 182; 
Tan, “Policy in the Philippines”, supra note 45) and the difficulty in demanding reregulation, 
despite its negative consequences (see e.g. Levine, “Reregulated?”, supra note 38). 
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interests, those that have most influenced air transport in Asia (and continue to 
do so) have been the interests of new entrants and those of incumbents. 
 
4.1. Liberalization and the Restructuring of the Air Services Market 
 
As with Europe and the US, the combination of liberalization and robust 
economic growth has deeply affected the structure of the market at both the 
regional and global levels. One of the principal effects of relaxing entry, 
particularly in ASEAN, has been the rise of a new class of low cost carriers in 
the region, where carriers such as AirAsia, Jetstar, Cebu Pacific, Lion Air, and 
Tiger Airways have grown into extremely competitive regional brands, some 
of which compete directly with the national carrier for status and significant 
market share.829 Indeed, much of the growth in air transport within Southeast 
Asia has been a result of the introduction of the LCC to the region.830 
 Many of these airlines have also adapted the cross-border joint venture 
to introduce their brand in other states’ markets, with the parent airline taking 
a minority shareholding in the operating company, while otherwise managing 
operations from a central headquarters.831 In this way each of the airlines 
provides services both within each domestic market in which the affiliate is 
incorporated as well as internationally. 
                                                
829 See Tan, “Prospects for ASAM”, supra note 44 at 263-67 (discussing AirAsia, 
Qantas/Jetstar, and Tiger’s attempts to establish South Korean Tiger Incheon); Intervistas-ga2, 
supra note 10 at 52-58 (studying liberalization between Thailand and Malaysia from 2001-06 
and noting that “AirAsia continues to every [sic] a major influence on the flag carriers.”); 
CAPA, “Cebu”, supra note 36 (noting Cebu’s dominance in the Philippine market). 
830 See e.g. Intervistas-ga2, ibid. at 55 (noting the surge of traffic caused by AirAsia’s entry in 
the market in 2004) & 58 (attributing over 370,000 of the 1.3 million passengers travelling 
between Thailand and Malaysia as a result of the combination of liberalized regime and entry 
of AirAsia). 
831 See generally above at 18-20 (discussing ASEAN joint venture ownership and control 
structures). See also e.g. Tan, “Prospects for ASAM”, ibid. at 263-65. 
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 Chapter 1 has already outlined the general ways in which the 
restrictions on foreign ownership and control in a country’s bilateral air 
services agreements (the “external lock”) and national laws (the “internal 
lock”) restrict the organizational choices available to airlines.832 Notably, no 
state has yet to suspend or revoke an operating license of any of these 
airlines.833 Yet this does not mean that national governments cannot challenge 
the effective control of the airline; rather, they have chosen not to, while the 
airlines themselves have chosen to expand in these markets despite the risk 
that one (or more) governments might well suspend at least some of their 
operating rights. While removing the external lock on foreign investment 
contained in bilateral or multilateral agreements would not in itself constitute 
an action sufficient to permit any carrier to establish similar ventures in any 
part of ASEAN, it is sufficient to allow the home state autonomy to review 
and certificate airlines.834 
 In other words, relaxing such requirements in the international sphere 
would transfer the discretionary power to limit foreign investment and 
expertise to the designating state. The form(s) of domestic relaxation would 
take varying shape, subject to the level that the concept is itself embedded in 
the national legal system. Undoubtedly the most rigid structure is that of the 
Philippines, whose 40 percent limit is itself a constitutional requirement, 
although other states such as Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam also see 
national ownership as a contentious domestic issue.835 As with the global 
                                                
832 See generally above at 23-25. 
833 See e.g. Tan, “Prospects for ASAM”, supra note 44. 
834 See e.g. ibid. at 274-78, especially at 274-75. 
835 See e.g. Forsyth et al., “ASEAN Open Skies”, supra note 692 at 145; Tan, “Policy in the 
Philippines”, supra note 45 at 286, 288 & 305. Nevertheless, these constraints are domestic in 
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instruments for ownership and control reform such as the waivers contained in 
Agenda for Freedom and the US’ 2010 Draft Multilateral on Foreign 
Investment, removing the right to suspend services operated by foreign-owned 
and/or controlled airlines is necessary but not sufficient to allow a full 
transformation of the air transport market. In order to create a truly single 
ASAM, ASEAN member states must agree to remove the internal lock of 
domestic ownership and control restrictions. Nevertheless, despite the 
insufficiency of purely international reform, removing the constraints imposed 
by the international system would at least grant states the autonomy to deal 
with the domestic system without outside impositions. 
 Removing inward investment restrictions gives a foreign person the 
right to set up an airline in State A and to operate that airline within State A as 
well as between State A and States B and C, so long as States B and C 
recognize such a right. This right of establishment remains bounded by market 
access restrictions contained in State A’s bilateral (or multilateral) agreements. 
It does not generally recognize, for example, the right of State A’s airlines, 
whether domestic or foreign-owned, to operate in the domestic market of State 
B.836 To permit this, States A and B (and C) would have to agree to remove 
market access restrictions between them, ostensibly on a reciprocal basis.837 
 Going back to AirAsia as an example. If ASEAN established an 
ASAM that eliminated restrictions on seventh, eight, and ninth freedom 
                                                
nature, and the Philippines is free to accept designations based on rules other than nationality. 
See Thomas et al., supra note 755 at 37. On other states, see e.g. Tan, “Prospects for ASAM”, 
ibid. at 275. 
836 See below at 332-39 (discussing ICAO’s conception of the right of establishment). 
837 See generally above at 158-60 (discussing the terms of the third package) & below at 307-
12 (discussing the EU and SAMANZ with respect to cabotage liberalization) & 336-37 
(distinguishing the EU’s conception of the right of establishment from ICAO’s). 
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services, AirAsia could consolidate its companies into a single Malaysian-
owned airline with a base in Kuala Lumpur and to operate its network of intra-
ASEAN routes as a single airline. This is similar to the European context, 
where, for example, the Irish LCC Ryanair can operate between Barcelona and 
Berlin, or even Barcelona and Ibiza, free of legal impediments so long as it 
remains owned and controlled by EU interests. In contrast, replacing national 
ownership and control with ASEAN ownership and control without changing 
the market access conditions would restrict AirAsia wherever incorporated to 
the rights provided under the terms of the international agreement. This means 
that in an ASEAN fully governed by the RIATS Agreements and MAFLPAS, 
AirAsia Indonesia and AirAsia Thailand remain barred from routes 
unconnected to their respective home state. The difference is obviously an 
important one, and one which ASEAN member states in particular will need to 
wrestle with as part of their transformation to ASAM. 
 
4.2. Regional Growth and the Global Alliance 
 
Yet any serious prospect for liberalization or integration in the region remains 
tied to the national carrier. In this regard, the inclusion of Asian airlines in 
global alliances offers important means of global network integration. As 
noted in Chapters 1 and 3, alliances offer a means of integrating into a larger, 
global grid at nominal cost, increasing revenue, and of lowering costs, and 
may also result in a reduction in competition, particularly among members of 
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an immunized alliance.838  These benefits confer significant advantages to 
airlines competing regionally for traffic, whether in terms of costs to the 
airline, the distribution of information and the use of principal-agent relations, 
or consumer preferences for larger networks. For airlines yet to enter into 
global alliances, such advantages may prove to be a significant cause for 
concern. 
 For the latter, alliance membership will often be a primary goal to 
becoming competitive.839 In certain instances, it may also signify a means of 
leapfrogging managerial practices to match those of more advanced systems. 
China Eastern’s Chairman Liu Shouyong described alliance membership as a 
process of “great-leap-forward[ing]” growth opportunities and operational 
efficiencies.840 Acceptance of an airline into a global alliance may also 
provide a signal of quality control, as might be expected of Garuda 
Indonesia’s membership in SkyTeam, planned for this year.841 
 But competitive air service providers, even coupled with immunized 
alliances, might not be enough. On the one hand, other factors, such as visa 
                                                
838 See generally above at 26-28, 34-35 & 200-04 (discussing airline alliances). See also e.g. 
Levine, “Competition in Deregulated Markets”, supra note 41 at 425-31 (noting the 
importance of scale in accessing, processing and distributing information) & 431-34 
(discussing the manipulation of principal-agent relationships). 
839 UNCTAD, The Positive Agenda, supra note 12 at para. 52. 
840 SkyTeam, Press Release, “China Eastern to join SkyTeam: Alliance Moves Closer to 
Welcoming Second Chinese Carrier” (16 April 2010), online: 
<http://www.skyteam.com/en/About-us/Press/News/2010/China-Eastern-to-join-SkyTeam/> 
(stating that “[j]oining an international airline alliance is China Eastern Airlines' strategic 
deployment to continuously strengthen core profitability and boost market 
competitiveness. For China Eastern Airlines, joining SkyTeam is the just way leading to a 
globalized market, which will provide wider space for growth. It offers rare opportunities to 
absorb successful experiences and realize great-leap-forward developments. It provides ideal 
chances to raise management level, improve operation quality and accelerate the application 
of information technology.”). 
841 See e.g. Rangga D. Fadillah, “Garuda Indonesia to Join Airline Alliance SkyTeam” The 




requirements or infrastructural constraints, may hamper competitiveness so 
that even if carriers are roughly competitive they may be structurally 
unequal.842 On the other hand, the push for alliance membership itself could 
potentially also have significant retarding effects on the liberalization and 
integration process with third states. Alliances are ultimately interested in 
growth opportunities, and their interest in a particular airline’s growth may 
best be protected by limiting foreign access.843 Given Indonesia’s relative 
transport geography, relaxing entry to third and fourth freedom traffic to all 
points in Indonesia would expose Garuda to a high level of network 
competition that it is incapable of competing with until it too has integrated its 
network into the SkyTeam alliance in 2014. Importantly, network integration 
would have effects not only on traffic through Jakarta, but also through the 
region’s main gateways at Changi and Bangkok’s Suvarnabhumi Airport, as 
one would expect member airlines to attempt to consolidate their competitive 
position at the sixth freedom hubs in addition to increasing the role of Jakarta 
as a regional hub airport. Indeed, in 2008 approximately 80 percent of traffic 
between the EU and ASEAN, 54 percent of traffic between China and 
ASEAN, and 58 percent of traffic between Japan and ASEAN was carried by 
Thai and Singaporean airlines.844 SkyTeam as a whole would have a 
significant interest in limiting competition from such impressive networks. 
                                                
842 See e.g. the points made by Zhihang Chi, Air China vice president and general manager 
North America, and Kris Urs, U.S. State Department deputy assistant secretary of 
transportation affairs, in Jay Boehmer, “Slots, Visas Stymie U.S.-China Open Skies” Business 
Travel News (27 April 2011), online: 
<http://www.businesstravelnews.com/article.aspx?id=20338&ida=Airlines&a=btn>. 
843 In the case of equity investment, the role of Qantas’ partial sale to BA in delaying the 
Single Aviation Market of Australia and New Zealand is a case in point. See Goh, supra note 
31 at 53-4. The SAMANZ is discussed in more detail below at 332-39 & 328-29. 
844 Thomas et al., supra note 116 at 152 (noting 80.4 percent of inbound and 81.9 percent of 
outbound flights pass through either of the two hubs) & 158-59. The ASEAN-Korea market is 
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5. EAST ASIA AND THE GLOBAL RE-ORDERING OF THE AIR 
 
Thus far, Chapter 4 has focused on intra-regional liberalization and integration 
initiatives. But, as the strategic role of global alliances illustrates, such 
regional initiatives also occur within larger global contexts.845 Viewed from 
this perspective, one of the principal advantages to the ASEAN (or Northeast 
Asian or wider Asian) initiative is its effect on network size. One of the 
primary disadvantages of (relatively) small markets is that competitors based 
in larger markets and drawing on a larger traffic base can offer increased 
frequencies at lower prices per seat, resulting in an increase in market share on 
routes to (and through) the smaller state.846 By increasing network size, 
integration creates a necessary precondition for parity in service offerings.847 
 One might expect demands for global integration from the region to 
increase once Asian markets develop parity with or surpass its European and 
North American counterparts. Yet for better or worse, while this may be a 
necessary precondition for market parity, it is not necessarily sufficient to 
establish an equal operating environment. Other factors, including travel 
                                                
a little different: while Thailand still sees the most traffic (35.5 percent), the Philippines 
receives the second largest share of traffic (22.5 percent). Ibid. at 159. 
845 This is also a point made within many of Alan Tan’s articles, see e.g. Tan, “Horizontal 
Agreement”, supra note 168 (rationalizing ASEAN from the standpoint of the impact of the 
reorganization of the European aviation market); Tan, “Prospects for ASAM”, supra note 44 
(discussing liberalization in the context of the ASEAN-China relationship). See also Bonin, 
“Strategic Liberalization”, supra note 672 (discussing Asian liberalization in the context of 
liberalization with the US). See also Havel, Beyond Open Skies, supra note 10 at 523 (as cited 
in supra note 14). 
846 Indeed, according to Kenneth Button, this did indeed occur across the transatlantic, where 
the volume of US passengers flowing through US gateways allowed them to price below 
European airlines and, as a result, gain significant market share on transatlantic services. 
Button, “Towards Truly Open Skies”, supra note 455. 
847 See also e.g. Tan, “Prospects for ASAM”, supra note 44 at 280-83 (discussing this as an 
issue with respect to ASEAN-China relations); Tan, “ASEAN-China”, supra note 168. 
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restrictions, customs issues, per capita levels of disposable income, and 
constraints on airspace and airport infrastructure may all impede regional 
airlines from competing on an equal footing. In this regard, China continues to 
refuse overtures to open skies with the US not because it rejects an 
immunized, metal neutral operating environment but because visa restrictions 
prevent Chinese carriers from filling the capacity currently offered under the 
US-China bilateral as amended in 2007.848 These issues are sure to stymie the 
best laid plans for liberal air transport markets. 
 Other considerations relate to the alternative legal instruments 
proposed to regulate ownership and control, particularly the principal place of 
business and effective regulatory control criteria.849 In the context of an 
ongoing process of rationalizing a regional market, the implementation of such 
a provision presents somewhat conflicting interests. On the one hand, by 
leveling access to international capital markets and managerial know-how, 
such provisions offer critical means of evening up the playing field within a 
market-based, competitive environment. Under such a rule, US or EU (or 
Chinese or Japanese) interests could establish an Indonesian airline with non-
Indonesian interests and with non-Indonesian directors and executives and be 
free to compete in the Indonesian market as well as international routes to, 
from or through Indonesia. This seems the optimum short-term allocation of 
information and capital in the context of a global aviation system. 
Strategically, these investments could be used to offset current imbalances of 
capital and expertise in the region. On the other hand, broader global access 
                                                
848 See e.g. Boehmer, supra note 842. For its part, the article cites US concerns over 
infrastructural constraints in response. Ibid. 
849 See generally below at 332-39. 
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also in at least some sense undermines the arguments for the regional project. 
To the extent states undertake to open or unify skies as a means of balancing 
global competitiveness, universal access – where US airlines can compete in 
the market equally with ASEAN or Asian airlines – certainly undermines this 
strategic component to a specifically ASEAN integration project.850  
 Ultimately, the ability to transition beyond nationality to something 
different will require adopting a different way of perceiving and talking about 
airlines.851 Such a vocabulary, moreover, must be one that satisfies both the 
economic and, unless and until states adopt a purely economic approach to air 
transport, non-economic concerns put forward by states. This has best – and to 
date singularly – been achieved by the European project, one which presents a 
concerted effort to create and govern a single economic space beyond any 
                                                
850 This point seems tied to, inter alia, Thailand’s opposition to relaxing both foreign 
ownership and control of airlines within the ASEAN markets, while being open to the idea of 
relaxing ownership criterion while maintaining the traditional effective control standard. See 
e.g. Tan, “Prospects for ASAM”, supra note 44 at 275 (noting that effective control remains a 
political issue for Thailand, as well as Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam); Thomas et al, 
supra note 116 at 219 (noting individual member state positions on, inter alia, ASEAN 
ownership and effective control). 
851 John Gunther made a similar argument in 1994: 
 
The challenge for regulators, in this technologically advanced and innovative industry, 
is to adjust and adapt for tomorrow a regulatory framework governed by practices and 
approaches that were developed for an era vastly different from that which now exists. 
This leads to the first suggested condition precedent for any serious contemplation of a 
broad multilateral approach: the need for the aviation community to address whether 
this sector’s habits, practices and mindsets, even its language, can take air transport out 
if [sic] its regulatory insularity. Any departure from the existing mould will be 
difficult, but perhaps a willingness to contemplate new language, concepts and ideas, 
some even from other regulatory environments such as trade, as well as definition of 
new broader objectives for the role air transport can play in trade, communications and 
economic development, might help the quest. 
 
Gunther, supra note 289 at 268-69 (also noting a second precondition: that multilateralism can 
achieve the expected improvements). The advantage of regionalism in this process is that, for 
a number of reasons, this new vocabulary – new ideas, widened contexts – take place within a 
reframing of broader political ideas and discussions. See e.g. Ruggie, “Territoriality and 
Beyond”, supra note 145 at 172 (noting that the EC is perhaps the first “multiperspectival 
polity”, a polity in which each state “increasingly endogenize[s] the existence of the other 
eleven.”). 
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individual nation state, but also to interact in and talk about that space as being 
singular in nature.852 So far, no regional arrangement in Asia has found the 
language to bring the project beyond the politics of the nation-state, although 
ASEAN is moving – slowly – in that direction. Arriving at an answer to this 
larger question is an issue – perhaps the issue – that ASEAN and its member 





A relative non-entity in the international political process at the close of the 
Second World War, East Asia has grown to become one of the major pillars of 
the global economy, including the global air services industry. These 
developments have meant both an increasing interest in and an increasing need 
to accommodate these states in the repositioning of the global regulatory 
framework that is currently taking place. For their part, East Asian states have 
begun to recalculate their own roles in the new global regulatory system. One 
aspect of this has been to recalibrate their policies in such a way as to make 
concrete efficiency gains and reposition their industries in an increasingly 
competitive market. At the same time, through programs such as ASAM, the 
same states have begun to discuss whether they can organize themselves in a 
manner that collectively meets the demands of the participation norm. 
                                                
852 Weiler, supra 137 at 2477. In contrast, the SAMANZ, discussed in more detail in Chapters 
5 and 6, has failed to make the external adjustments required to permit consolidation between 
international airlines within the trans-Tasman. See also the discussion on Exit and Voice 
below at 390-93. See also generally Ruggie, “Territoriality and Beyond”, ibid. 
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 As the final chapter analyzing the historical development of the norms 
and legal relationships governing international air transport, Chapter 4 has 
analyzed a particular region’s responses to the new emerging global regulatory 
scripts, both in terms of the ongoing intra-regional bargains themselves and 
the role that wider global movements play in shaping the structure and process 
of these renegotiations. These restructurings are, both in the conceptual and 
implementation phases, incomplete, a result of a myriad set of factors, 
including history, disparities in development and growth, and the 
particularities of geography and political systems. Yet ultimately the problems 
faced in Asia stem from the same concerns facing all regions and the world; 
namely, the desire to rationalize the regulatory system through a process 
which both retains the state’s non-economic interests in the transport system 
and remains politically acceptable. Part III analyzes the instruments needed to 





























































































CHAPTER 5: THE INSTRUMENTS OF MARKET ACCESS AND OWNERSHIP 








The three Chapters making up Part II focus on describing and interpreting the 
development of and changes to the legal order governing international air 
transportation as a whole. In doing so, it identifies two levels of analysis, a 
formal discussion of the terms themselves and a contextual interpretation of 
how that discussion has been informed by larger concerns of international 
political economy. It then interprets a number of attempts at changing the 
instruments governing the exchange of air services at the instrumental level. In 
other words, Part II demonstrates that liberalization is a discursive process 
attempting to obtain the price and network advantages that a flexible market 
system offers without necessarily changing the basic normative assumption 
that states have a right to meaningfully participate in the international air 
transport system. 
 Part II also identifies a broad pattern of states rescaling governance 
structures at the regional level as a critical component to liberalization in 
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many parts of the world. Europe offered an example of success, while East 
Asia continues to struggle with the shape and form of its regional architecture. 
While it also discusses attempts at global reform, those attempts have not 
found the level of support necessary to carry them through to fruition. 
 The Chapters that make up Part III shift focus away from the 
interpretation of macro-level institutional changes towards a more nuanced 
analysis of the particular instruments promoted to organize and govern the 
liberalized operating environment. This necessarily involves a rethink of the 
market access and the ownership and control rules, twin pivots on which 
liberalization ultimately rest.853 Under the postwar system, restrictions on 
market access and ownership and control provide the key terms binding the 
airline, directly and indirectly, to the nation and to the national traffic base. 
Liberalization has sought to increase the level of competition by either 
stretching these terms through agreements such as the US open skies model, or 
by replacing one or more of the nationality-based forms of association with 
any number of alternatives such at the “principal place of business plus strong 
links” formula. These can be more or less flexible in scope, a fact obviated by 
the various approaches to liberalization discussed in Part II. Chapter 5 
analyzes the various instruments designed to regulate the organization of the 
market, looking at the different mechanisms that have developed over time to 
stretch or replace the purely national approach, their interrelations, and their 
differences. 
 
2. MARKET ACCESS:  TRAFFIC RIGHTS AND OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITY 
                                                




By defining the terms of entry and the conditions under which airlines operate, 
market access has been the primary means of directly regulating air carriers. 
During the decades making up the postwar period, states had fairly clear 
conceptions of what constituted their national interest in international air 
transport markets, and thus the balance that would or should be achieved 
through regulation.854 These interests, moreover, were tied to the state and a 
national market, such that markets were defined either nationally, with 
agreements indicating predefined routes and inter-airline cooperation limiting 
competition for national traffic, or, in the case of protectionist agreements, by 
simply divvying up capacity and/or revenue amongst the participating airlines 
on a pre-agreed formula.855 
 Broadly, market access liberalization seeks the benefits of increased 
efficiency through competition by relaxing controls over the market. These 
efforts vary in terms of scope and depth. For most arrangements, such as the 
United States’ open skies policy, this involves stretching the concept of 
flexibility within the conceptual framework of a nationally organized transport 
system without moving beyond it.856 More recently, a small number of 
agreements, such as the 2008 UK-Singapore Air Transport Agreement, have 
incorporated rights unconnected to the home state within their terms, including 
seventh freedom and cabotage rights.857 These agreements enhance 
                                                
854 These have been discussed in detail in Chapter 2. For a concise statement of shared 
conceptions, see also Lowenfeld, “A New Takeoff”, supra note 5 at 38-41. 
855 See generally above at 103-15. 
856 See e.g. Havel, Beyond Open Skies, supra note 12 at 13 (quoted in supra note 80). 
857 See 2008 UK-Singapore Agreement, supra note 528. See also ICAO, “Overview”, supra 
note 8 at 1-2, para. 2.3 (noting that, as of March 2009, 12 reported agreements exchanged 
seventh freedom rights, while eight exchanged eight and ninth freedom rights). 
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competition while reducing the structural advantages caused by differences in 
market size and conditions. 
 In analyzing liberalization, this section begins with an analysis of 
market access relaxations on a first to sixth freedom basis.  This formulation 
forms not only the basis of both the current United States open skies policy 
and ICAO’s own description of “full” market access, but also the limits of the 
link between national carrier and national territory. From there it begins to 
analyze relaxing access to routes in instances where this link is severed: first 
in the context of international markets, then in the context of domestic 
markets. 
 
2.1. Open Skies and the ‘Full Market Access’ of Nation-Bound 
International Air Transport 
 
Evolving from somewhat amorphous roots as part of what Brian Havel has 
called a “quasi-deregulatory doctrine”,858 by 1992 open skies found itself 
expressed as a clearly defined, crystallized regulatory policy composed of 
eleven elements.859 Since then, the United States has expressed open skies in 
terms of eight basic elements: free market competition, including no 
                                                
858 Havel, Beyond Open Skies, supra note 10 at 12. 
859 See ibid. at 13 (noting that “[t]he United States launched various liberalizing initiatives of 
this kind, but the term open skies did not receive official imprimatur, or conceptual clarity, 
until a renewed initiative by the Bush Administration in 1992”). For a definition of open skies, 
see US DOT, Order in the Matter of Defining ‘Open Skies’, DOT Order 92-8-13, Dkt No 
48130 (5 August 1992) (cited inter alia in Lelieur, supra note 52 at 27, noting the decision 
specifically granted, on a first to sixth freedom basis: freedom to determine prices (subject to 
double disapproval pricing); freedom to determine routes; freedom to determine 
frequency/capacity; liberalization of the charter and cargo markets; freedom to convert and 
remit currencies; freedom to perform their own support functions; a guarantee of fair 
competition; and guarantees of non-discriminatory access to and operation of CRS)). See also 
Adam L. Schless “Open Skies: Loosening the Protectionist Grip on International Civil 
Aviation” (1994) 8 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 435 at 446-52 (analyzing each provision, while only 
noting nine provisions). 
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restrictions on number of designations, route rights, capacity, frequency or 
aircraft type; pricing freedom, subject to a double disapproval ex post review; 
doing business protections; a permissive environment for cooperative 
marketing arrangements (including an optional code-sharing provision 
between airlines and surface transportation companies); liberal charter 
arrangements; provisions for dispute resolution; provisions on ensuring a high 
standard of safety and security; and finally an optional seventh freedom 
provision for all-cargo transportation.860 This policy continues in place today. 
 While open skies represents a US policy, many of these provisions 
have found their way into a number of bilateral and regional multilateral 
settings through a process of diffusion, albeit in both an uneven and rather 
piecemeal fashion.861 As Chapter 3 notes, open skies has become the default 
position for the United States, irrespective of the bilateral or multilateral 
context of the agreement, or whether the partner is a state or group of states 
such as the EU. According to the US Department of State, as of December 
2011 the US had signed 105 open skies agreements, although this list counts 
each EU member state as a separate agreement.862 Other states have also 
adopted an open skies approach, at least in select cases. According to the 
ICAO Secretariat, as of March 2009, states had concluded 157 bilateral open 
skies agreements amongst themselves, involving 96 states and their respective 
                                                
860 US DOS, “Open Skies Fact Sheet”, supra note 406. See also generally US Model Open 
Skies Agreement, supra note 240. 
861 See generally, ICAO, “Overview”, supra note 8. For a list of regional agreements, see 
ICAO, “Regional/Plurilatral Agreements and Arrangements for Liberalization” (updated 22 
July 2009), online: <http://www.icao.int/sustainability/Documents/RegionalAgreements.pdf> 
[ICAO, “Regional Agreements”]. 
862 US Department of State, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, “Open Skies 
Partners”, online: US Dept of State <http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ata/114805.htm> [US 
Dept of State, “Partners”]. 
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territories.863 Importantly, the United States was at the time a party to only 82 
of those agreements, meaning that slightly under half of all the agreements 
involved states other than the United States.864 Additionally, 60 percent of 
open skies agreements included seventh freedom traffic rights for all-cargo 
services.865 In comparison, only 12 granted the same to passenger services and 
ten even included consecutive cabotage rights for both cargo and passenger 
services.866 
 Another important node for liberalization has been regional in nature. 
Indeed, a number of multilateral or plurilateral initiatives at a regional level 
exist in each of the world regions.867 In order to determine the scope of 
regional liberalization, this study surveyed a number of regional arrangements 
in eight regions, including the EU, APEC, ASEAN, the African Union, the 
Andean Community, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), MERCOSUR, 
and the Pacific Islands Forum.868 In doing so, it found significant uniformity 
in a number of areas, including designations, capacity, and price 
determination. All of these arrangements have opened designation and 
                                                




867 For a list of these initiatives, see e.g. ICAO, “Regional Agreements”, supra note 861. 
868 See generally EC, Reg. 1008/2008, supra note 176; MALIAT, supra note 585; MALIAT 
Protocol, supra note 589; above at 224-37 (discussing RIATS through MAFLPAS); Decision 
Relating to the Implementation of the Yamoussoukro Declaration Concerning the 
Liberalisation of Access to Air Transport Markets in Africa, done in Yamoussoukro, 14 
November 1999 [Yamoussoukro Decision]; Decisión 582: Transporte Aéreo en la Comunidad 
Andina, dada en Lima, Perú, el 4 de mayo 2004 [Decisión 582]; Multilateral Agreement 
Concerning the Operation of Air Services within the Caribbean Community, done at St. 
Michael, Barbados, 9 July 1996 [MASA]; Acuerdo sobre Serviceos Aéreos Subregionales 
entre los Gobiernos de los Estados Partes del MERCOSUR, Gobierno de Chile y Gobierno de 
Bolivia, firmado en Fortaleza, Brasil, el 17 de deciembre de 1996 [Fortaleza Agreement]; 
Pacific Islands Air Services Agreement, done at Auckland, 16 May 2003 [PIASA]. See also 
generally Forsyth et al., Preparing ASEAN, supra note 698 at 39-43, Table 3.2 (comparing the 
features of eight regional open skies arrangements (covering the Andean Community, 
MERCOSUR, the CLMV Arrangement, and a number of African arrangements)). 
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capacity determinations, with the sole exception of CARICOM, which 
maintains the right to restrict multiple entry on thin routes where competition 
might destroy the viability of the route altogether.869 Similarly, in all but two 
instances these arrangements permit carriers to freely determine capacity 
offered on routes. Of the two that do not, the Andean Community introduces 
country of origin regulations, while CARICOM requires double disapproval of 
a tariff.870 
 However, the agreements demonstrate a much more heterogeneous set 
of arrangements when it comes to traffic rights and ownership and control 
relaxations. At the extreme ends are the EU with its integrated single aviation 
market and MERCOSUR, which limited access to previously unserved third 
and fourth freedom routes.871 The majority of the others represent a median 
between the two ends of the spectrum, exchanging first to fifth (and 
sometimes expressly including sixth) freedom rights within the regional 
group.872 This median broadly corresponds with what ICAO has called “full 
market access”,873 suggesting that ICAO continues to view both the distinction 
                                                
869 See MASA, ibid., art. 4. 
870 Ibid., art. 15; Decisión 582, supra note 868, art. 20. 
871 See EC, Reg. 2408/92, supra 464, art. 3 (superceded by EC, Reg. 1008/2008, supra note 
176, art. 15(1)-(2)); Fortaleza Agreement, supra note 868, arts. 1, 4, 7 & Annex I, paras. 2-3. 
872 See Decisión 582, supra note 868, art. 6 (for non-scheduled carriers, see art. 7); 
Yamoussoukro Decision, supra note 868, art. 3; PIASA, supra note 868, art. 5(1), Annex 1 
(exchanging first through sixth freedom rights); MASA, supra note 868, arts. 6-7 
(multilaterally granting first to fourth freedom rights, but requiring fifth freedom be 
exchanged on a bilateral basis). On ASEAN, see generally above at 224-43 (discussing the 
agreements in place and expectations voiced by parties as to the ultimate shape of 
liberalization). 
873 See generally ICAO, “Overview”, supra note 8 at para. 2.5. Cf. ICAO, Report of the Tenth 
Meeting of the Air Transport Regulation Panel, Montreal, 13-17 May 2002, ICAO Doc. 
ATRP/10 (2002) at 9, para. 30 (f) (concluding, inter alia, that “[i]t might not be productive for 
ICAO to undertake work to define such terms as “full market access” and “open skies 
agreement” given the difficulty in achieving consensus. However, there could be merit in 
attempting to provide guidance for States as to the end-product of progressive liberalization, 
particularly in relation to traffic rights, while recognizing the difficulties in dealing with 
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between international and domestic markets and the territorial link between 
airline and market served as important for air transport regulation. 
 These shifts in policy have had a generally positive effect on air 
services, in terms of both price and connectivity. The Brattle Group’s study of 
the North Atlantic estimated a 10 percent increase in combined passenger 
volumes in transatlantic traffic between countries with open skies agreements 
when compared to predicted growth in the absence of liberalization.874 
Importantly, this report also noted that states that initially agreed to open skies 
saw greater gains than those that undertook liberalization later, including 
through traffic diversion, and that these gains persisted despite neighboring 
countries’ subsequent decision to liberalize,875 evidence supporting the 
efficacy of the US’ strategy of “divide and conquer” over the North Atlantic. 
Other studies have looked beyond the North Atlantic to demonstrate similar 
results. A 2006 report prepared by consulting group Intervistas-ga2 analyzed 
the impact of liberalization on five markets, including traffic between a (then 
potential) US-UK open skies agreement, within the EU, between the United 
Arab Emirates and Germany, in the trans-Tasman, and between Malaysia and 
                                                
controversial issues such as inward investment and the right of establishment.”) [ICAO, ATRP 
Report]. 
874 The Brattle Group, supra note 103 at 5-9, 5-10. A more recent report on the potential 
benefits of an open aviation area between the US and EU, prepared for the Commission’s 
Directorate General Energy and Transport in 2007, projects similar benefits. See generally 
Booz, supra note 498. 
875 The Brattle Group, ibid. at 5-9 & 5-10. Two other reports, both by the US Department of 
Transportation, have attempted to measure the impact of “global deregulation” more broadly 
and without measuring first-mover and path dependency in individual relations. See US DOT, 
International Aviation Developments: Global Deregulation Takes off (First Report) 
(December 1999); US DOT, International Aviation Developments (Second Report): 
Transatlantic Deregulation: The Alliance Network Effect (October 2000). However, these 
reports have been criticized for failing to identify a methodology in calculating any of their 
findings. See e.g. Micco & Serebrisky, supra note 118 at 29 (noting that “[t]he U.S. 
Department of Transportation (2000) published a report that argues that between 1996 and 
1999 average passenger airfares in transatlantic markets declined 10.3% in non-open skies 
countries and 20.1% in open skies countries. This report neither controls for other factors nor 
explains the methodology used to estimate the reduction in airfares.”). 
 285 
Thailand.876 Among its conclusions was that liberalization between Australia 
and New Zealand, discussed below, had resulted in a 56 percent higher growth 
rate, accounting for 1.7 million passengers, and a 37 percent increase in traffic 
due to liberalization.877 Although not necessarily to open skies, other areas had 
also experienced significant gains in connectivity as a result of liberalization. 
 Despite the potential for considerable welfare gains, however, many 
states continue to resist market access liberalization on even third and fourth 
freedom routes in a number of ways, much less on a fifth or sixth freedom 
basis. East Asian states are among these protectionist elements in air transport. 
Chapter 4 has already noted some of the means by which states in East Asia 
lessen the impact of liberalization, including individual ASEAN member 
states’ non-ratification of agreements undertaken and external partners’ 
continued dealing with regions as a collective of states, which in effect limits 
ASEAN member states’ ability to subsequently act unilaterally to change the 
terms of the ownership and control provisions internally without having to 
renegotiate the terms of the bargain.878 Many states also continue to practice 
opaque methods of exchange, such as the use of confidential memoranda or 
exchanges of notes mentioned in Chapter 2. 
 Other means of limiting gains include measures designed to manage 
the distribution of benefits between players in the market. Both China and 
Vietnam have negotiated a series of incremental market access relaxations 
                                                
876 See generally Intervistas-ga2, supra note 10 at 18-58. 
877 Ibid. at 51, 58. 
878 See generally above at 231-37 (discussing non-ratifications within ASEAN) & 259 
(discussing ASEAN-China’s continued regulation by nationality). 
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with the United States.879 Restrictions in the US-Vietnam agreement have 
concentrated on passenger transport through intermediate gateways such as 
France, South Korea, Hong Kong and Japan, where Vietnamese carriers had 
either recently entered or planned to enter, although further restrictions limit 
the number of points within the country served.880 Like many states, Vietnam 
has been less concerned with the transportation of air cargo, or rather the loss 
has been balanced by other factors that has made it easier to liberalize. For 
example, the agreement contains no restrictions on US carrier access from 
Taiwan, the Philippines, or China, traditional and new US cargo hubs, and in 
2008 the parties amended the bilateral agreement to increase cargo traffic flow 
                                                
879 On US-China air transport relations, see Agreement between the Government of the United 
States of America and the Government of the People’s Republic of China relating to Civil Air 
Transport, done at Washington, 17 September 1980 [US-China 1980 Agreement]; Exchange 
of Letters between H.E. Stapleton Roy and H.E. Tian Zengpei, 10 February 1992 [US-China 
1992 Protocol]; Protocol to the Agreement between the Government of the United States of 
America and the Government of the People’s Republic of China relating to Civil Air 
Transport, done at Washington, 8 April 1999 [US-China 1999 Protocol]; Protocol to the 
Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of 
the People’s Republic of China relating to Civil Air Transport, done at Beijing, 24 July 2004 
[US-China 2004 Protocol]; Protocol to the Agreement between the Government of the United 
States of America and the Government of the People’s Republic of China relating to Civil Air 
Transport, done at Seattle, 9 July 2007 [US-China 2007 Agreement]. On US-Vietnam air 
transport relations, see Air Transport Agreement between the Government of the United States 
of America and the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, done at Washington, 4 
December 2003 [US-Vietnam Agreement]; Agreement to Amend the Air Transport Agreement 
between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam, done at Vietnam, 7 October 2008 [US-Vietnam 2008 Amendment] 
(continued in Appendix 2 of the Memorandum of Consultations between the Government of 
the United States of America and the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, Hanoi, 
Vietnam, 7 December 2008 [US-Vietnam 2008 Memo]; Agreement to Amend the Air 
Transport Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, done at Ha Noi, 18 May 2010 [US-Vietnam 
2010 Amendment]. For a discussion of the US-China and US-Vietnam agreements through 
2008, see also generally Jason R. Bonin, “Strategic Liberalization”, supra note 672 at 383-88. 
880 See most recently US-Vietnam 2010 Amendment, ibid., art. 5, (amending Annex III, s. 
A(3)-(4) (restricting US carriers from operating to/from France or South Korea and from 
providing 5th freedom services to/from Hong Kong until 15 Oct. 2005 and to/from Taiwan or 
Japan, and restricting Vietnamese fifth freedom operations between Japan and the US). See 
also ibid. (amending Annex III, s. A(5), limiting the number of intermediate points (3), points 
within the other party (5), and beyond points (3)). 
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out of Chu Lai International Airport, in central Vietnam, as part of Vietnam’s 
strategy to encourage foreign direct investment in the region.881 
 The relationship between the US and China is even more complex. 
Since the People’s Republic of China entered its first bilateral air services 
agreement with the United States in 1980, the parties have amended their 
agreement a total of four times: in 1992, 1999, 2004, and 2007.882 Each of 
these agreements have introduced multiple changes: an indicative list of 
provisions would include terms on number of designations, the frequency and 
capacity of services to specified points within the other country, the way those 
points are specified, and the timing of entry. These relaxations are often 
planned out per year, often giving Chinese better or advance access to more 
liberal terms, and with the next round of negotiations set within the text of the 
amendment.883 For reasons noted in Chapter 4, the latest round of talks, which 
were to be over the transition to open skies, have so far failed to materialize 
into concrete commitments.884 
 Two other features of the US-China relationship, both of which emerge 
in the set of amendments introduced in 2004, need also be mentioned. First, 
the 2004 amendment introduces a provision permitting each state’s designated 
                                                
881 US-Vietnam 2008 Memo, supra note 879, para. 2; US-Vietnam 2008 Amendment, supra 
note 879, art. 2 (amending Annex I, s. 1(A)(2)). 
882 See generally US-China 1992 Protocol, supra note 879; US-China 1999 Protocol, supra 
note 879; US-China 2004 Protocol, supra note 879; US-China 2007 Protocol, supra note 879. 
883 For example, the 2007 amendment provided for relaxations on multiple entry for Chinese 
carriers in advance of US carriers, and slated the next round of talks for 2010. See US-China 
2007 Protocol, ibid., arts. 1 & 5. See also generally below at 374-80 (discussing 
advanced/asymmetric liberalization in more detail and in the context of political acceptance of 
a negotiated agreement). 
884 See generally above at 269-70. 
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airlines the right to establish “cargo hubs” in the other state.885 A cargo hub is 
identified as a point to which an airline operates a total of seventy-two 
movements per week, employs personnel to facilitate the movements, and 
utilizes the airport facilities, including bonded facilities under the supervision 
of the relevant customs authority.886 As of 1 January 2007, once these 
conditions are met the airline obtains cargo hub status at that airport, 
permitting it to, inter alia, operate starburst change of gauge operations, 
operate based on the seventh freedom from that point, and to coterminalize 
domestic routes (i.e. operate between two domestic points so long as nothing 
is embarked and disembarked on the domestic segment) without having those 
counted against the airline’s weekly frequencies.887 Moreover, once those 
rights vest, the airline retains them irrespective of whether it maintains the 
annual number of movements required to initially establish itself.888 Such 
provisions emphasize not only the less politicized nature of all-cargo transport 
liberalization, but also highlight the export-led nature of Chinese growth and 
thus the interrelationship between transport liberalization and the positive 
spillovers in the economy more broadly.889 
 Second, the amendment shifts spatial approaches to market access in 
China, moving from strict route descriptions to broader conceptions of access 
                                                
885 US-China 2004 Protocol, supra note 879, art. 9 (introducing Article 11 bis into the US-
China Agreement). For a discussion of “the strategic importance of air cargo services” to 
China, see e.g. Williams, China’s Policy, supra note 672 at 109-25. 
886 US-China 2004 Protocol, ibid. (art. 11 bis, para. 1). 
887 Ibid. (art. 11 bis, para. 2). There is a limited period where some non-hub operations in 
Zones 1 and 2 are not given the exemption from counting against total weekly operations, but 
these have since ended 31 December 2010. Ibid. (art 11 bis, para. 3(f)). 
888 Nevertheless, such rights can be withdrawn or amended after consultations between the 
governments.  See ibid. (art. 11 bis, para. 4). On the cargo hub see also generally Bonin, 
“Strategic Liberalization”, supra note 672 at 384-85. 
889 See generally Williams, China’s Policy, supra note 672 at 109-25. 
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based on geographic region, described as China Zones 1, 2, and 3.890 Each 
China Zone corresponds to a geographic region identified according to 
broader economic policies aimed at decelerating or even decreasing the 
growing economic disparities between the coastal regions and the central and 
western provinces.891 In 2004, US carriers were permitted unrestricted access 
to points in China Zone 3, while points in China Zones 1 and 2 retained 
frequency restrictions, with points in Zone 2 receiving some additional 
                                                
890 US-China 2004 Protocol, supra note 879, arts. 2-3; US-China 2007 Protocol, supra note 
879, arts. 2-3. In 2004, each Zone including the following areas: 
 
China Zone 1 China Zone 2 China Zone 3 
Beijing; Shanghai; 
Guangzhou 
Anhui; Fujian; Guangdong 
(except Guangzhou); Hebei; 
Henan; Hubei; Hunan; 
Jiangsu; Jiangxi; Shandong; 
Shanxi; Tianjin; Zhejiang 
Chongqing; Gansu; 
Guangxi; Guizhou; Hainan 
Island; Heilongjiang; Inner 
Mongolia; Jilin; Liaoning; 
Ningxia; Qinghai; Shaanxi; 
Sichuan; Tibet; Xinjiang; 
Yunnan 
 
The 2007 amendments adjusted some of these locations. At present, points in each zone now 
include: 
 
China Zone 1 China Zone 2 China Zone 3 
Beijing; Shanghai; 
Guangzhou 
Fujian; Guangdong (except 
Guangzhou); Hebei; Jiangsu; 
Shandong; Tianjin; Zhejiang 
Anhui; Chongqing; Gansu; 
Guanxi; Guizhou; Hainan 
Island; Henan; Hubei; 
Hunan; Inner Mongolia; 
Jiangxi; Jilin; Liaoning; 
Ningxia; Qinghai; Shaanxi; 




891 See e.g. Williams, China’s Policy, supra note 672 at 45-59 (also noting that part of the 
Great Western Development Strategy has been a large program to build airport infrastructure 
in the central and western provinces). On China’s spatial economy generally, see e.g. Godfrey 
Linge, ed., China’s New Spatial Economy: Heading Towards 2020 (Hong Kong: Oxford 
University Press, 1997); Barry J. Naughton, “The Western Development Program” in Barry J. 
Naughton & Dali L. Yang, eds. Holding China Together: Diversity and National Integration 
in the Post-Deng Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 253; Wen, supra note 
117. 
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frequencies as compared to Zone 1.892 This basic division continues into the 
present. 
 Efforts such as these clearly exhibit resistance to liberalization as a 
state-sponsored means of mediating the process of participation and 
efficiency. For its part, the US DOT has expressed a willingness to work with 
states to progressively achieve open skies without necessarily giving up those 
conditions as a final outcome as part of its 1995 Policy Statement, a (less 
controversial) means again of mediating advantage while maintaining the right 
to influence recalcitrant states through more coercive means.893 At the same 
time, both the Vietnamese and Chinese governments have institutionalized 
structures that either privilege or protect their carriers, to gradually expose 
them to elevated levels of competition, and to agree to the introduction of 
competition to the international marketplace as an objective of the bilateral 
relationship.894 By controlling the terms of competition, the agreements also 
(indirectly) mediate the relationship between air carriers and their users. 
 Achieving an acceptable balance is not always easy.895 Chapter 4’s 
brief discussion of the conflict between airlines and the broader business 
community within the Philippines revealed a pattern of promulgations, 
retractions, and re-promulgations around the unilateral liberalization of access 
to passenger markets at Clark and Subic Bay clearly demonstrates the 
                                                
892 See US-China 2004 Protocol, supra note 879, arts. 2-3. See also below at 369-71. 
893 See US DOT, 1995 Policy Statement, supra 62 at 598-99. 
894 See e.g. US-China 2007 Protocol, supra note 879, art. 5; US-Vietnam 2008 MoU, supra 
note 879, para. 3 (providing that “[t]he delegations agreed that they will meet before October 
2010 to work toward a liberalized agreement based on the U.S. model text, including the 
elimination of restrictions on fifth freedom rights for passenger services and third-country 
surface transportation”). 
895 See e.g. Boehmer, supra note 842 (noting the issues of moving beyond the terms of the 
2007 US-China Protocol). 
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contested nature of the liberalization process in many states.896 At the same 
time, Executive Order (EO) No. 253, which unilaterally opens all-cargo 
markets to international traffic (including on a seventh freedom basis), has 
remained in tact since its promulgation in 2003, again suggesting all-cargo as 
a means of mediating between interest groups.897  
 Of course, passenger transport demonstrates similar issues. Part of 
carriers’ opposition to efforts such as EO No. 500 had been that in breaking 
with the principle of strict reciprocity the government had given away rights 
that Philippines carriers themselves could not access.898 It is more often the 
case, however, that recalcitrance from Philippines airlines is the result of an 
inability to use the rights they already have because of a general lack of 
competitiveness.899 The state thus becomes the arena whereby interest groups 
vie for regulations designed to promote their own general self-interests. 
Nevertheless, differences in the mix of interests make one less contentious 
than the other – a point developed further with respect to seventh freedom 
access below. 
 
2.2. Beyond Full Market Access I: Seventh Freedom Traffic 
 
The same cost efficiencies and increased connectivity derived from 
liberalization on a third through sixth freedom basis equally apply to other 
                                                
896 See generally above at 233-35. See also generally Tan, “Policy in the Philippines”, supra 
note 45 at 289-97. 
897 See generally EO 253, supra note 729; Tan, “Policy in the Philippines”, ibid. at 289-91. 
898 Tan, “Policy in the Philippines”, ibid. at 295 (noting that Macau refused Asian Spirit (now 
Zest Air) a license to operate to between Clark and Macau because it was not designated 
under the agreement and that Hong Kong refused Cebu Pacific access to Hong Kong because 
available frequency and capacity had already been reached). 
899 Ibid. at 295-97. 
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forms of air traffic. Yet despite some inroads made in the last few years, “full 
market access” continues to remain largely something less than complete 
liberalization. This is certainly true of access to markets granted on a seventh 
freedom basis, i.e., the right for a carrier to operate international services 
between two foreign points without a stop in the home state. 
 The problem of market access relaxations on a seventh freedom basis 
is that, unlike traffic rights awarded on a third to fifth (or even sixth) freedom 
basis, these operations confront the central organizing feature of the 
international air transport system: nationality. As early as 1947, the ICAO 
Committee commissioned to study the prospects of multilateral agreement 
noted that “[n]o draft of multilateral agreement so far proposed has permitted 
the carriage of international traffic by an airline operating entirely outside of 
its home State” and that “there has been no support for authorizing such an 
operation on a multilateral basis.”900 With limited exceptions in the areas of 
seventh freedom air cargo services, international transport within regionally 
organized blocs, and a number of bilateral agreements insufficient to make a 
broad impact globally, this finding continues into the present.  
 
2.2.1. Air Cargo Services 
 
Of the different incursions into the national organizational paradigm, the most 
advanced is that of all-cargo air services. While drawing a distinction between 
all-cargo and combination services in some respects reflects an artificial 
                                                
900 ICAO, Records of the Multilateral Commission, supra note 245 at 18, para. 2.3.2. 
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practice,901 it is one that has found considerable acceptance among a number 
of states. 
 Three reasons apparently account for the acceptance of such a 
distinction. The first two reasons relate to the structure of special interests and 
their effects on the demand for liberalization. First, while air cargo continues 
to show the fastest rate of growth among the modes of transport and carries a 
significant percentage of goods by value, it represents a relatively small (but 
not insignificant) proportion of most airlines’ business.902 Second, a number of 
interests, including a concentrated number of global multimodal integrators 
and freight forwarders, which serve as middlemen between airlines and the 
shipper, as well as demands from business interests, add additional dimensions 
to the air cargo industry and concentrate otherwise dispersed interests (e.g. the 
individual consumer) that might increase demands for liberalization.903 
Indeed, freight forwarders would arguably benefit from reductions in freight 
prices irrespective of demand elasticity.904 This particular mix of interests, 
their structure and relative concentration, helps explain why cargo encounters 
less resistance than passenger transport. The examples of all-cargo services 
between the US and Vietnam, the US and China, and the Philippines are all 
                                                
901 Indeed, according to the OECD nearly half of air cargo travels in the belly of passenger 
services. OECD, 2002 Revision, supra note 52 at 3-4 (while also noting that combination 
carriers have an advantage insofar as they carry a diversified mix of passenger and cargo 
services). 
902 In 2007, air cargo represented less than one quarter (21 percent) of total revenues for the 
industry. See e.g. Havel, Beyond Open Skies, supra note 10 at 7, fn 22 (citing Perry Flint, “A 
World Turned Upside Down” Air Transport World (July 2008), 26 at 30 (using data from the 
article to calculate the percentage of earnings in 2007)). 
903 OECD, Background Document, OECD Workshop on Regulatory Reform in International 
Air Cargo Transportation, Paris, 5-6 July 1999 (1999) at 18-21 [OECD, 1999 Background 
Document]. 
904 If demand proves elastic, then lower prices increase the volume of business; however, if 
demand proves relatively inelastic, forwarders may nevertheless benefit by recouping a 
windfall between lower transport costs and the ultimate end cost charged to the consumer.  
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examples where this mix of interests have resulted in liberal arrangements for 
cargo services, despite differing degrees of resistance to passenger 
liberalization. 
 A third reason for distinguishing air cargo from passenger transport is 
the triangular nature of many all-cargo operations. Unlike passenger transport, 
there is a strong tendency for cargo shipments to be one directional.905 To 
compensate for this price differential and to fill the aircraft’s cargo hold on the 
return flight, cargo operators often plan multiple stops on the return portion of 
the operation.906 Relaxations on seventh freedom traffic permit the carrier to 
coordinate operations over its return routes over its network. 
 Yet despite the benefits derived from and the lesser political opposition 
to cargo liberalization, it still exhibits a particularly uneven regulatory 
geography. As with other trends, the United States took an early lead in 
liberalization: as of March 2009, the US had signed slightly under two-thirds 
of the total number of open skies agreements providing for seventh freedom 
                                                
905 See e.g. OECD, 1999 Background Document, supra note 903 at 35, para. 101. William 
O’Connor offers the following succinct explanation of the problems of directional imbalance 
in cargo: 
 
Cargo traffic by its nature is far more one-way than passenger traffic. In some market 
this may lead to a directional imbalance. In the early days of airlines, the tendency of 
cargo to flow more heavily out of industrialized areas than into them caused a heavier 
cargo flow in the United States from east to west and from north to south. This 
tendency is much less pronounced today, with the industrialization of the West and the 
South. In the Pacific there has been an imbalance wherein the development of light 
industries in Japan, Hong Kong, Korea, China, and Taiwan has caused cargo inbound 
to the United States to be heavier the outbound. 
 
William E. O’Connor, An Introduction to Airline Economics, 5th ed. (Westport, Connecticut & 
London: Praeger, 1995) at 180-81. 
906 See OECD, 2002 Revision, supra note 52 at 14, para. 10 (noting that “[t]riangular 
operations and better return traffic possibilities would address the “back-haul” issue and 
enhance the economic and commercial efficiency achieved in air cargo transportation and 
allow improved services to users.”). 
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cargo rights.907 In addition, agreements also accord similar rights absent open 
skies for passenger traffic, as is the case for the US-Vietnam Agreement as 
well as for cargo hubs in the US-China Agreement.908 The EU also has an 
interest in seventh freedom cargo operations, although these rights have not 
been secured to the extent they have in the United States. In 2007, the EC-US 
First Stage Agreement secured the seventh freedom cargo operations across 
the transatlantic, although limiting US rights to particular countries.909 In 
contrast, seventh freedom arrangements between Asian states remains 
anything but pervasive. Thus, despite the fact that a number of Asian carriers – 
among them Cathay Pacific, Korean Air, and Singapore Airlines – have 
developed significant cargo operations,910 the regulatory structure remains far 
from balanced. In ASEAN, six ASEAN member states (Singapore, Brunei, 
Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and Laos) have accorded US carriers seventh 
freedom all-cargo rights in their open skies agreements with the US,911 this in 
addition to access granted by Vietnam and the Philippines.912 In contrast, 
                                                
907 The US signed its first open skies agreement with seventh freedom cargo rights with 
Luxembourg in 1995. By the end of 2001 the United States had signed 29 open skies 
agreements awarding seventh freedom rights to all-cargo operations, and was a party to 60 of 
the slightly over 90 agreements reported by ICAO to contain such a clause in 2009, or just 
under two-thirds. US Dept of State, “Partners”, supra note 862 (listing two more open skies + 
seventh freedom cargo agreements since the ICAO update (cf. ICAO, “Overview”, supra note 
8 at 1-2, para. 2.3). 
908 US-Vietnam 2008 Amendment, supra note 879, art. 2 (amending Annex 1, s. 1); US-China 
2004 Protocol, supra 879, art. 9 (introducing art. 11 bis). 
909 EC-US First Stage Agreement, supra note 536, Annex 1, s. 3 (providing access to seventh 
freedom traffic markets in the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Malta, Poland, Portugal, 
and the Slovak Republic). 
910 US-China 2004 Protocol, supra note 879, art. 9 (cf. e.g. US-China 1999 Protocol, supra  
note 879, art. 3 (providing limited intermediate and unlimited beyond 5ths); US-Vietnam 2008 
Amendment, supra note 879, art. 2 (amending US-Vietnam Agreement, supra note 879, 
Appendix I (distinguishing between passenger and cargo services and granting cargo the right 
to provide services “between [the granting state] and any point or points”);  
911 US Dept of State, “Partners”, supra note 862. 
912 US-Vietnam 2008 Amendment, supra note 879, art. 5; Tan, “Policy in the Philippines”, 
supra note 45 at 289-91. 
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ASEAN carriers such as Singapore Airlines or AirAsia Cargo, a subsidiary of 
AirAsia, remain restricted from developing comparable route networks, even 
as the same member states attempt to create a single market and production 
base with identifiable ASEAN branding.913 
 There has also been some work on multilateral regulatory reform in air 
cargo, including matters of seventh freedom. From 1999 to 2002, the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
undertook a series of studies concerning the reform of the regulatory 
institutions governing the air cargo industry, including market access 
commitments such as traffic rights, pricing and operational flexibility, and 
leasing, as well as issues of establishment, ancillary issues, and facilitation 
through revisions to customs rules.914 In its final report of 2002, the OECD 
working group recommended an approach that included amending bilateral 
agreements and/or introducing a multilateral agreement that would grant both 
internal and external sevenths – that is, seventh freedom operations between 
contracting states and seventh freedom operations between a contracting and a 
                                                
913 Indeed, the High Level Task Force on ASEAN Economic Integration recommended, and 
Bali Concord II adopted, the very integration of priority sectors based on their ability to 
support the combination of economic strengths of ASEAN member countries, facilitate and 
promote intra-ASEAN investments, improve the condition to attract and retain manufacturing 
and other economic activities within the region, promote out-sourcing within the region, and 
to develop “made in ASEAN” products and services. Recommendations of the High-Level 
Task Force on ASEAN Economic Integration, II, para. 9, annexed to Bali Concord II, supra 
note 687. 
914 See generally OECD, 1999 Background Document, supra note 903; OECD, Trade 
Directorate, Trade Committee, Working Party of the Trade Committee, Assessing Barriers to 
Trade in Services – Air Cargo Services, Doc. No. TD/TC/WP(99)57/FINAL (14 November 
2000); OECD, Principles for the Liberalisation of Air Cargo, Workshop on Principles for the 
Liberalisation of Air Cargo Transportation, Paris, 4-5 October 2000 (2000); OECD, 
Summary Record, Workshop on Principles for the Liberalisation of Air Cargo Transportation, 
Paris, 4-5 October 2000 (2000); OECD, Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry, 
Division of Transport, Liberalisation of Air Cargo Transport, Doc. No. DSTI/DOT(2002)1 
(30 November 2001); OECD, Directorate for Science, Technology and Industry, Division of 
Transport, Summary Record, OECD Workshop on Liberalisation of Air Cargo Transport, 
Paris, 21-22 January 2002 (18 February 2002); OECD, 2002 Revision, supra note 52. 
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non-contracting state.915 These proposals were tied to further reforms to the 
ownership and control laws in favor of provisions permitting designations 
based on the airline’s principal place of business and, optionally, on the 
designating state’s effective regulatory control.916 Yet while wide adoption of 
either proposal would have opened cargo operations, and adoption of the 
proposed multilateral uniformly to all signatories, such an agreement has 
failed to find sufficient political capital to carry it through to fruition, although 
it retains a certain usefulness as a platform for discussion. 
 
2.2.2. Passenger and Combination Services 
 
While cargo transport on a seventh freedom basis has found some, although an 
uneven, degree of support, relaxing access to passenger and combination 
services on a seventh freedom basis remains highly contentious.  To date, 
there are three scenarios in which states have recognized a designated carrier’s 
right to operate air services on a seventh freedom basis. First, two states may 
agree to permit each other’s carriers to operate services to and from its 
territory on a seventh freedom basis. In the context of a bilateral agreement, 
such as the 2008 Singapore-United Kingdom Agreement,917 seventh freedom 
would necessarily entail operations to/from a point external to the agreement 
and would require at least two bilateral agreements among three parties to 
create an exercisable right to operate seventh freedom traffic. These 
                                                
915 OECD, 2002 Revision, ibid. at 30-33. 
916 Ibid. at 33-34 (using MALIAT as a template for a cabotage protocol) & 34-36 (drawing on 
the work of ICAO’s ATRP and MALIAT in discussing ownership and control issues, and 
adopting a provision similar to MALIAT’s “anti-Flags of Convenience” clause). 
917 UK-Singapore Agreement, supra note 528, art. 3. See also Tan, “Singapore’s Agreements”, 
supra note 519 at 362-64. 
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agreements are rare in the air transport world. Because of their rarity, they are 
currently of marginal value to operators. 
 A second possibility posits a multilateral exchange, either limited to 
contracting states or permitting operations both internal and external to the 
group of signatories.918 One example of the latter type of agreement is found 
in the MALIAT Protocol.919 In Northeast Asia, a recent proposal by Japanese 
economists Katsuhiro Yamaguchi and Yuichiro Yoshida modeled a limited 
form of access to Japanese, Chinese, and South Korean airlines to operate 
between their respective capital cities.920 This would mean that Korean Air 
could operate direct services between Tokyo and Beijing, ANA could offer 
similar services between Seoul and Beijing, and Air China could likewise 
directly serve the Tokyo-Seoul market. Their results are quite telling: while 
reducing market share on each individual route, the proposal would increase 
the total output of Japanese carriers by 4.7 percent, Korean carriers by 11.7 
percent, and Chinese carriers by 24 percent;921 moreover, while Japanese and 
Korean carriers each lose USD 10-15 million under the model, consumer 
benefits total USD43 million and Chinese carriers gain USD 1 million, while 
“leakage” of benefits to carriers outside the triad of states is minimized, 
thereby increasing competitive advantage vis-à-vis those third party carriers.922 
                                                
918  See e.g. OECD, 2002 Revision, supra note 52 at 14, para. 10. 
919 See generally above at 190-95. See also e.g. OECD, 2002 Revision, ibid. at 33-36. 
920 Katsuhiro Yamaguchi & Yuichiro Yoshida, ““Liberalization in North East Asian Skies” – 
Theory and Case Study of Tri-Partite Market Liberalization” (Presentation at the 2nd 
International Seminar of the International Transport Policy Research Unit, Tokyo, 2 March 
2007), online: <http://www.pp.u-tokyo.ac.jp/ITPU/seminar/2007-03-
02/documents/Yamaguchi_Yoshida%20Mar_2_2007_Tokyo.pdf>. 
921 Ibid. at sls. 11-12. The study assumes symmetrical air carriers carrying traffic under 
Cournot competition (simultaneous and independent competition on output) with airport 
capacity restraints and retention of home market advantage. See ibid. sls. 8-9. 
922 Ibid. at sls. 13-17. 
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 As with any economic model, the findings presented by Yamaguchi 
and Yoshida may be questioned in a variety of ways. There are certainly 
issues in assuming perfect symmetry among players, and the use of city rather 
than country pairs, or another, broader pairing,923 may well limit the analysis’ 
applicability as a practical model for liberalization.924 Even on a point-to-point 
exchange, with three hubs and three airlines, China would likely expect access 
for each. Yamaguchi and Yoshida also expressly acknowledge the need to co-
opt the “losers”, i.e., the Korean and Japanese carriers that incur the losses 
caused by liberalization,925 suggesting the use of transfers, or direct payments 
to the airlines incurring losses.926 These limitations are not insubstantial, nor 
are they novel. The failure of the MALIAT Protocol to gain acceptance among 
even parties to the base agreement is a paradigmatic example of the concerns 
over seventh freedom relaxations, and their relationship to strict conceptions 
of reciprocity within the industry. Still, the study suggests a possible avenue 
for achieving efficiency while compensating for changes in participation. It 
also advances the idea of liberalization as a public good, and of a Northeast 
Asian airspace as part of an ongoing discussion of trilateral liberalization and 
integration in the region. 
 A third category of seventh freedom relaxation is the result of 
replacing national norms with other, most often regional, norms. The EU’s 
project of replacing the national ownership and control clauses with 
                                                
923 On relaxations made at less than a national level, see e.g. above at 155-60 (discussion 
market access relaxations in the single European internal market) & 225-26 (discussing sub-
regional liberalization in ASEAN). 
924 The major exception to this discussed so far has been the relaxations between capital cities 
contemplated by ASEAN, although these again are framed within a wider liberalization 
project. See above at 226-30 & below at 364-65 & 370. 
925 Yamaguchi & Yoshida, supra note 920, sls. 7, 18. 
926 Ibid. 
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Community ownership and control clauses has this effect, the result of a 
difference between conceptions of the right of establishment under EU law 
and the right of establishment as figured in the variations of principal place of 
business models offered as alternatives to the national ownership and control 
rules discussed below.927 Although given a different legal basis, an ASEAN 
community carrier clause would have similar implications for the region. 
Unlike the principal place of business and effective regulatory control rules, 
the Community carrier does not require substantive links to the member state 
designating the airline: under Community law, simple ownership and control 
by any member state is sufficient to protect that state from exclusion in 
another member states’ bilateral agreements.928 This distinction between 
Community carrier and principal place of business is discussed in further 
detail below. 
 
2.3. Beyond Full Market Access II: The Question of Cabotage 
 
No consideration of market access liberalization is complete without 
considering questions of foreign access to domestic air transport markets, i.e. 
the question of cabotage.929 The right to exclude foreign entry from domestic 
markets dates back to the Paris Convention, which permitted states parties to 
                                                
927 See generally below at 336-37. On reforms within Europe, see generally above at 148-74. 
On the universal right of establishment, see generally above at 187 & below at 332-39. See 
also OECD, 2002 Revision, supra note 52 at 15-16 & 34-36 (discussing, inter alia, ICAO’s 
principal place of business and effective regulatory control). For a critique of the European 
position in light of ICAO and OECD’s discussions, see Mendelsohn, supra note 491 at 527-
32. See also generally Havel, Beyond Open Skies, supra note 10 at 79-81 (noting that the US’ 
recognition of the Community carrier clause is in effect a grant of seventh freedom rights 
from points within the Community to the United States). 
928 See the discussion on the open skies decisions above at 167-68. 
929 Chicago Convention, supra note 17, art. 7. 
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restrict foreign access to domestic routes and for states so excluded to 
implement reciprocal conditions.930 During the Chicago Conference, cabotage 
came to express the principle “that each country should as far as possible 
come to control and direct its own internal air lines.”931 It has since been 
touted as both a principle of national security as well as an economic asset 
conferring a competitive advantage to national industry. 
 In addition to the political reticence to open domestic markets to 
cabotage generally, there is also a question as to the legality of such 
exchanges. Specifically, while the first sentence of Article 7 of the Chicago 
Convention permits the state to close domestic routes to foreign operators, the 
second sentence of the same article places an obligation on states “not to enter 
into any arrangements which specifically grant any such privilege on an 
exclusive basis to any other State or an airline of any other State, and not to 
obtain any such exclusive privilege from any other State”,932 leading some to 
question the exact nature and content of this right. Nevertheless, contemporary 
arrangements have come to exchange these rights, and have important 
implications for the efficiency of the air transport system. This section 
addresses these legal questions before discussing two arrangements 
exchanging cabotage rights within the EU and across the Tasman Sea. 
                                                
930 Paris Convention, supra note 191, arts. 16-17. Professor Pablo Mendes de Leon traces the 
history of cabotage back to maritime law and the concept of “coasting trade”. He notes the 
distinction between “metropolitan cabotage” (traffic contained in the home state) and “extra-
metropolitan cabotage” (cabotage between the home state and overseas territories or 
possessions). He also notes that the discussions at the 1910 Paris Conference would have 
excluded metropolitan cabotage but permitted extra-metropolitan cabotage. Mendes de Leon, 
Cabotage, supra note 235 at 9-10. The Paris Convention would not make such a distinction. 
See also Douglas R Lewis, “Air Cabotage: Historical and Modern-Day Perspectives” (1980) 
45 J. Air L. & Com. 1059 at 1060 (noting that “[i]t was not until the [Paris Convention] that a 
specific air cabotage provision received international support.”). 
931 Statement by Adolf Berle to the Second Plenary Session in US Dept of State, Proceedings, 
supra note 2 at 61. 
932 Chicago Convention, supra note 17, art. 7. 
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2.3.1. The Question of Legal Constraints on Cabotage 
 
Article 7’s difficulties arise out of an ambiguity in the interpretation of the 
words “specifically granted … on an exclusive basis”.933 This wording has 
given rise to two interpretations of the obligations contained in the 
provision.934 The first, or strict, interpretation “de-emphasizes “specifically” 
and gives effect to the phrase, “on an exclusive basis.””935 This strict 
interpretation permits the grant of cabotage rights only on a non-exclusive 
basis, supporters holding that the clause is akin to a MFN provision. In 
contrast, the second, or flexible/liberal, interpretation “gives full meaning to 
“specifically””.936 Under the liberal interpretation, states may grant cabotage 
rights to another state so long as it does not specifically agree to exclude 
others from the possibility of obtaining similar rights. 
                                                
933 Ibid. 
934 See ICAO, Amendment to Article 7 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation, 
ICAO Doc. A16-WP/7 (1968) [ICAO, Swedish Proposal]. The Proposal noted that: 
 
[t]he second sentence limits the sovereignty of States […] in so far as they may not 
“specifically grant any such privilege on an exclusive basis to any other State---”. This 
sentence could be exposed to, at least, the two following interpretations: 
a) Cabotage rights must be granted on a non-exclusive basis, i.e. if one state is 
granted cabotage rights, any other State may require to be granted the same 
privilege; 
b) States may grant cabotage rights to another State exclusively, provided that it 
is not done “specifically”, i.e. if it is not specified that these rights are 
exclusive. 
 
See also Lewis, supra note 930 at 1059-65; George S. Robinson, “Changing Concepts of 
Cabotage: A Challenge to the Status of United States Carriers in International Aviation” 
(1968) 34 J. Air L. & Com. 553 at 560-64; Mendes de Leon, Cabotage, supra note 235 at 37-
52. 
935 Lewis, ibid. at 1063. 
936 Ibid. at 1065. 
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 This leaves open the question as to whether states can confer cabotage 
rights to another state without conferring the same to all states desiring access 
to the domestic market. There is some evidence within the travaux 
preparatoires demonstrating that the parties had intended a more liberal 
approach to cabotage. For one, it appears that the United States, whose draft 
convention is arguably the source of the provisions on cabotage, never 
suggests the application of MFN to any traffic rights.937 A similar provision, 
likewise designed to provide for an equality of right to negotiate rather than a 
uniformity of rights to operate,938 is found in the Standard Form Agreement 
promulgated at the end of the Conference.939 The drafting history of Article 
7(2), which added the requirement that the grant not be “specific”, also 
suggests an attempt to limit the interpretative scope of the provision to clauses 
                                                
937 Instead, Article 8(c) of the US Draft Convention sought to ensure that: 
 
No Contracting State shall agree with any foreign nation or an air transport enterprise 
of any foreign nation to grant exclusive rights of air commerce to such foreign nation 
or air transport enterprise, and no Contracting State shall obtain such rights from any 
foreign nation or deny to the other Contracting states full opportunity to seek rights of 
air commerce for their aircraft. 
 
United States Proposal for a Convention on Air Navigation (Conf Doc 16) in US Dept of 
State, Proceedings, supra note 2 at 557, art. 8(c) & 557, art. 21 (providing that “[a]ir 
commerce for hire may be reserved as cabotage exclusively to the aircraft of any Contracting 
State only if it both originates and terminates within the limits of such Contracting State and 
its colonies and possessions or among such colonies and possessions.”). 
938 On this point, see also Mendes de Leon, Cabotage, supra note 235 at 47 (finding that, in 
relation to Article 7(2), “[i]n light of the US inspired background principles, Article 7(2) must 
be understood to assure equality of treatment and to prevent discrimination”). This 
interpretation would broadly fit within the postwar order’s attempt to regulate non-
discrimination “above all”. Ruggie, “Embedded Liberalism”, supra note 4 at 396-97. 
939 Standard Form Agreement for Provisional Air Routes in US Dept of State, Proceedings, 
supra note 2 at 127, Rec. 1 (providing “[t]hat each State undertake to refrain from including 
specific provisions in an agreement which grant exclusive rights of transit, non-traffic stop, 
and commercial entry to any other State or airline, or from making any agreement excluding 
or discriminating against the airlines of any State, and will terminate any existing exclusive 
or discriminatory rights as soon as such action can be taken under presently outstanding 
agreements.” [emphasis added]). 
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that sought to create rights and obligations that necessarily precluded others 
from seeking cabotage rights.940 
 There is also a question regarding the application of Article 7(2) to 
contiguous states. During the Conference, the French delegation had raised 
some concerns regarding Article 7(2), proposing that it be deleted from the 
draft Convention.941 It expressed concern that the provision would prevent 
“such cases as that of France and Belgium which have services flying over no 
territory but their own, thereby opening their cabotage to each other and 
pooling their resources”.942 In response to this, both the United States and 
Great Britain asserted that it would not.943 France thereafter withdrew its 
proposal “[i]n view of the fact that this opinion was generally agreed upon by 
the Committee, and that it would be recorded in the minutes.”944 During the 
discussions on multilateralism, India argued to extend the understanding of 
contiguity to spaces between states that did not share a land border but were 
separated by a water barrier and no other state lay between them, such as itself 
                                                
940 See Commentary on the Development of the Individual Articles of the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation in ibid. at 1382. A mark-up of the pertinent text from draft Article 
7(2) reads as follows: 
 
Each member state undertakes not to enter into any arrangements which specifically 
grant any such privilege on an exclusive basis to any other state or an airline of any 
other state and not to obtain such exclusive privilege from any other state. 
 
The phrase appearing in italics represents the added text, while the strikethrough represents 
text in the original that was subsequently deleted. 
941 Minutes of Joint Meeting of Subcommittees 1, 2, and 3 of Committee I, December 4 (Conf 
Doc 485) in US Dept of State, Proceedings, ibid. at 656. Both France and the UK had 
proposed to delete this proposal. See United Kingdom Proposal for Insertion as Article VII in 
Document 414 (Conf Doc 421) in ibid. at 695; French Draft of Amendments to Documents 
433 and 435 (Conf Doc 44) in ibid. at 1342. See also Mendes de Leon, Cabotage, supra note 
235 at 48-49. 
942  Minutes of Joint Meeting of Subcommittees 1, 2, and 3 of Committee I, December 4 (Conf 
Doc 485) in  US Dept of State, Proceedings, ibid. at 656. 
943 Ibid. 
944 Ibid. See also generally Mendes de Leon, Cabotage, supra note 235 at 48-52. 
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and Sri Lanka.945 The proposal appears to have been of little concern and 
received no substantive criticism. 
 Despite this evidence in support of the liberal account of Article 7(2), 
the information contained in the travaux is circumstantial, often cryptic, and 
does not support a definitive interpretation.946 In 1966, a Swedish proposal to 
delete the provision from the Convention altogether again opened the issue to 
interpretation.947 This proposal surfaced around the same time as ICAO was 
considering a proposal for systems of non-national aircraft registration, and 
although a separate proposal, it remains linked to developments related to 
multinational operators being considered at the time. Under the Chicago 
Convention, Chapter XVI permitted the formation of an international 
operating agency amongst groups of states or their nationals.948 These 
questions, which raised issues related to aircraft registration, also pertained to 
the question of such organization’s status under the cabotage rules. While 
ultimately the ICAO Council decided that “the mere fact of joint or national 
registration […] would not operate to constitute the geographical area of the 
                                                
945 See Statement by the Delegate of India in PICAO, Multilateral 1, supra note 285 at 29-30. 
The Indian delegate’s statement was in reference to an exclusion of fifth freedom services 
from a future multilateral convention, and in this way echoed the Canadian draft’s proposal at 
Chicago. See Canadian Revised Preliminary Draft of an International Air Convention in US 
Dept of State, Proceedings, ibid. at 570-91. Contiguity was thus a generalizable category and 
not one solely related to cabotage.  
946 See ICAO, Swedish Proposal, supra note 934 at para. 7 (noting that while the liberal 
interpretation “seems to be preferable”, it “may, however, not be unchallenged). See also 
Robinson, supra note 934 at 563 (calling Article 7(2) “a history replete with non-definitive 
language, and unilateral expressions of opinions as to just what constituted cabotage in 1944, 
and what it hopefully would be in the future […,] hardly sufficient upon which to build a 
convincing argument that the concept of cabotage, as provided in Article 7, is definitive, 
inflexible, and not sensitive to changing conditions.”). 
947 See ICAO, Swedish Proposal, ibid. at para. 6. 
948 See generally Chicago Convention, supra note 17, arts. 77-79. 
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multi-national group as a cabotage area”,949 these discussions never answered 
the question of the exclusivity of cabotage. Ultimately the Swedish decision 
was discussed, but no action was taken and the matter left unresolved. 
 In the absence of a clearly defined treaty-based obligation, the terms of 
the Convention are left open to interpretation as guided by the subsequent 
agreements and practices of states parties that affect the interpretation or 
application of the Convention.950 It is here that some form of consensus is 
beginning to emerge around the issue. This consensus centers on the 
development of single aviation markets and the reciprocal relaxation of 
cabotage rights among member states required to establish them. These 
markets include the Single European Aviation Market, which has already been 
discussed in some substance in Chapter 3, and the Single Aviation Market of 
Australia and New Zealand. In both circumstances, third states have generally 
accepted these arrangements without protest or demands for similar treatment. 
In the case of the European Union, they have gone even further, recognizing 
the arrangements as legitimate by renegotiating the terms of their international 
agreement with Europe or its member states.951  
 
                                                
949 ICAO, Resolution Adopted by the Council on Nationality and Registration of Aircraft 
Operating by International Operating Agencies, Appendix 2, Part II, Note 2 (reprinted in 
René H. Mankiewicz, “International Civil Aviation Organization: Interpretation and 
Implementation of Article 77 of the Chicago Convention – Nationality and Registration of 
Aircraft Operated by International Agencies” (1968) 34 J. Air L. & Com. 83 at 85 
[Mankiewicz, “Interpretation”]) [ICAO, Council Resolution on International Agencies]. 
950 See generally Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, done at Vienna, 23 May 1969, 
art. 31(3) (providing that interpretation shall consider, together with the treaty’s context, 
subsequent agreement involving the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its 
provisions, subsequent practice establishing agreement of the parties concerning its 
interpretation, and other relevant rules of international law between the parties). 
951 See generally above at 168-74 (discussing recognition through both renegotiations and 
incorporation into a common aviation area). 
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2.3.2. The European Community and the Trans-Tasman: Two Models 
of Exchange 
 
Chapter 3 has already discussed the EC’s relaxation of cabotage rights 
between its member states as part of the third package, which removed 
restrictions on consecutive cabotage rights where capacity on the domestic 
segment of the route was no more than 50 percent of total capacity on 1 
January 1993, and removed the remaining restrictions on consecutive and 
stand-alone cabotage on 1 April 1997.952 It also discussed market integration 
as part of a larger institutional restructuring, transferring competences along a 
vertical axis to a set of supranational institutions that would be responsible for 
governing those aspects of the market transferred to it.953 At the same time, 
member states addressed the problems of regulatory arbitrage resulting from 
differences in safety and technical standards by transferring competence to 
another body, the Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA), a body formed in 1990 
and associated with ECAC, which included the EC member states954 and 
which the EC itself adopted as the basis for its own approach in December 
1991.955 This function of the JAA was formally disbanded as of 30 June 2009, 
                                                
952 Reg. 2408/92, supra note 464, art. 3(2). 
953 See generally above at 148-74. 
954 The JAA was also to harmonize European standards with those of the United States. See 
JAA, “About Joint Aviation Authorities”, online: 
<http://www.jaa.nl/introduction/introduction.html> (noting that “co-operation was intended to 
provide high and consistent standards of safety and a "level playing field" for competition in 
Europe.  Much emphasis was placed on harmonising the JAA regulations with those of the 
USA.”). 
955 See generally EC, Council Regulation (EEC) No 3922/91 of 16 December 1991 on the 
harmonization of technical requirements and administrative procedures in the field of civil 
aviation, [1991] O.J. L 373/4. See also EC, Council Directive 91/670/EEC of 16 December 
1991 on mutual acceptance of personnel licenses for the exercise of functions in civil aviation 
[1991] O.J. L 373/21 (increasing mobility of cockpit crew). 
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its functions formally taken over by the European Air Safety Authority 
(EASA).956 
 A second model for the exchange of cabotage rights, this time along a 
horizontal axis, is the Single Aviation Market of Australia and New Zealand 
(SAMANZ). Like the Single European Aviation Market, SAMANZ developed 
out of three sets of instruments: an initial Memorandum of Understanding 
signed in 1992 relaxing market access between the two states and providing 
some easing on limits to fifth freedom operations;957 the SAM Arrangements 
of 1996, which established a single internal market for carriers meeting the 
definition of a SAM airline;958 and finally a Memorandum of Understanding 
signed in 2000, followed by an open skies agreement in 2002, which both 
provide for an open skies arrangement between the two parties and incorporate 
the SAM Arrangements into the formal treaty structure.959 Like other 
regulatory arrangements, SAMANZ also grew out of broader economic 
cooperation between the two states, a result of a mixture of obtaining the 
economic benefits of integration between them and enhancing external 
                                                
956 See generally supra note 954. On EASA, see generally EC, Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 February 2008 on common rules in the 
field of civil aviation and establishing a European Aviation Safety Agency, and repealing 
Council Directive 91/670/EEC, Regulation (EC) No 1592/2002 and Directive 2004/36/EC, 
[2008] O.J. L 79/1. 
957 See generally Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Australia and 
the Government of New Zealand, 1 August 1992 [Australia-New Zealand MoU 1992]. 
958 See generally Australia-New Zealand Single Aviation Market Arrangements, signed in 
Canberra, 19 September 1996 [SAMANZ 1996].  
959 See generally Memorandum of Understanding on Open Skies between Australia and New 
Zealand, signed at Melbourne, 20 November 2000 [Australia-New Zealand MoU 2000]; 
Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of New Zealand 
Relating to Air Services, done at Auckland, 8 August 2002 [Australia-New Zealand Open 
Skies 2002]. 
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competitiveness, with its conceptual origins to be found in the Australia-New 
Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement.960  
 The first consideration of an exchange of cabotage rights between the 
two states appears in the 1992 Memorandum of Understanding, although not 
yet as a substantive relaxation. The MoU undertook broad reforms in the areas 
of entry, market access to trans-Tasman routes, market access to beyond 
routes, and tariffs. It opened entry, first on a country pair basis and after 1 
November 1992, on a city pair basis as well;961 it relaxed all restrictions on 
routes between the two countries over the period 1992-1994; and it permitted 
either state’s airlines to determine its own tariffs.962 However, the MoU 
retained restrictions on fifth freedom rights, offering corresponding traffic 
rights in terms of capacity and frequency, although the geographical scope 
differed somewhat for Australian and New Zealand carriers.963 While not 
exchanging cabotage traffic itself, the Memorandum did provide for the 
possible future exchange of cabotage rights by November 1994, as well as a 
consultation procedure for additional relaxations, including changes to the 
ownership and control rules, further relaxations on beyond rights, and bloc 
negotiations with third parties.964 This, however, would not take place as 
scheduled.965 
                                                
960See e.g. SAMANZ 1996, supra note 958, Preamble, para. 1; Australia-New Zealand MoU 
2000, ibid., Preamble, para. 1; Australia-new Zealand Open Skies 2002, ibid, Preamble, para. 
3. See also generally Goh, supra note 31 at 37-39. ANZCERTA also progressed in stages, 
first as a free trade agreement on goods in 1983, then gradually expanded to include services 
in 1988. Like other trade agreements, air services were expressly exempted from 
ANZCERTA. See ibid. 
961 Australia-New Zealand MoU 1992, supra note 957, para. (A). 
962 Ibid., paras. (C) & (F), & Annex I, paras. 4-5 
963 Ibid., paras. (D)-(E). See also below at 374-75. 
964 Ibid., paras. (G) (noting that the ministers “will recommend to their respective 
Governments” that each state’s domestic market be opened to the other’s airlines as of 1 
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 It was not until 1996, with Qantas successfully privatized and a sale of 
Ansett Australia’s shares identified for sale to Air New Zealand underway, 
that the second “stage” of integration would be concluded, both governments 
now being “in agreement that the concept of a single aviation market should 
be revived”.966 The 1996 Arrangements distinguished between two classes of 
carriers: the “SAM airline” (i.e. an airline at least 50 percent owned by 
Australian and/or New Zealand interests, with a board of which at least two-
thirds are Australian or New Zealand nationals, a chairperson who is either an 
Australian or New Zealander, and with a head office and operational base in 
either country), and a “domestic airline” otherwise incorporated under either 
Australia or New Zealand laws (both Australia and New Zealand allow 100 
percent foreign ownership and control of domestic airlines).967 While the 
analysis of ownership and control provisions below further analyzes this 
distinction, it is important because the division is tied to market access 
integration under the Arrangements: while domestic airlines remain tied to 
their respective domestic market, the Arrangements grant SAM airlines 
                                                
November 1994) & (H) (providing for consultations on issues related to further relaxations on 
beyonds, ownership and control, and whether the lifting of cabotage restrictions could be 
brought forward by a year, and bloc negotiations with third states). 
965 According to Goh, then-Australian Federal Minister of Transport Laurie Brereton, decided 
not to proceed with the second stage of the agreement as a result of concern over the possible 
sale of Qantas as well as a sale of shares in Ansett Australia. Goh, supra note 31 at 52 (noting 
that opening the market to added competition would have introduced an added level of 
uncertainty in the sale of either, while also noting concerns over a disproportionate amount of 
benefits accruing to New Zealand). 
966 Ibid. at 54. 
967 SAMANZ 1996, supra note 958, s. 3. On domestic investment in both, see e.g. Chang, 
Williams, & Hsu, supra note 52 at 162. 
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(which are also domestic airlines) the right to operate across the Tasman as 
well as in the other state’s domestic market.968 
 These conditions are continued almost without change in the 2000 
MoU and the 2002 Australia-New Zealand Air Transport Agreement. The 
only substantive change concerns the right of non-SAM designated airlines, 
defined as an airline with its principal place of business and place of 
incorporation in the designating state and which is effectively controlled by 
the designating state or its nationals.969 Here, the 2002 Agreement permits 
such airlines to operate between the two countries, as well as to behind, 
between, and beyond points where applicable, and to establish a local 
subsidiary in the other state, subject to that state’s rules and regulations.970 
 While the SAMANZ has introduced a more liberal operating 
environment across the Tasman, beyond the bilateral market both international 
and national requirements continue to enforce the nationality-based substantial 
ownership and effective control provisions.971 As with European external 
relations, the extension of market access benefits beyond the fifth freedom 
remains a strategic consideration: Australia’s most recent Aviation White 
Paper published in 2009, notes that while seventh and cabotage freedoms were 
generally non-negotiable, they would be considered in select instances deemed 
                                                
968 SAMANZ 1996, ibid., ss. 14 (permitting trans-Tasman flights) & 4.1 (providing that “[a]ny 
airline which meets the definition of a SAM airline…will be permitted to operate domestic 
services in Australia and New Zealand.”). 
969 Cf. Australia-New Zealand Open Skies 2002, supra note 943, arts. 2(2) (defining a 
designated airline), 2(4) (defining a SAM airline), & 2(6) (allowing both parties to jointly 
allow another airline to be designated as a SAM airline). 
970 Ibid., art. 13 (providing designated airlines of one state the right of establishment in the 
other) & Annex I (conveying first-sixth freedom rights for passenger traffic and first-seventh 
freedom rights for cargo traffic). 
971 See generally infra note 973 and accompanying text (noting Australia’s current 
requirements and the axes of possible reform as indicated by their most recent White Paper). 
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beneficial to the national industry.972 The White Paper gives facilitating a 
comprehensive open skies agreement with the EU (the EU and Australia have 
been negotiating a possible open skies (or even an Open Aviation Market) 
since 2008)973 and access to the US domestic market as two examples of 
acceptable strategic reasons for granting cabotage rights.974 Until then, foreign 
airlines wanting access to the Australian domestic market must create a 
subsidiary airline to do so.975 
 
3. OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL: ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF THE MULTINATIONAL 
AIRLINE 
 
The second type of fundamental legal transformation on which reform rests is 
in the substantial ownership and effective control of airlines. Like questions of 
market access, the tension between national ownership and effective control 
and the structure of international air transport is a long-standing one.976 During 
the postwar period, proposals to move away from the nationality rules had 
included the internationalization of air transport operations and a less stringent 
                                                
972 Australian Government, supra note 619 at 44-45. 
973 See ibid. at 43 & 68. Se also generally European Commission, “International Aviation: 
Australia”, online: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/transport/air/international_aviation/country_index/australia_en.htm>. 
974 Australian Government, ibid. at 44. 
975 Virgin Australia provides an excellent case in point. Earlier this year, the airline bifurcated 
its corporate structure into an international and domestic arm, in an attempt to increase foreign 
investment to develop its domestic routes while keeping its international operating rights from 
running afoul of the foreign investment restrictions in both Australian law and bilateral 
agreements. See e.g. Virgin Australia, “Virgin Australia Proposed New Structure Approved 
for Implementation” (16 March 2012), online: <http://www.virginaustralia.com/us/en/about-
us/media/2012/NEW-STRUCTURE-APPROVED/>. Neil Wilson, “Alan Joyce Attacks 
Virgin Over Majority Foreign Ownership Structure” Herald Sun (26 March 2012), online: 
<http://www.heraldsun.com.au/business/alan-joyce-attacks-virgin-over-majority-foreign-
ownership/story-fn7j19iv-1226310275748> (noting Qantas CEO Joyce’s complaints over 
creating an unequal playing field). 
976 See generally above at 99-103 & 112-15. 
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form of ownership and control permitting fellow state parties to own and 
control airlines.977 While these proposals sought to balance concerns over the 
distribution of aviation capabilities with the developing world’s need for 
foreign investment and expertise in (temporarily) supporting sustainable air 
transport operations,978 they ultimately failed in the face of assumptions 
related to the national organization of airlines and of economic and political 
life more generally. Although many regions have begun shifting towards 
alternative arrangements among themselves, many of the regional agreements 
surveyed above similarly express reservations about moving away from 
traditional nationality-based forms of regulation,979 forms that are anyways 
circumscribed by clauses in bilateral agreements beyond the region. 
 Nevertheless, there has always been room for exceptions. Moreover, 
the range and type of exceptions have gradually broadened to include a 
number of different mechanisms. While initial efforts to relax nationality rules 
were largely aimed at developing countries, beginning in the late 1980s states 
began to consider more universally applicable means of removing the 
nationality provisions in favor of types of regulatory control that match 
patterns of privatization and the global agglomeration of financial capital. 
                                                
977 See generally ibid. (discussing the ownership and control rules found in, inter alia, the 
Transit and Transport Agreements, ICAO’s Draft Multilaterals, and Bermuda I). 
978 See above at 101-02 (noting, in particular, Venezuela’s push for and Canada’s opposition 
to a more flexible ownership and control structure). 
979 PIASA, supra note 868, art. 6(2) (ultimately establishing criteria based on community 
ownership and control plus place of residence and principal place of business in designating 
party); Yamoussoukro Decision, supra note 868, art. 6.9 (requiring, inter alia, headquarters, 
central administration and principal place of business in the state concerned and be effectively 
controlled by a state party); Decisión 582, supra note 868, art. 12 (principal place of business 
and real and effective seat, but without affecting clauses in bilateral agreements); MASA, 
supra note 868, art. 1(C) (majority ownership and effective control by member states). On 
ownership and control in Europe and ASEAN, see generally above at 148-74 & 237-46, 
respectively. See also generally Forsyth et al., Preparing ASEAN, supra note 698 at 39-43, 
Table 3.2. 
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These latter initiatives have already been discussed to some extent in Chapter 
3.980 This section addresses the development of those alternative modes of 
regulation as a continuous project, beginning with a set of provisions 
contained in the Chicago Convention. 
 
3.1. Multinationalism and the Chicago Convention: Multinational 
Registration and the International Operating Agency 
 
Despite the strong assumptions in favor of national ownership and control, the 
Chicago Convention expressly acknowledges the possibility of non-national 
forms of organization.981 The Convention addresses multinational ownership 
in Chapter XVI, which consists of three articles. The core of Chapter XVI is 
Article 77, providing that the Convention shall not restrict states from forming 
either joint air transport operating organizations or international operating 
agencies, or from pooling any of their air services on routes or in regions.982 
Article 78 builds on this non-restraint by giving the Council the right to make 
suggestions to states on the formation of any joint organizations, while Article 
79 makes clear that the provisions apply to both state- and privately-owned 
enterprises.983 
                                                
980 See generally above at 180-99. 
981 Chicago Convention, supra note 17, c. XVI (entitled “joint operating organizations and 
pooled services”). On the origins of Chapter XVI, see e.g. Michael Milde, “Nationality and 
Registration of Aircraft Operated by Joint Air Transport Operating Organizations or 
International Operating Agencies” (1985) 10 Ann. Air & Sp. L. 133 at 135-36 (attributing the 
ideas to Article X of the “Canadian revised Preliminary Draft of an International Air 
Convention” (Conf. Doc. 50)) [Milde, “Nationality”]. 
982 Ibid,, art. 77. 
983 Ibid., art. 78-79. 
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 Interestingly, the Convention also makes an explicit connection 
between the airline and the aircraft. In addition to the provisions above, 
Article 77 states that  “[t]he Council shall determine in what manner the 
provisions of this Convention relating to nationality of aircraft shall apply to 
aircraft operating by international operating agencies.”984 The clause raises 
questions as to the scope of the article, which does not refer to joint 
organizations or pooling agreements, as well as to how an international 
organization would affect the aircraft registration requirements under Chapter 
III and also other provisions outside Chapter III that refer to aircraft 
nationality.985 Finally, it left open the question of whether a form of 
international registration would require some type of formal amendment to the 
Convention.986 
 ICAO had placed the issue of non-national registration on its agenda as 
early as 1948.987 However, it would take more than a decade until the issue 
                                                
984 Ibid. 
985 Chicago Convention, ibid., art. 77. Cf. ibid., c. III. See also Gerald F. FitzGerald, 
“Nationality and Registration of Aircraft Operated by International Operating Agencies and 
Article 77 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation, 1944” (1967) 5 Can. Y.B. Int’l 
L. 193 at 200-02; Bin Cheng, “Nationality and Registration of Aircraft – Article 77 of the 
Chicago Convention” (1966) 32 J. Air L. & Com. 551 at 555, para. 15 (noting that “both the 
1960 ICAO Panel of Experts and the 1965 Report of the Subcommittee on Article 77 of the 
ICAO Legal Subcommittee have rightly perceived that the main problem involved in 
operation of services by joint or international operating organizations under the terms of the 
Chicago Convention is one relating to the general question of registration and nationality of 
aircraft under the Convention.”) [Cheng, “Nationality”]. See also Milde, “Nationality”, supra 
note 981 at 136-38. 
986 See e.g. Cheng, “Nationality”,  ibid. at 556. 
987 Prior to 1959, the ICAO Assembly had adopted two resolutions on the matter (see ICAO, 
“Assembly Resolution A2-13 on Study on the Organization and Operation of International Air 
Transport, Including the Joint Ownership and Operation of International Air Services” in 
ICAO, Resolutions and Recommendations of the Second Assembly, 1-21 June 1948, ICAO 
Doc. A2-P/3 (1948) at 10 (requesting the Council to “promptly formulate and circulate … its 
views on the legal, economic and administrative problems involved in determining the manner 
in which the provisions of the Convention relating to nationality of aircraft shall apply to 
aircraft operated by international operating agencies.”); ICAO, “Assembly Resolution A4-17 
on Joint Operation of International Air Services”, in ICAO, 4th Assembly, supra note 300 at 
10-11 (noting that the Council “be directed to give assistance when requested to States that 
take the initiative in developing such cooperative arrangements directly among themselves or 
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would be formally raised within the Council, and another eight years until the 
Council would resolve the matter. Although the Council deflected an initial 
query put to it in December 1959 by the League of Arab States,988 the issue 
quickly reemerged in a number of forums. In March 1961, eleven African 
states formed Air Afrique through the Treaty of Yaoundé.989 In 1962, the 
Assembly’s Legal Commission recommended moving the issue to the Legal 
Committee’s active work program.990 The following year, several Yaoundé 
Treaty members successfully introduced a provision into the Tokyo 
Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft 
that allowed states establishing either a joint or international operating 
company to designate a state from among them to serve as the state of 
registration for purposes of the Convention.991 Finally, in 1964, requests by 
the Representative of Egypt on the Council and the Secretary General of the 
                                                
whose airlines develop such arrangements”, and inviting states with experience in the various 
forms of joint operation to submit such information to the Council), and in 1956 a study by the 
Air Transport Committee, conducted between 1952 and 1956, submitted some findings 
regarding the scope of application, although several of its members held these to be 
unacceptable. See generally Milde, “Nationality”, ibid. at 138-40. 
988 René H. Mankiewicz, “Aircraft Operated by International Operating Agencies” (1965) 31 
J. Air L. & Com. 304 at 304-05 (also discussing the findings of a panel of experts appointed to 
consider the issue as well as the Council’s own findings). Milde, “Nationality”, supra note 
981 at 142; FitzGerald, supra note 985 at 198 (also noting that “the report of the Panel and the 
letter approved by the Council were drafted so as to avoid the necessity of determining the 
case of the proposed Pan-Arab Airline.”). 
989 Milde, “Nationality”, ibid. at 142-43. 
990 ICAO, Report and Minutes of the Legal Commission, Fourteenth Session of the Assembly, 
Rome, 21 August – 15 September 1962, ICAO Doc. 8279, A14-LE11 (1962) at 7; FitzGerald, 
supra note 985 at 198. 
991 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, done at 
Tokyo, 14 September 1963, art. 18 (providing that “[i]f Contracting States establish joint air 
transport operating organizations or international operating agencies, which operate aircraft 
not registered in any one State those States shall, according to the circumstances of the case, 
designate the State among them which, for the purposes of this Convention, shall be 
considered as the State of registration and shall give notice thereof to the International Civil 
Aviation Organization which shall communicate the notice to all States Parties to this 
Convention.”). See Milde, “Nationality”, supra note 981 at 143-44 (also noting that the 
Secretary General of the Conference, Mr. P.K. Roy, also Director of ICAO’s Legal Bureau, 
also played an important role in bringing the clause within the Convention). See also 
FitzGerald, supra note 965 at 198-99. 
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Union Africaine Malgache de Coopération Economique formally petitioned 
the Council to make a formal study of the matter.992 After discussions within 
the Legal Committee in 1965 and 1967, these events resulted in a Council 
Resolution on Nationality and Registration of Aircraft Operated by 
International Operating Agencies.993 
 The Resolution takes an expansive approach to regulating non-national 
registration.994 At its base is a distinction between “joint registration”, in 
which the states constituting the international operating agency would 
“establish a register other than the national register for the joint registration of 
aircraft to be operated by the agency”, and “international registration”, in 
which the aircraft to be operated by the agency would be registered with an 
international organization having legal personality.995 Each type of registration 
is then subjected to a two-stage test.996 First, the proposed registration system 
needed to meet a set of “basic criteria” adopted by the Council, which include 
jointly and severably assuming obligations for aircraft in the registry, assuring 
third parties are not discriminated against, and guaranteeing a degree of 
uniformity in aircraft operations and the conduct of personnel.997 Additionally, 
joint registrations are asked to identify a state responsible for communications 
                                                
992 Milde, “Nationality”, ibid. at 145; FitzGerald, ibid. at 199. 
993 See generally ICAO, Council Resolution on International Agencies, supra note 934; ICAO, 
Report of the Work of the Legal Subcommittee (Sixteenth Session) (reprinted in Mankiewicz, 
“Interpretation”, supra note 949 at 92). 
994 In making its determination, both the Committee and the Council took an expansive 
approach to the Council’s own powers to determine rules applicable to non-national 
registration. The Council had the power to determine the applicable rules without amending 
the Convention, and those rules would not be limited to Chapter III. See generally ICAO, 
Council Resolution on International Agencies, ibid. 
995 Ibid., Appendix 1. 
996 See e.g. Mankiewicz, “Interpretation”, supra note 949 at 84-85. 
997 ICAO, Council Resolution on International Agencies, supra note 949, Appendix 2, Parts I-
II. 
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involving each aircraft, while international registrations must meet any 
additional guarantees necessary to ensure “sufficient guarantees that the 
provisions of the Chicago Convention are complied with.”998 Second, the 
proposed registration system would undergo an individual review, although 
the Resolution notes that in the case of joint registrations this would be largely 
a formal process.999 Once applied by the Council, aircraft registered on that 
registry are given a common mark distinct from any other nationality mark.1000 
 However, despite the concerns raised, neither system of non-national 
registration has been of much practical interest to states. Indeed, the Council 
approved the first and only application for a joint registration system only in 
1984, a request of the Iraqi and Jordanian governments related to the 
formation of Arab Air Cargo, an organization established in 1981 by Iraqi 
Airways and Royal Jordanian Airline.1001 None of the regional integration 
projects have attempted creating a non-national aircraft registry, and ICAO 
has never received an application for an international registry. Instead, most 
states and their airlines have opted to continue using separate national 
registration systems. The most well-recognized multinational airline doing so 
is Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS), a consortium of three national airlines 
from Sweden (AB Aerotransport), Norway (Det Norske Luftfartsselskab), and 
                                                
998 Ibid., Appendix 2, Part II. 
999 Ibid., Preamble, para. 8 (noting that “while the Council has discretion to arrive at such 
determination as it deems appropriate in the case of joint registration … there should be little 
problem in regard to the fulfillment of the basic criteria specified in Part I of Appendix 2 
hereto and, therefore, a determination by the Council in such or similar cases should merely 
be formal and could automatically be given”). 
1000 Ibid., Appendix 3. 
1001 See e.g. Milde, “Nationality”, supra note 981 at 133-34, 147-52; Khairy el-Hussainy, 
“Registration and Nationality of Aircraft Operated by International Agencies in Law and 
Practice” (1984) 10 Air L. 15. See also ICAO, Air Navigation Bureau, “Nationality Marks”, 
online: <http://legacy.icao.int/nationality/> (providing a list of nationality and common marks, 
the latter being allocated the range 4YA-4YZ). 
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Denmark (Det Danske Luftfarstelskab).1002 SAS remains a consortium 
between independent, nationally organized parent companies, and does not 
maintain a separate legal personality;1003 its operations are organized through a 
collective meeting of each parent company’s board of directors.1004 
 One scholar writing at the time multinational registration was an active 
concern noted that the SAS solution “avoids, rather than solves, the problems 
relating to national aircraft operated by international operating agencies.”1005 
If this is the case, in today’s market it is certainly nothing exceptional. Both in 
Europe and in Southeast Asia, the integration of services markets has not 
brought with it similar moves to integrate registration systems, instead setting 
common standards to be applied by separate national registries and 
recognizing registrations between them. In this regard, the SAS model of 
national registration, combined now with alternative designation rules to allow 
corporate integration, very much continues as the preferred method of reform. 
 While non-national registration has been non-essential to the 
development of multinational airlines, the discussions over non-national 
registration systems also made two other important contributions to 
multinational organization that have had more long-standing repercussions. 
First, the discussions within ICAO’s Legal Subcommittee brought out a 
                                                
1002 See e.g. Cheng, International Air Transport, supra note 21 at 271-78; Mendes de Leon, 
Cabotage, supra note 235 at 125-27; Peter T. Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises and the 
Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) at 68.  
1003 The three companies established SAS in 1950, pooling their resources, rights and 
liabilities, as well as profits and losses, based on the proportion of their contribution to the 
consortium: 3/7ths Swedish, 2/7ths Danish, and 2/7ths Norwegian. This includes aircraft, 
which remain registered under and in the state of the parent company. Cheng, ibid. at 272; 
Mendes de Leon, ibid. at 125-26; Muchlinski, ibid. at 68 & 76 (noting that SAS should be 
seen as a publicly owned MNE). 
1004 Ibid. at 68. 
1005 Milde, “Nationality”, supra note 981 at 138. 
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number of concerns as regarding the effects rescaling air transport systems 
beyond the nation on the concept of cabotage.1006 To placate concerns, the 
Council Resolution formally adopted an interpretative note to the anti-
discrimination clause of the basic criteria for registration, providing that “the 
mere fact of joint or international registration under Article 77 would not 
operate to constitute the geographical area of the multinational group as a 
cabotage area.”1007 There was apparently some debate surrounding this issue 
in the Second Subcommittee, with the worlds “the mere fact” added at the 
insistence of several African states after a lunchtime lobby for its inclusion.1008 
Although the virtual non-use of joint registrations has meant the limits of this 
argument have not been, nor will be, tested, the discussion was an early foray 
into the debate on the minimum requirements necessary to claim a cabotage 
area, a debate that has directly informed arguments over “Euro-cabotage”.1009 
That proponents of the idea have similarly failed to gain wide support for the 
                                                
1006 In this regard, the practice of excluding non-Arab states from operating intra-regional fifth 
freedom services as a practice designed to create an Arab “cabotage” area. See e.g. Mendes de 
Leon, Cabotage, supra note 235 at 125. It is also noteworthy that Sweden presented its 
proposal regarding Chicago Convention Article 7(2) during the same period that non-national 
registration was an active question within ICAO. See generally supra note 934. 
1007 Supra note 949. 
1008 Robinson, supra note 934 at 557-60. 
1009 Robinson, ibid. at 559 (noting concern that the clause left open the possibility of forming a 
cabotage area comprising the territories of the multinational operator through non-national 
registration plus “total or significant economic and administrative integration of civil aviation 
matters”). For a discussion of the debate between the United States and African states, see 
ibid. at 557-59 Pablo Mendes de Leon drew on this work to advocate an “Aviation Union of 
States” in his monograph on cabotage. See Mendes de Leon, Cabotage, supra note 235 at 
129-33 (discussing the case of Air Afrique and the note to the Council Resolution) & 186-89 
(advocating, in a different context, the concept of an “Aviation Union of States” as a 
substitute for federalism). One of the most vocal opponents of Euro-cabotage has been Allan 
Mendelsohn, who was also head of the US delegation to the Legal Subcommittee discussing 
non-national registration systems. See Robinson, ibid. at 557-59 (noting Mendelsohn’s 
responses as Chairman of the US delegation in his report to the Secretary of State); 
Mendelsohn, supra note 491 at 520-23 (applying the same reasoning to the EU’s current state 
of affairs). 
 321 
idea also has important repercussions for any other proposed single aviation 
market, including the one in ASEAN. 
 Second, and more importantly, the discussions highlighted the 
possibility of rescaling activities by pooling resources as a means of 
organizing for competitiveness in a major way.1010 Where SAS had initially 
been a relatively isolated example of aggregating national capabilities to 
remain relevant in an international system of mainly Western states, one of the 
principal effects of decolonization was to fragment a number of territories in 
the developing world. To these countries, pooling interests certainly correlated 
with the economic viability of their airlines, particularly at a time when the 
cost and economics of air transport was to change so dramatically. It is in this 
regard interesting to note that demands for non-national organization 
emanated primarily from new states in the Middle East and Africa. They also 
reflect emanations of colonial pasts – Air Afrique was not only comprised of a 
group of former French colonies, but was also partly owned by French 
interests.1011 Although indirectly, debate also brought forward questions 
regarding whether certain groups of states, particularly developing and least 
developed countries, might require a more lenient approach to the strict 
                                                
1010 See e.g. Robinson, ibid. at 563 (noting that “[w]hat could be effected, and quite 
legitimately, is the raising of the bargaining price which non-Member States would have to 
pay for operating in such an international cabotage area.”). 
1011 See e.g. Mendes de Leon, Cabotage, supra note 235 at 41-52 (discussing the context of 
the development of Chicago Convention Article 7, and the role of spheres of influence in 
particular, in shaping cabotage policy). Air Afrique had originally been a joint venture 
between French airlines Air France and UAT (subsequently reorganized as UTA), each with a 
17 percent interest in the airline, and 11 African governments. After a number of 
reorganizations and divestments, it eventually ceased operations in 2002. At the time of its 
second reorganization, Air France had actually increased its ownership interest to thirty-five 
percent. “A New Air Afrique? What To Do With a Trouble West African Airline” The 
Economist (23 August 2001), online: <http://www.economist.com/node/750374> (noting Air 
France had increased its equity stake from an initial twelve percent to thirty-five percent). Cf. 
supra notes 659-64 and accompanying text (discussing foreign ownership in North- and 
Southeast Asian (and South Pacific) airlines during the postwar period/period of 
decolonization). 
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national constructions that had developed from the 1940s onwards. This last 
point would drive ICAO to promote a second form of relaxation: the 
“community of interest”, both strictly and broadly understood. 
 
3.2. Community Interests and International Air Transportation 
 
The Afro-Arab initiative may also have influenced states to consider a more 
general mode of re-organizing air transport operations around particular 
groups of states sharing economic or political ties. These communities of 
states can be divided into associations of developing countries and 
associations of other states, most often around a regional basis. While the idea 
of a “community of interest” originates in an initiative to aide developing 
countries, it has since been overtaken in depth and impact by the development 
of other communities, particularly the EU and SAMANZ. 
 
3.2.1. ‘Communities of Interest’ among Developing Countries 
 
The ICAO Assembly took a significant step towards recognizing the 
importance of non-national organization during its 24th Session in 1983, when 
it issued Resolution A24-12.1012 Resolution A24-12 recognizes the need to 
                                                
1012 ICAO, “Assembly Resolution A24-12 on Practical Measures to Provide an Enhanced 
Opportunity for Developing States with Community of Interest to Operate International Air 
Services” in ICAO, Resolutions Adopted by the Assembly and Index to Documentation, 24th 
Session, Montreal, 20 September – 7 October 1983, ICAO Doc. 9414 (1983) at 54 [ICAO, 
“Assembly Res A24-12”].  In 1998, Resolution A32-17 superceded Resolution A24-14. See 
ICAO, “Assembly Resolution A32-17 on Consolidated Statement of Continuing ICAO 
Policies in the Air Transport Field” in ICAO, Resolutions Adopted at the 32nd Session of the 
Assembly, Provisional Edition, Montreal, 22 September – 2 October 1998 (1998) at 50, para. 
9 (declaring Res. A24-14 superceded) & Appendix A, s. II (addressing the community of 
interest standard) [ICAO, “Assembly Res A32-17”]. 
 323 
adopt a more flexible attitude towards the application of the national 
ownership and control criteria by identifying the existence of “communities of 
interest” among developing countries and calling on states to recognize and 
apply the concept in its dealings with them.1013 In doing so, the Resolution 
aims to harness the potentially virtuous circle between regular and reliable air 
services and economic development.1014 As applied, the principle would 
permit one state within a group of states, left undefined by the Resolution, to 
appoint a carrier owned and controlled by another state within that group as its 
own designated airline. To that end, the Resolution requests the Council to 
help facilitate its application.1015 
 The community of interest principle is significant for a number of 
reasons. Not least among these is its recognition of both air transport’s 
increasing economic role in the life of a nation and the increasingly extra-
national character of economic life.1016 At the same time, the Resolution 
leaves the concept of “community” loose and undefined, rooting the concept 
in the fact that: 
 
the realization of developmental objectives […] is increasingly being 
promoted by cooperative arrangements among such States in the form of 
                                                
1013 Ibid., para. 1-2. 
1014 Ibid., Preamble, para. 2. See also generally UNCTAD, The Positive Agenda, supra note 12 
at 8-10, paras. 20-31 (noting the development of regional agreements as separate but 
interrelated to the development of closer trade relationships). One might, however, also recall 
the failure of sub-regional efforts in ASEAN to generate significant increases in traffic 
volumes, or with similar, limited efforts in the EU to generate traffic between small, regional 
airports. On this, see generally below at 372. 
1015 ICAO, “Assembly Res A24-12”, ibid., para. 3. 
1016 Part of this fragmentation is of colonial origin, a result of the proliferation of states during 
the decolonization process. 
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regional economic groupings, and functional cooperation symbolic of 
the affinity and community of interest existing among those States.1017 
 
 Given the premise, it should be little surprise that the concept itself is 
also left noticeably flexible and intentionally vague. Thus, while “such 
community of interest is particularly shared among developing States 
belonging to such regional economic integration movements”,1018 functional 
cooperation appears sufficient to demonstrate an affinity sufficient for non-
national designation. At the same time, the Assembly criticized the strictness 
of state practice, noting that strictly national organizational patterns could, in 
certain circumstances, actually impede a developing country’s right to 
participate in international air transportation,1019 arguably the first time that 
the Assembly as a whole took a positive stance on nationality acting to the 
detriment of the participation norm. While not drawing on its discussions on 
economic multilateralism during the 1940s,1020 the Assembly’s exhortation to 
flexibility is certainly reminiscent of some of the more liberal voices heard 
there. 
                                                
1017 ICAO, “Assembly Res A24-12”, supra note 1012, Preamble, para. 4. 
1018 Ibid., Preamble, para. 5. 
1019 Specifically, the Assembly concluded that: 
 
The strict application of the criterion of substantial ownership and effective control for 
the authorization of an airline to exercise route and other air transport rights could deny 
to many developing States a fair and equal opportunity to operate international air 
services and to optimize the benefits to be derived therefrom. 
 
Ibid., Preamble, para. 3. 
1020 See above at 101-02. 
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 The community of interest concept has found continued support within 
ICAO, being reaffirmed both at the 32nd Session of the ICAO Assembly by 
Resolution A32-17, which superseded Resolution A24-12, and again at the 
Fifth Worldwide Air Transport Conference in 2003.1021 Yet it is not a legal 
right per se, and its application remains, strictly construed, limited to 
achieving “developmental objectives”, and thus to developing countries. 
Indeed, in both its 1983 form and its 1998 reiteration, the principle is 
conceptually bounded by its application to “developing States”.1022 One 
possible explanation for this limitation is as a function of norm-governed 
change, in particular the maintenance of the nondiscrimination principle. The 
community of interest concept found its origin among several Caribbean 
states, which, supported by the United States, had lobbied for a principle 
around which those states might rationalize their air transport markets among 
themselves.1023 Although not stated, it seems safe to assume that the US itself 
would have been concerned with interests from developed countries 
purchasing majority interests in or otherwise acquiring the rights to foreign 
colonies.1024 
                                                
1021 See generally ICAO, “Assembly Res A32-17”, supra note 1012; ICAO, “Declaration of 
Global Principles for the Liberalization of International Air Transport” in ICAO, Consolidated 
Conclusions AT/Conf 5, supra note 10, para. 1.1(c). 
1022 See ICAO, “Assembly Res A32-17”, ibid., Appendix A, s. 2, Preamble. 
1023 See ICAO, Draft Assembly Resolution “Practical Measures to Provide an Enhanced 
Opportunity for Developing States with Community of Interest to Operate International Air 
Transport Services, ICAO Doc. A24-WP/62 EC/13 (23 September 2003, REVISED 23 
September 2003, REVISION 2 26 July 1983, REVISION 2 ADDENDUM/CORRIGENDUM 
27 September 1983). Originally, the community of interest concept was presented to the 
Assembly by Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Grenada, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, and Trinidad 
and Tobago. Revision 2 added Canada and the United States among its presenters, while an 
addendum, filed 27 September 1983, added Australia, Belgium, and Mauritius to its list of 
presenters. The US had already made a number of exceptions to national designations in the 
region. See e.g. Mendes de Leon, “A New Phase”, supra note 349 at 361 (also noting the US’ 
approval of SAS). 
1024 For example, the US had required an additional number of traffic rights in exchange for 
waiving its right to suspend Aerolinas Argentina (a South American company) after Iberia (a 
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 Whatever the reasons, it is a major limitation. This is certainly true in 
terms of ASEAN, where many, if not most, of its member states have arguably 
passed beyond the Resolution’s threshold of “developing country”: it would 
seem unlikely that applying the principle to support a Malaysian designation 
of Singapore Airlines for operations from Kuala Lumpur would go wholly 
unopposed. Yet despite these limitations, it may yet hold some degree of 
weight in the region. While not carrying the legal certainty of a bilaterally (or 
multilaterally) recognized ASEAN carrier clause, it remains possible, for 
example, for Cambodia (which launched Cambodia Angkor Air as a joint 
venture between the Cambodian government and Vietnam Airlines in 
2009)1025 or Laos to seek support from another ASEAN member state’s airline 
such as Vietnam Airlines under the community of interest principle. The 
community of interest thus continues to hold significant, if limited, moral 
weight in the reorganization of air transportation. 
 
3.2.2. Community Carriers and Economic Integration 
 
Just as the principles underlying market access relaxations extend beyond the 
nation-bound conception of liberalization, the benefits of rescaling activities 
underlying the community of interest concept extend to forms of regional 
cooperation regardless of level of economic development. Regionalism in air 
transport has certainly not been limited to particular geographic areas, nor to 
                                                
European company) rescued the failing airline. See e.g. Mendes de Leon, “A New Phase”, 
ibid. at 362. Compare this with Air France’s more limited intervention – just 35 percent – into 
Air Afrique. See supra note 1011. 
1025 See e.g. CAPA Centre for Aviation, “Profile on Cambodia Angkor Air”, online: 
<http://centreforaviation.com/profiles/airlines/cambodia-angkor-air-k6>. 
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particular levels of economic development. Indeed, since ICAO’s Fourth 
Worldwide Air Transport Conference in 1994 states have lent general support 
to the idea of permitting states to reorganize their air transport networks along 
regional lines, and have practiced varying forms of advanced or preferential 
liberalization and integration on a regional basis for at least as long.1026 These 
developments, incomplete as they are, have had significant impacts in those 
regions.1027 But the full realization of gains would only result from completely 
rescaling the industry within the region,1028 and this, while not impossible, 
requires both an internal and external element of recognition of a different 
organizational basis. 
 At the heart of such changes lies the re-articulation of ownership and 
control rules. Chapter 3 discussed the EU’s process of internal change as well 
as the ongoing process of renegotiating external recognition.1029 Chapter 4 
similarly discussed the issues presented by ASEAN’s more ambivalent 
approach to an ASEAN carrier clause among themselves and with their 
Dialogue Partners.1030 They are certainly not alone in mapping out non-
national forms of ownership and control.1031 
                                                
1026 See e.g. ICAO, Report AT Conf/4, supra note 16 at 23, para. 2.3.5.2 (cited in supra note 
582). On regional arrangements, see generally supra note 868. See also Bonin, 
“Regionalism”, supra note 453 at 128 (noting that regionalism can be thought of as an 
extension of the idea of a “community of interest”). 
1027 See e.g. The Brattle Group, supra note 103; Intervistas-ga2, supra note 10.  
1028 For example, The Brattle Group has predicted that of annual cost savings of up to euro 2.9 
billion resulting from productive efficiencies generated by a TOAA, “[n]early 80 percent of 
the savings would come from intra-EU, as opposed to transatlantic, operations” (The Brattle 
Group, ibid. at v & c. 3), and that while passenger traffic would increase by 4.1 to 11 million 
annually on transatlantic routes, the increase in annual passenger traffic within the EU would 
be between 13.6 to 35.7 million (Ibid at vii & c. 6). 
1029 See generally above at 148-74. 
1030 See generally above at 237-46. 
1031 See Decisión 582, supra note 868, art. 12 (the administration, principal place of business, 
and operational base is situated in the designating state); Fortaleza Agreement, supra note 868 
(does not provide a definition, but leaves existing bilaterals to regulate based on the principle 
 328 
 A third model, mentioned in the discussion of cabotage above, is that 
provided by SAMANZ. One of the central components of SAMANZ is the 
distinction between the SAM and the domestic/designated airline. In order to 
qualify as a SAM airline, the carrier must demonstrate that it is at least 50 
percent owned and the board effectively controlled by Australian and/or New 
Zealand nationals, that its Chairperson and at least two thirds of the board are 
Australian and/or New Zealand nationals, and that its head office and 
operational base are in Australia or New Zealand.1032 Additionally, it must 
meet the security and insurance requirements of both countries, operate 
aircraft that meet both countries’ noise requirements, and possess both 
Australian and New Zealand operating authorizations.1033 In contrast, 
designated airlines are those with their principal place of business and 
effective control in one of the two states.1034 
 These requirements do not just open the domestic markets of one state 
to the airlines of the other. Rather, they confer a competitive advantage to 
Australian and/or New Zealand-owned airlines in a region where both states 
                                                
of subsidiarity); MASA, supra note 868, art. 13(1)(a) (majority ownership and effective 
control in one or more member states or nationals); PIASA, supra note 868, art. 6(2)(1) (from 
Phase 1, the right to nominate an airline: (1) it is substantially owned and effectively 
controlled by the member state or its nationals; (2) if (1) no longer holds, then if it is 
effectively controlled by one or more member states (or nationals) and with its place of 
residence and principal place of business in the designating state; or (3) where a member state 
does not have an international airline at the time of the agreement, then by its place of 
residence and principal place of business) & 6(2)(2) (from Phase 3, the right to nominate an 
airline: (1) substantially owned and effectively controlled by one or more member state and/or 
nationals; or (2) has its place of residence and principal place of business in the designating 
party); Yamoussoukro Decision, supra note 868, art. 6 (providing that a party can designate an 
Eligible Airline (i.e. it must have, inter alia, its headquarters, central administration and 
principal place of business in the concerned state and be effectively controlled by a state party 
(ibid., art. 6.9) from another state party to operate on its behalf or an eligible African 
multinational airline in which it is a stakeholder). 
1032 SAMANZ 1996, supra note 958, s. 3; Australia-New Zealand Open Skies 2002, supra note 
979, art. 2(4). 
1033 SAMANZ 1996, ibid., s. 8; Australia-New Zealand Open Skies 2002, ibid., art. 2(4)(f)-(h). 
1034 Australia-New Zealand Open Skies 2002, ibid., art. 2(2). 
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have completely opened domestic markets to foreign investment.1035 This 
means that, under the 1996 Arrangements, while Qantas or Air New Zealand 
remain free to operate within both the Australian and New Zealand domestic 
markets, as well as between the two countries (and third countries which retain 
traditional substantial ownership and effective control clauses),1036 foreign-
owned (in its wider, combined sense) domestic airlines remain restricted to at 
best one domestic and the trans-Tasman market and at worst a single domestic 
market. Although the 2002 open skies agreement narrows this divide 
significantly, the agreement still requires the non-SAM designated airlines to 
establish a local airline to operate domestic services in the other state.1037 In 
contrast, Jetstar could legally operate between Auckland and Christchurch 
without first establishing itself in New Zealand. 
 The arrangements along the trans-Tasman also raise other issues 
related to the legal arrangements governing air transportation. One such issue 
is external recognition. Unlike the Single European Aviation Market, and 
contrary to original intentions, Australia and New Zealand have not pursued a 
common external policy to date.1038 Indeed, the two countries have taken 
                                                
1035 See e.g. Chang, Williams, & Hsu, supra note 52 at 162. International airlines, however, 
remain restricted due both to bilateral arrangements and domestic law. See e.g. Australian 
Government, supra note 619 at 46-47. 
1036 SAMANZ 1996, supra note 958, s. 4(1) (providing that “[a]ny airline which meets the 
definition of a SAM airline … will be permitted to operate domestic services in Australia and 
New Zealand.”) & 14 (providing that “[a]ny airline which meets the definition of a SAM 
airline, provided that [it meets a specific set of safety and operating conditions] will be 
entitled to fly between Australia and New Zealand without restriction.”). 
1037 Australia- New Zealand Open Skies 2002, supra note 959, art. 13. In fact, this is the same 
right any airline possesses within the territory of either state. See e.g. Williams, Chang, & 
Hsu, supra note 52 at 162, Table 1 (noting Australia and New Zealand have both lifted 
restrictions on the right of establishment in their domestic markets). 
1038 Australia-New Zealand MoU 1992, supra note 957, H(ii) (including “the possibility of 
both countries establishing at some future time a joint bloc for the purpose of negotiating 
international traffic rights” as a point for future discussions). See also Goh, supra note 31 at 
57-61 (discussing external relations and en bloc negotiations). 
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vastly different approaches to external relations. On the one hand, New 
Zealand follows a genuinely liberal policy in relation to international air 
transport, as evidenced by its participation in a number of liberal agreements, 
including as a signatory of MALIAT and its Protocol.1039 On the other hand, 
Australia continues to pursue a more restrictive approach, although it holds 
itself out as pursuing liberalization, including open skies, to the extent such 
arrangements “are assessed to be in the national interest”, taking a “pragmatic 
approach to liberalisation, based around achieving a balance between the 
trade, tourism and consumer benefits and the objective of maintaining a strong 
Australia-based aviation sector.”1040 According to its most recent aviation 
white paper, this includes maintaining national ownership restrictions on 
international airlines, although bringing restrictions on Qantas into line with 
the 49 percent ceiling on foreign equity required of other airlines.1041 It also 
includes evaluating the prospect of a competitive regime against the interests 
of its international aviation industry, a balancing which continues to control 
the relationship between it and, inter alia, Singapore.1042 
 The issues arising between domestic, trans-Tasman and international 
aviation markets with third parties also demonstrate the differences between 
purely national, regional and universal rights of establishment. Virgin 
                                                
1039 See e.g. the discussion on MALIAT above at 190-93. 
1040 See e.g. Australian Government, supra note at 619 at 41-42. This includes renegotiating 
agreements where demand exceeds capacity, but not necessarily removing regulatory 
restrictions altogether. See ibid. at 43. 
1041 Ibid. at 47 & 49. The current limits on foreign ownership contained in the Qantas Sale Act 
1992 are 25 percent for an individual shareholder and 35 percent of cumulative shares. 
1042 See e.g. Tan, “Prospects for ASAM”, supra note 44 at 261 (noting that Australia’s 
reticence to join MALIAT is more due to the competitive position of Singapore Airlines than 
to open skies with the United States (see also supra note 595)). Tan’s argument seems to have 
been confirmed in March 2008 when Australia and the US signed an open skies agreement. 
See generally Air Transport Agreement between the Government of the United States of 
America and the Government of Australia, done at Washington, 31 March 2008. Notably, the 
agreement retains the traditional nationality-based ownership and control clause. 
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Australia’s recent restructuring clearly demonstrates the effects of legal 
arrangements on corporate form. Formerly an Australian owned and 
controlled international airline with a minority (49) percent stake held by its 
foreign parent, Virgin Australia recently split itself into a holding company 
and two operating companies, one international and one domestic.1043 This has 
offered one way of increasing the airline’s access to international capital 
markets – in an interesting twist, by domesticating part of the airline –, 
although it has not been without criticism.1044 
 ASEAN’s own equivocal approach thus far to regional ownership and 
control structures and a more universal (reciprocal) right of establishment may 
result in a similar regional structure among its member states. It will be 
remembered from Chapter 4 that ASEAN’s own internal arrangements so far 
propose both ASEAN community carrier and principal place of business and 
effective regulatory control standards, while the ASEAN-China Agreement 
adopts an ASEAN-only approach, each in addition to traditional ownership 
and control requirements and still subject to the other parties’ subsequent 
(non-binding) acceptance.1045 The ambivalence reflected in the formal rules 
stems from a number of concerns expressed from member states. The 
Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, and Indonesia have all expressed such 
concerns, often in terms of non-economic interests such as Thailand’s worries 
over emergency airlift capacity.1046 Other concerns reflect possible tensions 
between the differences in economic development, not only in terms of the 
                                                
1043 See supra note 975. 
1044 Particularly from Qantas, which has additional foreign ownership restrictions placed on it. 
See ibid. 
1045 See generally above at 238-39 & 259, respectively. 
1046 See supra note 104. 
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competitiveness of air transport markets, but arguably in the size of financial 
markets.1047 These problems require a more thorough evaluation of the right of 
establishment, which is presented in the analysis below. 
 
3.3. Towards a Universal Right of Establishment 
 
Thus far, discussion of revising the ownership and control rules has centered 
on rescaling the industry around politically acceptable cooperative 
arrangements. In contrast, a universal right of establishment presents itself as a 
facially neutral means of permitting as of right “(a) foreign investor(s) to set 
up an airline in any given country”,1048 while holding states accountable for 
the activities of airlines established within their territory. In order to introduce 
such a regime, states and international organizations have begun to evaluate 
the possibilities of replacing each of the substantial ownership and effective 
control criteria with ones based on principal place of business, incorporation, 
or business seat on the one hand, and with regulatory, as opposed to economic, 
control on the other.1049 
 Demands for a universal right of establishment relate to two 
underlying developments in the global economy. On the one hand, the 
ongoing processes of liberalization and privatization separate the operational 
elements from the regulatory elements of the system while forcing airlines 
                                                
1047 See e.g. Thomas et al., supra note 116 at 67 & 199. See also Tan, “Prospects for ASAM”, 
ibid. at 269 (noting Thailand’s opposition to a “principal place of business and effective 
regulatory control” rule, although not to a “principal place of business and effective control” 
rule). 
1048 Haanappel, “Ownership and Control”, supra note 277 at 97-98. 
1049 Both ICAO and the OECD have substantively incorporated these concepts into their 
discussion on liberalization. See ICAO, Consolidated Conclusions AT/Conf 5, supra note 10 
at 3-5, Agenda Item 2.1; OECD, 2002 Revision, supra note 52 at 15-16 & 34-36. 
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away from non-performance based access to capital. No longer under the 
protection of government aid, airlines have themselves come to demand 
increased access to capital markets, while governments have looked for 
alternative means to maintain the state’s economic connection to and 
regulatory responsibility for an airline.1050 On the other hand, financial 
markets themselves have become increasingly globalized, with capital 
concentrating around a limited number of increasingly global financial centers 
through which finance capital can move almost instantaneously.1051 By 
delinking ownership and control from the nation-state, these new 
organizational criteria allow airlines to access pockets of financial capital from 
around the globe and to organize in order to best to compete with other 
organizations competing for access to the same financial capital.1052 Its direct 
motivation is thus economic, rather than the more overtly political regional 
arrangements. 
 But these alternative criteria for legitimating designations also carry a 
number of complications with them. Three in particular stand out. First, there 
is a need to generate a sufficiently precise, common understanding of these 
                                                
1050 See e.g. ICAO, ATRP Report, supra note 873 at 5-6 (also linking the first alternative 
measure to Assembly Resolution A24-12 and, among the airlines, to IATA’s Annual General 
Meeting in 2001). 
1051 See e.g. Keohane & Nye, supra note 112 at 110. See also generally Gordon L. Clark, 
“Money Flows Like Mercury: The Geography of Global Finance” (2005) 87:2 Geografiska 
Annaler B 99. 
1052 See e.g. ICAO, Report AT/Conf 4, supra note 16 at 24, para. 2.3.5.4 (noting that “[t]here 
was widespread recognition that air carriers needed access to the international capital market, 
and for many States this would necessarily involve foreign investment.” It also qualified this 
statement by noting that “it was important that such investment be in responsible partnership 
with the national air carrier, that it meet the needs and respect the economic and social goals 
as well as sovereignty of the State concerned; and that it use local resources to the greatest 
extent possible.”). See also ICAO, ATRP Report, supra note 873 at 4. 
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new (and vague) terms.1053 This need has been met at both the international 
and domestic level through the concerted effort of organizations and 
governments. ICAO in particular has played an important role in refining 
these concepts by offering a non-exclusive set of indicia at the 2003 
Worldwide Air Transport Conference that would need to be met to satisfy 
each condition.1054 They are provided in Table 5.1 below. 
 
Table 5.1: ICAO’s Interpretative Guidelines for Principal Place of 
Business and Effective Regulatory Control 
 
1. be established and incorporated in the territory of 
the designating state in accordance with national laws; 
 
2. maintain a substantial amount of its operations and 
capital investment in physical facilities in the territory 
of the designating state; 
 
3. pay income tax to the designating state; 
 
4. register and base its aircraft in the designating state; 
and 
 
Principal Place of 
Business 
5. employ a significant number of nationals in 
managerial, technical and operational positions. 
 
                                                
1053 While there might be much wrong with the current system, the nationality rules have 
obtained, if not a universal meaning, then at least a broad common understanding of the 
operational aspects of the existing rules. See e.g. Lelieur, supra note 52 at 3-6 (noting that 
“there are no universally accepted definitions for these terms” (Ibid. at 3), although “[w]ithin 
the international community at large, ownership of an airline is generally understood to mean 
ownership of voting shares of the airline stock, and ‘substantial ownership’ usually equates to 
owning more than 50 per cent of the voting shares” (Ibid.) “The question of ‘effective control’ 
is subtler and requires a deeper analysis, since it has nothing to do with numbers but rather 
with the question of who actually controls the airline. Control over a corporation is commonly 
understood as the power to direct its internal and external policy.”). Havel, Beyond Open 
Skies, supra note 10 at 134. Cf. ICAO, Report AT/Conf 4, ibid. at 24, para. 2.3.5.3 (noting that 
“[o]n the other hand it was pointed out that the concepts of substantial ownership and 
effective control … had no agreed definition, and they were subject to wide variation in 
interpretation and application by States.”). 
1054 ICAO, Consolidated Conclusions AT/Conf 5, supra note 10 at 5, Integral Note (i). See 
also ICAO, Report AT/Conf 4, supra note 16 at 24, para. 2.3.5.4 (noting that states expressed 
the view that “there was a need for ICAO to define the terms of “headquarters, central 
administration or principal place of business””. The 2003 model clause is the outcome of this 
work). 
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1. hold a valid operating license or permit issues by 
the licensing authority such as an Air Operator 
Certificate (AOC); 
 
2. meet the criteria of the designating state for the 
operation of international air services, such as meeting 





3. the designating party has and maintains safety and 




Notably, these standards would attempt to address the problem of flags of 
convenience by requiring, inter alia, continuous compliance with ICAO 
Standards. 
 Other bodies have also taken up the concept of principal place of 
business. European Union Regulation (EC) No. 1008/2008, consolidating the 
third package, defines principal place of business as “the head office or 
registered office of a Community air carrier in the Member State within which 
the principal financial functions and operational control, including continued 
airworthiness management, of the Community air carrier are exercised.”1055 In 
2010, a unanimous US Supreme Court in Hertz Corp. v. Friend et al., a non-
aviation case which nevertheless impacts this discussion, addressed the 
concept of principal place of business, defining it as the “nerve center” of the 
organization, i.e., “the place where the corporation’s high level officers direct, 
control and coordinate the corporation’s activities.”1056  These indicia provide 
considerable guidance as to what the new paradigm might entail. 
                                                
1055 Reg. 1008/2008, supra note 176, art. 2(26). Cf. Reg 2407/92, supra note 464, art. 4(1)(a) 
(simply requiring that no undertaking be granted a license unless “its principal place of 
business and, if any, its registered office are located in that Member State” and its main 
occupation be air transport). 
1056 Hertz Corp. v. Friend et al., 130 U.S. 1181 (U.S. 2010) at 1186. 
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 Second, there is an important distinction between the right of 
establishment discussed in this context and the right of establishment 
recognized by the European Court in its open skies decisions.1057 In the latter, 
the Court invalidated member states’ bilateral air services agreements because 
those agreements prevented air carriers owned and controlled by nationals of 
one member state from operating to and from points in a different member 
state to points outside the Community.1058 Under the Court’s definition, 
Lufthansa, an enterprise owned and controlled in Germany, and whose 
operations were predominantly located in Germany, would nevertheless have 
the right to operate a service between Bucharest and Istanbul simply by virtue 
of the fact that it is owned by German interests and without any other ties to 
Romania.1059 In other words, in such instances as the “community of interest” 
or European Community carrier clause, the granting states acknowledges a 
limited right for states within a group to treat the seventh freedom service as if 
it were a third/fourth (and possibly fifth)1060 freedom service. 
 This is much different from the principal place of business and 
effective regulatory control requirements associated with ICAO and the 
OECD’s own discussions on the right of establishment, discussions in which 
the European Community and its member states participated.1061 Here, the 
requirement would still have to be a nationally organized company; however, 
                                                
1057 See generally supra notes 511-13 and accompanying text. See also Mendelsohn, supra 
note 491 at 527-32 (noting the difference between the right of establishment as understood by 
the OECD and ICAO and that understood by the court in the open skies decisions). 
1058 See generally above at 167-68. 
1059 See e.g. Commission v. Germany, supra note 511 at paras. 144-161. 
1060 This would be the case for, e.g., the Istanbul-Singapore segment of a Bucharest-Istanbul-
Singapore operation. 
1061 Allan Mendelsohn makes this point very well. See Mendelsohn, supra note 491 at 527-32. 
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the veil between the corporate entity and the investor and managerial staff 
would be lowered. Under this construction of the right of establishment, for 
Lufthansa to “operate” services between Bucharest and Istanbul it would in 
fact be performed by a Romanian subsidiary owned and managed by the 
German airline. Because of this, the latter does not benefit from the rescaling 
effects without a concomitant relaxation in the area of market access on a 
seventh, eighth, and ninth freedom basis. 
 Third, while facially neutral, the principal place of business and 
effective regulatory control contain particular political issues embedded within 
them. There are several facets to this argument. At one level there is the 
economic geography of state support. As Chapter 3 noted, support for both the 
Agenda for Freedom and 2010 Draft Multilateral – both broad-based measures 
flagged as early as ICAO’s Air Transport Regulation Panel Report in 20021062 
– comes almost exclusively from states with competitive airlines and strong 
pools of financial resources.1063 These concerns are not in any way novel. 
Indeed, Canada’s observation that broad ownership and control rules could 
endanger a state’s participation “either by financial or political methods”1064 
remains as possible now as it did in 1946. More recently, other states, 
particularly developing countries, have expressed concerns over the unequal 
relationship between developing or least developed country and global 
                                                
1062 ICAO, ATRP Report, supra note 872 at 10-11. 
1063 See generally above at 198-99. 
1064 Supra note 302 and accompanying text. 
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multinational corporations, a concern associated both with state capture and 
with the footlooseness of foreign enterprise.1065 
 A second aspect of the challenge of a global right of establishment 
arises from questions as to whether states can fully participate in international 
aviation through regulatory oversight of an otherwise global system has so far 
failed to persuade states such as the United States and Thailand, which remain 
concerned over the effects foreign ownership might have on their respective 
military requisition (CRAF) or emergency airlift programs.1066 To address 
such concerns, advocates for the removal of foreign ownership and control 
restrictions in the US have suggested alternative means such as mandatory 
participation and/or requisition programs providing airlines with compensation 
at market rates.1067 Thailand might also consider such alternatives in 
addressing its emergency airlift concerns. 
 Groups of states have also used the divisibility of the nationality tests 
(i.e., the separateness of the ownership and control criteria) to open investment 
without relaxing the national control criteria. MALIAT provides one example 
of what might be thought of as a hybridized open investment/closed control 
provision, opening designation to airlines with their place of incorporation in 
the designating state but requiring nationals of the designating state to retain 
                                                
1065 See ICAO, ATRP Report, supra note 873 at 4 (noting “the injection of foreign capital may 
lead to less stable operation of airlines as it tends to be more mobile, flowing in and out of 
particular sectors of the global economic as it seeks the best return.”). 
1066 See supra note 103 (noting several critiques of the CRAF). The ATRP recognized this in 
part by noting that states would ultimately be the arbiters of their own international aviation 
policy. See also ICAO, ATRP Report, supra note 873 at 5 (noting that “[t]he judgement about 
whether benefits of liberalizing ownership and control provisions outweigh the risks is a 
matter for individual States to determine, based on their national interest.”). 
1067 See supra note 103. 
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effective control over the corporation.1068 Two years later the OECD drew 
expressly on MALIAT to suggest a similar approach to multilateral all-cargo 
liberalization as a start towards a more comprehensive transformation of 
ownership and control rules.1069 And in ASEAN, Thailand’s own concerns 
with accepting second party designations based on the principal place of 
business and effective regulatory control criteria appear not to extend to 
relaxations of the ownership provision alone.1070 All of this seems to suggest 
that the effect is likely to be change as a form of gradual displacement, with 
changes to the ownership clause likely preceding changes to the control 
clause. Chapter 7 builds this point into its own recommendations for the 
region. 
 
4. REGULATORY ARBITRAGE AND MARKET ACCESS AND RIGHT OF 
ESTABLISHMENT LIBERALIZATION 
 
There is also an important regulatory difference between removing market 
access restrictions and replacing national ownership and control provisions 
that relates to an operator’s capacity to use regulatory arbitrage to circumvent 
a number of rules governing technical and safety standards, as well as make 
use of differences in inputs, particularly labor standards.1071 In this regard, 
market access liberalization (particularly with respect to cabotage) offers a 
                                                
1068 See MALIAT, supra note 585, art. 3(2). 
1069 OECD, 2002 Revision, supra note 352 at 35-36. 
1070 Thomas et al., supra note 116 at 63, 67 & 199; Tan, “Prospects for ASAM”, supra note 44 
at 268 & 275-76. 
1071 The Brattle Group discusses these concerns in relation to the TOAA in some detail. See 
generally The Brattle Group, supra note 103 at c. 8. See also Booz Allen Hamilton, supra note 
498 at 77-133. 
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wider space for arbitrage and thus concern over the effects of market access 
liberalization. In comparison, the right of establishment maintains the state’s 
regulatory control over services operated. This difference, moreover, has 
important effects on the competitive position of players in a global aviation 
market. 
 There are a number of ways in which market access relaxations create 
the potential for regulatory arbitrage. Arbitrage may be the result of 
differences between two states’ national safety and technical standards, or 
between a state’s standards and ICAO’s SARPS, which act as a sort of 
regulatory floor for accepted practices. Another potential conduit for arbitrage 
is through differences in labor conditions, such as wages or hours worked or 
number of flight attendants per aircraft type.1072 In both examples, the 
difference between the higher cost country and lower cost country – whether 
this be in terms of the relative wages paid or the relative cost of maintaining 
the two airlines’ fleet aircraft – gives the operators registered in the lower cost 
country, ceteris paribus, a cost advantage over the operators from the higher 
cost country on the same route. This advantage, deriving as it does not from 
more efficient operations but from differences in national regulations that 
make the market unequal,1073 explains at least some of a state’s reticence 
                                                
1072 See e.g. The Brattle Group, ibid. at 8-11 to 8-15 (discussing scenarios and likelihoods of 
direct and indirect labor substitution on the transatlantic. In this case, direct labor substitution 
equates with airlines either relocating or renegotiating contracts down to lower-wage 
standards, while indirect labor substitution arises from airlines with lower labor costs taking 
market share from “legacy” labor airlines). 
1073 Northeast Asia is an excellent example of differences in the cost and use of inputs 
informing demands for market access. While Japanese airlines are efficient in terms of use of 
inputs, the cost of those inputs remains high, weakening their competitive position. China 
remains inefficient in terms of use of inputs and market structure. In contrast South Korea 
possesses a combination of high efficiency and low cost, which their airlines could use to their 
advantage, both in terms of sixth freedom and (in the context of further relaxations) seventh 
freedom services. See e.g. Thomas et al., supra note 116 at 161-62; Oum & Lee, supra note 
417. For these reasons, as CAPA Consulting note: 
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towards opening up both seventh freedom and cabotage markets to foreign 
airlines. This is especially true of the latter, where regulatory protections fall 
entirely within the territory of a single state. For these states, the concern lies 
in its ability to maintain its own safety standards; for labor, concerns center 
not only on safety but also on the possibility that airlines use arbitrage to move 
to lower wage states to bring down labor costs/wages.1074  
 In contrast, reforming the substantial ownership and effective control 
requirements in line with a principal place of business and effective regulatory 
control standard does much less to challenge the regulator’s task. Whether 
owned by American or Singaporean interests, or directed by a board of 
Germans or Japanese, an airline incorporated in a national jurisdiction remains 
subject to that country’s national regulations. A violation of national rules in 
this case would result in any number of possible penalties, from fines to the 
revocation of the operator’s air operator’s certificate, all determined, policed 
and enforced through the national regulatory system.1075 In this way revisions 
to the ownership and control provisions do not challenge the state’s authority 
in the same way that deeper forms of market access liberalization might. 
                                                
 
China and Japan have remained cautious about the “trilateral” open skies proposal. A 
completely “open” trilateral system would enable not just 6th freedom operations, but 
arguably 7th freedom services as well for Korean carriers to connect points between 
China and Japan. This would be hugely beneficial for the two Korean carriers – Korean 
Air and Asiana – which have a competitive cost base. However, the Japanese carriers 
are not cost-competitive, while the Chinese carriers are still lagging behind in product 
innovation and service standards. Hence, it is unlikely that China and Japan will 
embrace the trilateral proposal in the short term. 
 
Ibid. at 161. 
1074 See e.g. The Brattle Group, ibid.; above at 178-80. 
1075 See e.g. ibid. at 8-17 (discussing principal place of business as being a primary means of 
mitigating concerns about flags of convenience). 
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 Because single aviation markets integrate markets, they must contend 
with the potential for regulatory arbitrage. States can address these issues in a 
number of ways. In the case of the European Community/Union, the solution 
has been to maintain common technical and safety standards, first through the 
JAA and later through EASA.1076 The case of SAMANZ is a bit different. 
Although not creating common standards, the two countries are sufficiently 
similar in approach and sufficiently small in number that the two countries 
have agreed that bilateral coordination and discussion is sufficient.1077 States 
have also moved towards formal regulatory cooperation such as the Joint 
Committees between the US and the EU or the EU and Switzerland.1078 
 Importantly, ASEAN’s Implementation Framework for ASAM 
broaches the issue of common technical, safety, and commercial standards as a 
means to level the playing field for its airlines.1079 Yet in terms of substantive 
policy, much remains unanswered. Importantly, both the EU and SAMANZ 
arrangements have addressed regulatory differences among welfare states in 
the developed world. Where policies and capabilities appreciably diverge – 
say, between China and the US or Indonesia and the EU (or even Indonesia 




                                                
1076 See supra notes 953-56. 
1077 See e.g. Goh, supra note 31 at 143-53 (discussing differences in competition regimes that 
would affect air transport). 
1078 See e.g. EC-US First Stage Agreement, supra note 536, art. 18; EC-Swiss Agreement, 
supra note 524, arts. 21-22. 
1079 ATM, ASAM Implementation Framework, supra note 747. 
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Chapter 5 analyzes the history and substance of market access and ownership 
and control reform by reference to the forms of the instruments designed to 
replace those established during the period immediately following the Second 
World War. In terms of market access, it addresses the benefits created 
through competition, the stretching of the nation-bound system of regulation 
to open skies, and the possibilities and (legal and political) constraints on 
relaxing access beyond open skies. In the area of ownership and control, it 
analyzes the place of ownership and control reform in terms of both altering 
the scale of transport activities and allowing an increasingly privatized 
industry access to increasingly globally-organized capital markets. Finally, it 
compares the effects of the two forms of liberalization on the regulator’s 
capability to regulate labor markets and safety/technical standards in its own 
national market. 
 However, apart from a short discussion of some of the contested 
relationships in select Asian states, it has not analyzed liberalization and 
integration as a process of change. Yet it is one of this thesis’ central claims 
that understanding liberalization as an incremental process of change, rather 
than an instantaneous conversion, the interests involved and the role of the 
institutions in mediating those relationships through change is essential to 
developing a successful liberalization project. Indeed, the gradual, incremental 
nature of liberalization, as much as any outcome, has been the key mediating 














One of the fundamental normative assumptions of this thesis is that formal 
institutional change is the result of demands for increased efficiency in the 
system. To this end, the previous Chapter analyzed different instruments 
developed to move the current system of (sometimes) government-owned, 
nation-bound airlines and air transport markets towards one of global aviation 
markets operated by (sometimes) private, commercially-driven multinationals. 
Each measure is designed to increase or enhance the efficiency of the system, 
addressing one of the two basic norms of the system. 
 The processes of liberalization and integration also involve 
negotiations around the second basic norm of participation. The existence of 
the participation norm complicates liberalization in at least three ways. First, 
each instrument is potentially inclusive of the others, so that each state or 
group of states is free to choose the pace(s), depth(s), and path(s) it proceeds 
along. It is perfectly possible to integrate on a regional basis while at the same 
time pursue the universal right of establishment, open skies, or even continue 
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with protectionist policies with others.1080 This opens aviation to a range of 
strategic policies that remain interlinked to each other – e.g., in the 
Netherlands, Singapore, and South Korea’s strategies of using advanced 
liberalization to channel sixth freedom traffic – that can influence policy in 
third parties. 
 Second, unlike efficiency, which can be quantified and neutrally 
discussed, a single group or concept does not define the idea of participation. 
Rather it is produced through a discursive process between players within a 
number of contexts. It is also an extremely complex process: of domestic 
politics influencing international policy, of international politics influencing 
domestic policy, and of transnational interests permeating both domestic and 
international spheres.1081 For example, previous Chapters noted both the US-
China and the US-Philippines bifurcated all-cargo and passenger transport 
markets, liberalizing the former well before the second.1082 Both decisions can 
be read as political groups trying to capture certain gains for business (i.e. 
lower, more frequent cargo shipments) with an uncompetitive industry’s 
concerns over weakening its core (in this case, passenger) market.1083 At the 
same time, the actual institutions that emerge out of this politics of definition 
                                                
1080 See generally supra note 109. On the non-exclusivity of any one path, see e.g. ICAO, 
“Declaration of Global Principles for the Liberalization of International Air Transport” in 
ICAO, Consolidated Conclusions AT/Conf 5, supra note 10 at 4.4 (noting each state is free to 
“determine its own path and own pace of change”). 
1081 See generally Cohen, supra note 254 at 118-41 (describing three levels or types of 
analysis (as viewed from the state): inside-out, outside-in, and cognitive). See also generally 
North, Institutional Change, supra note 14; Philip Selznick, “Foundations of the Theory of 
Organization” (1948) 13 Am. Soc. Rev. 25 (providing a sociological theory of how 
organizations adapt to demands of particular interests within an (assumed) institutional 
framework). 
1082 See above at 233-34 & 285-91. 
1083 On the Philippines, see e.g. Tan, “Policy in the Philippines, supra note 45 at 289-97. In 
China, the balance between business and airline interests is highlighted in the different 
policies of the previous and current ministers of the CAAC, Yuan Yuanyuan and Li Jianxiang, 
respectively. See Williams, China’s Policy, supra note 672 at 212-14. 
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may not result in the most efficient system.1084 Going back to the US-China 
Agreement, it is possible that the introduction of a system of cargo-hubs in 
2004 also removed a large incentive for China to further liberalize its market. 
 Finally, change remains a function of the specific institutions 
governing the process of change. This is best explained by way of example. 
Within the United States, the differences in attitudes between the relatively 
liberal US DOT and a more conservative/nationalist legislature emphasize the 
point that inward investment remains tied to domestic legislative reform and 
that differences in attitudes between domestic political institutions can make 
or break an intended reform.1085 The Philippines’ constitutional provisions 
draw attention to the relative height of different barriers to reform – in this 
case a constitutional limit being higher than legislative amendment or 
executive decision.1086 And differences between the EU principles of direct 
effect and supremacy and ASEAN’s selective application of rules through 
“ASEAN Minus X” alter both the bargaining structures and their ultimate 
application. 
 This Chapter addresses the possible ways in which institutions can 
alter incentive structures and evaluates these methods in light of the conflicts 
and contingencies of regulatory reform. It does so in four sections. The first 
three sections analyze particular aspects of reform that can influence or alter 
perceived interests.1087 In particular, section two addresses the use of transition 
                                                
1084 North, Institutional Change, supra note 14 at 92-117; Douglass C. North, Structure and 
Change in Economic History (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1981) (cited in 
ibid. at 7). 
1085 See generally above at 147-48 & 174-80. 
1086 See generally North, Institutional Change, supra note 14 at 47. 
1087 These sections owe a particular debt to Robert Axelrod’s seminal work, The Evolution of 
Cooperation. See generally Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, rev’d ed. (New 
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agreements to channel and contain the effects of liberalization on particular 
industries. Section three then addresses the roles different perceptions of 
reciprocity have on influencing the liberalization and integration processes. 
Section four then turns to transparency’s role(s) in conveying information to 
third parties and, in so doing, supporting further liberalization. Finally, 
drawing on the preceding discussions, section five offers a final critique of the 
potential effects plurilateral arrangements can have on participation.  
  
2. CO-OPTING REFORM THROUGH TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
 
Within the international system, states vie with each other in a complex 
relationship between the demands of a dominant group and recalcitrance to 
those demands. To this end, states have developed a range of mechanisms to 
address such recalcitrance. Indeed, this study has already alluded to if not 
explicitly described many of those mechanisms. Strategies of “divide and 
conquer”,1088 incrementally “packaging” relaxations,1089 individual controls 
such as price floors on particular categories of operations,1090 and identifying 
groups with similar special interests and (potentially) histories of cooperation 
                                                
York: Basic Books, 2006). Axelrod suggests five ways to enhance the conditions for 
cooperation, including: enlarging the shadow of the future; changing the payoffs; teaching 
people to care about each other; teaching reciprocity; and improving recognition capabilities. 
Ibid. at 124-41. These five methods might be analogized to the three groups of conditions 
discussed above.  
1088 See generally above at 137-41. 
1089 See generally above at 149-63 (discussing the EC’s three packages), 224-37 (discussing 
ASEAN’s MAFLAFS, MAAS, and MAFLPAS) & 328-31 (discussing the transition to 
SAMANZ). 
1090 See generally above at 156-58 (discussing, inter alia, price leadership during integration) 
& 161 (discussing Community carrier price leadership through 2008). 
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that would support further liberalization1091 are all examples of mechanisms in 
some way designed to alter incentive structures and motivate actions. 
 These mechanisms can be broken down into three types or categories. 
First, mechanisms such as the United States’ “divide and conquer” approach 
to opening intercontinental gateways involve what are generally seen as 
coercive means of drawing other states into an efficient framework.1092 
Whatever its independent merits in terms of efficiency, US liberalization 
policy had also explicitly become – Kahn is quoted as saying “Let’s stick it to 
the Brits – let’s put pressure on the Germans through Amsterdam”1093 – a 
method of accepting a program that involves a level of participation that they 
would not otherwise accept. As such, it is not merely a way of seeing 
relationships beyond strict bilateralism, but also of using them to foist a strain 
of policy decision on a wider audience. 
 A second type of mechanism is plurilateralism. An open agreement 
among likeminded states to either attract or force third parties into adherence, 
the plurilateral agreement provides a second means of addressing 
recalcitrance, arguably more open in its approach to liberalization. Because of 
the relative openness of its qualities, a separate critique of the plurilateral 
agreement as instrumentality for liberalization is offered below.1094 
 A third group of mechanisms are those specifically designed to address 
sustainable participation in the international air transport system. Rather than 
                                                
1091 See generally Commission, Memo No. 2, supra note 182 at 3-8 (polling interest groups); 
Thomas et al., supra note 116 at 34-35 (noting extensive interviews with special interests as 
part of the study’s methodology). 
1092 On divide and conquer, see generally above at 136-41. 
1093 Sampson, supra note 218 at 145. See also Dempsey, Law and Foreign Policy, supra note 
257 at 33 (discussing the importance of divide and conquer on both transoceanic routes). 
1094 See generally below at 398-402. 
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coerce, these types of mechanisms tend to co-opt various interests into the 
institutional restructuring process.1095 In the private sphere, alliance 
membership is certainly one form of co-opting airline interests through re-
arranging the payoff set for opening market access.1096 The public sector has 
also demonstrated a high level of support for such measures. In 2003 ICAO 
officially endorsed both “preferential measures” (“non-reciprocal regulatory 
arrangements which States in a regulatory relationship agree are needed by a 
developing country for its effective and sustained participation in international 
air transport”)1097 and “participation measures” (i.e. measures available to all 
and “used to build confidence in progressively moving to a less restrictive 
regime and to ensure that the results of increasing competition, while not 
equal, do not become too unequal”)1098 as part of the adaptation to a more 
efficient global market system. The following analysis is concerned with this 
particular group of mechanisms. 
                                                
1095 Organizational theorist Philip Selznick has described cooptation in policy-making as “the 
process of absorbing new elements into the leadership or policy-determining structure of an 
organization as a means of averting threats to its stability or existence.” Selznick, supra note 
1081 at 34 (also distinguishing between formal cooptation, designed to share responsibility 
without necessarily sharing power, and informal cooptation, which aims at reconfiguring the 
substance of power without necessarily changing its form. Ibid. at 34-35). This concept can 
just as easily be extended to cooptation through institutional design by utilizing processes of 
institutional change to address the concerns of recalcitrant organizations operating within the 
structure. This view takes the air transport agreement not as a one-off negotiation between 
states, but as a position continuously (if implicitly) negotiated, where decisions over whether 
to exercise a particular function such as rights under a safeguards clause or attempt to change 
the institutions themselves, whether by renegotiating the terms of the existing institutions or 
by repudiating them for others or altogether, is a matter continuously worked out in both 
domestic and international contexts. 
1096 On the effects of alliances on competition among airlines in regional and global markets, 
see generally above at 23-28, 34, 200-04 & 266-72. See also generally Axelrod, supra note 
1087 at 133-34 (discussing changing the payoff set as a form of fostering cooperation among 
groups). 
1097 ICAO, Sustainability and Participation, ICAO Doc. ATConf/5-WP/12 (3 December 
2002) at 3, para. 3.2.1. 
1098 Ibid. 
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 For those at ICAO’s Fifth Worldwide Air Transport Conference, such 
means were ultimately paths to enhanced efficiency. To this end, the 
Conference itself proposed that states use a “transition annex” as a means of 
limiting the initial impact of liberalization and to allow airlines to gradually 
adapt to new conditions.1099 Such practices can have important – and critical – 
implications for liberalization among states. As the Air Transport Regulation 
Panel noted in 2002, it was possible that “the gradual process itself could 
serve as a safeguard for fair competition.”1100 According to this view, “a 
gradual, progressive, orderly and evolutionary approach to liberalization could 
in itself ensure participation, adaptation and fair competition”,1101 and one that 
might even supplement or even substitute for a competition law framework 
that was in many respects incomplete.1102 While preferential measures were 
more problematic – due in part to the paucity of materials for discussions, and 
also to the difficulty in generalizing a set of measures for a variety of context-
                                                
1099 See e.g. ICAO, Consolidated Conclusions AT/Conf 5, supra note 10 at 11-12, Part 2, para. 
e (noting that as “to ensure the effective and sustained participation of developing countries 
and to facilitate the liberalization process, States should take into consideration in their air 
transport relationships the interests and needs of states with less-competitive air carriers and, 
wherever appropriate, grant preferential and participation measures. Such measures may be 
incorporated in the “Transition Annex in their air services agreement.”). & Transition Annex, 
& 19, para. 1.1, Preamble & (c) (providing that “ICAO and its Contracting States, together 
with the air transport industry and other stakeholders in civil aviation, will work to ensure that 
international air transport continues to develop in a way that: […] takes into consideration the 
differing levels of economic development amongst States through maintenance of the 
principle of “community of interest” and the fostering of preferential measures for developing 
countries.”). UNCTAD also spent some time analyzing measures to deal with participation 
issues. UNCTAD, The Positive Agenda, supra note 12 at 16-22. 
1100 ICAO, ATRP Report, supra note 873 at 16, para. 54. Cf. Axelrod, supra note 1087 at 124-
34 (discussing lengthening the shadow of the future (by increasing the frequency of 
interaction or by breaking down the issues into a number of smaller issues) and changing the 
payoff structure). 
1101 Ibid. 
1102 Ibid. at 17. Compare this with the recommendations made by UNCTAD in UNCTAD, The 
Positive Agenda, supra note 12 at 16-17, paras. 54-57. 
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specific needs – the 2003 Conference left open the issue for consideration as 
part of its transition annex.1103  
 State practice also reveals a number of mechanisms designed to 
transition regulatory systems into a liberal, market-based environment. Earlier 
Chapters have already discussed a number of instances of transitional 
arrangements, including the US-China and US-Vietnam bilateral agreements, 
as well as regional arrangements within, inter alia, the EU, Australia and New 
Zealand, and ASEAN.1104 Some of these have ended, while others are still in a 
transitional state of affairs. The following breaks down these agreements and 
others into a number of categories, including strategies designed to stretch 
liberalization across a number of agreed periods, to break down the contents of 
regulation in various ways1105 and to relax each incrementally over time, to 
use floors and ceilings to gradually introduce competition on critical areas 
such as price and capacity shares, and to use asymmetric terms to co-opt 
diverse elements into adopting more liberal positions.1106 Each category is 
illustrated by examples taken from discussions in the previous Chapters. 
 
2.1. Extending Relaxations Across One or More Periods 
 
                                                
1103 Ibid. at 19-20, paras. 64-67. 
1104 See generally above at 149-63 (discussing the EU’s internal market), 222-52 (discussing 
ASEAN’s incremental development), 285-90 (discussing the US-Vietnam and US-China 
agreements) & 328-31 (discussing SAMANZ). 
1105 A reminder that the Bermuda I–IATA arrangements are similarly a bifurcated 
arrangement, both in terms of the regime governing market access and price competition and, 
within market access arrangements, between Bermuda I-type and predetermination-type 
arrangements. See generally above at 106-12. 
1106 See also generally Axelrod, supra note 1087 at 124-34. 
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The core mechanism for increasing the acceptance of regulatory reform 
among a diverse set of interests is to structure the process across a number of 
gradual, incrementally deeper relaxations. Indeed, incremental relaxations 
represent both a structure and a superstructure for liberalization, a method 
through which the other methods and mechanisms dealing with issues such as 
capacity and price controls can be embedded in the process of reform. 
 The preceding chapters have already identified and discussed a number 
of arrangements that have based changes to the regulatory instruments 
governing their air transport system on an incremental basis, including 
(arguably) the United States, the European Community, ASEAN, and the US-
China air transport market.1107 Beyond this basic commonality, however, the 
agreements exhibit a range of different approaches to incremental 
liberalization. 
 Unarguably the greatest critical distinction is that between transitions 
contained entirely within the terms of an agreement and agreements 
implementing one set of changes, leaving further relaxations to a later 
discussion at a later date. One example of this distinction arose in Chapter 3 
when it compared US domestic deregulation to the EC’s use of the three 
packages to bring about regulatory change.1108 In fact, each of the packages 
relies on a combination of incremental relaxations within a particular package 
and a subsequent negotiation of deeper relaxations beyond the first set of 
arrangements. For example, the first package gradually (but not entirely) 
relaxes multiple entry on a city-pair basis, while introducing a limited degree 
of flexibility for capacity shares (up to 60 percent) on routes covered by the 
                                                
1107 See generally above at 124-31, 149-63, 221-52 & 285-90. 
1108 See generally above at 154-55. 
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package.1109 The second package then builds on these by further relaxing and 
eventually eliminating restrictions on multiple entry on routes covered by the 
package, while further relaxing but not entirely eliminating restrictions on 
capacity shares.1110 
 The amendments to the US-China Air Transport Agreement 
demonstrate a similar use of both mechanisms. Each Protocol agrees to a 
limited range of relaxations in areas such as multiple designation and capacity 
increases, while explicitly demarcating the next set of negotiations within the 
amendment. For example, each of the 1992, 2004, and 2007 Protocols 
incrementally relaxes capacity restrictions on an annual basis, while also 
providing a clear date to begin the next phase of negotiations.1111 The 1992 
Memorandum of Understanding between Australia and New Zealand, 
amending their bilateral agreement of 1961, provides for a similar mix of 
annual capacity relaxations and a specific date for considering further 
liberalization.1112 
 From a general perspective, each mechanism offers its own sets of 
advantages and disadvantages. For example, incremental liberalization across 
a series of agreements may prove more responsive to particular concerns than 
one that attempts to control for all factors at one time, as states increase the 
number of opportunities to re-evaluate, adjust and re-implement longer term 
                                                
1109 EC, Dec. 87/602/87, supra note 464, art. 5 (on multiple entry); EC, Dir. 87/601/87, supra 
note 464, art. 5 (on capacity shares). 
1110 EC, Reg. 2343/90, supra note 464, art. 6 (on multiple entry) & 11 (on capacity shares). 
1111 US-China 2007 Protocol, supra note 879, art. 5; US-China 2004 Protocol, supra note 879, 
art. 14; US-China 1992 Protocol, supra note 879, Attachment II, Ann. V(1)(C). 
1112 See below at 374-75. 
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strategies.1113 Breaking down the units of exchange at any one point in time 
also potentially makes information about the consequences of a particular set 
of measures (in this case, e.g., the depth, scope, and pervasiveness of threats) 
easier to process and, consequently, accept or amend.1114 Such advantages 
suggest a particularly important role in dealing with relationships of 
significant complexity. It is certainly difficult to imagine either the EC or 
ASEAN member states sitting down to negotiate a process of moving from 
strict regulation to a single integrated aviation market at one go. 
 But the potential increase in responsiveness comes at a cost, in 
particular the possibility that future negotiations might stall or fail altogether. 
An excellent example of this is the failure of talks between the United States 
and China to materialize into an open skies agreement. Indeed, while the 2007 
Protocol to the US-China Air Transport Agreement explicitly notes that the 
“mutual, ultimate objective is the full liberalization of their bilateral air 
transport market”, to begin negotiations to this end no later than 25 March 
2010, and for an agreement and timetable to this end to be completed “as soon 
as possible”,1115 such an agreement remains elusive. Reports state that 
                                                
1113 See Axelrod, supra note 1087 at 126-33. See also La Croix, supra note 795 at 6 (arguing 
for an immediately concluded, deferred liberalization of air-cargo services (as opposed to the 
simplification of customs as a means of lowering transport costs), noting that “[d]eferred 
agreements may seem unrealistic in some respects (by pushing implementation into the future 
and onto the backs of a new government), but they change current perspectives from 
defending current rents (as they are still being earned) to preparing for future liberalization”). 
1114 See ibid. 
1115 US-China 2007 Protocol, supra note 879, art. 5. Compare this with Article 14 of the 2004 
Protocol, which provides: 
 
The Parties shall commence negotiations in 2006 with the ultimate objective of fully 
liberalizing the civil aviation relationship between the People’s Republic of China and 
the United States. To that end, the purpose of such negotiations shall be to 1) conduct a 
comprehensive review of the implementation of their bilateral civil aviation agreement 
to date, and 2) establish the next steps the Parties shall take to further liberalize their 
bilateral civil aviation relationship. 
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discussions have stalled over issues related to Chinese visas to the US and 
capacity concerns at Chinese airports.1116 Similar treatment of market access 
and ownership and control issues in the EU-US Second Stage Agreement 
gives little hope of even the possibility of further negotiations moving 
substantively beyond an “enhanced” open skies agreement in either 
domain.1117 
 In contrast, sets of relaxations contained within a single agreement 
increase the level of certainty that those measures will actually be 
implemented by establishing legal obligations upon signing and, where 
applicable, ratifying the document. The counterpoise, however, is that 
providing too much within one agreement may result in intense resistance by 
powerful, concentrated special interest groups such as a national airline 
industry. Where institutional dynamics allow (as they do in ASEAN and with 
unilateral actions as in the Philippines)1118 the provisions of these agreements 
may ultimately be successfully resisted, whether by delay, non-
                                                
 
 US-China 2004 Protocol, supra note 879, art. 14. 
1116 Indeed, former U.S. State Department deputy assistant secretary of transportation affairs 
John Byerly, who negotiated the US-EU agreements, has said this of China’s position on open 
skies: 
 
China has given no sign of being interested, in the near term, of moving to an Open 
Skies agreement, citing the fact that Chinese air carriers have ample frequencies in the 
existing 2007 agreement to expand their services. Chinese representatives have 
repeated long-standing criticisms of U.S. visa policy as a barrier to competitive 
equality, a view that the U.S. government does not share. In the next year or two, the 
biggest challenge for U.S. airlines is more about obtaining commercially viable slots 
for the frequencies they already possess than about gaining new frequencies. 
 
Boehmer, supra note 842. 
1117 See generally above at 174-80. 
1118 See e.g. Tan, “Prospects for ASAM”, supra note 44 at 265-67; Tan, “Policy in the 
Philippines”, supra note 45. See also generally above at 220-21 & 232-34. 
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implementation, or by formally exiting the arrangement altogether. This point 
is particularly important when discussing ASEAN, as the “ASEAN Minus X” 
Formula provides an express sanction of this type of selective application.1119 
 ASEAN also demonstrates the opposite issue. By introducing each 
liberalization measure as an independent legal obligation, the Association has 
effectively de-linked each part of the process from the overall structure of 
liberalization. The effect such an arrangement has is to offer up a set of 
independent objectives – in effect, a buffet of freedoms – from which each 
state can pick and choose as it likes. The effect of such arrangements has been 
demonstrated with Indonesia and the Philippines, with the former remaining 
outside all but the intra-sub-regional arrangements and the latter refraining 
from inter-capital relaxations.1120 This might not in itself be wholly 
disadvantageous – the Philippines has accepted a wide range of liberalizations 
(particularly with respect to MAFLPAS) that it might otherwise have stopped 
short of if it had been committed to the timeline of phase-ins suggested by a 
strictly “RIATS first” approach. Yet given the common commitments, non-
implementation of such consensus-based commitments also calls into question 
not only the organization’s efficacy as a negotiating platform, but also the 
intentions of the negotiators and the likelihood of achieving the end objective.  
 
2.2. Price Bands 
 
Another means of controlling competition is through the regulation of the 
price mechanism. During the period of regulation dominated by the Bermuda 
                                                
1119 See generally above at 248-52 & below at 390-93. 
1120 See generally above at 231-37. 
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I–IATA system, the price mechanism had been the principal means of 
multilateral regulation.1121 Manipulations of the price mechanism can similarly 
be used as a transition mechanism by imposing floors or ceilings on prices. 
Such floors and ceilings can be relative to a particular set of prices (a more 
likely scenario), or might be absolute. 
 Among the methods of controlling price competition, two stand out in 
their use as stepping stones towards a liberalized market. The first method 
relies on the temporary use of one or more price bands. The second method 
references the price floor to the local operator. 
 A number of agreements have used price bands as a means of 
introducing (and limiting) a measure of flexibility into a market. The US-
ECAC agreements of the early 1980s provide an early example of price bands 
being used to balance demands for increased flexibility with concerns over too 
much.1122 These agreements, however, were not intended as a transition to 
open skies or another, more liberal arrangement. Rather, they sought – 
successfully – to stop the United States from removing the IATA’s antitrust 
immunity for coordinating tariffs on routes over the North Atlantic, at least for 
European airlines.1123 Other must look to other agreements to find price bands 
as a specifically transitional measure. 
 These are not hard to find. Price bands were an integral part of the 
European Community’s transition to a single internal aviation market. Indeed, 
                                                
1121 See generally above at 103-06. Professor Lowenfeld summarized the system as one in 
which “[f]ares were seen as more interdependent than routes, and the basic control 
mechanism, IATA, would function on a global basis.” Lowenfeld, supra note 5 at 39.  
1122 Haanappel, Pricing and Capacity, supra note 312 at 165-67. 
1123 Ibid. By this time the United States had already revoked US carriers’ ability to participate 
in the Traffic Conferences. See e.g. above at 133. A revocation of IATA immunity over the 
transatlantic would have implicated European carriers in the IATA Traffic Conferences for 
discussing prices over the North Atlantic. The 1983 Agreement prevented this. 
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they featured prominently as an integral part of both the first and second 
package.1124 Each introduced a set of price bands, or “zones of flexibility”, 
based in part on a percentage below (or, in the second package, above) the 
average fare charged on third or fourth freedom operations over a particular 
route.1125 Thus, the first package introduced a discount zone (from 90 to just 
above 65 percent below the reference fare) and a deep-discount zone (from 65 
to 45 percent below the reference fare).1126 The second package adjusted the 
margins for both the discount (94 to 80 percent) and deep-discount (79 to 30 
percent) zones, and also introduced the normal economy fare zone, priced at 
95 to 105 percent of the reference fare.1127 
 To benefit from either discount zone, each regulation also required the 
discounted ticket meet a number of other conditions related to the contract for 
carriage. For example, Regulation 2342/90 required that a ticket be for a round 
or circle trip,1128 and that reservation, ticketing and payment be made at the 
same time, with the exception that reservation for the return trip could be done 
at a different time.1129 It also required cancellations to be done prior to the 
departure of the outbound segment of travel and at a fee of no less than 20 
percent of the ticket price, and that changes in the reservation must be at least 
                                                
1124 See generally above at 155-60. 
1125 EC, Dir. 87/601/87, supra note 464, arts. 2(c) (defining reference fare) & 5(1) (giving 
deviations from the reference fare); Reg. 2342/90, supra note 464, art. 2(i) (defining reference 
fare) & 4(3)(b) (giving deviations from the reference fare). 
1126 EC, Dir. 87/601/87, ibid. 
1127 EC, Reg. 2342/90, supra note 464, art. 4(3)-(4). Prices could also ago above the one 
hundred five percent ceiling, but would be subject to a double disapproval mechanism. Ibid., 
art. 4(4). 
1128 Like a round trip, a circle trip refers to air travel where the point of origin and ultimate 
destination are the same. Unlike a round trip, however, a circle trip has more than one 
stopover. 
1129 EC, Reg. 2342/90, supra note 464, Annex II, s. 1. 
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equal to the change in ticket price.1130 The deep-discount zone retains the 
restrictions found in discount zone tickets, while introducing additional 
requirements in areas such as length of stay, advance purchase, and off-peak 
travel.1131 The third package finally introduced complete pricing freedom for 
Community carriers when it came into force on 1 January 1993. 
 The second form of price control is by reference to a price floor, 
usually with respect to the fares of a select carrier or group of carriers. 
Continuing the discussion of the EC’s internal market, until Regulation 
1008/2008 came into force, the Community had prohibited non-Community 
carriers from pricing services within the Union below the lowest tariff offered 
by a Community carrier on that particular route.1132 The measure was designed 
to mitigate foreign intrusion into what has since become to the Commission a 
distinctly European market.1133 
 Price floors have also been suggested as a means of transitioning 
ASEAN from open skies to ASAM. In particular CAPA Consulting’s 2008 
report recommends a transition period of two to four years where carriers 
exercising consecutive cabotage rights must price at or above the lowest 
market fare offered in the domestic market.1134 These suggestions were given 
as a “base case”, with the report contemplating the possibility that a greater (or 
                                                
1130 Ibid. 
1131 Ibid., Annex II, s. 2. 
1132 EC, Reg. 2409/92, supra note 464, art. 1(3) (providing that “[o]nly Community air carriers 
shall be entitled to introduce new products or lower fares than the ones existing for identical 
products”). 
1133 As a permanent feature, its function is similar to that of the system of rate differentials 
proposed at the Chicago Convention and discussed at PICAO and ICAO during their 
consideration of economic multilateralism. See generally above at 85-91 & 95-99. 
1134 Thomas et al., supra note 116 at ix, 118-22. 
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lesser) period might be needed for any of its recommendations.1135 Given the 
less than inspiring record of implementing even the open skies arrangements 
thus far, together with the less than reassuring statements found in the 
Implementation Framework of the ASAM, these plans may only find a limited 
space for application. 
 Price floors might also find other uses in mediating the contentious 
relationships within ASEAN. For example, they might offer one possible 
means of gradually lifting Indonesia’s prospective ban on LCCs operating to 
Jakarta, Surabaya, Denspasar, and Medan.1136 As Chapter 4 noted, the effect 
of this ban has been to prohibit new entrants like Tiger Airways, and require 
Jetstar Asia, which acquired Singaporean carrier Valuair in July 2005, to 
maintain the latter’s livery in order to keep its operations to Jakarta.1137 One 
means of relaxing these controls would be to introduce price floors on 
international routes for a specified period, whether in terms of the lowest rate 
offered by an Indonesian carrier or the lowest offered rate of an incumbent 
airline. Such an arrangement would have the benefit of opening market entry 
while limiting some of the more disagreeable effects of price competition, 
meaning that, e.g., Jetstar Asia could enter any route, but could at best only 
match the lowest price offered by incumbents AirAsia or Lion Air. Such 
restrictions might operate for one or two years, and be wholly removed at the 
end of the transition period. However, with Indonesian airlines like Lion Air 
                                                
1135 Ibid. at 121-22. 
1136 See above at 235-36. There was some talk on lifting the ban in 2009, although no specifics 
were given and no reports since then indicate that Indonesia has in fact moved on its proposal. 
1137See ibid. 
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now investing abroad, it is possible that even this modest transitional 
arrangement might not be necessary. 
 
2.3. Capacity Shares 
 
While price manipulation has been the historic center of regulatory control, 
other forms of regulation can function equally well as transition mechanisms. 
One such method has been through a gradual relaxation of the capacity and/or 
frequency controls in bilateral or regional arrangements. 
 Internal market integration within the EC again serves as an example 
of operational freedom phased-in over a series of transition measures. The first 
package began to remove this strict 50:50 division by relaxing capacity share 
ratios to a ratio of 55:45 in 1988 and to a 60:40 ratio in 1989.1138 The second 
package then removed the strict margins, granting instead the possibility of 
change of up to seven and a half percent annually.1139 In both instances, states 
continued to possess a safeguard that allowed them to override the rules for a 
limited period where a state complained of “serious financial damage for the 
air carrier(s) licensed by that Member State” and the Commission evaluated 
and approved re-imposing limits on those routes.1140 As with regulations on 
tariff controls, the third package removed any remaining restrictions on 
capacity shares. 
 The use of gradually reduced capacity shares in the European 
transition to single internal market was in large part a response to prior 
                                                
1138 EC, Dec. 87/602/87, supra note 464, art. 3. 
1139 EC, Reg. 2342/90, supra note 464, art. 11. 
1140 EC, Dec. 87/602/87, supra note 464, art. 4; EC, Reg. 2343/90, supra note 464, art. 12. 
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regulatory arrangements within the Community. Prior to the first package, 
many of these routes had been governed by agreements demanding strict 
reciprocity based on pooling aggregate traffic and divisions of capacity.1141 
During the postwar period of regulation, this would often mean that an airline 
or government (often the same thing in postwar Europe) wanted to increase its 
capacity, say through an addition of two weekly frequencies, it would have to 
offer an exactly equivalent exchange in return, either in terms of frequencies 
or its estimated monetary equivalent.1142 This might be in the form of 
reciprocally valued traffic rights, but often required cash payments to the 
government or the airline.1143 Introducing limited bands of acceptable 
competition therefore had the effect of disciplining operators without unduly 
threatening their existence as an entity or their operations as a whole. 
                                                
1141 See e.g. Commission, Memo No. 2, supra 182 at 22-26, para. 42(i)-(vi) (noting the general 
operating conditions between EC member states). In particular, the Commission notes that the 
bilateral system “enables governments to ensure that their airlines do not suffer from the 
operations of competitors to a degree that they consider unacceptable”, a position that, 
although varying in scope and depth, “at its most comprehensive in effect ensures that the 
traffic carried and the revenue earned on services between Member States is divided equally 
between their carriers.” Ibid. at 22-23, para. 42(ii). 
1142 See e.g. Raben, supra note 349 at 16-18 (discussing several cases of amendments 
requiring strict equivalence of exchange). After discussing the complexity of renegotiating 
route rights by example (Mendelsohn, supra note 491 at 521-22), Allan Mendelsohn made the 
following observations on the history of market access negotiations in the age of open skies: 
 
Those who came to participate in the world of international aviation only after the 
advent of “open skies” have no knowledge of, let alone appreciation for, this history. 
There are not many in the world of aviation today who were there in those “olden”— 
some would say “golden”—days. But for those of us who were there, the task was 
arduous for the U.S. Government, yet very important for U.S. carriers with the short 
range aircraft of the day. Today, of course, those fifth freedom rights are hardly ever 
used by U.S. passenger carriers, which mostly rely on their code share partners to 
provide services behind the first E.U. gateway point. It is essential, however, for the 
international aviation community to know this history, especially those who so glibly 
equate fifth freedom within the E.U. to cabotage within the U.S. 
 
Ibid. at 522. 
1143 Raben, ibid.; Lim, supra note 349 at 48 (noting Italy demanded a USD600,000 a year 
payment be made to Alitalia for Philippine Airlines’ right to operate between Rome and 
Manila). 
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 It is also possible to imagine other uses for capacity shares. As with 
price floors, limiting the effects of new entry by temporarily imposing 
capacity shares on new entrants might serve the mediating function of 
regulation better than a unilateral ban such as Indonesia’s. To lift the ban, 
Indonesia might consider beginning with a capacity limit – perhaps beginning 
with 33 percent – while providing clear dates for further relaxations. Indonesia 
could then revise the ratios on an annual basis, for example, for 50 percent by 
the end of 2013, 75 percent in 2014, and removing the ban altogether in 2015. 
To give it substance, Indonesia could include the commitments in the 
framework of an agreement with key partners. While perhaps not ideal, this 
approach would at least offer the advantage of disciplining the incumbents 
without overly threatening market share while giving clear guidelines to 
airlines so that they are prepared for each measure’s effects in advance.1144 
Such an approach also offers the potential for consultations (and, one would 
hope, rapprochement) between affected governments, an outcome Indonesia’s 
current unilateral posturing does little to foster. 
 ASEAN might also use capacity or frequency limits as a means of 
guiding further relaxations. For example, Professor Alan Tan suggests that 
seventh freedom relaxations within ASEAN could be guided not only by 
geographical distinction (in this case giving priority to unserved and/or inter-
capital relaxations), but also by maintaining capacity limits on new 
entrants.1145 Although Professor Tan does not elaborate a precise method, 
there are two possible ways this could be done. On the one hand, states could 
                                                
1144 See also La Croix, supra note 795 (making a similar point with respect to liberalization in 
Northeast Asia). 
1145 Tan, “Prospects for ASAM”, supra note 44 at 272. 
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adopt an absolute limit, such as total number of available weekly seats, 
number of frequencies per aircraft type.1146 On the other hand, ASEAN might 
choose to adopt something along the EC model and limit competition based on 
total market share: for example, by limiting capacity to 20 percent (or more, or 
less) of total capacity on the route as calculated from the previous year’s 
figures, and then gradually relaxing that percentage over a period of years. 
Importantly, either mechanism introduces a limited form of competition that 
would not overtly threaten incumbent airlines with exit from a market. 
 
2.4. Traffic Rights 
 
While tariff and capacity controls limit the amount of competition on a route, 
regulation has also controlled the scope of access to the underlying traffic 
rights required to mount operations. Indeed, the issue is as at least as old as the 
Chicago Convention, where, as Chapter 2 notes, issues pertaining to fifth 
freedom traffic rights ultimately ended discussions over the possibility of 
economic multilateralism.1147 And although the extension of liberal, open 
skies-type arrangements across a larger geographic space means an acceptance 
of competition on a fifth and even sixth freedom basis, issues regarding 
seventh freedom and even cabotage traffic remain an issue.1148 At the same 
time, many important markets, such as passenger traffic between China and 
                                                
1146 See e.g. the discussion on Australia and New Zealand’s provisions on fifth freedom 
services in their 1992 Memorandum below at 374-75. 
1147 See generally above at 85-115. Nationality was still a common assumption. See e.g. 
Lowenfeld, “A New Takeoff”, supra note 5 at 39; Gertler, “A Hidden Force”, supra note 32. 
1148 See supra note 29. 
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the US, continue to limit access to traffic rights within, much less beyond, the 
local US-China origin-destination market.1149 
 One of the most common ways that agreements both demonstrate 
preferences for local (i.e., third/fourth freedom) traffic and gradually remove 
them is by categorizing classes of traffic rights and then gradually removing 
restrictions on each of those classes. The EC again offers one such example. 
The first package limits fifth freedom traffic to 30 percent of the total number 
of passengers carried over the entire journey.1150 The second package 
increases capacity on the fifth freedom segment to 50 percent, while the third 
package completely removes any limits with its coming into force in 1993.1151 
The third package also removed restrictions on seventh freedom services.1152 
Cabotage restrictions follow a pattern in many ways similar to those placed on 
fifth freedom services between the second and third packages. From 1993 
until April 1997, the third package only permits consecutive cabotage and 
only when the cabotage segment makes up less than 50 percent of the total 
origin-destination traffic.1153 Thereafter, airlines could freely compete on a 
cabotage basis. 
 Like the EC, ASEAN also distinguishes between introducing 
competition on a third/fourth freedom and competition on a fifth freedom 
basis. But ASEAN’s model is distinct from the European one. In particular, 
ASEAN has refrained from using capacity, frequency or tariff controls on its 
                                                
1149 For regulations limiting market access to points behind, between, and beyond the US-
China market, see generally US-China 2007 Protocol, supra note 879, art. 2 (regulating 
frequencies by number and point of destination in China). 
1150 EC, Dec. 87/602/87, supra note 464, art. 8. 
1151 EC, Reg. 2343/90, supra note 464, art. 8. 
1152 EC, Reg. 2408/92, supra note 464, art. 3. 
1153 Ibid., art. 3(2). 
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fifth freedom sector. Rather, it has chosen to segment liberalization into 
particular market segments – special regions, capital cities, then all ASEAN 
points – and liberalize each more or less sequentially on a third and fourth 
freedom basis;1154 after a period of years allowing airlines to adjust to this 
level of competition, it then relaxes competition on a fifth freedom basis on 
the same market segment, without limitations.1155 Table 6.1 summarizes the 
liberalization process for passenger traffic through the fifth freedom by date 
and traffic right. 
 
Table 6.1: ASEAN Passenger Market Liberalization by Region and 
Traffic Right 
 
 Third/Fourth Freedom Fifth Freedom 
Intra-regional 31 December 2005 31 December 2006 
Inter-regional 31 December 2006 31 December 2008 
Capital Cities 31 December 2008 31 December 2010 
All ASEAN Points 30 June 2010 30 June 2013 
 
 
 Notably, ASEAN has not yet made any indication as to how (or even 
if) it will proceed with liberalization on a seventh freedom or cabotage 
basis.1156 Given the difficulties in removing these types of market access 
restrictions, the ASEAN member states may wish to consider a more nuanced 
approach when opening the remaining market segments. Indeed, a number of 
                                                
1154 See generally above at 228-32. 
1155 See generally above at 232-33. 
1156 See generally above at 237-46 (discussing issues related to the ATM, ASAM 
Implementation Framework, supra note 747). 
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suggestions have already been proposed, including CAPA Consulting’s 
recommendation on tying price floors to local airlines for cabotage 
liberalization.1157 CAPA has also suggested advancing connectivity by 
opening unserved domestic routes prior to those served by local operators.1158 
Since the CAPA report, Professor Tan has also suggested a number of possible 
transition arrangements for seventh freedom services, including a transition 
period where airlines would be restricted to operating seventh freedom 
services on previously unserved routes but also including other transition 
mechanisms such as a limited period of single designation and/or the capacity 
limits on seventh freedom services discussed above.1159 
 
2.5. Differentiation by Economic Geography 
 
As the ASEAN program suggests, geographical divisions can also serve to 
break up the pace of liberalization across the territory of a state or region. 
Furthermore, such divisions can be divided into at least two classes or 
categories of distinction. The first category relates to the economic geography 
of the place of service or network coverage. The second category relates to the 
economic competitiveness of the air transport industry. 
 The previous Chapters have already given some examples of 
liberalization divided by underlying industries or network coverage. Three 
cases stand out as not only exemplifying the methods used to distinguish by 
                                                
1157 Thomas et al., supra note 116 at 75. 
1158 Ibid. 
1159 Tan, “Prospects for ASAM”, supra note 44 at 272. Tan also suggests using foreign 
investment in local operators (using traditional tie-ups and local majority shareholdings) and 
opening public service obligations up to foreign operators as transition mechanisms for 
cabotage operations. Ibid. at 273. 
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geography but also the possible contrasts between such programs. In the first 
case – that of the EC –, the Community gave preference to expanding services 
to regional (non-hub) airports while controlling the degree of competition on 
any route. In particular, the first package introduced measures lifting 
constraints on entering many new routes to points connecting each nation’s 
largest (category 1) airports to smaller, regional airports open to international 
service, only carving out airports with specific capacity limits.1160 The second 
package then removes the restrictions between category 1 airports as well as 
to/from capacity constrained airports.1161 Yet at the same time the first two 
packages limited the impact of competition on major routes not only by 
restricting capacity shares, but also by limiting multiple entry on a city pair 
basis to particularly dense routes based on either the annual number of 
passenger movements or return flights.1162 Specifically, the first package 
introduces multiple designation on a city-pair basis only for routes with an 
annual capacity of more than 250,000 passengers in the preceding year.1163 
The two packages then reduce restrictions on multiple entry in the following 
manner over a period of four years: 
 
Second Year: On routes on which more than 200,000 passengers were 
                                                
1160 See EC, Dec. 87/602/87, supra note 464, art. 6. These included: regional airports 
exempted under EC, Council Directive 83/416/EEC of 25 July 1983 concerning the 
Authorization of Scheduled Inter-Regional Air Services for the Transport of Passengers, Mail, 
and Cargo between Member States, [1983] O.J. L 237/19 [EC, Dir 83/416], a list of airports 
unable to handle more than 100,000 passengers per annum, and eight regional airports 
specifically exempted to give them the opportunity to prepare for future demand. Ibid., art. 
6(2). 
1161 EC, Reg. 2343/90, supra note 464, art. 4. 
1162 See EC, Dec. 87/602, supra note 464, art. 5(2); EC, Reg. 2343/90, supra note 464, art. 
6(2). 
1163 EC, Dec. 87/602/78, supra note 464, art. 5(2), para. 1. 
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carried in the previous year or on which there are more 
than 1,200 return flights per annum; 
Third Year: On routes on which more than 180,000 passengers were 
carried in the previous year or on which there are more 
than 1,000 return flights per annum; 
1 January 1991: On routes on which more than 140,000 passengers were 
carried in the previous year or on which there are more 
than 800 return flights per annum; 
1 January 1992: On routes on which more than 100,000 passengers were 
carried in the previous year or on which there are more 
than 600 return flights per annum.1164 
 
Such rules expand hub-and-spoke network reach on a third and fourth freedom 
basis while limiting the effects of fifth freedom traffic and intrusions on 
capacity shares discussed, inter alia, in the preceding sections.  
  The second case comes from the US-China Air Transport Agreement, 
in particular in its 2004 and 2007 iterations. It will be remembered from 
Chapter 5 that the 2004 Protocol introduced a three-fold division in terms of 
China Zones, and that these Zones generally correspond with China’s 
distinction between Coastal, Central and Western economic regions.1165 
Moreover, the regions differ in the extent they are open to international traffic. 
In particular, they are distinguished by the relative presence or absence of 
                                                
1164 Ibid., paras. 2-3; EC, Reg. 2343/90, supra note 464, art. 6(2). 
1165 See supra notes 890-92 and accompanying text. Elsewhere, Alan Williams has discussed 
other attempts to bring air services inland, including massive infrastructure investments in the 
Central and Western areas. See Williams, China’s Policy, supra note 672 at 45-59 (discussing 
air transportation’s “model role” in developing the Western areas). 
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capacity restrictions – while the agreements maintain restrictions on traffic 
to/from the three Coastal cities (i.e., Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou) in 
China Zone 1, they are less restricted on China Zone 2, and are wholly absent 
on flights to/from China Zone 3.1166 In theory, this should raise the price on 
tickets between points in the US and Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou above 
market rates, while simultaneously bringing down prices to other points in 
China, including increasingly important cities such as Chengdu and 
Chongqing. Thus, on its face the agreement as amended should serve to 
“push” price-elastic demand to the West. 
 A third case is that of the timing of ASEAN’s arrangements to open 
skies. In contrast to the examples of EC internal market development or the 
spatial arrangements between the US and China, ASEAN’s approach first 
targets building a competitive framework within and between sub-regions 
(December 2005–December 2008).1167 Only after does it focus on links within 
the economic core and between core and periphery, first on routes between 
capital cities (December 2008–December 2010),1168 and later extending 
liberalization to all points (June 2010–June 2013).1169 Thus, in contrast the 
EC’s approach, the principle transition period is located within the periphery 
and between a small but significant segment of ASEAN’s economic core. 
 Such programs also demonstrate the limits of such an approach. In the 
case of services between the US and China, even large, important cities such 
as Chengdu and Chongqing do not receive direct international service from the 
                                                
1166 See supra notes 890-92 and accompanying text. 
1167 See generally MAAS Protocol 1, supra note 720; MAAS Protocol 2, supra note 720; 
MAAS Protocol 3, supra note 720; MAAS Protocol 4, supra note 720. 
1168 See generally MAAS Protocol 5, supra note 720; MAAS Protocol 6, supra note 720. 
1169 See generally MAFLPAS and its two Protocols, supra notes 724-25. 
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US. Instead, services are routed through China’s major international hubs. At 
least two reasons account for this. One is the general substitutability of one- or 
even two-stop routes for direct services on long-haul intercontinental routes, a 
well-known (and well-documented) phenomenon.1170 A second factor has to 
do with the effect of inter-airline cooperation, particularly code-sharing, on the 
shape of traffic.1171 In a world of independent, nationally-organized operators, 
if a US carrier were to independently serve Chongqing, it would of necessity 
need to serve that point directly from the United States, or at best through 
some intermediate point such as Tokyo. The code-share, however, allows the 
US airline to route the passenger through its Chinese partner’s hub, not only 
offering the passenger more flexibility but also reducing the airline’s costs by 
increasing load factors and frequencies by concentrating services on the 
intercontinental segment of the route. It also undermines any attempt at 
pushing traffic inland that the Agreement might hope to facilitate. 
 There has also been a broad general failure of projects designed to 
increase the connectivity within peripheral and semi-peripheral areas. In 
ASEAN’s case, this has lead to a prolonged concentration on sub-regional 
liberalization despite a clear understanding that the projects of the 1990s and 
                                                
1170 See e.g. the route pairings and overlap between US and Japanese carriers noted in supra 
note 65. 
1171 See US-China 1992 Protocol, supra note 879, para. 5 (amending article 11(5) of the US-
China agreement to permit code-sharing on international routes, but continues restrictions on 
cabotage routes); US-China 1999 Protocol, supra note 879, art. 3 (introducing a limited right 
to code share on a specified number of domestic routes across a three year period); US-China 
2004 Protocol, supra note 879, art. 5 (permitting code-share arrangements on domestic routes 
between a US and Chinese airline). Even as amended, the agreement controls for code-shares 
between two or more airlines of the same nationality. See e.g. US-China 2007 Protocol, supra 
note 879, art. 4. 
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early 2000s had led to only marginal growth, if at all.1172 ASEAN does not 
stand alone in this respect: the year prior to Commission Memorandum No. 2, 
the EC had also liberalized long-distance air services between category 2 and 
category 3 airports for aircraft seating less than 70 passengers.1173 Like 
ASEAN’s sub-regional initiatives, inter-regional services failed to generate 
any appreciable growth in demand,1174 and by 1986 had been replaced with the 
approach described above. Even here there is sometimes hesitation. Given 
both ASEAN and the EC’s experience, it is surprising that Indonesia has 
refused to ratify market access commitments between the economic sub-
regions (as opposed to within a single sub-region),1175 or that the ASEAN 
process has spent so much time liberalizing what should otherwise be a fairly 
non-contentious liberalization project. 
 States may also choose to address regulations in terms of the relative 
competitiveness of each state’s airline industry. In 2004, a group of experts 
put forward one such suggestion in the context of ASEAN.1176  This group, 
commissioned by the ASEAN Australia Development Cooperation Program’s 
Regional Economic Policy Support Facility to put together a roadmap to open 
skies, suggested the use of three sub-regional open skies arrangements – 
CLMV plus Thailand and Brunei (CLMV+T+B), Vietnam-Indonesia-
Philippines plus Brunei (VIP+B), and Singapore-Malaysia-Thailand plus 
                                                
1172 Forsyth et al., Preparing ASEAN, supra note 698 at 65 (noting that “[t]he BIMP- EAGA 
and IMT-GT allow cooperation among secondary/tertiary points in the countries involved. 
However, progress in these two sub-regions has not been significant in the past years.”). 
1173 See generally EC, Dir 83/416, supra note 1160.  
1174 See e.g. Commission, Memo No. 2, supra note 182 at 15, para. 27 (noting that the 
proposal for interregional services, as promulgated, was unlikely to have any impact on 
overall traffic). 
1175 See ASEAN, “Table of Treaty Ratifications”, supra note 722 at 24-25. 
1176 See generally Forsyth et al., Preparing ASEAN, supra note 698. 
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Brunei (SMT+B) – as transition mechanisms to region-wide open skies.1177 
Once these three sub-regional arrangements are established, they would then 
be “merged” into each other by first merging the VIP+B and SMT+B sub-
regions and subsequently bringing in the CLMV+T+B region.1178 
 Although ASEAN ultimately adopted another path to reform, it is 
useful to briefly account for the considerations that went into the panel’s 
suggestions. The basis for its suggestions lies in the relative competitiveness 
of the national airline industries in each sub-region,1179 dividing ASEAN 
member states into three categories: the “big three” or “the superpowers”, 
comprised of Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand;1180 the “secondary aviation 
states” of Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines;1181 and what might be 
called the lesser states composed of CLMV (with Vietnam significantly 
stronger than the other three) and Brunei.1182 In doing so, it acknowledged that 
“[o]ne of the major and well recognized difficulties of moving quickly […] is 
the aviation, trading and general economic power of the big 3”.1183 To address 
power differences within the particularly difficult CLMV+T+B sub-region, 
the report recommended limiting competition from Thailand through a two-
stage approach to liberalization. In the first stage, relaxations would allow 
airlines from CLMV states to operate fifth freedom services from Thailand’s 
                                                
1177 Ibid. at 65-76 (discussing sub-regional groups). 
1178 Ibid. at 72-78. 
1179 Ibid. at 66 (noting that “[s]ub-regions can be based on a similarity of economic and 
aviation strength.”). While the panel makes the suggestion that it is also trying to build on sub-
regional initiatives (see ibid.), this seems a nominal consideration, given the relative failure of 
BIMP-EAGA and the IMT-GT to generate traffic. 
1180 Ibid. at 71-72. 
1181 Ibid. at 69-70. 
1182 Ibid. at 66-68. While Brunei is a country of “medium strength” with a liberal policy, the 
panel regards it as non-threatening to liberalization. 
1183 Ibid. at 71. 
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regional airports, such as Chiang Mai and Phuket.1184 In the second stage, the 
sub-region would be opened on a third to fifth freedom basis; however, Thai 
carriers would be restricted to the current level of service or up to daily 
services.1185 After this, Thai carriers could only increase service levels once 
the partner CLMV state had matched service levels with the Thai airline, and 
only then in equal installments.1186 Such considerations, while not 
implemented, provide sound explanations to the types of considerations that 
go into any set of transition mechanisms. 
 
2.6. Asymmetric Liberalization 
 
The last part of the discussion above also highlights a final means of drawing 
interest groups into cooperation through asymmetric liberalization. The term 
asymmetric as used here describes an exchange in which one party gains more 
on the terms of the agreement than the other. This might be done either to 
compensate for an imbalance in competitive capabilities among actors – i.e., 
as a preferential measure – or to correct for a de facto imbalance that might 
otherwise emerge from an outwardly equal exchange. 
 The treatment of fifth freedom rights in the 1992 Memorandum of 
Understanding between Australia and New Zealand, noted earlier, offers one 
example of a facially asymmetric agreement being used to maintain strict 
reciprocity. The Memorandum undertook broad reforms of the agreement 
                                                
1184 Ibid. at 66-67 (also noting Thailand has developed a stated policy to develop these airports 
into regional hubs). 
1185 Ibid. at 68. 
1186 Ibid. 
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within the trans-Tasman. It opened entry on a country pair basis and, from 1 
November 1992, on a city-pair basis as well.1187 Between 1992 and 1994, it 
relaxed all restrictions on international routes between the two states.1188 
However, the MoU retained restrictions on fifth freedom rights. Moreover, it 
gave Australia broader geographical coverage than New Zealand: while New 
Zealand gained access from Australia to points in the US, Canada, and 
ultimately nine other points unnamed in the agreement, Australian carriers 
gained rights to operate from New Zealand to the US, Canada, Fiji (and 
beyond), South America, and six other points unnamed in the agreement.1189 
However, the unevenness in geographic access to beyond markets is explained 
by a number of factors, including differences in the relative size of national 
markets between the two countries and the fact that transpacific markets to 
South America remain relatively thin.1190 At the same time, provisions on 
capacity and frequencies, determined by number of weekly B747 services, 
evened out the benefits in terms of traffic carried.1191 
                                                
1187 Australia-New Zealand MoU 1992, supra note 957, para. (A). 
1188 Ibid., paras. (C) & (F), & Annex I, paras. 4-5. 
1189 Ibid., para. (D). In bilateral agreements, points generally refer to cities (i.e. particular 
points of arrival or departure), while beyond market access by country is described as such. 
The 1992 Memorandum follows this distinction, meaning that Australia gains access to the 
South American continent in exchange for three additional cities beyond Australia. 
1190 Goh, supra note 31 at 52 (noting that, at the time, Australians still perceived New 
Zealand’s position as being relatively advantageous, and quoting then Australian Federal 
Minister of Transport, Laure Brereton, as stating that anything beyond the 1992 MoU was 
“clearly an arrangement that, in the absence of any rationalization of the airline structures 
competing with each other, was in New Zealand’s favour to the tune of many millions of 
dollars.” (quoting from the Australian Financial Review, 11 November 1994)). See also the 
discussion on MALIAT’s failure to generate any real traffic among many of its partners, 
above at 190-93. 
1191 See Australia-New Zealand MoU 1992, supra note 957, para. (E) (giving carries from 
each state four (1992), eight (1993), and ten (1994) weekly B747 services). 
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 The US-China Air Transport Agreement, particularly from 2004, 
provides an excellent example of asymmetry as preferential treatment.1192 
Beginning with the 2004 Protocol, the parties introduced at least three types of 
amendments giving Chinese carriers a number of advantages over US carriers 
in terms of formal opportunities to enter and compete in the US-China market. 
The first asymmetry corresponds to the number of additional designations 
permitted at any one time in the 2004 and 2007 Protocols. Beginning with an 
equal number of four designations, the agreement finally awards designations 
based on the following dates: 
 
US: one additional cargo designation; 1 August 2004: 
PRC: one additional combination or cargo designation; 
US: one additional combination designation; 25 March 2005: 
PRC: one additional combination or cargo designation; 
US: one additional combination or cargo designation; 25 March 2006: 
PRC: one additional combination or cargo designation; 
US: one additional combination or cargo designation; 25 March 2007: 
PRC: one additional combination or cargo designation; 
US: one additional combination or cargo designation; 1 August 2007: 
PRC: unlimited designations; 
25 March 2009: US: one additional combination or cargo designation; 
                                                
1192 While some asymmetry existed in the US-China agreement before 2004, the types of 
asymmetry were rather different. In the amendments from the 1990s, the primary difference 
lies in the comparatively larger number of points in the US that Chinese carriers were given 
access to, although the difference in spatial geography and China’s policy of concentrating 
economic activity on the coastal regions arguably make this a non-issue. See e.g. US-China 
1999 Protocol, supra 879, arts. 1 (providing each four designations) & 4 (providing equal 
capacity arrangements and equal flexibility in terms of convertibility). 
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25 March 2010: US: one additional combination or cargo designation; 
25 March 2011: US: unlimited designations.1193 
 
 A second asymmetry contained in both the 2004 and 2007 Protocols is 
the significantly greater degree of flexibility given to Chinese carriers in 
converting the cargo frequencies awarded under the agreement to combination 
frequencies, and similarly from combination to cargo, for traffic to and from 
China Zones 1 and 2.1194 As amended, the agreement starts with a base of 54 
weekly frequencies per airline in 2004.1195 Already at this stage the agreement 
demonstrates a heightened flexibility for Chinese carriers: while the agreement 
divides the composition of those rights for the US airlines (34 combination 
services, 20 all-cargo services), and provides the margin of flexibility (18 
services may be converted from one to the other), China is given absolute 
discretion in apportioning the rights between cargo and combination 
services.1196 The Agreement then goes on to grant the following additional 
frequencies for combination and cargo services between the US and China 
Zones 1 and 2: 
 
                                                
1193 US-China 2004 Protocol, supra note 879, art. 1; US-China 2007 Protocol, supra note 879, 
art. 1 (both amending Article 3(1) of the original US-China bilateral agreement). Originally, 
the 2004 Protocol made two more awards of one additional (combination or cargo) 
designation to each state party: one from 25 March 2008 and one from 25 March 2010. US-
China 2004 Protocol, ibid. These designations were superceded by the 2007 Protocol. US-
China 2007 Protocol, ibid. 
1194 The original agreement and earlier amendments had also used frequencies (and, later, 
stages of relaxations), but the rights maintained a rough parity. See e.g. US-China 1980 
Agreement, supra note 879; US-China 1992 Protocol, supra note 879. China Zone 3 was 
designated a “Special Aviation Area” and given special rights from 2004 onward. See 
generally above at 288-90. 
1195 US-China 2004 Protocol, supra note 879, art. 2 (replacing paragraphs (1) and (2) of 
Annex V of the 1980 agreement). 
1196 Ibid. (para. (1) of the amended text). 
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Combination: an additional 14 weekly frequencies; 1 August 2004: 
Cargo: an additional 21 weekly frequencies; 
Combination: an additional seven weekly frequencies; 25 March 2005: 
Cargo: an additional 18 weekly frequencies; 
Combination: an additional seven weekly frequencies; 25 March 2006: 
Cargo: an additional 12 weekly frequencies; 
Combination: an additional seven weekly frequencies; 25 March 2007: 
Cargo: an additional 15 weekly frequencies; 
Combination: an additional seven weekly frequencies; 1 August 2007: 
Cargo: No changes; 
Combination: an additional seven weekly frequencies 
(nonstop to Guangzhou only); 
25 March 2008: 
Cargo: an additional 15 weekly frequencies; 
Combination: an additional 28 weekly frequencies; 25 March 2009: 
Cargo: an additional 15 weekly frequencies; 
Combination: an additional 21 weekly frequencies; 25 March 2010: 
Cargo: an additional 15 weekly frequencies; 
Combination: an additional 14 weekly frequencies; 25 March 2011: 
Cargo: unlimited frequencies for the airlines designated 
by each party; 
25 March 2012: Combination: an additional fourteen weekly 
frequencies.1197 
 
                                                
1197 US-China 2007 Protocol, supra note 879, art. 2 (paras. (2)-(3) of the amended text). 
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For US airlines, these frequencies remain apportioned exactly as they are 
given in the Agreement.1198 However, for Chinese carriers these frequencies 
are freely convertible between combination and cargo services, with the sole 
exception being that the number of cargo frequencies convertible to 
combination services ends on 25 March 2010.1199 The result is a much more 
flexible space for Chinese carriers to serve passenger and cargo demand. 
 A third set of requirements introduces increased flexibility for Chinese 
carriers in terms of access to intermediate points. From March 2005 until 
March 2010, China maintained the right to annually select one additional 
intermediate point (the first one is Tokyo) through which Chinese airlines are 
then free to operate.1200 In contrast, the United States is given only one 
additional point, and only from March 2009.1201 This, more than any other 
formal asymmetry in the agreement, seems more equivalent to the trans-
Tasman case, using a legal asymmetry to balance out another structural 
asymmetry, this time the entrenched market position of US airlines in Japan, 
built up over decades.1202  
 Even with these preferential measures in place, there are still a number 
of disparities between the capabilities in the two state’s national industries. 
The most telling asymmetry has been in the all-cargo sector. Both UPS and 
Fedex established air cargo hubs in Shenzhen and Guangzhou, respectively, 
shortly after the provisions of Article 11 bis came into effect, while Chinese 
                                                
1198 Ibid. 
1199 Ibid. 
1200 US-China 2004 Protocol, supra note 879, art. 4 (amending note 4 to Annex I). 
1201 Ibid. (introducing note 7). 
1202 On the decades long dispute between the US and Japan, see generally supra note 417-22 
and accompanying text. 
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airlines have yet to establish a US cargo hub.1203 This has been both an issue 
of organization and, more recently, a matter of localized politics between the 
Chinese demands for economic incentives and the US municipality’s 
willingness to consider them.1204 At the same time, China’s global presence in 
the express-package industry remains, on the whole and despite the enormous 
underlying demand for transport to and from the country, negligible. 
Nevertheless, the Agreement may provide a model for other arrangements in 
the region, particularly with respect to its Northeast Asian neighbors. 
 
3. RECIPROCITY AS A GUIDE FOR EXCHANGE: SPECIFIC, DIFFUSE, AND 
BEYOND 
 
While the myriad varieties of transition arrangements offer numerous forms 
for addressing recalcitrance and thus in mediating the transition from 
regulated to liberalized or integrated market, they are not the only method for 
moving towards a more efficient system. 
 Another important guide for exchange is that of reciprocity. Indeed, a 
central part of the discussion in Chapter 2 relates to the role specific forms of 
reciprocity has played in guiding international air transport regulation; indeed, 
the details in exchange within the bilateral agreements governing the system 
                                                
1203 See e.g. Mary Jane Credeur, “Fedex Takes on UPS In China With Longest-Range Cargo 
Jets: Freight Markets” Bloomberg (14 January 2011), online: 
<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-13/fedex-takes-on-ups-in-china-with-longest-
range-cargo-jets-freight-markets.html>. China Cargo had initially sought St. Louis as its cargo 
hub, but after two years failed to receive the tax benefits it sought from local lawmakers. See 
e.g. Ariel Tung, “St. Louis Set to be Major Air Trade Hub” China Daily (16 July 2011), 
online: <http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2011-07/16/content_12916602.htm>; Stephanie 
Ebbs, “Lawmakers Defeat China Hub Bill; $280,000 Spent on Special Session” The 
Missourian (27 October 2011), online: 
<http://www.columbiamissourian.com/stories/2011/10/27/special-session-summary/>. 
1204 See ibid. 
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have been so minute that one party’s request for an extra frequency or route 
has often required payment of an equivalent in either route rights or cash.1205 
Even states that have moved to a more diffuse conception of reciprocity – or 
even, arguably, beyond it – have made the transition in degrees, a point made, 
inter alia, in Australia and New Zealand’s accepting a specific conception of 
fifth freedom rights even as they transitioned from a regulated to a liberalized 
or even semi-integrated internal market. 
 States’ conceptions of participation remain intimately tied to their 
understanding of reciprocity.1206 Beginning with the idea of dealings in 
specific reciprocity, the section moves on to address the distinction between 
specific and diffuse reciprocity and ultimately, through a transformation of 
political identity, the possibility of moving beyond reciprocity. The shift from 
specific to diffuse does not correlate naturally with a shift from regulation to 
liberalization: as Chapter 3 demonstrates, specific reciprocity remains a 
critical restraint on nation-bound bilateral exchanges.1207 At the same time, 
global multilateralism remains in its infant stages of development, with states 
polarized as to their positions and voting along largely atomized national 
                                                
1205 See generally above at 112-15. On the exactitude of payments in exchange of rights, see 
supra notes 1142-43. 
1206 This idea is (broadly) tied to Axelrod’s advice on teaching caring and teaching reciprocity 
as a means of fostering cooperation (see Axelrod, supra note 1087 at 134-39), but also moves 
beyond it as states collectively assume a common identity for addressing particular issue-
areas. 
1207 This comes across in various ways, from the EU’s rescaling to match the US transport 
market, to the more classic concerns expressed by states debating global liberalization (see 
especially supra note 580 (providing very strong statements by India and Japan regarding 
liberalization’s effects on reciprocity)). For a similar position in relation to the US’ air 
transport policy, see Havel, Beyond Open Skies, supra note 10 at 318-25 (noting that the US 
open skies policy has “exhausted” the possibilities of the bilateral approach). 
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interests.1208 This section analyzes regional efforts to move from specific to 
diffuse reciprocity and beyond. It ends by briefly linking these developments 
to those of transition mechanisms. 
 
3.1. Specific Reciprocity: Transfers Within and Between Industries 
 
For many states, evaluating the effects of an agreement continue to be based 
on notions of specific reciprocity, with imbalances set off in one form or 
another. As mooted in Chapter 2, specific reciprocity attempts to achieve an 
equal exchange of benefits among all parties at all times.1209 In the postwar 
system, reciprocity could be based on the right to operate services for the 
national traffic base or on a predefined distribution of capacity, revenues, or 
both.1210 Any deviation from these pre-agreed norms would need to be 
rebalanced. Arrangements such as the fifth freedom provisions in the 1992 
MoU between Australia and New Zealand, and even the provisions contained 
in the US-China Agreements, address specific forms of reciprocity, defined 
nationally.  
 States have devised many ways of maintaining specific reciprocity. 
The UK’s rejection of Bermuda I and the negotiation of a new Bermuda II is 
an oft-cited but singular means of maintaining reciprocity.1211 More 
                                                
1208 See generally above at 181-90 & 193-99. See also generally Schermers & Blokker’s 
comment on consensus-based and majority voting patterns in global and regional contexts, 
supra note 135. 
1209 See generally above at 113-14 (referring to Ruggie, “Multilateralism”, supra note 343 at 
571-72). 
1210 See generally e.g. Cheng, “The Right to Fly”, supra note 185 at 126 (distinguishing 
between liberal-type agreements dividing traffic on a national traffic basis and more 
conservative inter partes divisions of the aggregate traffic in a bilateral market). 
1211 See generally above at 137-38. 
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commonly, states have amended their agreements, or have addressed 
imbalances in market demand through the use of money payments, or 
transfers, to buy access to new routes, or to increase capacity or frequencies on 
an existing route.1212 
 In this regard, transfers continue to play an important role in the 
discourse over liberalization. Yamaguchi and Yoshida’s study – discussed 
earlier in Chapter 5 – drew on transfers as a means of opening market access 
to a significant if limited segment of the Northeast Asian market.1213 
Importantly, the study highlighted that by compensating the losers within the 
industry through transfer payments, an agreement liberalizing market access 
between capitals on a seventh freedom basis would generate several million 
dollars in benefits to that regional economy.1214 
 Other experts have also suggested other means of using arrangements 
based on strict reciprocity to induce liberalization in the region. Such 
arrangements include negotiating liberalization among a group of industries as 
a means of offsetting the state’s (not the airline’s) loss in the air services 
sector with gains in another.1215 This might include, inter alia, jointly 
negotiating shipping and air transport liberalization in Northeast Asia, where 
Japanese competitiveness in the former might offset its loss in the latter, or by 
                                                
1212 Raben, supra note 349 at 16-18; Lim, supra note 349 at 48; Mendelssohn, supra note 491 
at 521-22 (including the text quoted at supra note 1131). 
1213 See generally Yamaguchi & Yoshida, supra note 920. 
1214 It is important to remember that the benefits accrue to the users. Otherwise, the agreement 
runs a net loss for the carriers, and that Chinese carriers only seek to gain USD1 million 
dollars, while Korean and Japanese airlines seek to lose USD10-15 million each. See 
generally supra note 922 and accompanying text. 
1215 In relation to East Asia, see e.g. La Croix, supra note 795; Oum & Lee, supra note 417 at 
331-35; John Bowen, “The Asia Pacific Airline Industry: Prospects for Multilateral 
Liberalization” in Findlay et al., eds., supra note 670, 123 at 140-45 (discussing the ASEAN 
FTA and APEC as two multi-sector vehicles, while nevertheless predicting the way forward 
through transport-specific sub-regional arrangements and inter-carrier cooperation). See also 
generally the discussion of the GATS-approach, above at 181-84. 
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offsetting losses in the air transport industry by transferring know-how in 
another.1216 
 Importantly, while the objective – liberalization through more or less 
reciprocal exchange – is the same in both, each mechanism operates on a 
different set of assumptions as to how to bring about the stated end. Proposals 
such as Yamaguchi and Yoshida’s seek to quell resistance to an otherwise 
welfare-generating agreement by directly paying the recalcitrant factions to 
accept the agreement. Through transfers, they propose not only to buy out the 
recalcitrant airlines, but also to keep them financially sound. The mechanism 
works differently in the case of offsetting losses in one industry with gains in 
another: rather than silence the recalcitrant organization by compensating it 
directly, such arrangements attempt to drown out voices resistant to change by 
bringing in a clamor of others shouting for it. They would thus compensate the 
state, or more particularly another industry, instead of the air transport 
industry as a means of limiting the effects of opposition from special interest 
groups on the outcome of the agreement. In other words, both agreements use 
conceptions of specific reciprocity to change the calculation of payoffs, but in 
very different ways. 
 Each also brings with it its own set of problems. In addition to the 
points made in the previous Chapter,1217 Yamaguchi and Yoshida’s analysis is 
oversimplified in a number of ways. For example, it does not suggest from 
where the money necessary to make the transfers might come. The general 
welfare of users and even second-order beneficiaries does not equate with the 
tax-paying citizenry, so that a simple payment from government to airlines 
                                                
1216 La Croix, ibid.; Lim, supra note 349. 
1217 See generally above at 298-99. 
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would not allocate the cost of liberalization to those receiving the benefits. 
One might possibly employ a tax, but such an option is also not discussed. At 
the same time, those losses might be worked out through labor relations within 
the company, a factor that would need to be accounted for to ensure transfers 
were offsetting injury in the right place. These would have to be factored into 
payment systems for an effective transfer, and building these institutions 
would themselves entail costs. 
 Liberalization through offsetting losses in one industry with gains in 
another is also problematic. Perhaps the greatest concern would be that from a 
normative standpoint a simple offset does not sufficiently address states’ 
claims to participation within the system. This is certainly true of the non-
economic concerns states have with liberalization. The actual practice of states 
in separately negotiating air transport agreements seems to confirm this 
statement. Indeed, despite being quick to recognize the link between air 
transport and other industries, states have almost universally eschewed placing 
air transport within more general frameworks for trade liberalization or 
integration. This is certainly true of the WTO system to date.1218 Regional 
organizations have also separated air transport initiatives from other trade 
liberalization programs. Even the EC, which moved its single aviation market 
in line with the broader transitions to single European market, did so through 
                                                
1218 See generally above at 181-84. See also ICC, supra note 8 at 6 (concluding that “ICC 
believes in the multilateral liberalization of trade in all goods and services and also believes 
that, as a general matter, the WTO has proven to be the most effective mechanism for 
achieving such liberalization. ICC recognizes, however, that the air transport sector possesses 
particular characteristics that may be seen as complicating the inclusion of direct market 
access (traffic rights) in the GATS at this stage. Governments seeking the most rapid path to 
liberalization may feel that the prospects for achieving agreement on including air transport 
within an agreement as widely subscribed as GATS are too uncertain, and that other, more 
predictable avenues are preferable – at least in the near term.”). 
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separate and distinct legal processes.1219 This bifurcation between goods and 
services liberalization on the one hand and air transport liberalization on the 
other carries over into a number of regional agreements, including both the 
SAMANZ and ASEAN liberalization and integration initiatives, and including 
a number of common market initiatives in other parts of the world as well.1220 
 
3.2. Moving from Specific to Diffuse Reciprocity 
 
In the examples above, clear conceptions of specific reciprocity underlie the 
discussion of both transfers and inter-industry offsets: although the outcome is 
achieved through different political mechanisms, both attempt a balance 
through strictly quid-pro-quo exchanges. But negotiations, particularly, among 
regional economic organizations, have demonstrated other tendencies as well 
– namely, to move from a concept of reciprocity as a specific exchange to one 
of a broad benefit diffusely felt. 
 Unlike the requirement of specific reciprocity that an agreement yield 
roughly equal advantages of equal weight in each industry at all times, diffuse 
reciprocity looks for a balance between industries and across a period of 
time.1221 In this reading, a loss in airline revenues in the short term is seen as 
part of larger economic gains, although not necessarily measured and weighed 
across industries or at a particular time. Such arguments can be read into the 
                                                
1219 See generally above at 149-60 (listing the three packages and noting the constructivist link 
between single market and single aviation market). See also generally Weiler, supra 137 at 
2453-74 (discussing the Single European Act and reformations through 1992). 
1220 On SAMANZ, see generally Goh, supra note 31 at 31-42. On ASEAN, see generally 
above at 222-52. For other agreements that fall within regional economic integration 
organizations but are disconnected from other goods and services liberalization initiatives, see 
generally supra note 868. 
1221 See generally above at 113-14. 
 387 
expectations embedded in the EC’s single internal market and in the Preamble 
to the SAMANZ agreements,1222 although both processes have also stretched 
intra-industry liberalization so as to minimize the harm caused by one-off 
liberalization. ASEAN’s identification of air transport as a priority sector 
because of its effects on the region’s competitiveness as a whole indicates the 
region’s desire to move in a similar direction.1223 But as Chapter 4 shows, it is 
as yet a task that is far from finished. 
 Although reaching situations of diffuse reciprocity is an extremely 
complex process, two issues stand out as particularly relevant to this 
discussion. One is the relationship between forms of reciprocity and breadth of 
coverage. Like large multilateral agreements, reorganization across a diverse 
segment of the economy requires participants to think differently about the 
types of bargains struck. Put baldly, it is extremely impractical to expect to get 
to an ordered, strictly reciprocal relationship between ten countries across a 
hundred (or more, or less) industries over the course of a single negotiation, 
while group dynamics may yield different expectations of reciprocity than 
strictly bilateral ones.1224 By lowering transport costs, air transport 
                                                
1222 See generally e.g. Commission, Memo No. 1, supra note 457 at 11 (listing distortions 
caused by regulation); EC, Reg 2408/92, supra 464, Preamble (linking the single internal 
market to the Single European Act and to resolving the free movement of goods, persons, 
services, and capital); Australia-New Zealand Open Skies 2002, supra note 959, Preamble 
(linking open skies to ANZCERTA). 
1223 See e.g. Vientiane Action Programme, supra note 703 at s. 2.1 (providing that “[t]he 
proposed approaches to integrate these priority sectors are premised on combining the 
economic strengths of ASEAN Member Countries for regional advantage; facilitating and 
promoting intra-ASEAN investments; improving the conditions to attract and retain 
manufacturing and other economic activities within the region; promotion of intra-industry 
trade and outsourcing within ASEAN; and promoting the development of ”Made in ASEAN– 
products and services.”). 
1224 This is not necessarily the case: the GATT/WTO, which took 40 years to reach and 
remains contested in some areas due to the structure of industrial activity between countries, is 
a case in point. See e.g. Ruggie, “Embedded Liberalism”, supra note 4 at 402-03. See also 
Keohane, supra note 342 at 6-7 (noting that at least rough equivalence is necessary for 
understandings of reciprocity, although they may emphasize an overall balance among a 
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liberalization removes certain barriers to achieving the full value of expected 
benefits in other areas of economic activity. It works to stimulate tourism, 
realign the location of numerous industrial activities, and affects the end cost 
of perishables such as food items. In this way, regional integration becomes a 
vehicle through which air transport liberalization or integration takes on new 
meaning. 
 The second is the role of history in developing relationships of diffuse 
reciprocity. Indeed, the interactions between history and reciprocity are both 
generalizable and context-specific. One of history’s roles in developing 
diffuse forms of reciprocity is as an information bank of experience on which 
states can draw to analyze and predict a number of possible outcomes of an 
agreement.1225 Where little or no history between the states exists, then there is 
little basis for those states to evaluate the payoffs of comprehensive 
cooperation based on conceptions of diffuse reciprocity. In contrast, political 
regions with long histories of cooperation will have a larger set of available 
experience to draw on and evaluate the proposed conditions of cooperation.1226 
                                                
group rather than an exact bilateral exchange). Importantly, Keohane discusses sequential 
reciprocity as a means of deepening commitment – a point which plays into several 
incremental liberalization efforts, including discussions of Europe, SAMANZ, and 
(potentially) ASEAN. See Keohane, ibid. at 19-24. 
1225 See e.g. Axelrod, supra note 1087 at 139-41 (noting that “[t]he ability to recognize the 
other player from past interactions, and to remember the relevant features of those 
interactions, is necessary to sustain cooperation. Without these abilities, a player could not use 
any form of reciprocity and hence could not encourage the other to cooperate.” Ibid. at 139). 
See also North, supra note 14 at 131 (noting that “[w]riting history is constructing a coherent 
story of some facet of the human condition through time. Such a construction exists only in 
the human mind. We do not recreate the past; we construct stories about the past. But to be 
good history, the story must give a consistent, logical account and be constrained by the 
available evidence and the available theory.”). 
1226 ASEAN and the EU are good examples of regions with short and long histories of 
cooperation to draw on, respectively. Whereas Southeast Asia has until recently been 
dominated by relationships between colonial and colonized, Europe has enjoyed a centuries 
long history of growing interdependence. See e.g. Peter Temin, “The Golden Age of European 
Growth Reconsidered” (2002) Eur. Rev. Econ. History 3 (noting that Europe achieved prewar 
levels of economic interdependence only in the 1970s, the end of the thirty years of growth). 
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Their ability to draw on and learn from the patterns and outcomes of historical 
interactions plays an important role in framing the information set states draw 
on in their relationships with one another. 
 On a global basis, such patterns are also disseminated and drawn on by 
others as part of a process of collating, processing and translating various state 
experiences into global “best practices” and adapting them to local conditions. 
Such practices are disseminated in a number of ways: through templates 
constructed by groups of states or international organizations (such as OECD 
or ICAO); through policy statements and model agreements used by states to 
negotiate traffic rights, made freely accessible to other states (such as the US 
open skies model agreement); or by simply providing information on a range 
of policy perspectives thought to be at the frontier of regulatory thinking (as 
IATA has done as part of its Agenda for Freedom).1227 These practices can 
then be taken up and adapted to local conditions in other regions, assuming 
that local conditions and histories allow for a group of states to perceive the 
use and utility of such programs and political issues do not otherwise block 
agreement. 
 As with history, institution-building is not only a function of 
measuring the past, but is also a projection into the future. In this regard, legal 
institutions channel and constrain certain political actions while enabling 
others. The Philippines’ constitutional prohibition on foreign ownership and 
control is but one example: while outright prohibiting foreign investment, it 
                                                
1227 See generally e.g. ICAO, Consolidated Conclusions AT/Conf 5, supra note 10; US Model 
Open Skies, supra note 240; Agenda for Freedom, “Global Best Practices”, online: 
<http://www.agenda-for-freedom.aero/library/Pages/best-practices.aspx> (offering 
information from the EU, the US, Chile, Switzerland (noting preferences for principal place of 
business clause), and the Singapore-UK bilateral agreement); Thomas et al., supra note 116 at 
45-60 (analyzing both the Single European Aviation Market and SAMANZ as models for the 
ASAM). 
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also structures debates around others, including Tiger’s minority investment in 
SEAir.1228 In other instances, changes in the current of transaction patterns can 
suggest the need for new institutions (or new forms of old institutions). 
Regionalism – including for air transportation – is an outgrowth of these 
changing patterns.1229 
 One of the principal roles played by legal institutions is in shaping the 
dynamics between Exit and Voice. These two concepts, taken from Albert 
Hirschman’s Exit, Voice and Loyalty as a means of describing differences 
between the disciplines of economics and politics, were adapted to the context 
of the European Community by Joseph Weiler.1230 For Weiler, Exit became 
“the mechanism of organizational abandonment in the face of unsatisfactory 
performance”,1231 Voice “the mechanism of intraorganizational correction and 
recuperation.”1232 Weiler also distinguishes between Formal (or Total) Exit 
and Selective Exit. Total Exit is the formal abandonment of the organization 
as a whole: the withdrawal from the EU, or ASEAN, altogether.1233 Selective 
Exit, in contrast, is “the practices of […] retaining membership by seeking to 
avoid [the member’s] obligations under the Treaty, be it by omission or 
commission.”1234 
                                                
1228 See generally above at 18-20 & 234-35. In particular, Tan notes the constitutional rhetoric 
(i.e. access to the domestic market) employed by Philippines airlines such as Cebu Pacific in 
opposing Tiger’s investment. Tan, “Policy in the Philippines”, supra note 45 at 306-07. 
1229 See generally above at 36-54. 
1230 Weiler, supra note 137 at 2411-12. See also Albert O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty 
– Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations and States (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1970). 
1231 Weiler, ibid. at 2411. 
1232 Ibid. 
1233 Ibid. at 2412. 
1234 Ibid. 
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 Although Weiler is clear that “[i]n the life of many international 
organizations, including the Community, Selective Exit is a much more 
common temptation than Total Exit”,1235 his subject matter – the legal 
mechanisms and the effects of closing Selective Exit in the European 
Community – prevents him from exploring in any detail the consequences of 
leaving the Exit option open. Where its presence persists, however, the 
tendency will normally be towards Exit, often at the cost of Voice. Hirschman 
marks this tendency himself: 
 
While exit requires nothing more but a clear either-or decision, voice is 
essentially an art constantly evolving in new directions. This situation 
makes for an important bias in favor of exit when both options are 
present: customer-members will ordinarily base their decisions on past 
experience with the cost and effectiveness of voice even though the 
possible discovery of lower cost and greater effectiveness is of the very 
essence of voice. The presence of the exit alternative can therefore tend 
to atrophy the development of the art of voice.1236 
 
 These observations – both of the bias favoring Exit and its effects on 
the development of Voice – have important repercussions for the interplay 
between the legal and political domains. A comparison between the EC and 
ASEAN’s air transport liberalization initiatives provides one example of how 
the presence of Exit affects the function of Voice. In the EC, the lack of an 
Exit option meant that if the Community were to act, its member states must 
                                                
1235 Ibid. 
1236 Hirschman, supra note 1230 at 43. 
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necessarily find a politically acceptable conduit for integration. The result was 
the Commission’s Memorandum No. 2, a political compromise and the 
product of a comprehensive, multi-year study of interest groups’ positions, as 
well as the three packages of implementation instruments established in 1987, 
1990, and 1992.1237 This is true not just of the formal legal instruments, but 
also of a certain degree of flexibility in applying the rules contained in them to 
individual organizations at a policy level, including the application of state aid 
rules to former flag carriers.1238 
 In contrast, the flexibility afforded by ASEAN mechanisms derives 
almost exclusively from the flexibility to Selectively Exit the agreement 
through the “ASEAN Minus X” Formula.1239 The system not only provides an 
escape from both the legal commitments and some, if not all, of the 
reputational harm associated with non-performance,1240 but also weakens the 
very processes which otherwise might force state representatives to work 
towards an agreement representative of major interests and foreseeable 
impediments, and ultimately build the single political economic community 
that ASEAN envisions itself becoming. Such an agreement, while certainly 
difficult to reach, would have the benefit of fully utilizing the Voice 
mechanism, and ultimately of being accepted at the implementation stage. 
                                                
1237 See generally above at 149-60. 
1238 See supra note 182 and accompanying text. The length of this approach, and the ability to 
fall back into similar patterns of political meddling, has been (rightly) criticized by Brian 
Havel. See Havel, Beyond Open Skies, supra note 10 at 497-502 (discussing the contests 
between the Commission and Greece and Italy over the Greek and Italian governments’ use of 
multiple state aid packages to keep Olympic Airlines (formerly Olympic Airways) and 
Alitalia afloat through their restructurings). Havel describes these as “the last reflexive gasp of 
a disappearing order of public dominion of the airlines themselves.” Ibid. at 506. 
1239 See generally above at 248-52. 
1240 See e.g. the discussion regarding the comments by Mr. Tri Sunoko and Indonesia’s 
subsequent agreement to MAFLPAS, infra note 792 and accompanying text. 
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 Beyond the immediate comparisons, a weakness in Voice may also 
negatively impact the development of diffuse reciprocity in other ways. One 
way in which this might occur is simply through the aggregate effects of using 
(or even possessing a recognized right to use) the Selective Exit option across 
a range of industries. In this view, Selective Exit not only retards the 
integration of an industry, but also emphasizes particular structures (including 
the idea of the isolated national industry) that shape the ways in which states 
view and discuss their relationships with each other. Even where states 
formally recognize common interests at the macro-level, the politics of 
comprehensive integration may fall through the cracks made by the thousands 
of contested spaces that such a fragmented approach to comprehensive 
integration necessarily entails. This is especially true of attempts to move 
discussions forward in time and among industries, as ASEAN has tried to do 
by creating “priority sectors” for integration.1241 Without the cohesion created 
by the experience of integrating a wide range of sectors before it, a project like 
the ASAM becomes a pioneer for the development of diffuse reciprocity 
rather than a beneficiary of it. 
 
3.3. Political Cooperation Beyond Reciprocity 
 
The European experience also draws out another aspect of regionalism – the 
possibility of moving beyond reciprocity by locating political authority in the 
                                                
1241 See generally supra notes 703-05 and accompanying text. 
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regional organization.1242 The EC’s expansion of internal and external 
competences offers the most developed example of this phenomenon. 
 The effect has been an incomplete transformation in the way 
reciprocity is discussed,1243 within the Community as well as with it. 
Regulations within the EU and those willing to adopt the acquis 
communautaire are now European; relationships with third parties are 
controlled by a mix of state- and European-level authority, and all subject to 
EU rules on European ownership and control; negotiations with international 
organizations such as ICAO or IATA are either carried out directly by the EU 
or through common policies carried out by its member states.1244 For those 
who have accepted the EU as a replacement for traditional state authority, the 
result has been reciprocity balanced against a region. 
 Even with the EU, this transformation of reciprocity from state to 
region remains incomplete. External relations remain the best illustration of 
this fractional re-organization. This is true both of EU policy and third party 
approaches to the EU’s horizontal mandate. Within the EU’s legal and 
political systems, it will be remembered that both states and the EU maintain 
mixed competence to renegotiate the terms of the nationality-based substantial 
                                                
1242 For more abstract theoretical discussions of this concept, see generally e.g. John H. 
Jackson, “Sovereignty-Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated Concept” (2003) 97 A.J.I.L. 
782; Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2004) (discussing the networked world order). See also Hettne & Soderbaum, supra note 131. 
I have also made an argument for a regional (as opposed to national) interest in air 
transportation. See generally Bonin, “Regionalism”, supra note 453. 
1243 These shifts in thinking began to occur at a relatively early period. Again, Ghandour’s 
comment during the 1992 ICAO Colloquium, where he specifically refers to the “Europeans” 
as a political entity in liberalization, seems an appropriate reference point. See supra note 580 
and accompanying text. Professor Haanappel similarly references the “transformations” of 
sovereignty occurring in Europe. See generally Peter P.C. Haanappel, “The Transformation of 
Sovereignty in the Air” (1995) 20 Air L. 355. 
1244 See generally above at 168-73 (discussing mixed competence). On the EU and ICAO, see 
e.g. Bonin, “Regionalism”, supra note 453 at 129-30. 
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ownership and effective control provisions contained in bilateral 
agreements.1245 Relationships between member and non-member states, 
especially the potential for regulatory arbitrage by Community carriers and the 
anti-free rider clauses designed to fill the regulatory gap,1246 also emphasize 
the incompleteness of the transfer of authority. Still, the EU is increasingly 
seen as a competent substitute for its member states in external relations. 
Within the Union itself, the single internal market, the degree of cross-border 
investment within the Community’s airlines, a distinctly European safety 
agency, and plans for a European air traffic management system, the argument 
for an exchange based on any form of reciprocity among member states has 
become irrelevant. 
 Thus far, the EU is unique among both liberalization and integration 
projects in its partial surrender of both sovereignty and claims to (internal) 
reciprocity. While other programs such as the SAMANZ have achieved 
significant results within their sphere of competence, they have not moved 
beyond a state of exchange between two or more independent national bodies. 
In the case of Australia and New Zealand, it is possible to describe SAMANZ 
as one of diffuse reciprocity, although both states maintain a national, strategic 
vision of exchange.1247 With ASEAN member states still presented with the 
challenge of transitioning from strict to diffuse reciprocity in a political 
context sans its constitutional moment,1248 looking beyond reciprocity to an 
                                                
1245 See generally above at 168-73. 
1246 See generally van Fenema, supra note 519; Tan, “Singapore’s Agreements”, supra note 
519 at 357-63. 
1247 See e.g. above at 329-30 (discussing Australia’s strategic position taken in its air 
transportation White Paper). 
1248 On ASEAN’s questionable constitutional moment, see e.g. Tay, supra note 149. 
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integrated single ASEAN market (and single ASEAN market) may appear a 
daunting proposition. Without an integrated goods and services sector, 
ASEAN’s aviation first approach also raises the question of whether its 
attempt to reverse the logic of comparative experience has by its very nature 
doomed itself to be an ill-fated one.1249 
 Ultimately, the EC’s political experience also offers some comfort for 
projects such as ASEAN’s ASAM. Despite its current pace and place of 
development, the EC achieved its Single European Aviation Market from a 
starting point of strict reciprocity.1250 While Memorandum No. 2 identifies the 
ultimate objective has been a single integrated market, the relationships 
between states were often extremely specific. By ensuring continued national 
representation, the transition mechanisms embodied in the three packages 
created the space for change from strict exchange to reciprocal right to operate 
in a unified European market.1251 This is true not only of the formal legal 
mechanisms discussed above but also of the Commission’s decision to enforce 
laws such as those regulating state aids only gradually.1252 Indeed, ICAO has 
drawn on both experiences to suggest the broader importance of preferential 
                                                
1249 Perhaps the closest work in the domain of air transport to suggest that a discrete transition 
to something beyond reciprocity is possible is Professor Pablo Mendes de Leon’s idea of an 
“Aviation Union of States”. See generally Mendes de Leon, Cabotage, supra note 235 at 186-
89. 
1250 See e.g. Commission, Memo No. 2, supra note 182 at 22-26, para. 42 (outlining the status 
of air transport regulation in the Community). 
1251 See e.g. Keith Harper, “BA-KM Merger Talks Fail” The Guardian (22 September 2000), 
online: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2000/sep/22/britishairwaysbusiness> (noting 
that “[u]nder the plan, in effect BA would have controlled KLM. But the Dutch company 
wanted to retain an element of national identity, which BA refused. KLM sources said this 
could have meant changes to livery [sic], and the company was not ready to go that far.”). 
1252 See e.g. supra note 182. 
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and participation measures in supporting the long-term goals of moving 
beyond strict reciprocity.1253  
 
4. ENHANCING TRANSPARENCY 
 
A final means of understanding the process of liberalization is as a mode of 
enhancing transparency.1254 One of the primary problems facing air 
transportation is the high degree of opacity in many air transport relations.1255 
Part of the liberalization process – indeed, “an essential element […], 
particularly in the liberalized environment”1256 has been to make the terms of 
international agreements formally transparent by publishing those agreements, 
whether or not the terms or contained in agreements or in protocols.1257 This 
facilitates third party analysis and evaluation, allowing them to measure the 
terms and outcomes of liberal arrangements and to adapt them to their own 
uses. 
 There are also other ways of enhancing transparency among 
stakeholders. One instrument that has become a stable feature of discourse is 
                                                
1253 The Air Transport Regulation Panel made a similar note of the European experience in 
2002 when it noted that “State aid could play a potentially useful role in the restructuring of 
government-owned airlines and that, in this context, experience of the European Commission 
with regulation of State aid could provide a useful case study.” ICAO, ATRP Report, supra 
note 873 at 18, para. 61. 
1254 A category broadly equated with Axelrod’s suggestion of improving recognition 
capabilities. See Axelrod, supra note 1087 at 139-41. 
1255 See generally ICAO, Transparency in International Air Transport Regulation, ICAO Doc. 
ATConf/5-Wp/16 (3 September 2002) [ICAO, Transparency]. The Working Paper notes both 
issues arising from Chicago Convention Article 83 and GATS obligations to register their 
agreements in the relevant areas, as well as a more general concern with accessing and 
evaluating information. Ibid. at 1-2, paras. 1.1-1.3. See also ICAO, Consolidated Conclusions 
AT/Conf 5, supra note 10 at Agenda Item 2.7. 
1256 ICAO, Transparency, ibid. at 2, para. 1.3. 
1257 See generally ibid. 
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the intergovernmental or transgovernmental forum,1258 a category equally met 
by ICAO’s Worldwide Air Transport Conferences, by forums such as the EU-
US Joint Committee under the EU-US Air Transport Agreement, or the 
ASEAN Transport Ministers’ meetings. Such forums give their participants 
opportunities to share their positions, discuss common problems or particular 
concerns, draw on others’ experience (which might prove or disprove related 
concerns), and generally address these issues through the type of “common 
counsel” originally sanctioned at Chicago.1259 Increasing contacts and 
communication between government officials responsible for governing the 
issue-area increases both the quantity of information conveyed and the speed 
in which it is received and processed. Beyond flagging issues and discussing 
solutions, such forums also provide important opportunities for developing 
common approaches to transnational issues and for fostering a sense of 
community among regulatory agencies.1260 Such affinities may also ultimately 
constitute the base for larger transitions beyond specific reciprocity.  
 
5. A CRITIQUE OF PLURILATERALISM 
 
The beginning of section two mentioned that plurilateralism as an institutional 
form had a relatively open relationship with both coercion and cooptation. 
                                                
1258 The intergovernmental organization is one where representatives represent the state, while 
transgovernmental organizations might represent a unit within the participants’ domestic 
government, such as inter-agency meetings between transport agencies. See generally 
Slaughter, supra note 1242. In terms of such forums’ effects on liberalization, see e.g. Havel, 
Beyond Open Skies, supra note 10 at 40-52 (discussing the roles of nongovernmental 
organizations, governmental organizations, and academics in mooting and promoting a 
liberalized/integrated system across the transatlantic). 
1259 The term is Adolph Berle’s. See Adolph Berle, Statement to the Second Plenary in US 
Dept of State, Proceedings, supra note 2 at 57-58 (discussing the process of coming to 
agreement on the exchange of traffic rights). 
1260 For a discussion of networked governance, see generally Slaughter, supra note 1242. 
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Given its role in advancing liberalization and integration through mechanisms 
such as the “ASEAN 2+X” Formula, it is also an extremely important concept 
in the processes playing out in ASEAN. This final section elaborates on this 
relationship. 
 As originally presented to the aviation community, plurilateralism was 
designed as both a means of distributing a set of goods – competitive markets 
– evenly across a range of states and of presenting protectionist markets with a 
compelling argument for a rethink of their aviation policy.1261 The impetus 
towards the second initiative stems from the effects that it has on the 
capabilities of industries within the agreement as compared to those outside it. 
Like the US’ “divide and conquer” strategy, the plurilateral introduces a 
considerable degree of flexibility among signatories, with the effect that 
airlines within the agreement gain both wider access to markets and more 
pricing flexibility, ultimately resulting in competitive advantages to those 
airlines when compared to those outside it. As proposed, these advantages 
were to act – “indirectly” (it was argued that it would have no direct 
relevance)1262 – to present protectionist states with a new payoff set to 
evaluate. As Henri Wassenbergh, credited with originating the idea within the 
air transport community, noted in 1980: 
 
[protectionist states] may eventually be forced to accept the 
[plurilateral]-regime under public pressure and as a defense against 
deviation of traffic from their markets via liberalized markets. Or they 
                                                
1261 See generally Wassenbergh, “Plurilateralism”, supra note 109. 
1262 Ibid. at 213. 
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may come to the conclusion that more freedom is the best way to protect 
(the further expansion) of their airline(s).1263 
 
At the same time, it was to evenly distribute market access commitments 
among those states that saw a competitive regime as being to their general 
advantage.1264 
 Two points come out of this. The first is the existence of a third 
potentiality that Wassenbergh discards, inadvertently or otherwise, as a 
consequence of noting that protectionist states will not be directly concerned 
with the plurilateral.1265 That potentiality relates to the possibility that by 
enhancing the gap between the capabilities of those within and those outside 
the plurilateral, the agreement will have the effect of retrenching recalcitrance. 
Put another way, interest groups resisting liberalization are likely to remain 
opposed or increase their opposition to liberalization where their 
competitiveness deficit is increased – in game theoretic terms, where the 
shadow of the future is diminished.1266 Without taking into account the effects 
of power politics, the effect of the plurilateral will thus be specific to its 
effects within and outside the agreement. The outcome is contingent. 
 The second point relates to whether the distinction between the relative 
openness of plurilateralism and the coercive nature of bilateralism exists in 
practice. This is difficult to prove either way: although states have 




1266 See e.g. Axelrod, supra note 1087 at 15-16 (noting that one precondition for cooperation 
among a group of individuals invading relationships is a sufficiently large shadow of the 
future). 
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demonstrated recalcitrance to plurilateral arrangements such as MALIAT, 
there is no evidence that MALIAT has actually increased opposition to 
liberalization among states like Australia beyond that which exists for bilateral 
liberalization with states like Singapore.1267 Yet there is still a case for 
differentiating between plurilateralism and coercive bilateral attempts at 
opening protectionist markets. This distinction comes out of the discursive 
practices of liberalization in bilateral and plurilateral contexts. For example, 
the US had originally envisioned liberalization as a tool for gaining market 
share in international markets.1268 That US open skies policy has mutated into 
something more acceptable to other states is largely to be credited to the US 
Department of Transportation, whether through its willingness to consider 
incremental liberalization or through the use of antitrust immunity to change 
the payoff sets for countries willing to pursue open skies.1269 In contrast, 
plurilateral discourse such as that by Wassenbergh plays to the equity 
principle, ensuring that like-minded states receive like operating rights, while 
playing down its potentially coercive function – it is only coercive 
“indirectly”, and even then only one of many possible outcomes.1270 At the 
                                                
1267 See generally above at 190-93. Beyond the lack of empirical/qualitative studies on relative 
attitudes among regulatory authorities, one difficulty is with the fact that countries like the 
Netherlands and Singapore would otherwise pursue similar policies on a bilateral basis, with a 
similar aggregate effect. 
1268 See e.g. Dempsey, Law and Foreign Policy, supra note 257 at 29-30 (discussing Carter 
and Kahn’s pro-competitive liberalization policies, and comparing them to Ford’s much more 
deferential policy); Havel, Beyond Open Skies, supra note 10 at 274-75 (noting the neo-
mercantilist quality of IATCA). See also generally above at 131-46. 
1269 See US DOT, 1995 Policy Statement, supra note 61 at 598-99; supra note 879-92 
(discussing the (progressively more liberal) amendments to the US-China and US-Vietnam 
agreements); above at 143 (discussing antitrust immunity’s role as an inducement to 
liberalization). 
1270 See generally Wassenbergh, “Plurilateralism”, supra note 109. Another important 
contribution Wassenbergh’s plurilateral agreement expressly made, and one in stark contrast 
with then-contemporary US policy, was in the area of safeguards for developing countries. 
Ibid. at 213-14 (noting that “[s]tates with a developing airline industry will wish to negotiate 
certain bilateral safeguards when granting freedom of competition in their markets under the 
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same time, the distinction between plurilateral and multilateral cooperation 
blurs as numbers within the framework increase, whether the numbers are in 
terms of absolute number of participants or in percent total market share.1271 
These practices may influence the legitimacy of the proposed regime even 




In developing an understanding of liberalization and integration as procedural 
and tied to the demands of a variety of organizations, this Chapter 
demonstrates the political and legal intricacies underlying the changes to the 
substantive law governing the industry. Although some of these concerns 
occur in domestic contexts (the United States serves as one example), because 
liberalization in international contexts deeply impacts the participation norm 
and because of the micromanaged default position of the international 
regulatory system, these aspects often find particular emphasis in changes to 
the international legal order. The categories of practice offered here provide 
one basis for a clear critique of the instruments used by states to move from 
heavily regulated to liberalized, perhaps even integrated, market. 
 As a whole, Part III has focused on the substance and procedure of 
moving from regulated national market to the diffusion of different regulatory 
                                                
PATA. This possibility is incorporated in the PTA on a bilateral basis”, while also noting that 
the PATA provides the opportunity for airlines from developed and developing countries to 
expand access through cooperation). 
1271 See e.g. Havel & Sanchez, “Lex Aviatica”, supra note 21 at 666 (noting the significance of 
having the US and EU behind the Draft Multilateral on Investment). See also generally 
Ruggie, “Embedded Liberalism”, supra note 4 at 413-14 (noting the existence and effects of 
“takers” and “makers” in the postwar multilateral environment). 
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ideas that dominate the discussion of the post-postwar environment. Chapter 
7, the final Chapter of this study and the sole component of Part IV, takes the 
sum of the analyses and evaluations in Parts II and III and applies them to the 
situation in East Asia as described earlier in Chapter 4. In doing so, it 
demonstrates how the instruments discussed in Part III can be applied to a 
specific situation as a means of advancing reform in a manner that upholds the 
normative claims for both efficiency and participation which continue to 

































































































CHAPTER 7: LIBERALIZATION AND INTEGRATION IN EAST ASIA: TOWARDS 










This study tasked itself with evaluating the possibility of further liberalization 
and integration in the East Asian region, comprised of the ten member states 
of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations plus China, South Korea, and 
Japan. It also proposed a phased approach to air transport liberalization and 
integration as a means of balancing interests in a heavily politicized debate 
between increasing access and protectionism. In this context, Part I set of the 
major premises of this study, introducing a normative framework composed of 
two basic normative elements – efficiency and participation –, discussing how 
liberalization affected those two elements, and laying out the rationales for 
adopting a regional approach to institutional change. Parts II and III then 
analyzed the global currents of liberalization in significantly more detail. In 
particular, Part II analyzed the historical development of the instruments of 
international air transport regulation and analyzed the rationales for and 
processes of regulatory reform, as well as how and why states resist those 
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processes, within the contentious world of international political economy. 
From there, the two Chapters comprising Part III refocused attention on the 
development of the substance(s) and process(es) of instrumental reform 
associated with liberalization, integration, and ultimately transformation. 
 As the final Part of the study, this Chapter returns to the task of 
proposing a way forward for the East Asian region, drawing on the 
observations, analyses, and evaluations made in the previous Chapters to 
suggest a way forward for the region, from the creation of open skies towards 
an arrangement that could lead to an aviation area similar to the proposed 
TOAA. Of course, there are several limitations to delineating a prescriptive 
strategy for reform: there is the open nature of such prescriptions; in Northeast 
Asia, the lack of an official position limits the ability – not to mention the 
utility – of suggesting much more than a general strategy for the region; 
finally, the project is itself contingent on a range of other factors, including 
inter-airline cooperation (particularly in the form of alliances) and a number of 
potentially significant developments beyond the region. All of these limit the 
potential scope for useful prescriptive judgment. 
 Despite these limitations, projecting a plan for further regional 
liberalization and integration serves a number of important functions. In 
ASEAN’s case, such a discussion clearly tracks its member states’ concrete 
plans to establish an ASAM, despite some setbacks in implementing open 
skies, in the legal and political impediments in the area of internal investment 
in particular member states, and a great deal of disagreement as to a final 
outcome.1272 In this regard, the proposals contained in this Chapter merely 
                                                
1272 See generally above at 222-52. 
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build upon and in some cases revise a pre-existing body of work, including 
formal legal instruments, policy documents, and CAPA Consulting’s 2008 
report to the ASEAN Secretariat.1273 And while proposals in Northeast Asia 
and broader East Asia represent a more attenuated case than that of ASEAN, 
further discussion is worth having for at least two reasons. First, the ideas have 
been mooted and discussions, despite an obvious vagueness, are underway.1274 
Second, developments in Northeast Asia can potentially impact ASEAN’s 
efforts in terms of developing both greater integration and a common policy 
for dealing with Dialogue Partners.1275 Each effort draws on the analytical and 
evaluative elements developed throughout the work to anchor any 
recommended approach firmly within larger global (and historically-
developed) normative frameworks and liberalization practices at the 
instrumental level. 
 Substantively, the Chapter is divided into three major sections. 
Sections two and three concentrate on applying the norms, methods and 
mechanisms of liberalization and integration developed in the previous 
Chapters to ASEAN, Northeast Asia and the East Asian region as a whole. 
The divisions themselves are based on the scope of reform actually discussed. 
Section two concentrates on liberalization to open skies, i.e., to full 
operational flexibility on a first to fifth freedom basis, and including sixth 
freedom services, while retaining the traditional links to the home state and the 
nationality-based substantial ownership and effective control requirements. 
                                                
1273 See generally ibid. See also generally Thomas et al., supra note 116; Forsyth et al., 
Preparing ASEAN, supra note 698. 
1274 See generally above at 252-62. 
1275 See e.g. Thomas et al., supra note 116 at 160-63 & 192-93. 
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Section three then turns to initiatives that break with the traditional patterns of 
industrial organization. This includes the objective of creating an ASAM, but 
it also includes the possibility of enhanced cooperation and, possibly, 
integration within the region as a whole. While ultimately the 
recommendations included in this section do not go so far as to establish an 
East Asian Open Aviation Area, they do establish the basis for doing so. 
Section four then discusses the possible effects that East Asian regionalism 
might have within the context of global air transport markets. A final section 
concludes the study. 
 
2. TOWARDS OPEN SKIES: STRETCHING THE NATION-BOUND REGULATORY 
SYSTEM 
 
As a fully stretched version of the nationally organized air transport system 
and as a recognized set of objectives for most of the region, achieving open 
skies in East Asia stands out both as a significant achievement in itself and as 
the first significant “pre-step”1276 to deeper forms of cooperation. 
 As noted in Chapter 4, the path to region-wide open skies is at 
different stages in different parts of the region. ASEAN is by far the most 
advanced of the regional units, with a clear path laid out in the RIATS 
Agreements and in MAFLPAS.1277 Implementation, however, has proven 
problematic, a problem which has been compounded by the “ASEAN Minus 
X” approach to regulatory reform, giving states room to pick and choose 
among programs and to Selectively Exit those that are successfully resisted by 
                                                
1276 Lee, “Toward Integrated NE Asian Market”, supra note 801 at sl. 16. 
1277 See generally above at 224-37. 
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interests in the domestic sphere.1278 In Northeast Asia, Japan and South Korea 
have agreed to open their international markets from the middle of 2013, 
subject to capacity constraints at Haneda; however, China, which retains a 
number of restrictions on most parts of its territories, along with capacity 
concerns at major airports, remains more reticent to move towards open 
skies.1279 ASEAN also continues to lead the wider region in discussing open 
skies, with arrangements on an ASEAN+3 basis seemingly less contested than 
liberalization within South- and Northeast Asia. 
 This study proposes two critical dates in developing a path to open 
skies for the region. The first date is December 2015, the end of ASEAN’s 
original date for concluding ASEAN open skies and just shy of the start of a 
five year “review” process proposed by the 2011 Implementation Framework 
before ASEAN’s next five year transport action plan.1280 Notably, the date is a 
step back from the 30 June 2013 deadline given by MAFLPAS Protocol 2;1281 
however, given the imperfect implementation of even the RIATS Agreements, 
MAFLPAS’ relatively wide-ranging set of relaxations in comparison with 
RIATS, and the suggestion that open skies with Indonesia may only be to 
select points, the December 2015 deadline seems a more likely candidate. The 
second critical date is December 2020, a date used for suggestions in the 
contexts of both Northeast Asia and East Asia more broadly. It also represents 
a critical date in the Implementation Framework and in the CAPA Consulting 
                                                
1278 See generally above at 248-52 (discussing ASEAN Minus X) & 390-93 (discussing 
ASEAN Minus X in terms of its effects on the Exit/Voice heuristic). 
1279 Ionides, supra note 799. 
1280 See e.g. ATM, ASAM Implementation Framework, supra note 747. 
1281 MAFLPAS Protocol 2, supra note 725, art. 2. 
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report,1282 as well as in this study’s own recommendations for developing an 
ASEAN Single Aviation Market.  
 
2.1. ASEAN: Implementing RIATS and MAFLPAS 
 
In ASEAN, the RIATS Agreements and MAFLPAS have already established 
a clear timetable for a phased transition to open skies.1283 However, although 
the instruments provide the basis for a set of binding commitments, 
ratification of the agreements and, consequently, the implementation of the 
legal commitments made in them have stalled. This includes the areas of 
transport between capital cities (Indonesia and the Philippines) as well as the 
larger sets of relaxations contemplated by MAFLPAS (Brunei, Indonesia, 
Laos, and Cambodia).1284 While the result is consistent with the ratification 
requirement and more broadly with the application of the “ASEAN Minus X” 
Formula to the liberalization of the industry, the transition is already 
considerably delayed, and there are some suggestions that MAFLPAS might 
not be fully implemented even by 2015.1285 
 This study suggests two means of strengthening the liberalization 
process to open skies. First, given Indonesia’s level of recalcitrance and 
importance to ASEAN, member states will need to evaluate the state’s level of 
                                                
1282 Thomas et al., supra note 116 at 18-19, 64-68, 73-75 & 119 (giving 2019-20 as the critical 
milestone for mandatory ASEAN ownership and control as well as for market access 
relaxations including seventh freedom and cabotage, subject to a rule requiring 8th freedom 
traffic match the third/fourth freedom operators’ lowest published fare). 
1283 See generally above at 224-37. 
1284 ASEAN, “Table of Treaty Ratifications”, supra note 722 at 8-11 & 22-26. 
1285 See e.g. Tan, “Prospects for ASAM”, supra note 44 at 281 (noting that “fifth freedom 
restrictions within ASEAN itself are still in effect, and are unlikely to be wholly lifted until at 
least 2015 when the proposed SAM comes into effect”); Kaur, supra note 742. 
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participation and whether they will need to take additional action to bring it 
into open skies. Second, ASEAN should target a comprehensive evaluation of 
its progress towards the end of the given deadlines. 
 
2.1.1. Evaluating Indonesia’s Participation to Open Skies 
 
Undoubtedly the most conspicuous case of an ASEAN member state 
demonstrating reservations with the liberalization process is Indonesia. With 
its continuing ban on international LCCs, the possibility of only a limited set 
of market access grants by 2015, and some concerns expressed about the 
adequacy of a number of airports to meet the demands of international 
service,1286 it remains to be seen whether Indonesia can ultimately meet the 
significant challenges presented to it by the agreed deadlines. Given its 
geography and its carriers’ relative level of competitiveness, Indonesian 
airlines are certainly also threatened by the network effects of liberalization. 
 This might not be all that surprising if it were not for the fact that all of 
the member states have collectively participated and agreed to the undersigned 
relaxations contained in the RIATS Agreements and MAFLPAS. While it is 
impossible to put down a final verdict as yet, as of now the “ASEAN Minus 
X” Formula has played the fairly devious role of both legitimizing ASEAN’s 
Agreements to date and offering an outlet for Selective Exit, for Indonesia as 
well as others.1287 At the same time, ASEAN member states have clearly 
                                                
1286 See generally above at 235-37. 
1287 See generally above at 231-37 & 392-97. The Philippines has only come on board many 
of the agreements in 2012, following EO 29 (2011). 
 414 
failed thus far to move beyond notions of specific reciprocity and the sanctity 
of national sovereignty.  
 When viewed from a regional lens, these conditions pose a significant 
problem for the ASEAN project. A two- (or more) speed approach such as the 
one emerging out of ASEAN significantly weakens the particularly strategic 
consequences for regional integration vis-à-vis other regions.1288 While those 
outside the framework lose the benefits of increased service at generally lower 
cost typically associated with liberalization, those inside the agreement 
achieve at best only part of the benefits of expanded opportunities for network 
growth. This is especially true of an arrangement leaving behind the largest 
and potentially most lucrative of its markets.  
 The issue is more complex when viewed from the perspective of 
particular national industries. Given Indonesia’s relatively weak position in 
intercontinental markets, flag carrier Garuda’s elaborate fleet expansion 
program by 2015 and its planned integration into SkyTeam in 2014, and the 
continued resistance to having new international LCCs penetrate its 
international markets, it seems likely that Indonesia will continue to resist 
penetration into its market. This is especially true given its relative geography 
to the region’s major transport hubs at Bangkok and Singapore.1289 Given 
ASEAN’s focus on national autonomy, it should be of little surprise if 
resistance still persists. 
 Given this scenario, ASEAN member states may choose to pursue one 
of two possible alternatives to what might be called the Indonesia question. 
                                                
1288 This is, again, a central feature of Professor Alan Tan’s criticism. See generally Tan, 
“Horizontal Mandate”, supra note 168; Tan, “Prospects for ASAM”, supra note 44. 
1289 In this regard, see above at 268. 
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First, member states may wait for the Indonesian market to re-organize 
internally and ratify the agreements. This is perhaps the most plausible option, 
and is further reinforced by both the ASEAN-China Air Transport Agreement 
and Indonesian Lion Air’s more recent expansion into other ASEAN 
markets.1290 In this sense AirAsia – the “truly ASEAN” airline, which has 
itself relocated its headquarters to Jakarta – has become less of a political 
maverick than it was even several years before. Moreover, the effects of a 
two-speed approach may ultimately bring Indonesia in line over concerns that 
staying out of ASEAN open skies may do more harm than participating in 
it.1291 
 However, Garuda’s timelines, Indonesia’s failure to ratify almost any 
of the RIATS or MAFLPAS Protocols, and the possibility that open skies may 
be restricted in terms of airport access, may equally well result in considerable 
delays in achieving open skies over the projected timeline. A second option to 
address these concerns would be for member states to renegotiate issues of 
acute and chronic recalcitrance as a potential solution to the bottlenecks in the 
ratification and implementation processes.1292 Such renegotiations would 
undertake to co-opt recalcitrant elements as a means of bringing the 
liberalization process forward. While the less likely option of the two, it is 
nevertheless worth exploring. 
 In Indonesia’s case, either Indonesia itself could unilaterally issue or 
ASEAN member states could renegotiate specific terms or the agreement as a 
                                                
1290 See generally supra notes 827 (discussing the “silver lining” of ASEAN-China) & 45 and 
accompanying text (discussing Malindo). 
1291 See generally above at 389-402. 
1292 This may also work for issues such as transport to Manila’s main international airport, 
where member states might agree to a transitional arrangement using, e.g., capacity shares as a 
means of limiting the impact of competition on Philippines airlines. 
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whole as it applies to Indonesia. In terms of specific areas of recalcitrance, 
Chapter 6 has already suggested adopting mechanisms such as price floors or 
capacity shares as mechanisms for gradually lifting its proscriptive ban on 
international LCCs.1293 Other means of breaking down the liberalization 
process might include rescheduling the timing of relaxations based on a 
different economic geography; for example, through the following schedule of 
commitments: 
 
December 2012: Remove restrictions on a third and fourth freedom 
traffic to/from Jakarta, Medan, and Makassar; remove 
restrictions on third and fourth freedom traffic to/from 
areas within the BIMP-EAGA; 
December 2013: Remove restrictions on fifth freedom traffic to/from 
Jakarta, Medan, Makassar and points within the BIMP-
EAGA; remove restrictions on third and fourth 
freedom traffic to/from Denpasar and other airports 
covered by IMT-GT; 
December 2014: Remove restrictions on fifth freedom traffic to/from 
Denpasar and airports in the IMT-GT; remove 
restrictions on a third and fourth freedom basis to/from 
remaining points; 
December 2015: Remove remaining restrictions on all intra-ASEAN 
routes on a third, fourth, and fifth freedom basis. 
 
                                                
1293 See above at 360-61 & 363 (discussing price floors and incremental relaxations on 
capacity shares as means of liberalizing new LCC entry). 
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These arrangements improve the time for local carriers to adjust to 
competition, break up the effects that a one-off relaxation of third and fourth 
freedom restrictions has on Indonesian airline networks, and would ultimately 
end in open skies by the 2015 deadline. The divisions also prioritize 
connecting the “I” in IMT-GT and BIMP-EAGA to ASEAN’s core economic 
areas. To ensure Indonesia gets to open skies, the timetable would need to be 
embodied in one set of legal commitments. 
 
2.1.2. Establish a Comprehensive Commission to Review and 
Evaluate Progress 
 
A second means of increasing the likelihood of receptivity to inter-agency 
agreements is by establishing more inclusive processes of debate at a regional 
level by organizing one or more workshops or forums that would draw other 
significant stakeholders into a frank and open discussion of the issues. Such 
forums would necessarily include airlines, but might also include labor and 
consumer groups to add a fuller dimension to the debate in the public sphere 
and give policymakers direct perspective into concerns rather than relying on 
national agencies as proxies. 
 Undoubtedly the best example of this all-encompassing approach is the 
significant polling done by the European Commission prior to developing its 
Memorandum No. 2.1294 There are also the two EU-US Aviation Forums on 
Liberalisation and Labour, framed as a problem-solving tool to address labor’s 
concerns regarding deeper market access relaxations and ownership and 
                                                
1294 See generally Commission, Memo No. 2, supra note 182 at 3-8. 
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control reform.1295 Indeed, the North Atlantic has been intimately shaped by 
ideas, papers, and workshops organized by groups of airlines, 
intergovernmental organizations, and academics, “webs of influence” that run 
through each other so that each could take direct account of the concerns and 
considerations of the others.1296 As if to emphasize this very point, the terms 
of the EC’s proposal for its Transoceanic Open Aviation Area originated in 
the Association of European Airlines,1297 a body arguably divested of the 
regulatory-operational link of the postwar period. 
 The North Atlantic is not the only site of polycentric innovation. On a 
global scale, the ICAO Worldwide Traffic Conferences have also included 
representatives from regional groups, private interest groups such as the 
International Federation of Airline Pilots Association, and public interest 
groups, including the World Tourism and International Labor 
Organizations.1298 IATA has itself adopted ideas out of discussions with other 
public and private bodies by adopting the Agenda for Freedom as a 
mechanism for liberalization.1299 All of these mechanisms, moreover, 
contribute to raising Voice as a mechanism for organizational development. 
 What all of these have in common is that they promote direct, 
immediate contact between various interest groups. In contrast, the ASEAN 
project remains largely mediated by national governments, which represent 
                                                
1295 See generally Commission, First Labour Forum, supra note 554; Commission, Second 
Labour Forum, supra note 554. 
1296 See generally Havel, Beyond Open Skies, supra note 10 at 40-52. Other organizations 
might include the press, which could force the issue into the popular spotlight. See generally 
Levine “Reregulated?”, supra note 38. 
1297 See e.g. Havel, Beyond Open Skies, supra note 10 at 41; Lelieur, supra note 52 at 122. 
1298 See generally IFALPA, Issues of Labour and Social Policy to be Considered in 
Connection with Liberalization of International Air Transportation, ICAO Doc. ATConf/5-
WP/34 (25 February 2003). On the views of the WTO and ILO, see supra notes 38 & 116. 
1299 See generally above at 204-07. 
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national interests in a regional transgovernmental forum. Projects like CAPA 
Consulting’s report similarly mediate between various groups of stakeholders 
in the regional liberalization project.1300 To increase responsiveness to various 
demands and ultimately improve the implementation process, ASEAN could 
remove these mediating devices and engage in more immediate discussion 
with various stakeholders similar to the aforementioned forums. Given the 
more or less fixed structure of arrangements to open skies this would prove a 
little too late for such purposes. However, ASEAN might consider bringing 
together different ASEAN interests in an integrative conference to evaluate 
the successes and failures of the RIATS Agreements and MAFLPAS through 
2014 or 2015. Such a conference might be planned for mid-2014 or early 
2015, in order to leave room to digest and act upon this information in terms 
of open skies and to build the discussion into the next phases of ASAM. 
 
2.2. Northeast Asia: Asymmetry as a Negotiating Tool 
 
A second, more tenuous proposal is that of an open skies regime in Northeast 
Asia. As Chapter 4 notes, South Korea and Japan have worked out 
arrangements for an open skies agreement (with the exception of Haneda) for 
mid-2013; however, the China-South Korea and China-Japan relationships 
remain highly regulated, largely because of China’s concerns that 
liberalization will negatively impact its industry’s competitive position.1301 As 
with Indonesia, such concerns are not only a result of differences in relative 
                                                
1300 See generally Thomas et al., supra note 116 at 34-39 (discussing the methodology used in 
preparing the report). 
1301 This can be seen, e.g., in its conservative attitude towards liberalization in the Northeast 
while being a first mover vis-à-vis Southeast Asia. See generally below at 252-62. 
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competitiveness; they are also a matter of political, economic, and transport 
geography. In particular, in resisting liberalization China is guarding against 
the potential loss of gateway status as a structural phenomenon as much as it is 
guarding any individual carrier from the shocks of a more competitive 
operating environment. 
 Without an articulated plan for liberalization, the region remains 
relatively open in terms of the possible structures for a transition to open skies. 
Almost certainly the region will require the continued use of incremental, 
asymmetric liberalization, combining incremental arrangements within and 
between agreements, geographic distinctions, and advanced market access or 
increased flexibility for Chinese carriers, as means of moving any potential 
arrangement forward. This could be done either bilaterally or trilaterally, 
although trilateral negotiations combining Korea and Japan’s mutual interest 
in an open skies with China might prove more effective in addressing China’s 
demands for reciprocity.1302 Whether bilateral or trilateral, such arrangements 
might look similar to the US-China Air Transport Agreement, which usefully 
serves as a template for exchange. Such an approach helps compensate for 
asymmetries in market size, a point emphasized by the fact that any bargain 
would surely be understood within the domain of specific reciprocity. 
 More specifically, a trilateral agreement could begin by opening 
market access to China’s Western provinces on a third, fourth and (possibly) 
                                                
1302 See e.g. La Croix, supra note 795 at 8-9 (proposing an integrated Japan-South Korea 
aviation market, phased-in over a ten year period, structured to allow China (as well as other 
North Asian states) to participate). Cf. Lee, “Toward Integrated NE Asian Market”, supra note 
801 at s. 22 (discussing liberalization through bilateral negotiations). Importantly, while 
suggesting continued bilateral negotiations, Lee notes the important role of trilateral 
discussions as a coordinating mechanism. Ibid. at s. 24 (noting the 5th International 
Symposium on Air Transport Liberalization and Cooperation in NE Asia as an important 
mechanism for achieving liberalization in the region). 
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fifth freedom basis, this time as an initial step towards fuller market access.1303 
This could be done for all-cargo initially, but followed shortly after by 
combination and passenger services. The triad could also remove restrictions 
on access between major international hubs (i.e. Beijing, Guangzhou, Seoul, 
Shanghai, and Tokyo Narita and Haneda) on a third and fourth freedom basis 
at an early stage. Such a decision promotes connectivity to the Chinese 
economic periphery and complements China’s wider strategy of developing 
the Western provinces,1304 while limiting competition between entire 
networks. Similarly, traffic between hubs should be strong enough to support 
multiple carriers, while network carriers remain relatively protected. If this 
were an issue, the use of capacity shares as a preferential or participation 
measure could provide some protection, while being phased out during the 
term of the agreement. To make the agreement functionally symmetric, 
Chinese carriers could receive increased access to Korean and Japanese 
airports, including some additional access – but not full – to Seoul and Tokyo, 
as well as a limited set of fifth freedom rights within and possibly beyond the 
region. A second agreement would then remove the remaining restrictions on 
Central and Coastal cities, as well as on traffic rights carried on a third, fourth, 
and fifth freedom basis within and outside the triad. Like the first agreement, 
this would be done incrementally, and with certain formal asymmetries 
designed to functionally balance out the initial exchange. 
                                                
1303 The linking of Western provinces to initial phases of liberalization in China is a general 
prescription made throughout the Chapter. It is designed to allow the transport industry to 
freely respond to changes in industrial location as a means of promoting industrial 
development in the West. 
1304 See e.g. Williams, China’s Policy, supra note 672 at 45-59. See also above at 369-71. 
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 One way of visualizing this is by developing a hypothetical model. 
Taking December 2020 as a deadline for trilateral open skies, a first-stage 
agreement might include arrangements to liberalize third and fourth freedom 
traffic among hub cities and China’s Western periphery on a third, fourth, and 
fifth freedom basis by December 2015.1305 The exchanges could then be 
further broken down into two or more sets of exchanges. For example, the 
three states could initially relax market access on services to and from the 
Chinese Western region (and possibly select points in the Central region) on a 
third, fourth, and fifth freedom basis. In exchange, South Korea and Japan 
would increase overall capacity for Chinese carriers to points in the two 
countries on a third and fourth freedom basis – say, by 20 percent –, expand 
points of service, and improve Chinese carriers’ access to select points 
between South Korea and Japan on a fifth freedom basis.1306 This set of 
exchanges could be completed by December 2013. A second set of relaxations 
within the same agreement could then be planned for December 2015. Such an 
exchange would include the major international hubs, but would carve out 
secondary points in the Coastal and Central zones that might put pressure on 
Chinese airline networks, again in exchange for increased capacity for Chinese 
carriers and a limited degree of fifth freedom access to beyond points. At this 
stage, the parties may also wish to limit the effects of sixth freedom services 
as a way of reducing opposition in China to liberalization. 
                                                
1305 This generally accords with the approach articulated by South Korea (see Lee, “Toward 
Integrated NE Asian Market”, supra note 801 at sls. 22-23), although the proposal here uses 
fifth freedom rights for China as a recognition that the markets are of vastly unequal size, that 
there is competition for network centrality as well as between carriers, that Chinese carriers 
are still competitively weaker than Korean and Japanese carriers, and that the governments 
still think largely in terms of specific reciprocity.  
1306 Compare this with the asymmetry of exchange between Australia and New Zealand, above 
at 374-75. 
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 At the end of the first agreement’s term – here December 2015 – the 
parties could then refine and adjust the content of the first-stage agreement 
and negotiate the terms of a second-stage agreement, the object of which 
would be to get to open skies. The second leg of the process could similarly 
work across a number of dates and individually timed relaxations. A first set 
of relaxations, introduced by December 2017, could target the remaining 
barriers to third and fourth freedom services, as well as fifth freedom services 
from the major international hub airports, where incumbents would again be 
most protected, to any point within or outside the three countries. To mitigate 
issues with introducing competition on fifth freedom services, the 
governments might agree to initially limit capacity on the fifth freedom 
segment (for example, similar to the 50 percent rule used by the EC) and/or to 
peg price floors to local services.1307 A second phase would remove any limits 
placed on fifth freedom services from capital cities, and would further open 
fifth freedom services on all points within the territories of the three states. 
The parties could also begin to relax restrictions on competition on a sixth 
freedom basis – between the three states and beyond – at this point, if not in 
2017. The final phase of the agreement would then remove any remaining 
restrictions on fifth and sixth freedom service. 
 Of course, this model represents but one of a myriad number of 
possibilities for institutionalizing open skies in the region. The points could be 
refined or adjusted to more accurately fit the parties’ concerns. Given the 
detail in the US-China Agreement, it is easy to imagine a more meticulously 
nuanced bargain, with exchanges planned annually based on frequency, 
                                                
1307 See generally above at 355-67. CAPA has also suggested price floors for intra-ASEAN 
liberalization beyond the fifth freedom. See Thomas et al., supra note 116 at 75. 
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aircraft type, and a list of behind, between, and beyond points, each mentioned 
with dates and degrees of access.1308 The triad may also take a bilateral rather 
than trilateral approach to liberalization.1309  They could just as well 
distinguish between all-cargo and combination services throughout by creating 
separate systems, as in RIATS, or by awarding distinct rights for each type of 
service, with or without the varying degrees of flexibility seen in the US-
China Agreement.1310  However, the central tenets of the proposal – that the 
agreement work towards removing restrictions on third and fourth freedom 
traffic as a means of extending route networks, that liberalization not 
immediately challenge a carrier’s entire network of services, that China be 
given additional benefits as a means of acknowledging asymmetries in market 
size, that the parties prioritize connectivity to China’s Western periphery – 
clearly fit within the broad normative framework of enhancing efficiency 
while responding to political concerns over participation. It also draws on a 
number of “best” practices from other regions, adapting them to the 
particularities of local conditions. 
 
2.3. The Wider East Asian Region 
 
December 2020 may also serve as a milestone for open skies in East Asia 
more generally. Indeed, with ASEAN and its Northeast Asian counterparts 
                                                
1308 See e.g. US-China 1992 Protocol, supra note 879, Attachment I, note 3 (change of gauge 
subject to Annex V) & Attachment II (adjusting frequencies); US-China 2004 Protocol, supra 
note 879, arts. 2-3 (frequencies) & art. 7 (change of gauge); US-China 2007 Protocol, supra 
note 879, arts. 2-3. 
1309 See e.g. Lee, “Toward Integrated NE Asian Market”, supra note 801 at s. 22. 
1310 See above at 227-32 (discussing MAFLAFS, MAAS, and MAFLPAS) & 76-80 
(discussing the difference in flexibility permitted to Chinese and US carriers). 
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each engaged in discussions, achieving open skies between South- and 
Northeast Asian states might prove significantly easier than within either. 
 There are, of course, complications. One such complication is the 
relationship between intra-regional (i.e. Southeast Asian or Northeast Asian) 
liberalization and integration initiatives and wider East Asian liberalization. 
For reasons related to the depth of formal commitments to integration, this 
problem is more acutely felt in ASEAN than in Northeast Asia.1311 In 
particular, the Memorandum of Understanding on ASEAN Engagement with 
Dialogue Partners effectively requires a member state ratifying an agreement 
with a Dialogue Partner to automatically accord equivalent rights to the other 
ASEAN member states.1312 Like the ASEAN agreements, this may prove a 
double-edged sword, potentially luring recalcitrant states into the intra-
ASEAN accords with the benefits of a vastly expanded market1313 but also 
potentially increasing the division between those within and those outside the 
ASEAN-wide initiative. 
 The existence of the Memorandum also affects a potential decision to 
renegotiate the ASEAN-wide agreements. For example, if ASEAN were to 
restructure Indonesia’s market access relaxations, the member states would 
also have to reconsider Indonesia’s relationship to the ASEAN-China (and, 
potentially, -Korea and/or -Japan) Agreement. One possibility would be to 
simply leave the requirements in the Memorandum as they stand in the hope 
that the benefits of liberalization, or potential losses of not liberalizing, would 
                                                
1311 While the trilateral arrangements in Northeast Asia have yet to move beyond discussions, 
the start of concrete negotiations would undoubtedly change this. See e.g. Thomas et al., 
supra note 116 at 192-93. 
1312 MoU on Dialogue Partners, supra note 775, para. 4. 
1313 Tan, “Prospects for ASAM”, supra note 53 at 281. 
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draw Indonesia into the agreement in advance of its new commitments. A 
second approach would be to waive the conditional MFN clause for select 
Protocols if Indonesia ratifies an acceptable, comprehensive schedule for open 
skies by a particular date. Such an approach would place pressure on 
Indonesia to accept open skies, but through a much different structure of 
incentives. By adjusting the procedural mechanisms, such arrangements might 
also end in deeper forms of cooperation, just as the suggested workout 
arrangement uses third and fourth freedom access to China to promote third to 
fifth freedom relaxations in Indonesia. 
 Beyond complicating the intra-ASEAN and intra-Northeast Asian 
arrangements, there are also questions as to how to address the remaining 
restrictions on fifth and sixth freedom access. Given the current framework for 
negotiations, ASEAN would likely use the ASEAN+X framework to negotiate 
the removal of any remaining restrictions in their bilateral with that particular 
Dialogue Partner – for example, any limitations placed on fifth freedom traffic 
in a Protocol 2 to the ASEAN-China Agreement1314 –, potentially in a new 
agreement but more likely through a third protocol to the agreement. At the 
same time the protocol might address sixth freedom traffic, and could also go 
so far as to commit to an alternative ownership and control clause. 
 
3. BEYOND OPEN SKIES: TOWARDS AN EAST ASIAN OPEN AVIATION AREA? 
 
Open skies in East Asia would itself be an impressive accomplishment. 
However, it is by the very terms of its discussion but part of a larger process of 
                                                
1314 See above at 259-60. 
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deeper liberalization and, possibly, integration. Any final consideration of the 
region must therefore not only address the issue of moving to open skies, but 
also the possibilities of moving beyond it. In doing so, the study comes back 
to regionalism’s roles in both rationalizing markets for efficiency and 
coordinating political Voice as a means of reinforcing the participation 
norm.1315  
 In comparison with the evaluation of open skies, this is a much more 
difficult task. As Chapter 5 notes, open skies has become a fairly well-
established phenomenon, with many Asian states – including ASEAN, South 
Korea and now Japan and, at least with the US, China – accepting its premises 
in theory if not always in practice.1316 Yet they are conceptually accepted to a 
large extent precisely because they are relatively uncontroversial: that is, they 
challenge neither the assumption that a route connect to the home state nor the 
assumption that the airline be nationally owned and controlled, both essential 
assumptions of the paradigm of the nation-bound airline. In contrast, proposals 
such as the TOAA or single aviation market challenge these premises, as well 
as the ways in which one thinks about reciprocity. 
 East Asia is only beginning to consider the concrete details that go into 
industrial organization beyond the nation-bound airline. While ASEAN has 
committed itself to grapple with these ideas, it has provided little more than a 
set of firmly articulated aspirations and a to-do list made up of bullet points 
and broad generalizations: what information it does provide with respect to the 
critical elements of market access and ownership and control remain entirely 
                                                
1315 See generally above at 37-49. 
1316 See generally above at 280-91. 
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contingent on future negotiations.1317 In this regard, the CAPA Consulting 
report remains the most comprehensive statement on both ASEAN integration 
and its relationship to broader trends in the region. Northeast Asia still 
struggles with open skies, although the Koreans continue to promote the idea 
of a Northeast Asian aviation bloc.  
 Because of ASEAN’s commitment to integrate air transport markets as 
part of a comprehensive single market and production base, this section begins 
with a discussion of the ASAM. In particular, the recommendations contained 
herein build upon CAPA Consulting’s thorough analysis produced for the 
ASEAN Secretariat. At the same time, any prescription must take into account 
the “risk that the proposed ASEAN SAM will end up being a single market 
arrangement purely in name, with only modest relaxation being adopted for 
the regional air transport sector”,1318 and many of the (relatively minor) 
deviations from the report reflect this concern. The following two sections 
then turn to the difficult tasks of discussing Northeast Asia and East Asia as a 
whole, a double difficultly given the asymmetries involved and the lack of any 
formal commitment by Japan or China.1319 As a result, the recommendations 
below are limited to developing a general strategy for deeper integration in the 
region. 
 
3.1. ASEAN: An ASEAN Single Aviation Market? 
 
                                                
1317 See generally ATM, ASAM Implementation Framework, supra note 747. 
1318 Tan, “Prospects for ASAM”, supra note 44 at 283. 
1319 See above at 252-62. See also e.g. Tan, “Prospects for ASAM”, supra note 44 at 284, fn 
89 (noting that “[d]iscussions in Northeast Asia have so far been initiated by academics and 
think-tanks”). 
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Of the regions under study, only ASEAN has firmly committed itself to 
developing a single aviation market. Unfortunately, ASEAN and its member 
states have provided little official guidance to evaluate: reported opinions vary 
greatly in terms of the ultimate content of a “single” market and the 
Implementation Framework provides little in terms of concrete objectives.1320 
Indeed, the Implementation Framework gives little more than suggestions that 
member states will discuss the feasibility of liberalization beyond the fifth 
freedom, and will similarly consider alternatives to the national ownership and 
control rules currently governing their relations.1321 While this is certainly 
understandable, given the delays in implementing market access relaxations 
on even a third and fourth freedom basis, it nevertheless leaves little for 
analysis and paints a fairly dark picture of further relaxations, despite the rosy 
language used in official ASEAN documents. 
 At the same time, the lack of formal information opens the possibility 
of a vigorous discussion as to how to best manage the process going forward. 
With the development of open skies thus far, the Implementation Framework 
takes the pragmatic and understandable step of moving the timeline back, 
giving member states from 2016 to 2020 to discuss ownership and control 
issues and to evaluate open skies and decide whether to proceed beyond it.1322 
The prescriptions below similarly build out from this period. 
 At the same time, any discussion of a future ASAM would need to take 
into account, at a minimum, the three key issues of market access, ownership 
                                                
1320 See generally above at 237-46. 
1321 ATM, ASAM Implementation Framework, supra note 747. 
1322 See ibid. 
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and control, and external relations.1323 Because these three issues permit 
operators to rationalize their services along the identified regional scale, each 
element is critical to the success of the ASAM project. The following three 
sub-sections discuss each element in turn. 
 
3.1.1. Reforming the Ownership and Control Requirements 
 
In moving beyond substantial ownership and effective control based on the 
nationality of the designating state, ASEAN member states will ultimately 
need to decide whether to pursue an ASEAN community carrier clause, an 
alternative such as ICAO’s principal place of business and effective regulatory 
control, or a hybrid of more or less restrictive versions of the two provisions. 
This decision appears open: both the RIATS Agreements and MAFLPAS 
include both structures, although mandate neither;1324 the Implementation 
Framework leaves open alternatives, although explicitly noting the possibility 
of an ASEAN community carrier clause.1325 CAPA Consulting suggests an 
ASEAN approach although the states surveyed preferred the principal place of 
business and effective control clause.1326 At the same time, political and legal 
impediments in countries like Thailand and the Philippines may prevent a 
uniform system, at least in the short term. 
                                                
1323 In this regard, see Tan, “Prospects for ASAM”, supra note 44 at 267-83 (analyzing each 
element in turn and concluding that “[i]n the final analysis, it is clear that any credible single 
aviation market arrangement must go far enough to address substantially the three key 
questions of market access, ownership and control, and external relations.” Ibid. at 283). 
1324 See above at 238-39. 
1325 See above at 240-41. 
1326 See above at 241-44. 
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 A truly single aviation market must ultimately integrate both 
ownership and control and market access rules. However, it is possible to 
distinguish and draw distinctions between the two based on the level of 
intrusion into the state’s sovereign space – e.g., in terms of the level of 
regulatory control a state maintains on services carried out within its own 
territory.1327 Because ownership and control reform continues the designating 
state’s regulatory control over its designated airlines, these reforms could 
precede or otherwise be tied to the earlier stages of market access reform.1328 
At the same time, changes to ownership and control rules can potentially alter 
the demands for protectionism on seventh freedom and cabotage markets 
(particularly the former), as those markets become accessible indirectly.  
 Given the options, this study proposes replacing the “external lock” 
with a principal place of business and ASEAN regulatory control clause. At 
least two reasons justify such an approach. First, ASEAN should pursue as 
open an ownership policy as possible, as such a policy opens airlines up to 
much larger quantities of capital than an exclusively ASEAN ownership 
provision without opening the control mechanism to non-ASEAN elements. 
Given the large differences in levels of development and size of capital 
markets within the region, it also limits the possibility of one ASEAN member 
state dominating another through financial means by allowing other airlines to 
                                                
1327 On the regulatory distinctions between market access and ownership and control reform, 
see above at 339-42. 
1328 While not particularly compelling evidence, the Implementation Framework does use 
different language to consider market access commitments beyond the fifth freedom and 
ownership and control reform, suggesting at least some difference in member states’ 
receptiveness to changes in each respective area. See above at 240-41. CAPA Consulting’s 
polling results also demonstrates that most member states are comfortable with alternative 
conceptions of ownership and control, although few are open to market access commitments 
beyond the fifth freedom, and only Singapore (a country with no domestic market) suggested 
opening cabotage. See Thomas et al., supra note 116 at 70. 
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look beyond ASEAN for funding.1329 Second, by restricting control to 
ASEAN member states, the provisions both allow ASEAN to complete the 
outer framework for a true single aviation market and excludes free riders of 
the type that Thailand remains concerned over.1330 Of course, the free rider 
problem arises within ASEAN where there is an uneven distribution of market 
access commitments. However, ASEAN member states can control this by 
either limiting airlines owned by non-nationals to the same degree of access 
given by the state of nationality, by introducing the ASEAN community 
carrier clause only to those nationals who ratify a certain degree of market 
access commitments (for example, open skies), or by waiting for all states to 
ratify certain market access commitments (again, for example, through open 
skies). 
 In terms of timing, ASEAN’s goal should be to try to introduce these 
provisions in the period between 2016 and 2020. In terms of implementation, 
ASEAN could adopt CAPA Consulting’s suggested two-phase approach to 
reform. While ASEAN member states would introduce the new principle place 
of business/ASEAN effective control clause in 2015, an opt-out provision 
would provide a transition period for states choosing to delay the more liberal 
provisions as applied to their own carriers.1331 The opt-out would then be 
removed after the expiry of the transition period: given a five-year transition, 
this would mean 2020 as an effective end to this option.1332 At the same time, 
those choosing to opt out of the more liberal ownership and control regime 
                                                
1329 On market domination through financial means, see e.g. Canada’s comment on PICAO’s 
first draft multilateral, supra note 294 and accompanying text. 
1330 On Thailand, see Thomas et al., supra note 116 at 67 & 199. 
1331 Ibid. at 64-69 & 118-22. 
1332 Ibid. 
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would refrain from restricting those choosing the more liberal framework to 
move forward uninhibited.1333 
 With or without the deferment inbuilt into the system, individual 
member states could of course refrain from ownership and control reform 
through the ASEAN Minus X Formula. Again, states choosing to continue 
imposing a more restrictive set of operating regulations on their own airlines 
should nevertheless refrain from interfering with others who choose to adopt 
the more liberal approach. 
 Another concern is that individual member states refrain from 
removing the “inner lock” on internal investment while taking advantage of 
the possibility to own and control airlines incorporated in a member state that 
has decided to lift its restrictions on internal investment.1334 For example, 
Thailand or Indonesia might retain a “substantial ownership and/or effective 
control” clause for its own national airlines while Thai airlines take advantage 
of more open regulations in other member states (for example, Singapore or 
Malaysia), in effect allowing its airlines to expand opportunities while 
preserving its own domestic market for its nationals. One option to address 
this concern is through conditioning the acceptance of ASEAN controlled 
airlines to member states granting others the right to invest in and control 
airlines in that state. While such a condition would protect against this type of 
free riding, it would, however, weaken if not eradicate the opt-out provisions 
                                                
1333 Ibid. 
1334 This a problem similar to the one identified with respect to proposals such as the US’ 
Draft Multilateral Convention on Foreign Investment in Airlines, where the principle 
proponents such as the United States continue to apply strict ownership and control rules 
internally. See generally above at 198-99. 
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in at least some of its possible manifestations.1335 A second option would be to 
maintain a member state’s right to revoke or suspend rights for those states on 
a state-by-state, case-by-case basis after the opt-out period comes into effect. 
 
3.1.2. Reforming Market Access Commitments 
  
The second challenge of internal market integration relates to decisions of 
market access integration. These decisions remain intimately connected to a 
number of other reforms: the previous section already noted changes to 
ownership and control laws, while harmonizing or adopting regional technical 
and safety standards would also foreseeably influence member states’ attitudes 
towards market access integration.1336 At the same time, market access 
integration poses some challenges unique to this area of regulation.1337 These 
differences undoubtedly prove market access to be a much more complicated 
affair. 
 Member states appear highly reticent to exchange market access 
commitments beyond open skies: as of CAPA’s 2008 survey, few ASEAN 
member states supported the idea of seventh freedom relaxations, and none 
agreed to cabotage liberalization outright.1338 Despite the concerns among 
member states, it will be remembered from Chapter 4 that CAPA proposed 
that the ten countries relax market access to seventh, eighth, and ninth 
                                                
1335 For example, states could introduce an “opt-out” which is actually a deferral, granting the 
right to invest and operate airlines but deferring the operability of those provisions until some 
future date.  
1336 See e.g. above at 342 (noting that common or similar standards are likely to influence the 
level of objection to aircraft not registered in that state operating within that territory, and 
using Australia and New Zealand and the US and Europe as examples of common standards). 
1337 See generally above at 339-42. 
1338 See generally Thomas et al., supra note 116 at 69-70. 
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freedom basis over three milestones (the dates given correspond to a flexible 
“base case”):1339 phase one (2014-15) (which assumes open skies) would 
introduce unrestricted all-cargo seventh freedom, seventh freedom rights for 
passenger services on routes unserved by local carriers, and eighth freedom 
access on markets unserved by direct flights;1340 phase two (2019-20) then 
introduces seventh freedom services between capitals, eighth freedom services 
on all routes subject to a minimum pricing rule, and an opt-in clause 
permitting ninth freedom;1341 finally, phase three (2022-23) would then 
remove any remaining restrictions on seventh to ninth freedom services.1342 
Notably, CAPA builds several types of participation and preferential measures 
into its program, differentiating market segments such as unserved routes, 
limiting entry by route and freedom identity (e.g. seventh freedom between 
capital cities), and subjecting cabotage to price floors tied to local services 
offering effective transition mechanisms in order to break up the impact of 
liberalization on the participation norm.1343 At the same time, given the level 
of recalcitrance exhibited at the earlier stages of liberalization one wonders 
whether even the instruments designed by CAPA are sufficiently gradual.1344 
                                                
1339 Thomas et al., ibid. at 69-74 & 118-22; Tan, “Prospects for ASAM”, supra note 44 at 
268-73 (arguing for the same basic pattern but suggesting that the dates might be moved 
back). 
1340 See Thomas et al., ibid. at 121-22. The first phase would also allow unrestricted charter 
operations all on unserved routes. 
1341 See ibid. The date would also remove all restrictions on charter services. 
1342 See ibid. 
1343 See generally ibid. at 63-126. 
1344 In this regard, see generally Tan, “Prospects for ASAM”, supra note 44 at 268-73. The 
author, himself a member of the consulting team that prepared the CAPA report, moves back 
the deadlines for seventh freedom and cabotage and suggests additional limitations as 
transition mechanisms to move the ASAM forward. 
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 Despite the reticence shown by ASEAN member states, this study 
follows CAPA’s general advice on relaxing market access commitments 
through the ninth freedom. One reason for this is ideological: substantively, a 
single aviation market must be preeminently single. Divisions in market 
access based on nationality would fundamentally frustrate the very object and 
purpose of a single aviation market. A second ground for a truly single 
aviation market is the supporting role air transport plays in ASEAN’s wider 
commitment to market integration. A third reason for full market relaxation 
involves the rationalization of air transport services across the region. This last 
rationale is functional, relating to the sizable welfare gains expected from 
restructuring at the regional level. 
 However, because of the diversity in market size and competitive 
capabilities among its member states, as well as the fact that specific 
reciprocity still dominates their frame of reference, ASEAN’s process for 
breaking the national link will necessarily need to be slow and incremental 
relaxations strictly controlled. The recommendations given here extrapolate 
from CAPA’s own recommendations (and, like CAPA, assume open skies 
from December 2015),1345 while further breaking down the process and 
extending it over a further two to three years. 
 This study proposes market reform through two distinct agreements. A 
first-stage agreement, promulgated in December 2015, would liberalize 
market access commitments on a seventh freedom and, to a limited extent, an 
                                                
1345 As with CAPA, this section also assumes that all ten ASEAN member states will reach 
open skies in its widest sense, which for traffic rights means all international airports are open 
to services limited only by reasonable safeguards and constraints on infrastructure. 
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eighth freedom basis. The first stage agreement would introduce the following 
(or similar) set of market access relaxations among member states: 
 
December 2015: Relaxation of seventh freedom restrictions to all 
routes unserverd by local airlines; 
December 2017: Relaxation of seventh freedom restrictions on routes 
between capital cities, subject to price floors pegged 
to the lowest fare offered by a local airline; 
Relaxation of eighth freedom restrictions on routes 
unserved by domestic airlines; 
December 2020: Relaxation of seventh freedom restrictions on all 
routes subject to a price floor tied to local airlines; 
December 2023: Complete relaxation of market access restrictions on 
a seventh freedom basis. 
 
The periods break seventh freedom relaxations down into several stages, both 
reducing the impact of any one measure on overall performance and providing 
clear signals to airlines as to the preparations required for the next phase. At 
the same time, the early introduction of a limited eighth freedom service both 
expands domestic networks and commits member states to consider further 
cabotage relaxations. 
 With the first agreement clearly in place, a second agreement could 
then carry the single internal market through to fruition. This agreement could 
be introduced in 2020, at the end of the newly revised timetable provided by 
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the Implementation Framework.1346 In keeping with ASEAN’s five-year 
transport plans, relaxations could be carried out through three discrete 
relaxations over the following five-year period: 
 
December 2020: Relaxation of eighth freedom restrictions on 
remaining routes, subject to requirement that at least 
50 percent of total capacity be from place of origin to 
place of ultimate destination, and subject to price 
floors pegged to the lowest fare offered by a local 
airline; 
December 2023: Relaxation of eighth freedom restrictions, subject to 
price floors pegged to the lowest fare offered by a 
local airline; 
Relaxation of ninth freedom restrictions on 
remaining routes, subject to requirement that at least 
50 percent of total capacity be from place of origin to 
place of ultimate destination, and subject to price 
floors pegged to the lowest fare offered by a local 
airline; 
December 2025: Complete relaxation of market access restrictions on 
eighth freedom traffic; 
Complete relaxation of market access restrictions on 
ninth freedom traffic (subject to an optional two year 
peg to lowest local fare).1347 
                                                
1346 See ATM, ASAM Implementation Framework, supra note 747. 
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 There are also problems of implementation beyond the formal 
completion of the agreements themselves. One such problem is with the gap 
between promulgation and ratification: as with the RIATS Agreements and 
MAFLPAS, market access relaxations must first be ratified by each member 
state before they are implemented with respect to that state. There is also a 
possibility that a member state – particularly large member states with large 
populations such as Indonesia – invokes the “ASEAN Minus X” Formula for a 
set of provisions, particularly cabotage, although some states may also wish to 
restrict seventh freedom access.1348 Finally, domestic regulations such as the 
Philippines constitution may impose an internal lock similar to that related to 
ownership and control.1349 Such national-level restrictions would ultimately 
have to be removed for ASEAN to achieve a truly uniform single aviation 
market. 
 It is in this regard that ownership and control reform, placed as it is in 
these recommendations ahead of market access liberalization, may play an 
integral role in breaking down resistance to further relaxations according to 
freedom identity. Because the principal place of business/effective ASEAN 
control clause opens access to seventh freedom and cabotage markets on an 
indirect basis (i.e., through inward investment), protecting direct access to 
routes on a seventh freedom basis becomes demonstrably less important. The 
fact that a Singaporean owned and controlled airline might access the Jakarta-
                                                
1347 Cf. the suggestions made in Tan, “Prospects for ASAM”, supra note 44 at 269-73. 
1348 See generally the survey results from CAPA Consulting’s report, above at 242-43, Table 
4.1. 
1349 On the constitution, see e.g. Tan, “Policy in the Philippines”, supra note 45. 
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Manila route by incorporating an airline (whether subsidiary or independently 
owned and controlled) in Jakarta would more likely than not influence special 
interests in both Indonesia and the Philippines to reevaluate their position vis-
à-vis market expansion. At the same time, if an airline like Malindo could be 
100 percent owned and controlled by Lion Air, the latter would have a strong 
incentive to lobby to eliminate the redundancies caused by incorporating and 
maintaining two separate businesses. 
 
3.1.3. Extending ASEAN External Relations Horizontally 
 
Once ASEAN member states commit to integrate national markets, external 
relations also become a matter of importance. In this regard, CAPA 
Consulting recommends providing ASEAN with a horizontal mandate in 
2020.1350 This seems a reasonable deadline, as well as a date that corresponds 
to the introduction of the mandatory ASEAN community carrier clause and 
the final negotiation of market access liberalization recommended above. 
 Ultimately, full integration of the ASEAN air transport system will 
require ASEAN or its member states to renegotiate the ownership and control 
clauses governing flights between the region and third states. To further the 
integration process, ASEAN member states may wish to consider a systemized 
plan to negotiate with its Dialogue Partners.1351 Certainly Northeast Asia 
remains a priority, and is included naturally here in discussions of progress 
                                                
1350 Thomas et al., supra note 116 at 194-98. See also Tan, “Prospects for ASAM”, supra note 
44 at 278-83. 
1351 In this regard, CAPA Consulting identifies a set of Partners to be treated on a priority 
basis, based on ASEAN member states’ own identified priorities. See generally Thomas et al., 
supra note 116 at 187-98. The EU has adopted a similar policy in terms of its own approach to 
external engagement. See above at 172-74. 
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towards an East Asian Open Aviation Area, although even in its absence 
ASEAN-China/Korea/Japan relations would likely be prioritized.1352 Given 
relative traffic volumes, a second priority would be to Europe, and particularly 
the EU.1353 Finally, a third area for discussion would be the wider transpacific, 
including the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. In this regard, 
ASEAN might pursue one of two routes. One route would be through 
traditional state-to-state or region-to-state bilateral negotiations. However, a 
second route might involve an amendment to MALIAT recognizing ASEAN 
effective control. Such an attempt to revive the plurilateral arrangement would 
bring ASEAN member states within a wider framework, grant ASEAN 
carriers traffic rights to, inter alia, the US and New Zealand in one set of 
negotiations, and with the added size of the entire ASEAN market might also 
prove sufficient to bring Australia to the table. 
 
3.2. Northeast Asia: Further Liberalization Across the Sea of Japan 
 
Although much less certain than even open skies, South Korea has already 
expressed its desire to use open skies as a staging ground for more 
comprehensive regional reform, including further market access liberalization 
and even possibly establishing a trilateral/regional right of establishment.1354 
And more limited studies such as Yamaguchi and Yoshida’s offer at least 
                                                
1352 See e.g. Thomas et al., ibid. at 187-93. Currently, the ASEAN-China Agreement 
acknowledges the possibility of an ASEAN community carrier but which gives China the 
right not to accept a non-national designation. ASEAN-China Agreement, supra 811, art. 
3(2)(a)(ii). 
1353 See Thomas, et al., ibid. at 152 (identifying the EU as ASEAN’s third largest trading 
partner as of 2006). 
1354 Lee, “Toward Integrated NE Asian Market”, supra note 801 at sl. 23. 
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partial support from pundits in Japan.1355 At the same time, a number of 
factors, including variation in market size, growth rates,1356 relative 
competitiveness among airlines, market concentration, the inability to 
institutionalize even a free trade agreement, and the histories and transport 
geographies of the three countries suggest that moving into a single aviation 
market might at this time be premature. 
 Still, there are possible avenues for further liberalization beyond open 
skies. In this regard, one critical step forward on this path is for Japanese and 
South Korean markets to move towards an open aviation area or single 
internal market,1357 for example, in a form similar to those in the 1996 
SAMANZ Agreement between Australia and New Zealand.1358 There are 
                                                
1355 See generally Yamaguchi & Yoshida, supra note 920. 
1356 See e.g. supra note 12. Another useful comparison is in terms of projected aircraft orders. 
Between, 2012 and 2031, Boeing forecasts that China will order 4,180 aircraft. Boeing, “Long 
Term Market – World Regions: Asia Pacific: China”, online: 
<http://www.boeing.com/commercial/cmo/china.html>. In comparison, the manufacturer 
forecast only 1,270 aircraft orders from both South Korea and Japan. Boeing, “Long Term 
Market – World Regions: Asia Pacific: Northeast Asia”, online: 
<http://www.boeing.com/commercial/cmo/northeast_asia.html>. 
1357 This is not the first time an integrated Japanese-Korean market has been proposed. For 
example, although not taken up, economist Sumner La Croix made this suggestion some time 
ago and seems worth reprinting here: 
 
Consider the following plan: Both countries would essentially agree to form a single 
aviation market by 2012. Airlines would be free to totally restructure their services to 
realize economies from multiple hubs in the two countries and a more efficient hub-
and-spoke network. The Korea-Japan unified aviation market would be phased in over 
a 10-year period, much as the European Union aviation liberalization was phased in 
over a 10-year period, 1987-1997. Cabotage, i.e., service provided by a foreign carrier 
between two cities in the same country, would not be allowed until the end of the 
phase-in period, and perhaps could be subject to phased-in implementation according 
to specific routes. The agreement could be structured to allow China, Mongolia, 
Russia, and even North Korea to join unilaterally if they were able to meet one critical 
criterion: substantial private ownership stakes in their major airlines. As I argue above 
(see section I.A.), unless major airlines are primarily privately owned and managed, an 
open-entry open-exit competitive market is likely to attain a stable equilibrium. 
 
See e.g. La Croix, supra note 795 at 9. 
1358 See generally above at 307-12. 
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several reasons for taking such an approach. One such reason is the 
similarities in market dynamics. In this regard, it is interesting that aircraft 
manufacturer Boeing already distinguish between Northeast Asia, which 
comprises South Korea and Japan, and China in its market forecasts,1359 
indicating market analysts’ thoughts on how the region is shaping itself. A 
second reason relates to airline alliances, where the combined territory of 
Japan and South Korea now comprise a functional node of competition 
between the three global networks. Given Japan’s recent shift in policy in 
favor of liberal arrangements and integration into global networks, 
arrangements such as an open aviation area between the two countries would 
allow the two economies to tap the benefits of network competition between 
the three global groups. Such an arrangement would also establish a legal 
framework permitting cost restructuring and network expansion; for example, 
a SAMANZ-type arrangement would enable ANA and Asiana to establish a 
jointly owned feeder network, and would generally expand LCC networks. 
 
3.3. The Wider East Asian Region: Bringing China In 
 
A third reason to explore a Japan-South Korea open aviation area or single 
aviation market is for its potential effects on pan-regional liberalization. Given 
the specific conceptions of reciprocity dominant in the region, an ASEAN or a 
Japan-Korea market alone may not offer sufficient benefits to get China to 
consider liberalization beyond open skies, a combined ASEAN-Japan-Korea 
market might prove a more enticing bargain. Such an arrangement would also 
                                                
1359 See generally supra note 1360. 
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provide significant network advantages1360 in addition to stoking China’s 
interest in further cooperation. 
 While it is too early (and, given China’s rising position, more than a bit 
naïve) to advocate for a truly integrated single East Asian market along the 
lines of the European model, a start towards deeper reform would almost 
certainly include the right of establishment for regional operators.1361 Even 
this might be too much at present. Indeed, China has grown increasingly 
assertive of its policies with its northern and southern neighbors. Territorial 
disputes regarding several areas in the South China Sea to which several 
ASEAN member states as well as China have laid claims to have resulted in 
several flare-ups and for calls for a code of conduct in the region. China has 
also engaged in several recent rows with Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
Islands in the East China Sea have resulted in severe diplomatic tensions, 
including a ban on exporting rare earths to Japan in 2010 and more recently 
reports that China would not send its banks to an IMF meeting in Japan.1362 
While economics may allow liberalization along national lines, blurring these 
lines – especially in a strategic, protected industry, with many airlines still 
state-owned – would be an extremely difficult task. 
 
                                                
1360 In this regard, East Asia would be organized in a way similar to the US market’s East and 
West coasts, with an integration of services being largely an expansion of end-to-end network 
coverage. See Thomas et al., supra 116 at 225-57 (providing service schedules for the region). 
As a spatial concept, see Fujita, supra note 112 at 2-6. 
1361 Such a recommendation continues Chinese regulatory oversight over aircraft operating 
wholly within Chinese airspace, a fact that, given the issues experienced in the early 1990s 
and the depth and length of intervention required to sort them out (see above at 218-20), 
would certainly favor it to market access relaxations in the domestic market. 
1362 See recently, e.g., “China and Japan: Relations on the Rocks” The Economist (25 August 
2012), online: <http://www.economist.com/node/21560893>. 
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4. AN EAST ASIAN OPEN AVIATION AREA FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF GLOBAL 
AIR TRANSPORT MARKETS 
 
Thus far, Chapter 7 has discussed reform largely as a process of legal change 
within the region, with only passing reference to how broader concerns 
influence the policies of liberalization and integration. This final section 
briefly addresses two developments that can fundamentally alter the demands 
for regulatory reform. The first of these is the expansion and deepening of 
global alliances in the region. The second is the dynamic relationship between 
legal reforms occurring in other parts of the globe and the shape of demands 
for reform within the region. 
 In Chapters 1 and 4, this study noted that in a region where some 
airlines are members of alliances and others are not the latter may have a 
significant incentive to favor protectionist policies, as it can neither compete 
in the areas of network coverage and price differentials created through 
various cooperative programs designed to take advantage of scale (e.g., oil and 
aircraft purchases) and network rationalization (e.g., eliminating redundancies 
in airport facilities and baggage handling).1363 For airlines such as Garuda, 
which plans to join SkyTeam in early 2014, there is thus an incentive to push 
back liberalization at least until it has integrated itself into SkyTeam’s global 
service network.1364 At the same time, SkyTeam might also continue to look 
for protection or otherwise delay liberalization beyond open skies, especially 
                                                
1363 See generally above at 23-28, 34 & 266-68. 
1364 Cf. supra note 965 (noting the Australian government’s protectionist position in 1994 was 
in part due to concerns over liberalization’s potential effects on Qantas’ share price at a time 
when it was looking to sell shares abroad). 
 446 
given Indonesia’s relative market size, growth rate, relative geography in the 
region, and the strength of Singapore and Bangkok as regional hubs. 
 In this regard, it is noteworthy that IATA, the consortium of the 
world’s scheduled airlines, remains a staunch advocate for further 
liberalization.1365 However, states may also continue to restrict reforms for 
non-economic reasons, such as the US and Thai governments’ concerns over 
their ability to requisition aircraft for emergency needs.1366 In such cases, 
states may oppose the airlines’ own interests in liberalization. Furthermore, 
alliances may negatively impact demands for further reform, as such 
agreements offer alternative arrangements that maintain the state’s interest in 
national ownership while permitting the airlines to achieve a substantial 
portion of the gains expected from mergers.1367 To move beyond national 
organization, arguments for and against the efficacy of alternatives, such as 
those discussed with respect to the US’ CRAF program,1368 should be 
evaluated in the context of local conditions. Until such alternatives are taken 
up, however, second best may ultimately remain first choice. 
 At the same time, the structure of demands for change within ASEAN, 
Northeast Asia and East Asia more broadly are in many respects tied to 
developments in other regions,1369 just as the EC’s single aviation market was 
in many aspects a response to US deregulation.1370 Moreover, such policy 
changes may also move those regions to push for reform at a global level. 
                                                
1365 See above at 204-07. 
1366 See generally supra note 104. 
1367 See e.g. supra note 69 and accompanying text (noting (non-metal neutral) alliances 
generate up to 70 percent of the benefits of merger). 
1368 See supra notes 103-06. 
1369 See e.g. generally Tan, “Horizontal Mandate”, supra note 168. 
1370 See generally supra note 454 and accompanying text. 
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While the EU-US Second Stage Agreement ultimately failed to provide what 
would otherwise have been the most significant spur to liberalize and integrate 
markets within the region, other initiatives may well turn into drivers of 
reform. For example, the recently completed merger between Chile’s LAN 
and Brazil’s TAM into LATAM is certain to affect domestic political markets 
and thus demands for changes to the ownership and control rules both within 
the region and without as the new transnational airline attempts to consolidate 
its operations without the fear of losing traffic rights under the current 
nationality rules.1371 As Brazil’s interests tie up with Chile’s, it would be very 
possible to see Brazil join in projects such as IATA’s Agenda for Freedom (a 
project which Chile has already endorsed),1372 and for LATAM to exploit its 
economies of scale by lobbying both governments to seek expanded 
opportunities within the region. Indeed, it is increasingly likely that catalysts 
for reform come from places other than the North Atlantic. For East Asia, 
developments in the Middle East, with abundant capital, geostrategically 
positioned as an intercontinental hub, and with clear plans to be global leaders 
in the industry, may influence Asian states towards deep market reforms in the 




                                                
1371 On the LATAM merger, see e.g. José Ignacio García-Arboleda, “Transnational Airlines in 
Latin America Facing the Fear of Nationality” (2012) 37 Air & Sp. L. 93. See also “LAN, 
TAM, Merger Plan” The Economist (26 June 2012), online: 
<http://www.economist.com/blogs/gulliver/2012/06/south-american-airlines>. 
1372 See supra note 638. 
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At the close of the Second World War, the Allied powers convened a global 
conference to establish a set of legal instruments to govern the economic 
operations of international air services. These instruments would govern 
national air transport enterprises, ensuring a balance between the efficient 
provision of services and the continued participation of each nation in 
international air transport. Yet while the efficiency and participation norms 
remain the same, other assumptions of the postwar system, including concerns 
over natural monopoly, the efficiency of government-controlled monopolists, 
and the premise of nationally organized economies have meant that the old 
nation-bound instruments of the system have diverged significantly from the 
types of transactions that would enable the efficient global aviation markets 
demanded of the air transportation system today. The diffusion of global 
patterns of liberalization and integration along multiple pathways are 
responses to the increasing demands to amend the instruments of regulation 
towards new understandings of economic efficiency and transnational 
organization without unduly affecting each state’s right to participate in the 
international air transport system. 
 In analyzing and evaluating East Asia, this study has addressed one 
path in one geographical region within the context of broader global reform. 
Even more than Europe or the US, East Asia is a history of dramatic shifts 
along multiple paths. From its origins as an outpost in colonial networks or the 
farthest eastern links in globe-spanning, multi-continental corporate empires 
during the interwar period, the region has developed into one of equal 
importance with the US or Europe, an elevation in status that will only 
continue as the world moves deeper into the Asian century. In Southeast Asia, 
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all but one of the ten states comprising ASEAN has moved from colony to 
national home rule in the last 60 years: the growth of an incomplete move to 
regional, multi-level governance at the ASEAN level serves to highlight the 
tremendous shifts in thought within the region in a relatively short period of 
time. In Northeast Asia, politics remain largely national, although 
regionalization of the economy has increased de facto interdependence in the 
region. On the whole, however, politics and policies remain largely national 
and with states reticent to cede national autonomy of action – a point 
emphasized by ASEAN Minus X’s place in developing ASEAN’s air transport 
policy at both the open skies and ASAM stages. 
 At the same time, large-scale efforts have failed to establish the types 
of mechanisms that would satisfactorily address the possibility of governing at 
a global scale. So far, efforts to establish truly global aviation markets such as 
IATA’s Agenda for Freedom and the US’s Draft Multilateral Convention on 
Investment in Airlines has found support from few states, mostly financial 
centers with mature markets or little or nothing to exchange beyond transit 
rights. Such arrangements are largely nationally driven and with weak (if any) 
form of accompanying institutionalization that might move global reforms 
beyond the current sphere of international politics. In contrast, regional 
arrangements continue to quicken institutionally around various organizations. 
In East Asia, ASEAN provides the basis for reform in Southeast Asia as well 
as, through ASEAN+3, East Asia more broadly. 
 Yet there is still much to work out. This study has sought to develop 
one set of mechanisms by which ASEAN and its Dialogue Partners to the 
north might move so as to increase connectivity and efficiency without unduly 
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threatening the participation norm. It has situated developments in the region 
within the global discourse of norms and instruments; analyzed the 
development and purposes of the instruments of reform; and analyzed a range 
of measures and perceptions influencing the transition from regulated national 
market to deregulated transnational market. This final Chapter has developed a 
strategy to utilize this information to coordinate liberalization to open skies, to 
integrate markets in ASEAN, and to move towards (if not to) an open aviation 
area in North- and East Asia. Ultimately, such recommendations are merely 
that: it is possible to imagine a range of potential outcomes, dependent on a 
number of stated and unstated goals as well as upon reactions to events outside 
aviation markets and outside the region. In this regard, the question remains 
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